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ABSTRACT 
While most international political economy (IPE) literature has been concerned with the 
relations between multinational corporations (MNCs) and the host states in which they operate, 
this study sought to contribute to general state-MNC relations by looking at the other 
dimension, namely home state-MNC relations. In addition, while home state-MNC literature 
mostly focuses on how this relationship plays out in the domestic realm; this study focused on 
home state-MNC relations in foreign policy. A further limitation was to only look at home 
state-MNC relations in the developing world by using China and Brazil as the main case 
studies, and their interaction with MNCs in foreign policy towards developing states from 
Africa.  
 
The research design was comparative, using the most similar system case selections. The cases 
(China and Brazil) were selected based on several similarity indicators: a history of a strong 
state apparatus and a history of dirigisme in relation to the economy. This implies the pivotal 
role of the state not only in domestic but also international relations, particularly regarding 
MNCs internationalisation. In addition, China and Brazil’s similarities in other respects: 
emerging power status, internationalisation of MNCs and economic expansion from 1990 
onwards (particularly in Africa), move towards capitalist economy and aspects of late 
industrialisation; provided for interesting contextualisations. Given China and Brazil’s history 
of state control over all aspect of society, politics and economics, this study wanted to 
investigate how the home state interacts with its MNCs in foreign policy, based on the 
assumption that globalisation forces have caused the state’s role to decline as outlined by 
Stopford and Strange (1991).  
 
This was done through the application of the theoretical framework derived from (mainly) the 
works of Strange (1988, 1996) and Weiss (1998), which stipulates that the locus of power in 
home state-MNC relations is dependent on the control of four pillars of structural power (credit, 
security, production, and knowledge). In other words, whoever controls majority of the pillars 
has the leverage to ask certain favours from the other. This extends to the attribution of specific 
roles to MNCs by their home state in its foreign policy. In the case of equal control of the 
pillars, it is argued that the relationship will be one of governed interdependence. Based on 
China’s political and institutional background of being a communist state, it was expected that 
the locus of control, despite the forces of globalisation and increasing move towards open 
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market principles, will remain in the hands of the home state. For Brazil, the assumption was 
that the home state-MNC relationship will be one of interdependence, based on the history of 
protectionism. However, the findings of this study are counterintuitive, as it was found that in 
the case of China, the home state-MNC relationship is one of conditioned governed 
interdependence; and in the case of Brazil, it is one of dependence of MNCs on the home state. 
In relation to roles attributed to MNCs in the home states foreign policy, it was found that the 
types of roles in the case of China and Brazil are the same: national champion, wealth creator, 
market access pioneer, and positive image creator through the performance of South-South 
Development Cooperation activities.  
 
In the case of China, it was found that the home state can attach a certain role to its MNCs 
which is furthermore dependent on five indicators of MNC importance: time, sector, region, 
events around region, and MNC ownership structure. However, based on the MNCs control of 
two of the four pillars of structural power (production and knowledge) they have operational 
flexibility in deciding if they want to adhere to the attributed role, therefore the home state-
MNC relation is one of conditioned governed interdependence. In the case of Brazil, it was 
found that the role attributed to MNCs by their home state depends on one indicator: the 
political or economic importance of the region/country of MNCs operation for Brazil’s foreign 
policy. In addition, based on the dependence of MNCs on their home state, Brazilian MNCs 
are more likely to adhere to that role than their Chinese counterparts, indicating that they have 
limited operational flexibility as their relationship towards the home state is one of dependence.  
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OPSOMMING 
Terwyl die meeste internasionale politieke ekonomie (IPE) literatuur oor die verhoudinge 
tussen multinasionale korporasies (MNKs) handel en die gasheerstaat waarbinne hulle 
funksioneer, beoog hierdie studie om ’n bydrae te lewer tot algemene staat-MNK verhoudinge 
deur te fokus op ’n ander dimensie, naamlik tuis staat-MNK verhoudinge. Terwyl tuis staat-
MNK literatuur meestal fokus op hoe hierdie verhoudinge uitspeel op plaaslike vlak, fokus 
hierdie studie aanvullend op tuis staat-MNK verhoudinge in buitelandse beleid. ’n Verdere 
beperking was om net te kyk na tuis staat-MNK verhoudinge in die ontwikkelende wêreld deur 
gebruik te maak van Sjina en Brasilië as die hoof gevallestudies, en hierdie state se interaksie 
met MNKs in die buitelandse beleid teenoor ontwikkelende state van Afrika.  
 
Die navorsingsontwerp is vergelykend en die mees gelyksoortige gevalle is gekies. Die gevalle 
(Sjina en Brasilië) is gekies gebaseer op vele ooreenkomstige indikatore: ’n geskiedenis van 
sterk staataparatuur en ’n geskiedenis van dirigisme in verhouding tot die ekonomie. Dit 
impliseer die deurslaggewende rol van die staat, nie net in die plaaslike-, maar ook in die 
internasionale verhoudinge, met spesifieke verwysing na MNKs se internasionalisering. Sjina 
en Brasilië se ooreenkomste in ander aspekte: ontluikende magstatus, internasionalisering van 
MNKs en ekonomiese uitbreiding van 1990 en vorentoe (veral in Afrika), beweging na 
kapitalistiese ekonomie en aspekte van laat industrialisering. Hierdie aspekte het gelei tot 
interessante kontekstualisering. Gegewe Sjina en Brasilië se geskiedenis van staatsbeheer oor 
alle aspekte van die samelewing, politiek en ekonomie, wil die studie die interaksie tussen die 
tuis staat en die MKN in buitelandse beleid ondersoek, gebaseer op die aanname dat 
globaliseringsmagte tot gevolg gehad het dat die staat se rol, soos uiteengesit deur Stopford en 
Strange (1991) afneem.  
 
Dit is gedoen deur die toepassing van die teoretiese raamwerk afgelei van (meestal) die werk 
van Strange (1988, 1996) en Weiss (1998) wat stipuleer dat die lokus van mag in die tuis staat-
MNK verhoudinge afhanklik is van die beheer van die vier pilare van strukturele mag (krediet, 
sekuriteit, produksie en kennis). Met ander woorde, wie ook al die meerderheid van die pilare 
beheer, het die opperhand om sekere gunste van die ander te vra. Dit brei uit tot die toerekening 
van rol tot MNKs namens hulle tuis state in buitelandse beleid. In die geval van gelyke beheer 
van die pilare, word daar geargumenteer dat die verhouding een van regerende 
interafhanklikheid sal wees. Gebaseer op Sjina se politieke en institusionele agtergrond van ’n 
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kommunistiese staat, was dit te wagte dat die lokus van beheer, ten spyte van die magte van 
globalisering en ’n toenemende skuif na opemarkbeginsels in die hande van die tuis staat sal 
bly. Vir Brasilië was die aanname dat die tuis staat-MNK verhouding een van 
interafhanklikheid, gebaseer op ’n geskiedenis van proteksionisme sal wees. Tog is die 
bevindinge van hierdie studie inteendeel anders, omdat daar gevind is dat, in die geval van 
Sjina, die tuis staat-MNK verhouding een van gekondisioneerde regerende interafhanklikheid 
is, en in die geval van Brasilië dit een van die afhanklikheid van MNKs op die tuis staat is. Met 
betrekking tot die rol toegeskryf aan MNKs tuis staat buitelandse beleid, is daar gevind dat die 
tipe van rol in geval van Sjina en Brazilië dieselfde is: nasionale kampioen, rykdomskepper, 
pionier tot marktoegang, en positiewe beeldskepper, deur die prestasie van Suid-Suid 
Samewerkende Ontwikkelingsaktiwiteite.  
 
In die geval van Sjina is daar gevind dat die tuis staat ’n sekere rol kan toeskryf aan die MNKs 
wat verder afhanklik is van vyf indikatore van die belangrikheid van MNKs: tyd, sektor, area, 
gebeurtenis in die area en MNK eienaarskapstruktuur. Tog, gebaseer op die MNKs se beheer 
van twee van die vier pilare van strukturele mag (produksie en kennis), het hulle operasionele 
buigsaamheid om te besluit of daar gehoor gegee gaan word aan die toegediende rol. Gevolglik 
is die tuis staat MNK verhouding een van gekondisioneerde regerende interafhanklikheid. In 
die geval van Brasilië is daar gevind dat die rol toegestaan aan MNKs deur die tuis staat 
afhanklik is van een indikator: die politieke of ekonomiese belangrikheid van die area/land van 
die MNK se operasie vir Brasilië se buitelandse beleid. Verder, gebaseer op die afhanklikhied 
van MNKs op die tuis staat, is Brasiliaanse MNKs meer geneig om te voldoen aan die rol 
toegestaan as hulle Sjinese eweknieë. Dit dui op beperkte operasionele buigsaamheid as gevolg 
van die verhouding tot die tuis staat een van afhanklikheid is. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study 
The geopolitical landscape has historically focussed on the interplay between nation states. 
However, the analysis of international relations has already in the early 1970s come to include 
different sets of actors, particularly economic actors who assumingly compete for political 
power vis-à-vis the state. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the innate political and 
economic dominance of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)1 in international 
relations has been in decline. Globalization patterns, international economic cooperation and 
integration and the general geopolitical landscape have entered in a state of alteration, not least 
due to the increasing influence of developing countries and newly industrialised states (NIS)2 
from the South3, such as China and Brazil (Shaw et al., 2007). In addition, the increasing 
internationalisation and global reach of multinational corporations (MNCs) originating from 
those countries has put extra pressure not only on the West’s dominance, but also on the ways 
in which international relations are studied.  
 
While traditional/realist theorists of international relations, place the state and its motives 
centre stage (Morgenthau, 1946; Waltz, 1979); others, such as Strange (1970, 1972, 1975, 
1982, 1985, 1988, 1996, 1998), Vernon (1971), Weiss (1998) and Boddewyn (1988) include 
economic actors and their impact on international relations as equally important to states; thus, 
blending international relations with international business and creating what is now known as 
international political economy (IPE).  
 
Working with this hypothesis, Stopford and Strange (1991) argue that MNCs are the main 
players in IPE, which not only set the pace and agenda for international affairs but also 
influence policy, including foreign policy (FP), something that has historically and traditionally 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter referred to as the West.  
2 NISs are divided into first, second and alternative wave, the first wave termed “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan); the second wave: Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey and 
South Africa (Mendel University, N/A). NISs share the following characteristics: strong political leaders; change 
from agriculture to industrial economies (particularly manufacturing); gradual shift to open-market economy; 
large national corporations operating overseas; strong capital investment from foreign countries; political 
leadership in specific areas of influence; rapid population and urban centre growth.  
3 According to Alden et al. (2010) ‘the South’ is used to describe those regions of the world that have common 
traits in terms of political, economic and social history rooted in inequalities due to colonialism or imperialism. 
The term South, preferred over other terms such as ‘developing world’, ‘Global South’, ‘least developed countries’ 
(LDCs) and the like, speaks to its endurance as a “descriptive term in the contemporary environment” (Alden et 
al., 2010:1). The South will hereinafter refer to developing countries of South-East Asia (including China), South 
America, Africa and the Middle East.  
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been the state’s area of influence. In terms of conceptualising MNCs, Balaam and Veseth 
(2005:377) claim that businesses that compete in global markets have held different names 
over the years depending on the field of study, often referred to as international businesses, to 
distinguish them from firms that operated in local or national markets. Interchangeably, the 
term transnational corporation (TNC) has been used, due to the emergence of global markets 
and production structures; however, for many years the term MNC has been used, indicating 
that the firm operates in several different national markets. From this, it can be discerned that 
TNC is in its core the same as MNC4.  
 
The forces of globalisation5 have given rise to new sets of actors, from states to MNCs, and 
have also paved the way for new interactions between these actors, all of which come with 
their own brands, public advocacy, and even foreign policies (Shaw et al., 2007). Foreign 
policy has entered a new era (particularly post World War II), where theoretical roots planted 
by Snyder et al. (1954, 1962), such as the imperative to look below the nation-state level of 
analysis to the variety of players involved; remains but has been elaborated on. Snyder et al. 
(1954, 1962) assert that FP has changed to increasingly focus on “how leaders, groups, and 
coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are 
selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented” (in Hermann 2001:1). This is 
of importance to this study considering the wide range of goals that different actors have (for 
example the state and MNCs) and thus; the ways in which they go about accomplishing those 
goals.  
 
In addition to the arguably increasing role of economic actors, countries of the South have in 
recent years played an increasingly active role in international relations. Larger developing 
countries (“emerging economies” or NIS), such as China, Brazil and India have increased their 
global activities, including investment and aid in other developing countries outside their 
immediate neighbouring regions. These changing dynamics also contributed to the rise of 
regional economically interdependent clusters of states concentrated arguably around the same 
goals of economic integration and prosperity, such as the G20, India-Brazil-South Africa 
(IBSA), Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and the Forum on China-Africa 
                                                          
4 The term MNC will be used henceforth in this study.  
5 This term refers to “global economic integration of many formerly national economies into one global economy, 
mainly by free trade and free capital mobility, but also by easy or uncontrolled migration. It is the effective erasure 
of national boundaries for economic purposes” (Saunders, 2013: N/A).  
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Cooperation (FOCAC). While FOCAC for instance is of high relevance to African states as it 
provides a platform for them to negotiate investment and trade deals with China, the institution 
that has taken up most media attention over the years is the BRICS. While attempts have been 
made to understand the BRICS, their rise, their motives, their aspirations; Li (2014:14) argues:  
 
“The BRICS phenomenon does not match either the conventional North-South 
dichotomy or the dependency and core-semi-periphery-periphery paradigm. 
Neither can their success be explained by any lesson or doctrine defined by the 
Washington Consensus, nor can their political order, which rests on a strong 
economy and robust market, reflect the assumed or desired linkage between 
economic development and political liberalization”.  
 
According to Kornegay (2013:4-5), BRICS can be considered a reformist coalition of multi-
lateral utility in negotiating the terms of transition toward a new international system of global 
economic governance, or an umbrella bringing together great and middle powers. In other 
words, BRICS and other emerging powers have risen to the fore “because of the limited social 
mobility of today’s order and because of existing institutions’ incapacity to adequately 
integrate rising powers” (Stuenkel, 2016:11); which would indicate that their main motive is 
to change the existing world order and the institutions attached to it. “The BRICS countries are 
not frontally attacking US-American hegemony, but the contest the West’s pretensions to 
permanent stewardship of the existing system largely because it no longer seems legitimate to 
emerging powers, particularly in the realm of economic governance” (Stuenkel, 2016:22). 
Stuenkel (2016) however claims that emerging powers will continue to invest in existing 
institutions as a recognition of strength in today’s order, with the aim of propelling themselves 
into positions of power.  
 
However, while the BRICS is a relevant concept, it will only serve as one of several common 
denominators between China and Brazil (both members of BRICS), the two case studies used 
in this analysis of changes in IPE and the role of states and MNCs therein. While there are 
those (Goldstein, 2013) who expect emerging powers, particularly China, to terminate the 
existing structures in the near future, Stuenkel (2016) claims that policy makers in Beijing (and 
Delhi and Brasilia) can be expected to invest in Western-dominated structures and 
simultaneously push for their reform. However, at the same time these countries are quietly 
expanding networks in many different areas, ready to include and engage those who feel 
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today’s institutions have failed to satisfy their needs. Therefore, the rise of countries like China 
and Brazil, has given new impetus to the general relations between countries of the South, and 
an expansion of tools used in FP, which have come to include South-South Development 
Cooperation (SSDC)6. 
 
The more general term, development cooperation (DC) (encapsulating both its variants: North-
South and South-South), has a relatively long history, dating back to the days of the League of 
Nations. In the aftermath of World War II, DC was largely used by industrialised countries as 
a mechanism to assist post-colonial states to establish themselves as sovereign entities in the 
global community (Simplicio, 2011). The major issues that post-colonial states were facing 
were deemed to be of economic and technical backwardness, a solution to which could be 
found in economic growth, using official development assistance (ODA), later to be replaced 
by trade (Simplicio, 2011). These premises predicated the United Nations Development 
Decade of the 1960s and the flow of ODA at that time was almost entirely from the North7 to 
the South8, from 1960’s until 2000. In 2000, the opportunity arose to modify this global 
paradigm through the addition of a ‘complementary’9 and growing SSDC, including the 
development assistance component (Simplicio, 2011). SSDC is particularly building on 
investments (“mutual benefit”), and thus blends state incentives and development cooperation 
programmes with the involvement of (often large scale) MNCs of more advanced countries 
(Bräutigam, 2009), such as China and Brazil. What is interesting to note here is the implied co-
operation between the state and MNCs in the home state’s FP, which is the focal point of this 
study.  
 
1.2 Literature Survey  
The majority of literature on state-MNC relations has been met with limitations. As will be 
explained in chapter two, state-MNC relations have been at the core of IPE. However, these 
relations have been studied through either one of the following two fields of study: international 
relations (with predominantly political aspects and a state-centric approach) or international 
                                                          
6 SSDC dates to the 1950s and the Bandung conference in Indonesia, where it was discussed that development 
cooperation as was known at that stage needed to be expanded on to include cooperation between countries of the 
South. 
7 North, referring to the industrialised (developed) countries of the West (United States, Canada, Western Europe 
and developed parts of Asia: Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). 
8 South, referring to the developing countries in Latin America, Africa, developing Asia, and Middle East  
9 The complementarity of SSC with NSC is a contested issue, which will further be outlined in chapter two and 
also in Appendix one.  
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economics (with the focus on business models and MNCs organisational features). While 
attempts have been made to bridge this gap, and combine the two fields of study (Strange, 
Cox)) literature is still divided in either the economic (Dunning, 1979) or political field. For 
example, after conducting a quick Google Scholar search on the phrase “state MNC relations”, 
out of the top twenty academic articles (excluding other sources), 18 were published in business 
or management related journals and only two in International Relations/Political Science 
journals10. Literature on this topic has also predominantly looked at this in terms of economic 
aspects and business strategies (Dunning, 1979, 1988; Rugman, 1986; Krueger, 1974). In 
addition, state-MNC literature predominantly covers this in relation to MNCs from developed 
states (US, EU, Japan) operating in either other developed states (Dunning, 1988) or in 
developing states of the South (Strange, 1970, 1995; Vernon, 1971). There has been a growing 
number of literature on MNCs from developing states operating globally; however, this 
literature deals almost exclusively with economic aspects within international relations 
(Monkiewicz, 1986; Buckley et al., 2007; Gammeltoft, 2008; Pradhan and Abraham, 2005; 
Duanmu, 2014; Goldstein, 2013; Xu, 2012; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Duanmu, 2012). In 
addition, state-MNC relations literature mostly deals with the relations between MNCs and the 
host states in which they operate (Doz and Prahalad, 1980; Luo, 2001; Luo, 2004; Vivoda, 
2011). As stated by Cohn (2016:304) and Muller-Carmen et al. (2001), discussions of host 
state-MNC relations are mostly devoted to the least developed countries (LDCs), while the 
home state-MNC analysis mostly focuses on the advanced industrialised states from the West 
(US, Germany, and Japan).  
 
Home state-MNC relations have largely been overlooked, but in instances where they were 
mentioned (for example Stopford and Strange, 1991; Rasiah et al., 2010; Goldstein, 2013; 
Nölke, 2014a, b, c) interactions were reduced to a singular path: the state gives directives and 
national companies adhere to them. Even more so, the overall literature has neglected to focus 
on the relations between home states and MNCs originating from the developing world. The 
limited literature that has focused on this (Nölke, 2014a, b, c; Ozawa, 2014) has taken a rather 
similar approach to the abovementioned Western-centric approaches. A singular path of 
interaction is depicted, where MNCs follow state directives blindly because they are perceived 
to be subordinate to their home states (Nölke, 2014a, b, c; Ozawa, 2014; Goldstein, 2013). 
Literature that has attempted to study home state-MNC relations by looking at developing 
                                                          
10 This search was conducted in September 2017.  
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states, has mostly focused on how these relations play out in the domestic realm (Saich, 2001; 
Buckley et al., 2007), with very few studies looking at how this relationship plays out in foreign 
relations (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009). Lastly, literature that has looked at developing states 
relations to their MNCs in foreign policy has focused on how this plays out when developing 
state MNCs operate in the developed world and consequently the repercussions of that on the 
relations between the home and host state (Callick, 2006).  
 
The lack of studies conducted on home state MNC relations, from developing countries, 
operating in other developing countries combined with the increasing importance of developing 
states from the South and their MNCs in IPE, forms the main departure point of this study. In 
this context, the relations between developing states and MNCs in relation to other developing 
states will be analysed. As mentioned, the limited analyses that do exist on home state-MNC 
relations, is based on developed states and their MNCs. Thus, in the light of the rising presence 
and influence of countries from the South, such as China and Brazil in IPE, scholars of 
International Relations need to pay more attention to the home state-MNC relations.  
 
Chinese MNCs increasing global reach combined with their implied ‘unquestionable’ 
connection to the Chinese state as the media and academia wants us to believe (Ozawa, 2014; 
Goldstein, 2013), make this study relevant, as it aims to discover what role MNCs play in their 
home states foreign policy, whether their role is imposed by the home state, and if so, whether 
MNCs adhere to this role. Furthermore, the question arises of whether ‘psychological’ factors 
and feelings of belonging as outlined by Stopford and Strange (1991) cause MNCs to follow 
certain home state directives. This study will look at Chinese and Brazilian MNCs and their 
role in China and Brazil’s foreign policy towards developing states in Africa. This will be done 
through the application of a theoretical framework derived from Strange’s (1996) book: ‘The 
Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy’, and Weiss’s (1998) book 
‘The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era’; and see if, and 
how, this impacts on China and Brazil’s relations with countries in Africa.  
 
Stopford and Strange (1991), Strange (1996), and Weiss (1998) claim that the struggle for 
world dominance in international relations is no longer played out just between states but 
between states and non-state actors, particularly MNCs. While that argument has been debated 
and contested, it is of no doubt that international relations have in one way or another been 
changed since the rise of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1980s and 1990. Even more so, with 
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the rise of large developing states, such as China, Brazil, India and Russia; whose rising global 
economic power steered by a strong state apparatus is greatly impacted on by their own MNCs 
operating around the world.  
 
Stopford and Strange (1991:1) claim that the upheavals of IPE during the 1980s have 
irreversibly altered the relationship between states and MNCs, making it a fierce and intense 
rivalry. Moreover, Stopford and Strange (1991:4) argue that: “structural change in international 
political economy has altered the nature of the game by affecting the actions and responses 
among firms and states”, and that cross-border competition is rising for both sets of actors. 
Furthermore, national boundaries no longer define the rules, given that the game is now carried 
out on a triangular basis as can be seen in figure one below. 
 
 
Changes in IPE, particularly since the 1980s11 have created new sources of asymmetry in the 
relative importance of the three sides of the triangle, which begs the question of defining this 
asymmetry. Stopford and Strange (1991) assert that state-firm interaction as depicted in figure 
one, has become more important than state-state interaction, yet in their qualification of this 
argument they only take into consideration host state-MNC relations. Stopford and Strange 
(1991) downplay the relationship between home state and MNCs, signalling that the role of the 
home state is secondary to the role of host states in their triads of relationships. They do not 
consider the ways in which the interaction between home state-MNC can influence the 
                                                          
11 Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. 
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trajectory of the MNCs engagement in host states and ultimately how that interaction reflects 
on the relationship between home and host state.  
 
Stopford and Strange (1991) expand on their argument of singular path of interaction, 
particularly when speaking of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is assumed that they will 
adhere to any command or instruction that their home state directs at them, claiming: “However 
great the global reach of their operations, the national firm does, psychologically and 
sociologically, ‘belong’ to its home base” (Stopford and Strange, 1991:233).  
 
However, the need arises to investigate the home state-MNC relations in more depth, 
particularly in the light of rising economies such as China, whose MNCs, mostly SOEs, have 
spread their activities across almost all corners of the world, and where media and academia 
want us to believe that Chinese MNCs activities are by default done at the directives of the 
Chinese state, because they are in the state’s ownership (Goldstein, 2013).  
 
Stopford and Strange’s (1991) important theoretical contribution was formed in a landscape 
branded by a very Western-centric approach to the study of international relations and the role 
of states and non-state actors, particularly MNCs. This confirms the importance of this study 
as it seeks to re-evaluate Stopford and Strange’s (1991) and Strange’s (1996) hypothesis that 
states are losing power due to challenges posed by MNCs. To be more specific: since 1996 
there has been a change in international relations with the rise of emerging economies, such as 
Brazil and China, whose political and socio-economic structures offer a different starting point 
to the analysis of IPE. Their political systems, China being a nominally communist state and 
Brazil being a democracy, combined with their increasing enmeshment in the global capitalist 
economic system, offer different starting points to the study of how home states (China and 
Brazil) see and interact with MNCs in their foreign policy. Accordingly, the aim of this study 
is to test the theory set out by Stopford and Strange (1991) and contribute to it by analysing the 
relations between the Brazilian and Chinese MNCs and their home state through the application 
of the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework. A critical 
reading of the above-mentioned texts and related works will be provided in chapter two.  
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1.3 Problem Statement, Focus and Research Question(s)  
The proposed study seeks to research the relationship between Chinese and Brazilian MNCs 
(particularly those involved in mining activities) and their home states (China and Brazil) 
through the application of the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence 
framework. This study argues that due to the provision of certain incentives (credit and 
security) the home state has leverage to assign a specific role to its MNCs in its foreign policy. 
However, MNCs have the choice of either adhering to that role or not, depending on their own 
leverage they may have over the home state through the provision of certain incentives 
(production and knowledge) in return. The features of these dynamics between MNCs and the 
home state will be researched to determine the structural constraints that MNCs face in relation 
to their home state in foreign policy towards developing countries from the South. Furthermore, 
this study seeks to investigate whether and how the relationship between MNCs and the home 
state influences the activities of the MNCs in a host state, and consequently the relations 
between the home and host state in which the MNCs operate. This study will compare Chinese 
and Brazilian MNCs relations with their respective home states (China and Brazil) in foreign 
policy towards developing countries form the South, with limited focus on the MNCs role in 
SSDC activities as the home state’s foreign policy tool of choice when dealing with developing 
countries of the South, particularly in Africa.  
 
A comparison of Chinese and Brazilian state-MNC relations is important given both countries’ 
growing interest in and influence on political and economic affairs, especially in Africa. The 
main research question that will guide this study is: What role do Chinese and Brazilian MNCs 
play in the foreign policy objectives of their home states towards Africa? 
The main research question will be further supported by three underlying research questions: 
1. Does the home state impose a specific role onto MNCs in its foreign policy, if so; how 
does it leverage that power over MNCs?  
2. If attached a specific role, do MNCs follow it indiscriminately?  
3. Are there factors that contribute to MNCs being able to withstand home state directives?  
 
With the above-mentioned in mind, there are two ways in which this research could be 
executed:  
1) a foreign policy perspective - an in-depth analysis of China and Brazil’s foreign policies 
and their formulation, with focus on how the state’s use MNCs to pursue those foreign policies 
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2) an IPE perspective – an in-depth analysis of the patterns of interaction between the 
home state (China and Brazil) and MNCs in foreign policy, with focus on the structural 
constraints imposed by the home state on the realisation of MNC autonomy in international 
relations and foreign policy  
 
This study follows the second option, by analysing the interaction between the home state and 
MNCs, from the home state’s perspective. The aim is to discover whether MNCs act as agents 
of the state or rather as autonomous actors with operational flexibility including in terms of 
SSDC, or whether there exists an interdependent relationship. Thus, it is assumed that home 
state-MNC relations in foreign policy can vary accordingly:  
1. States use MNCs to further their foreign policy agenda  
2. MNCs use the state’s foreign policy to further their own agenda  
3. MNCs and the state operate autonomously, with no influence from each other 
4. Symbiosis: they are interdependent in their actions and decision making 
5. MNCs are dependent on and subordinate to the state  
 
In relation to China, one would expect that MNCs are dependent on and subordinate to the 
home state. When referring to Brazil, the expectation is that MNCs and the state operate 
autonomously, with no influence from each other or that they are interdependent in their actions 
and decision-making. These expectations are however not a valid reflection of home state-
MNC relationships, as will be illustrated in this study.  
 
1.4 The Research Process 
“I keep six honest serving-men (They taught me all I knew); Their names are What and Why 
and When and How and Where and Who” (Kipling, 2004:58).  
 
The above-mentioned quote does not refer to an academic piece of work; however, the names 
of the ‘honest serving-men’ can be used to ask questions about the research process before the 
main body of work can commence. These questions include the following:  
What does this study investigate? 
Why is a particular topic investigated?  
When is the investigation to be conducted and over what period? 
How does the researcher intend to investigate the topic? 
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Where is the topic located and where is it to be investigated? 
Who are the respondents from whom data are to be collected? 
These will be answered in detail in the sections that follow.  
 
This section of chapter one sets out to give a detailed explanation of the research design and 
the methodology used as the foundation of this study. Considering that the conclusions of this 
study are not only primary data-based, but are a combination of secondary and primary data 
collection, it is argued that this study is not making major methodological contributions, 
therefore it is not necessary to have a separate methodology chapter. The most important 
methodological aspects will however be outlined in the following sections.  
 
1.4.1 Research Design  
Before any research can commence, the reach design needs to be put in place. The research 
design refers to the overall strategy chosen to integrate the various components of the study in 
a coherent and logical way (De Vaus, 2001; Trochim, 2006). In essence, the research design is 
the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data, it is a map of what the study 
is about and how it will be shaped.  
 
Depending on the research question(s) and variables (independent, dependent and intervening), 
research designs differ between comparative, experimental, and case study design. The 
research design for this study can be described as a comparative case study research design.  
 
1.4.1.1 The Research Design: Comparative Case Study 
According to Burnham et al. (2008), the comparative research design is one of the most 
important designs in political science. Burnham et al. (2008) claim that comparative research 
design carries several advantages: contextualisation of knowledge, improvement of 
classifications, formulation and testing of hypotheses, and the making of predictions. However, 
there are several weaknesses in this design as pointed out by Yin (1984) and Burnham et al. 
(2008). Burnham et al. (2008) outline two main disadvantages: ‘too many variables, not enough 
cases’12 and ‘Galton’s problem’13. Furthermore, Yin (1984:21) claims that findings and 
                                                          
12 “The ‘too many variables, not enough cases’ problem of comparison arises because the political world […] is 
too rich and varied for the researcher to be able to find enough cases to control for all the effects of these variables” 
(Burnham et al., 2008:83).  
13 “Galton’s problem occurs when the expectation is not met that political outcomes are due to processes internal 
to each case in the research design” (Burnham et al., 2008:87).  
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conclusions of the study can be influenced by the lack of rigour as a result of biased views by 
the researcher. Another weakness as noted by Yin (1984:21) is the problem of generalisation, 
for which two cases may not be enough. In order to address these problems within the study, 
the researcher used research themes for the data collected during key informant and elite 
interviews. Through the use of themes for primary data, secondary literature was supplemented 
and supported. It must be noted here that primary data collected during fieldwork in Brazil, 
China and Zambia are not the main data upon which this study rests. That said, the value of the 
primary data in this study is immense; as it serves the purpose of supplementing and enhancing 
the secondary data used throughout this study. 
 
The focus of this study is on the role of MNCs in China and Brazil’s foreign policy, and how 
activities by MNCs on ground in host states influence the relations between the host and the 
home state. The activities of those MNCs (particularly those pertaining to development 
cooperation projects) will be compared in terms of motivations, which will help the researcher 
establish whether MNCs are engaging in such projects as autonomous actors or agents of Brazil 
and China’s state, instructed to follow the SSDC rhetoric of the two countries’ foreign policy.  
The Zambian Copperbelt province was selected as a site or common ground for a number of 
reasons. First, there is a large presence of international MNCs (including Chinese and 
Brazilian), the primary non-state actor in this study, involved in mining activities in the 
province. Secondly, the province has experienced significant socio-economic fluctuations in 
the past four decades (1970-2014), as a result of mining activities of foreign MNCs. Thirdly, 
Chinese and Brazilian MNCs in Zambia operate predominantly in the mining sector, yet they 
often use proclamations of cooperation and South-South Solidarity (SSS) (Nel and Taylor, 
2013) to justify their interest in opening new operations in countries of the South. This proves 
interesting particularly in the light of SSDC rhetoric used by China and Brazil in their foreign 
policy approach to other countries of the South, particularly in Africa. As mentioned 
previously, the objective of this study is not to make generalisations about all areas with similar 
characteristics, but to be in the position to comment on and contribute to the theories of state – 
MNC relations within foreign policy and broader IPE.  
 
When conducting a comparative study, the researcher is usually guided by four main 
objectives. These four objectives are as stated by Landman (2003:5): contextual description, 
classification, hypothesis-testing, and prediction. Contextual description is the first objective 
of comparative politics used to describe political phenomena and events of a particular country 
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or group of countries (Landman, 2003). The aim of this study is to gain more knowledge about 
Brazil and China’s institutional (political and economic) backgrounds, their content and 
processes, in order to facilitate a discussion on whether the difference in political systems has 
an effect on how they see and interact with MNCs in their foreign policy.  
 
The second objective when conducting a comparative study is classification. The aim is usually 
to establish different contextual classifications to group several countries, and/or political 
systems, into distinct categories with identifiable and shared characteristics. This reduces the 
complexity of the world, as it seeks out those qualities that countries share and those that they 
do not (Landman, 2003:5). Even though this study does not seek to make generalisations about 
all state-MNC relations and their interaction in foreign policy; within the limits of this study, 
it is anticipated that differences and similarities found between the two cases (China and Brazil) 
will have implications for the study of state-MNC relations in foreign policy and IPE.  
 
The third objective of comparative research is hypothesis-testing. This objective comes to light 
after things have been described and classified; thus, enabling the researcher to search for those 
factors that may help explain what has been described and classified. “Comparison of countries 
allows for rival explanations to be ruled out and hypotheses derived from certain theoretical 
perspectives to be tested” (Landman, 2003:6). When using this mode of analysis, important 
variables are identified and it is implied that there is a relationship between them, after which 
the relationship is analysed comparatively in order to generate comprehensive theories 
(Landman, 2003). In the case of this study, it is implied that there is a relationship between a 
(home) state’s foreign policy toward another (host) state and the operations of the home state’s 
MNCs in that host state, and the ways in which those operations impact on the relations 
between the two states.  
 
The last objective of comparative political studies is also the most difficult one. Once the 
hypothesis has been tested, predictions can be made about outcomes in other countries based 
on generalizations from the initial comparison (Landman, 2003). While all four objectives co-
exit and are mutually reinforcing, some of them receive more emphasis than others; thus, this 
study will not focus in depth on the objective of prediction. However, the study will take the 
conclusions made on the basis of the two case studies and outline potential gaps and 
opportunities for further research on other case studies with similar characteristics.  
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While the comparative research design is deemed the most important in political science, it 
also has major difficulties, particularly pertaining to the selection of comparable cases. A case 
refers to a “phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any 
pertinent variable […] a case means an event or an observation which can help researchers 
investigate their research questions” (Kai, 2013:27). Thus, a case study is an investigation of 
an event that is chosen for analysis. By comparing more than one case, the research is more 
generalizable (Kai, 2013); however, the selection of cases cannot be made based on 
convenience, but on scientific criteria. There are two basic comparative research designs: most 
similar (method of difference) and most different (method of agreement) research design (Kai, 
2013), as seen in the following section. 
 
1.4.1.2 Variables, Units and Levels of Analysis 
The most similar research design is called as such because the “selected cases should ideally 
be identical in all respects except for the value of only one independent variable” (Kai, 
2013:28).  Furthermore, the independent variable is regarded as “a cause variable that produces 
an effect or results on a dependent variable in a causal hypothesis” (Neuman, 2006:161). The 
dependent variable is regarded as “the effect or result variable that is caused by an independent 
variable in a causal hypothesis” (Neuman, 2006:161). While an independent and dependent 
variable are the prerequisites for a basic causal relationship, in more complex causal 
relationships one may encounter an intervening variable, which is “logically or temporally after 
the independent variable and before the dependent variable, and through which their causal 
relations operates” (Neuman, 2006:161).  
 
This study has attributes of a most similar research design, as the cases selected for this study 
(China and Brazil) share certain similarities: a history of strong state apparatus and a history of 
dirigisme in relation to the economy. This implies the pivotal role of the state not only in 
domestic but also international relations, particularly regarding economic proliferation. In 
addition, China and Brazil are similar in other respects: emerging power status, economic 
expansion from 1990 onwards (particularly in Africa), move towards capitalist economy and 
both are late industrialisers. For the purposes of this study the dependent variable is role of 
MNCs in FP, the independent variable is the state and the intervening variable MNCs. The two 
cases differ in one value of the independent variable, namely the political system underpinning 
the state apparatus (China being a nominally communist state and Brazil being a democracy).  
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In political science research, “the units of analysis are typically political actors, political acts, 
or geographic areas” (Barakso et al., 2014:86). This study focused on two units of analysis: the 
state (China and Brazil) and MNCs (both private and state-owned). Moreover, this study 
focuses only on MNCs operating in one specific geographical area, namely Africa, with 
Zambia being chosen as a site-example. Comparing a study of states (China and Brazil) 
illustrates two other crucial aspects that need to be considered, namely levels of analysis and 
timeframe of analysis. The two units of analysis (the state and MNCs) and their interaction 
were both observed on the macro level, as well as the effects of their relation on state-state 
relations. Furthermore, theories around the state were discussed on the macro level in chapter 
two. The core aspect of this study, namely the role of MNCs in their home state’s foreign 
policy, is contextualised in chapters three and four on the macro level. The primary data 
collected during fieldwork, serve to make conclusions and recommendations about the macro 
level of analysis of the relationship between the Chinese and Brazilian state and its MNCs in 
foreign policy towards developing states from the South, in this case African countries.  
 
Lastly, while some temporality aspects of this study can be defined as longitudinal (evolution 
of MNCs role in foreign policy over time), the study falls into the cross-sectional data category, 
as a snapshot of the relation between states and MNCs in foreign policy was done at one point 
in time. The time frame of this study covers the period between 1990 and 2015, observed from 
the current time (2016-2017). This time frame was selected as it covers the build-up to the time 
of China’s “Go Out Strategy” launched in 1999 and the subsequent expansion of Chinese 
MNCs into overseas markets including Africa; as well as Brazilian MNCs increasing 
investments in African mining industries and the general increase in importance of Africa in 
Brazil’s foreign policy under the Cardoso (1995-2002) and even more prominently, Lula 
(2003-2010) administrations. 
 
1.4.1.3 Purpose of the Study 
Another aspect of the research design is the question of purpose of the study. The purpose can 
be organised in three groups based on what the researcher is trying to accomplish: describe, 
explain and explore. According to Neuman (2006), the following are the characteristics of all 
three research purposes: 
1) exploratory research: “…in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue 
or phenomenon to develop preliminary ideas and move toward refined research questions by 
focusing on the “what” question” (Neuman, 2006:33). 
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2) descriptive research: “…in which the primary purpose is to “paint a picture” using words or 
numbers and to present a profile, a classification of types, or an outline of steps to answer 
questions such as who, when, where and how” (Neuman, 2006:35). 
3) explanatory research: “…in which the primary purpose is to explain why events occur and 
to build, elaborate, extend, or test theory” (Neuman, 2006:35). 
 
This study contains elements of all three purposes. It is descriptive in so much as it describes 
the historical underpinnings for China and Brazil’s foreign policy and the evolution of MNCs 
importance in this foreign policy, with particular focus on Arica.  The exploratory aspects of 
this study lie in the analysis of the role of MNCs in their home state’s foreign policy towards 
African states, and the subsequent analysis of what (if any) effect MNCs role (and execution 
of that role on ground in Africa) have on Brazil and China’s relations with African states. In 
other words, how does the interaction between home state-MNC influence MNC activities in 
a host state and subsequently; what effect does this have on host state - home state relations. 
The explanatory research aspects are grounded in the why question, which builds on the 
exploratory and descriptive research, and provides causes and reasons for why something 
occurs. This study is thus explanatory, as it hopes to contribute to theoretical foundations of 
state – MNC relations in IPE and FP, by looking at aspects of structural power between state 
and MNC, with focus on MNCs from newly industrialised states and their relations to their 
home states. 
 
1.4.2 The Research Methodology 
According to Lambrechts (2013), it is a common mistake among researchers to confuse the 
concepts of research design and research methodology or to use it interchangeably. The 
methodology of a study refers to the tools used to conduct the research. The research 
methodology focuses on the procedures used to obtain the most unbiased (valid and reliable) 
answers to the research question(s) (Lambrechts, 2013). Research methodology according to 
Neuman (2006) can either be quantitative or qualitative. A qualitative methodology has been 
selected for this study as it is more flexible and non-linear. Given that this study focuses in 
detail on the investigation of the role of MNCs in the home state’s foreign policy, the non-
linear approach of qualitative research was deemed more appropriate. This is due to the fact 
that it gave the researcher opportunity to be more flexible in gathering information from Key 
Informants, Elite Interviews, and direct observation, something that would have been limited 
in a close ended questionnaire or other instruments of quantitative research. Also, Barbour 
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(2007: xiii) claims that hypotheses are usually not formulated at the beginning of qualitative 
research, but rather developed and refined during the course of research.  
 
1.4.2.1 Secondary Data Collection and Analysis 
Secondary data analysis was predominantly utilized in the earlier phases of the research and to 
a lesser extent during and after the collection of the primary data. Secondary data was mainly 
used in chapter two (theoretical foundation, conceptual clarification and framework for 
analysis), chapter three (contextualisation of case study, China (history, international relations, 
foreign policy towards South states from Africa) and chapter four (contextualisation of case 
study, Brazil (history, international relations, foreign policy towards South states from Africa). 
The secondary data focused on existing data and information from academic books and 
journals, as well as industry specific reports. These sources were used before conducting field-
research, to identify key informants on the topic. Industry specific reports (mining) were 
analysed in order to see the trends and changes over time (the study looks at a period between 
1990 and 2015). The documentation also included primary documents and reports from 
respective Ministries (Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of both China 
and Brazil, written in English. Document analysis was primarily used to provide background 
information and context before entering the field-research process. Through this process the 
researcher identified a number of institutes, government departments and non-governmental 
organisations whose publications served to inform this research in more depth14.  
 
1.4.2.2 Primary Data Collection and Analysis 
Primary data was generated by conducting field-research in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, 2-17 July 
2015), China (Beijing, 4-18 March 2016), as well as in the selected site, Zambia (Lusaka, 20-
28 May 2016). In addition, in cases where face to face interviews were not possible (due to 
geographical distance) primary data was collected using social media tools such as LinkedIn, 
Skype, and Microsoft Outlook. Several qualitative research techniques were used in this study: 
semi structured interviews with two categories of respondents (Key Informants and Elite 
Interviews), and direct observation. The two categories of respondents differ as follows:  
“key informant interviews involve interviewing a select group of individuals who 
are likely to provide needed information, ideas, and insights on a particular subject. 
Only a small number of informants are interviewed. Depending on the nature and 
                                                          
14 Please see Appendix two for a detailed list.  
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scope of an inquiry, the investigator identifies appropriate groups from which the 
key informants are drawn and then selects a few individuals from each group” 
(Kumar, 1989:1).  
 
Key Informants can assist in determining not only what but why something happens. In this 
study, Key Informant refers to respondents whose knowledge, insight, and perspectives, 
acquired through their work in academia, policy institutes, non-governmental organisations, 
and the like can inform the researchers’ understanding of the role of MNCs in China and 
Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa (particularly Zambia) in depth15. Gillham (2000:62) 
claims that key informant interviews are preferred when the establishment of trust is needed 
between the researcher and respondent, as respondents are more likely to disclose information 
through face to face communication than through a questionnaire.  
 
Elite Interviews on the other hand is not as clear-cut in its definition as Key Informants. Given 
its vast understanding across different social sciences, scholars have tended to adopt different 
definitions and approaches. Zuckerman (1972) for instance uses the term ‘ultra-elites’ to 
describe individuals who hold significant power within a group that is already regarded elite, 
such as US Senators. McDowell (1998) on the other hand analyses a broader group of 
professional elites who are employees (at different levels) for merchant banks and investment 
banks in the City of London. She classifies this group as elite, as they are “highly skilled, 
professionally competent, and class-specific” (McDowell, 1998:2135). Harvey (2010) 
however is highly critical of these classifications, as they assume that those who hold 
professional positions are also the most influential; claiming that job titles can be highly 
misrepresentative. From the above it is however clear that the conceptualisation of the term 
elite can mean different things in different contexts. When referring to this study, Elite 
Interviews reflects those respondents in high-ranking positions, but not on the executive or 
director level, within government, government think tanks, embassies, and MNCs16.  
 
According to Thalhammer (2013), elite interviews do not have to involve a representative or 
random sample. The researcher needs to identify a target group of people who can collectively 
illuminate varying aspects of the research question(s). When new interviews expand our 
                                                          
15 Please see Appendix two for a full list of interview contacts. 
16 Please see Appendix two for a full list of interview contacts. 
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knowledge of the topic and key events or provide new information, then the researcher should 
continue doing them. When no new information is being received from every subsequent 
interviewee, then the level of saturation has been met and it is time to stop doing the interviews 
(Thalhammer, 2013:67). 
 
Within China, government officials are often hesitant to answer critical questions regarding 
policy and foreign relations. In addition, the strict adherence to the official policy line risks 
putting the validity of their answers into question, therefore the option of interviewing members 
of the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved to be both difficult and 
potentially misguiding. However, the researcher made use of academic, government, business, 
and non-governmental contacts17 in China obtained through networking at international 
conferences and the researchers’ affiliation to the Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) at 
Stellenbosch University. The snowball18 sampling method proved useful in this instance, as the 
above-mentioned interview subjects also served as a gateway to other interviewees in this field.  
When conducting field-research through Key Informant and Elite Interviews, it is expected that 
the researcher would have a set of questions to present to the interviewees. The use of 
quantitative research methods was not applied in this study as is it was deemed that a qualitative 
research method would be better suited to answer the main research question.  
 
Therefore, the interview design was also structured to reflect the qualitative methods used. As 
Leech (2002) argues, different interview designs serve different purposes, providing three types 
of interview designs: unstructured, structured, and semi-structured. In unstructured interviews, 
the researcher asks a few broad open-ended questions about a subject, which can provide an 
insider’s perspective and are useful when not much about the topic is known. Structured 
interviews are those where the researcher asks close-ended questions that only yield “yes” or 
“no” answers. This type of interview design works best when the researcher is highly familiar 
with the topic at hand and wishes to compare data using statistical methods (such as Statistical 
Packages for Social Scientists). The last interview design, semi-structured, involves “asking 
consistent open-ended questions in the same order” (Thalhammer, 2013:68). This study 
combined the semi-structured and structured interview design by asking questions such as: “Do 
                                                          
17 Please see Appendix two for a full list of interview contacts.  
18 “A non-random sample in which the researcher begins with one case, and then based on information about 
interrelationship from that case, identifies other cases, and repeats the process again and again” (Neuman, 
2006:223).  
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China and Brazil impose a certain role onto MNCs in their foreign policy” Yes or No? 
(structured); followed by “If yes, please describe in your own words what kind of role”; “If no, 
why not?” (semi-structured).  
 
The last technique used, was direct observation19. According to Lambrechts (2013), direct 
observation is conducted “in order to get an insiders’ understanding of the topic under 
consideration” (Lambrechts, 2013:32). Direct observation is regarded to be an essential method 
in support of interviews, as claimed by Angrosino (2008): “…even studies that rely mainly on 
interviewing as a data collection technique employ observational methods to note body 
language and other gestural cues that lend meaning to the words of the person being 
interviewed” (Angrosino, 2008:161).  This technique was mostly used while conducting field-
research at the site (Zambia) where attention was drawn to the physical surroundings. This 
included social and economic development in the area, quality of road infrastructure, public 
spaces and the like, with the aim of identifying the levels of Chinese and Brazilian engagement.  
 
1.4.3 Ethical Considerations 
Before commencing any work, the proposed research study went through the Research Ethics 
Committee of the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University to obtain ethical 
clearance20. The committee estimated that the ethical risks involved were minimal (no 
interviews were conducted with individuals below the age of 18 or any vulnerable society 
group) and concluded that the application did not warrant an elevated-level evaluation by the 
Faculty of Social Science Research Ethics Committee. Also, when conducting interviews, the 
interviewees were given detailed information (in Brazil and Zambia through the provision of 
written consent forms, in China verbally21) as to what the data will be used for and what the 
study entails. In order to establish and maintain trust between the researcher and the 
interviewees, honesty and openness throughout the study were the guiding principles. The 
identity of the interviewees was and will not be disclosed to the public as they were guaranteed 
                                                          
19 Direct observation, refers to an observation technique where the researcher remains an outside observer. This 
is opposed to participant observation, where the researcher can form part of a group that is studied, simultaneously 
fulfilling the role of the researcher (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293).  
20 Please see Appendix three.  
21 Presenting a consent form in China was not possible, as scepticism on behalf Chinese respondents around 
signing forms could cause the respondents to not want to disclose certain information, which was otherwise given 
freely and without hesitation, based on the establishment of trust due to conferences where some of the 
respondents were familiarised with the researcher.  
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anonymity. Respondents were labelled22 so that identification in the text could be done by the 
reader. All data was stored on a personal USB and personal Dropbox account.  
 
1.5 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
This study is confronted with a number of limitations and delimitations. Firstly, the research 
question deals with a specific aspect of state - non-state actor relations, namely state-MNC 
relations. This means that despite other actors’ (organised criminal groups and civil society) 
importance in state – non-state actor relations theory, they did not form part of this study. 
Secondly, the study focused on China and Brazil and their interaction with MNCs in foreign 
policy towards countries of the South. Considering that there are numerous newly industrialised 
states23, due to resource constraints this study had to be limited to two representative cases, 
namely China and Brazil. Thirdly, the term South refers to developing countries of Central and 
South America, Africa, Middle East (apart from Israel) and East Asia (not including Japan, 
Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), which due to methodological and 
resource limitations could not all be covered in this study. Thus, this study only focused on one 
region as representative of the South, namely Africa (with particular focus on Zambia). 
Fourthly, in the theoretical framework that is used in this study, there are three equally 
important relations in Stopford and Strange’s (1991) triads of relationships theory, namely 
state-state, firm-firm, and state-firm relations. However, this study only focused in detail on 
the relationship between the state and firms (MNCs) and secondary (and to a lesser extent), on 
the effect thereof on state-state relations.  
 
As stated previously, this study’s field-research was conducted in China, Brazil and Zambia; 
thus, the limitation of language arises. When researching secondary data, such as books, 
journals and industry specific reports as well as government reports, the researcher did not 
come across difficulties, as the majority of published documents are readily available in 
English, even in China. Secondly, in relation to primary data collection, it was assumed that a 
translator would be needed, particularly in China; however, most high-ranking government 
officials, MNC managers, academics and researchers in Brazil, China, and Zambia are 
                                                          
22 Example: Key Informant A (July 2015), BRICS Policy Centre, Rio de Janeiro. 
23 First tier (1970s and 1980s): Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Second tier (late 2000s): South 
Africa, Mexico, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. 
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proficient in English, the language of choice of this study. In China, all besides one interviewee 
responded in English24. 
 
Another often encountered limitation when conducting field-research is access to interviewees. 
However, through the researchers’ affiliation to the CCS at Stellenbosch University the 
contacts garnered (through conferences and visiting scholars) served as a good starting point 
for interviews in China, and furthermore as gateways to other potential interview subjects. In 
the case of Brazil, one of the supervisors of this study has numerous contacts within Brazil 
whose expertise was drawn on and who identified other contacts as potential interview subjects. 
Interview subjects in Zambia were provided through snowball sampling by interviewees in 
Brazil and China, and the CCS.   
 
1.6 Outline of the Remainder of the Study 
This chapter offered the background to the study and the presentation of the theoretical 
framework and case studies. In addition, it included the aims of the study, research questions, 
research design and methodology and the outline of the rest of the study.  
 
Chapter two begins with an outline of the different perspectives in IPE. After that, a literature 
review of the role of the state vis-à-vis non-state actors (MNCs) in IPE is presented. Thereafter 
a section on state-MNC relations in FP hypothesises the role of MNCs and the tools used 
(SSDC). The last section presents the theoretical framework. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a theoretical background for the study with the aim of positioning it in a wider 
discussion on the importance of state-MNC relations, with particular focus on home state-
MNCs relation in the South, so as to contribute to theories of state-MNC relations in the field 
of IPE.  
 
Chapter three contextualises the first case study, China. A short history and background of 
China’s international relations and foreign policy is explained. The background of the MNCs 
and their place in China’s economy are explored. Moreover, the nature of the interaction 
between MNCs and the Chinese state is placed in a historical context, after which the 
theoretical framework is applied to the case study and analysed within the broader context of 
Chinese foreign policy towards developing states from the South (especially in Africa). Lastly, 
                                                          
24 This respondent was accompanied by a personal assistant who translated from Mandarin to English.  
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a short analysis of the effects of MNCs SSDC activities in Zambia on China-Zambia relations 
is presented. Chapter four follows the same structure as chapter three, in relation to Brazil.  
 
Chapter five reports results of the analysis of the two case studies. The chapter reflects on the 
theories and research design used. Thereafter, the chapter addresses and summarises 
similarities and differences between the two case studies and assesses the role of MNC’s in 
China and Brazil’s foreign policy towards African states. Thereafter, the comparison and 
conclusions are drawn, before limitations of the research and recommendations for further 
research are considered.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a detailed introduction to this study. The aspects that 
were discussed include: the theoretical background and literature review, the research design, 
the methodology used, ethical considerations and limitations, and the outline of the remainder 
of the study.  
 
The following chapter provides a detailed literature review of the theoretical discussions on the 
role of the state and non-state actors (MNCs) in foreign policy and more broadly IPE. The 
focus of the chapter also turns to the analysis of the importance of SSDC as a tool of foreign 
policy of newly industrialised states in their interaction with other developing states, and the 
role that MNCs play in this. The aim of the following chapter is to provide a theoretical 
background for this study, to position it in a wider discussion of state-MNC relations in IPE.   
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 24 
 
CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction 
International politics as a field examines the sources of both conflict and cooperation between 
(and among) states and international actors within the international system (Foyle, 2003). 
Relationships between states in the international arena are governed by a set plan of action by 
one nation regarding its diplomatic ties with other nations, which constitutes the core of the 
term foreign policy. The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework that will be 
used to analyse the relationship of home state-MNC relations in foreign policy of newly 
industrialised states towards developing states of the South, within the broader field of IPE. 
 
The first part of this chapter is a literature review of the role of the state and MNCs in IPE. This 
part provides a critical analysis of the field of IPE, how it has evolved over the years, and who 
the main protagonists are. Thereafter, a section highlighting the multiplicity of actors and tools 
used in FP is presented and the role of MNCs in FP hypothesised. The aim of this part is to 
locate this study and its purpose within the field of IPE, by focusing on a very specific part of 
state-MNC relations, namely home state-MNC relations in foreign policy. This is done so to 
pave the way for the development of the theoretical framework in the second part of this 
chapter, which will then be applied onto the two case studies, China and Brazil in chapters 
three and four. The theoretical framework is developed from the works of Stopford and Strange 
(1991), Strange (1996) and Weiss (1998), focusing on the discussion of the relationship 
between the home state and MNCs, and the role that newly industrialised states such as China 
and Brazil attach to MNCs in their foreign policy towards developing states in Africa. 
 
2.2 Literature Review: Role of the State and MNCs in IPE and FP 
Robert W.  Cox, is known for saying: “…theory is always for someone and for some purpose. 
All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, 
specifically social and political time and space” (Cox, 1981:87). In this context, Cox mainly 
refers to international political economy theories. According to Stiles and Akaha (eds., 1991) 
IPE is not a policy sub-field of international economics, nor is it a theory. While the field of 
IPE pulls together a variety of concepts, assumptions and approaches, as well as methods and 
epistemic schemes, these serve to undermine attempts at one single paradigm of IPE (Stiles 
and Akaha (eds.), 1991). As Palan (1999:125-6) claims, IPE is neither of the above, but a 
specific way of looking at the world, both a framework for analysis and a method of diagnosis. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 25 
 
Stiles and Akaha (eds., 1991: xi) claim that IPE is the study of international and global 
phenomena, which are inherently economic, political and social in their core. IPE scholars are 
concerned with the developments in a world where economics and politics, i.e. wealth and 
power, are intertwined at their core.  
 
Katzenstein et al. (1998) on the other hand suggest that IPE was initially defined by the topics 
that it investigated such as trade, finance and MNCs. In a simplified way, IPEs central concern 
is the impact of the world market economy on the relations of states and the ways in which 
states seek to influence market forces to their own advantage.  
 
2.2.1 International Political Economy: what about the state?  
According to realists, non-state actors (MNCs, international organizations (United Nations 
(UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other transnational organisations) are decidedly 
less important than the state, as they cannot operate in a void without the latter setting the 
framework for their activities (Morgenthau, 1946; Keohane, 1986; Waltz, 1979). Williams 
(2002) on the other hand argues that states share the stage with a multiplicity of sovereignty-
free actors ranging from MNCs with global market reach to NGOs advocating for good causes 
(Williams, 2002:161). Similarly, Ohmae (1995) claims that nation states are no longer 
important actors in global economic activities as they have become dysfunctional.  
 
Important for this study and as will be expanded on extensively in this chapter, Strange 
(1998:4) argues that impersonal forces of world markets integrated by private MNCs in 
finance, industry and trade, rather than cooperative decisions of government, have become 
more powerful than the states who are supposedly the authority over society and economy. In 
instances where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which in many 
(critical) instances are the masters over governments of states (Strange, 1998:4).  
 
It is clear that the debate on the role of the state in IPE has been two sided: those who are 
sceptic of the state as the dominant and defining unit in international relations (Strange, Cox, 
and Williams) and those that argue that the state was and remains the dominant and defining 
entity in world politics (Morgenthau and Waltz). While the former argue that forces of 
globalization are challenging the dominance of the state in international relations from above, 
and sub-national forces are eroding it from below (Strange, 1986); the latter group of scholars 
maintain that the state is robust and therefore remains the fundamental unit in international 
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relations (Adigbuo, 2007).  As seen in recent examples, such as United Kingdom’s (UK) exit 
from the EU in 2016, and the global financial crisis of 2008; the dominance of state power was 
(re)confirmed. This poses questions of where relative power lies over time, in markets or states; 
something that can be studied through a collage of different perspectives: liberalist/neo-
liberal25, realist/nationalist, and radical/Marxist.  
 
2.2.1.1 Different perspectives of IPE 
In ‘Three Ideologies of Political Economy’, Gilpin (1987) introduces liberalism, 
nationalism/realism, and Marxism as ideologies “representing conflicting moral and 
intellectual models regarding the role and significance of the market in the organisation of 
society and economic affairs” (Stiles and Akaha (eds.), 1991:1). While these three are the main 
underpinnings of IPE, scholars such as Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1977) introduce world-
system theory. Moreover, Singer and Prebisch (1949) introduced already in 1949, an approach 
known as dependency theory. Dependency theory offers an explanation for dependent 
development by focusing on “both domestic and external factors and their interactions, and on 
the interests and behaviour of the nation-states, corporate entities, and social classes” (Stiles 
and Akaha (eds.), 1991:2).  
 
In addition, theories of IPE, or more generally, theories of IR have over the years seen “growing 
awareness of, and dissatisfaction with, the narrow and Euro-American-centric framing of 
mainstream IR theories” (Bishoff et al., 2016). This has sparked a movement for the creation 
of Global IR (Acharya, 2014), whose purpose is not to dismiss existing theories of IR, but 
rather challenge them to rethink their assumptions and broaden the scope of their 
investigations. While this relates to IR theories, this could be applied to theories of IPE as well, 
especially given the unprecedented rise of MNCs from the South, all of which have their 
distinct socio-economic and politically conditioned operational features and ways in which 
they relate to states in the international arena. In the 1960s and 70s a strongly articulated 
opposition to the existing capitalist system, emerged among the states from the South, who 
regarded the system where MNCs are the main protagonists, as unacceptable (Solomon, 1976; 
Jain and Puri, 1981). As foreign investment grew and the South sought to redress the 
                                                          
25 While neo-liberalism is a contested term at best, what makes it neo and thereby different from its predecessor, 
liberalism; is the recognition that the state must be active in the organisation of the market economy. Furthermore, 
the conditions allowing for a free market economy must be won politically; thus, the state needs to be re-
engineered to support the free market at all times (Metcalf, 2017). 
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international economic imbalance, criticism of MNCs began in Latin America and spread 
throughout the South. Critics of MNCs contended that MNCs distorted development and 
perpetuated the South’s economic dependence on the North. This sparked the Southern state’s 
attempt at a New International Economic Order (NIEO), under which MNCs would be brought 
under international control.  
 
“In 1974, the United Nations made two major statements on the NIEO: the 
Declaration of the Establishment of the New International Economic Order and the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Both documents asserted the full 
sovereignty of each nation over its natural resources and all economic activities 
including the right of nationalization. The Declaration of the Establishment of the 
NIEO made no reference to any compensation, and the Charter simply said that any 
compensation should be “appropriate”. Although the United Nations did establish 
a Center on Transnational Corporations. The attempt to draw up an international 
code of conduct proved impossible” (Edelman Spero and Hart, 2010:315). 
 
Thus, the real effort to control multinational corporates came at the national level, seen for 
instance in the case of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). While this is of interest for 
this study as it highlights the historically strained relations between MNCs and states from the 
South, it must be noted that the MNCs that were under heavy scrutiny by South states, were 
MNCs form the developed North. However, while this should be explored in more depth, this 
study does not warrant a discussion of the differences between theoretical approaches to the 
study of IPE along the North-South or West-East axis. Furthermore, China and Brazil’s 
relations to MNCs have over the years, especially since 1990, espoused many of the same traits 
that developed western states reflect in their relations to MNCs. Thus, it is deemed that 
existing/traditional theories on IPE can be utilised in this study. The perspectives and 
approaches to IPE presented below, are fundamentally different in their conceptions of the 
relationships among/between society, state, and market. This study does not warrant a critical 
discussion of these theories; however, a brief commentary will be provided below, to cement 
this study’s position on the mentioned three theories.  
 
Liberalism 
Liberal economic theory is guided by the notion that a market arises spontaneously so to satisfy 
human needs, and once in operation it functions in accordance with its own logic, for which 
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state intervention is not necessary, in fact it is undesirable. Liberalist economic theory stipulates 
that governments should not intervene in the market, “except where a “market failure” exists, 
or to provide a so-called public or collective good” (Gilpin, 1991:6). In short, liberals believe 
that “trade and economic intercourse are a source of peaceful relations among nations because 
the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence among national economies will 
tend to foster cooperative relations” (Gilpin, 1991:8). Although this study takes recognition of 
liberal theory, the applicability is limited as it does not adequately address state-market 
relations, but keeps each sphere separate.  
 
Economic nationalism 
The central idea of economic nationalism theory is: “economic activities are and should be 
subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state” (Gilpin, 1991:8). 
According to Hawtrey (1952) to have national power, economic resources are necessary; thus, 
every conflict is at once both economic and political. For nationalists, relative gain is of higher 
importance than mutual gain; thus, the rules governing international economic relations are 
always changing so to benefit one economic power over another. This study holds a contrasting 
view of this theory, as the selected cases (China and Brazil) advocate in both political and 
economic terms for a multipolar world in which mutual benefit is the core principle.  
 
Marxism, Dependency theory and World-System theory  
According to Marxist theorists (Gramsci, Engels, Marx) there can be no social harmony, as 
liberals believe. Marxist theory when applied to IPE sees politics and economics as inherently 
intertwined; however, the focus lies on the struggles that ensue amongst classes in society 
caused by the capitalist system of production. Therefore, IPE in the Marxist view would be 
better studied through the lens of social and political interaction between states and society, 
rather than focusing on the economic aspects of liberal market forces in the global economy, 
or in the case of this study, state – non-state (MNC) relations.   
 
Dependency theory, a precursor to World-systems theory, developed in the post-World War II 
era in Latin America, focuses predominantly on the regions’ relations to the global political 
economic system. According to dependency theorists (Singer and Prebish, 1949), theory should 
promote development in developing countries, while rejecting the notion that all societies 
follow the same developmental path (Stiles and Akaha (eds.), 1991).  
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The three main premises of dependency theory (as envisaged in 1949 by Singer and Prebish) 
include the provision of natural resources, cheap labour, destinations for obsolete technology, 
and new markets for developed nations without which the latter could not enjoy the standard 
of living that they have. To maintain this standard, wealthy developed nations actively 
perpetuate a state of dependence through various means and actively counter any attempts by 
dependent nations to resist their influences by either expanding economic sanctions or 
deployment of military force (Deji, 2012:19-20). In essence, dependency theory stipulates 
exploitation of one by another.  
 
According to Singer and Prebish (1949) private foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
developed states increased the economic, technology and culture dependency of developing 
states, thereby contributing to the exploitative world order. Poynter (1985) compares the 
acceptance of FDI and the presence of developed country-MNCs in developing countries to a 
Trojan horse through which developed states exert their influence on developing states. 
Furthermore, Vernon (1971) assumed that the power relations between states and MNCs were 
skewed in favour of the MNCs, with states having little to no bargaining power. However, all 
of these works dealt with state-MNC relations from a Western perspective, only focusing on 
developed states and MNCs from developed states operating in developing states of the South. 
Would the analysis be the same if one were to take standing hypotheses and focus on MNCs 
from developing states operating in other developing states?  
 
While applicable in some ways to the cases in this study, particularly Brazil, the historical and 
time boundaries of this theory do not consider the changes that have happened around the world 
and in Latin America since the 1950s. Brazil for instance is classified as a newly industrialised 
state, as well as Mexico, China, India, and South Africa, who have previously been 
characterised as those subjugated developing states in the dependency theory structure. 
Therefore, dependency theory can only serve to inform the historical development of Brazil 
and to a lesser extent China.  
 
Similarly, the world-systems approach, a multidisciplinary, macro-scale approach to world 
history and social change, emphasises the world-system, not nation states as the primary unit 
of social analysis (Wallerstein, 2004).  The concept of World-system refers to the inter-regional 
and transnational division of labour, according to which the world is divided into core 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
countries26, semi-periphery, and periphery countries. In 1998 Wallerstein (1998:32-33) stated: 
“We have entered into the crisis of this system . . .  an historic transition”, thereby indicating 
that the direction in which the system was moving was not clear. Structural limitations to the 
capitalist mode of production are functioning as a break on the system, causing a chaotic 
situation from which only a new world order could emerge in a 50-year time-span (Wallerstein, 
1998: 89-90). This new world order is looming, as developing countries are getting more 
influence in global affairs. In the case of Brazil, this theory explains its understanding of IPE 
leading up to 1990s, where the critique of Latin America’s exploitation by rich countries form 
the West, particularly the US, drove the establishment of a new world order. Similarly, China 
is regarded as one of the main advocates of a new world order in which previously 
disadvantaged countries would be more prominent in global political and economic affairs.27 
This theory however only serves to inform historical changes in the world system, without 
looking in depth at state-MNC relations that constitute an important building block of this 
system.  
 
Critical vs. Problem-solving Theory  
The British school of IPE has been greatly inspired by the works of Robert W. Cox and Susan 
Strange. For the first mentioned, his categories of critical and problem-solving are part of the 
very common-sense ordering of IR theory (Davies, 2014). Problem-solving theory, first, “takes 
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions 
into which they are organised, as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1981:128-129).  
Problem solving in its core is analytic, whereas critical theory, is holistic.  Critical theory “does 
not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of 
changing. As the work of Susan Strange focus on the dynamics of structural power between 
states and MNCs by allowing for the locus of control to shift between the two actors it is aligned 
with critical theory. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole 
rather than to the separate parts” (Cox, 1981:129). Critical theory accounts for changes in the 
world order and social structures, and emphasises the importance of different actors in 
                                                          
26 While core countries focus on higher skills and capital-intensive production, the rest of the world focuses on 
low-skill, labour-intensive production and the extraction of raw materials (Wallerstein, 2004). While this approach 
is based on 19th century Europe, it has evolved over the years to encompass the US, Japan and Australia as the 
core countries. This change was guided by the perception of US global hegemony. 
27 It has to be noted that both dependency theory and world-systems theory fail to account for the fact that 
countries that were previously disadvantaged, like China and Brazil have over the years become significant players 
in the capitalist system of production. 
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international politics and economics. Critical theory epitomises the core of IPE, whose central 
concern is the impact of the world market economy on the relations of states and the ways in 
which states seek to influence market forces to their own advantage i.e. state-MNC relations. 
The changing patterns of interaction between states and MNCs are the core of this study.  
 
2.2.1.2 State-MNC Relations within IPE  
State-MNC relations have been a point of discussion since post-World War II, but have 
received more attention in academic circles since the 1970s, especially after the global oil 
crisis. However, what is quite clear is that literature on state-MNC relations has been divided 
into two fields: international relations and international economics; thus, looking at it from an 
either overtly state-centric/political standpoint (Morgenthau, 1946; Keohane, 1986; Waltz, 
1979), or an economically based business model point (Dunning, 1988). The two fields were 
treated as separate until 1970, when Susan Strange discovered a void between the two and 
called for the development of IPE as a separate discipline. She claimed that the failure to fill 
this void would result in relevance loss for both fields and would ultimately lead to an inability 
to deal with the major problems within international economy (Strange, 1970). Consequently, 
there would arise an inability to analyse the main tendencies in the international economic 
system; growing international co-operation and organisation, and increased domestic 
defensiveness over national welfare issues. She was among the first scholars (see Vernon, 
1971) to suggest that in order to bridge this gap, the fields should be combined and courses 
taught on these fields should do so in cohesion. It is because of this that Tooze and May (eds., 
2002) argue that despite the existence of numerous pathways to IPE, the work of Strange is one 
of the most “significant individual contributions” (Tooze and May (eds.), 2002:1). Strange 
(1970, 1975, 1982) initially rejected traditional notions of what IPE should be as being too 
narrow and state-centric and failing to account for non-state actors in the international system. 
She was in particular concerned with the role of large firms and the power that they often 
wielded in the world, an idea inspired by works by Vernon (1971). 
 
The 1971 ‘Sovereignty at Bay’ book, written by Vernon is still today (post-2000) a major point 
of reference for scholars in IPE, as it concerns itself with the emergence of: “basic asymmetry 
between MNEs28 and national governments, both legitimate in their own spheres, [which] 
causes inevitable points of friction that need to be resolved […] thus positioning each party “at 
                                                          
28 Multinational enterprises (MNEs) is just a different term for MNCs.  
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bay”” (Eden, 2000:336). Vernon (1991:191) saw MNCs and nation states as “two systems, 
[…] each legitimated by popular consent, each potentially useful to the other, yet each 
containing features antagonistic to the other”. These dynamics have been changing depending 
on the time and historical events, but ultimately still hold correct today as was seen in the case 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, where an antagonistic relationship ultimately ended in a 
mutual dependence of states and MNCs in search for resolution. Since the work of Susan 
Strange was pivotal to the development of IPE the following literature survey will map her 
theoretical development.  
 
Strange built upon Vernon’s 1971 work, and in 1972 wrote one of her earliest pieces that deals 
directly with MNCs and governments. She focused on the potential conflicts arising from the 
governments’ need to control, and the difficulty of trying to control foreign companies. 
Conclusively Strange (1972) argues that rather than being concerned with threats from other 
states, the main issue at hand for most governments is how to deal with the operations of 
international businesses. Strange (1972) argues that an analysis of MNCs leads to both 
domestic and foreign policy making, but also into the fields of international (regulatory) policy 
making. This is of importance for this study as it signals that state-MNC relations are not just 
an abstract field of study, but are components of everyday life that can have an impact on inter-
state relations in foreign policy.  
 
In 1975 Strange moved on to develop an early version of the structure of power theory, which 
became her main point of focus for the next 13 years, and is also the main theoretical 
underpinning of this study. In this 1975 version, there are only three dimensions of power in 
IPE: security, ideology, and economics; as opposed to four in the last version. However, the 
main focus does not lie on these dimensions, but on different levels at which economic power 
is apparent: the world market structure; international co-operative relations; 
national/governmental control of markets; and the operational level of economic transactions. 
In this work, she touches upon the historical importance of bargaining, but does not yet develop 
it fully nor clarify whom the actors are that should be or are involved in this process. Her 
mention of historical importance of bargaining echoes Vico’s teachings on human affairs where 
“the coherence of minds and institutions characteristic of different ages, and the process 
whereby one such coherent pattern – which we can call a historical structure – succeeds 
another” (in Cox, 1981:94). This also forms part of the underpinnings for Cox’s (1981) critical 
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theory, which is based on one of two strands of Marxism, namely historical materialism and 
structural Marxism (this strand will not be discussed in relation to this study).  
 
Historical materialism studies the connection between power in production, power in the state 
and power in international relations and directs its attention to conflict as a possible cause of 
structural change (as also stated by Strange (1972, 1996)) (Cox, 1981). Furthermore, historical 
materialism focuses on the production process, as a critical element in the explanation of the 
specific historical form taken by the state/society complex. The production of goods and 
services creates both wealth of a society and a basis for the state’s ability to mobilize power 
behind its foreign policy. This takes place between those who control the power (state) and 
those who execute the tasks of production (MNCs).  
 
Strange (1982) continued to develop her structural approach to IPE, by arguing that the analysis 
of IPE must be focused on its environment29. She claims that changes in the structure inevitably 
have an impact on sectoral politics and economics. This is the first time that she states that the 
study of IPE needs to include a sectoral analysis, and includes the aerospace and steel sectors 
as part of her analysis. In this work, she also for the first time suggests that the key bargains in 
IPE – intergovernmental, intra-governmental, corporation-government, intra-company or 
intercompany, between labour and management; are the main purpose of sectoral analysis. 
However, this also suggested that key bargains were no longer reached in international 
organisations, but have been reached beforehand at the transnational industrial level, and often 
bilaterally. She claims that it has made very little difference “whether delegates bargain in their 
capacity as representatives of corporations or associations of corporations (as in the 
International Iron and Steel Institute), or whether they do so (thinly disguised) as the 
representatives of governments” (Strange, 1982:25). In this way, Strange (1982) opened for the 
inclusion of diverse types of non-state actors in the analysis of IPE.   
 
In 1985 Strange argued that the analysis of trade inefficiencies as a disruptive force in the 
international system is irrelevant, as this is only a secondary structure, which is influenced by 
the primary structures: security, finance, production, and knowledge. The disruptions in the 
international system and trade relations are merely a symptom of disruptions within the primary 
                                                          
29 This implies a structural approach, where the environment consists of multiple structures, that together make 
up a global political economy the production, the monetary, the security, and the trade structure.  
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structures, specifically the financial structure. This work represents a forerunner to 1986, in 
which she for the first time laid out in its fullest form the structural power theory. 
 
In this (1986) article, another precursor to Stopford and Strange (1991), she argues that there 
is a functional convergence between states and MNCs. The central argument she puts forward 
is a “political explanation for the persistence of the state as the – or at least as a – major entity 
in the international political system, and for its continued enjoyment of predominant political 
authority within its own territorial limits” (Strange, 1986:290). She argues that while the state 
has been under attack from two kinds of supranational entities, these have at the same time 
been contributing to the authority of the state. Moreover, Strange (1986) argues that there has 
been a shift in the underpinnings of economic power, to reflect capital and knowledge and not 
land. Given the time of writing and the dominance of the US in world affairs, Strange (1986) 
argued that MNCs were both undermining the power of the US for the benefit of the rest of the 
world, while simultaneously undermining the power of developing countries for the benefit of 
the US (as also claimed by dependency school scholars). She further claimed that this could 
only be right if it could be argued that MNCs were at the same time a help and a hindrance, 
sympathetic and antipathetic to the interests of both their home state and host state. This forms 
her main argument that states and MNCs operate in a symbiotic relationship from which both 
benefit, while at the same time being competitors or opponents. In this way, Strange (1986) 
shifts away from the assumption of state’s having the final authority over MNCs, which was 
also the underlying argument in her 1991 collaboration with Stopford, which will be further 
elaborated on in the theoretical section.  
 
Strange (1995) argues that the superficial importance of states as major actors in the global 
system and their authority has been hollowed out by the underlying power relations between 
them and international institutions and markets. Consequently, this has led to an asymmetry of 
structural authority in the global system. Furthermore, Strange (1995) suggests that the 
importance of non-state actors warrants a new research agenda based on the concept of 
structural power within the broader field of international relations; in substitution of the state 
centric approach that has dominated the field for so long. She does not deny that competition 
between states prevails; however, she suggests that the field needs to be reset to include non-
state actors as equal competitors in IPE (Strange, 1995). Strange (1996) rejected traditional 
notions of what IPE should be as being too narrow and state-centric and failing to account for 
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non-state actors in the international system, claiming that those forces are making the state 
retreat.  
 
Furthermore, in 1997s article ‘The Erosion of the State’, Strange (1997a) briefly revisits the 
globalisation debate and suggests those who claim that globalisation can be ignored given the 
unfaltering existence and perseverance of the state, are missing the point. She outlines three 
dilemmas that globalisation is faced with: the economic – there is no political authority capable 
to control market relations; the environmental – market actors are driven by profit and use 
environmental resources irresponsibly, without countervailing power able to curb it; and the 
political – the global system has a democratic deficit in its governance structure. In addition, 
she links these globalisation aspects to technical change and the increasing mobility of capital. 
Consequently, she argues (like in 1996) that the state is in the process of losing authority due 
to the increasing irrelevance of war making (as well as acquisition of territory/land) and its 
inability to control the currency and provision of welfare. She argues that denial of the declining 
role of the state is denial of the need for something to be done about it unless big business is to 
be allowed to rule the international system (Strange, 1997a).  
 
In slight contrast to the work of Strange (1997a), Weiss in her 1998 book claims that the state 
is being killed off by the emergence of allegedly new tendencies in the world at large and by 
the appearance of new perspectives, rather than by the emergence of new actors. Weiss (1998) 
asserts that there are numerous forms of state denial at play, most of which revolve around the 
same set of claims and assumptions: the state has lost national autonomy, governments are 
powerless in the face of transnational capital and the nation-state as an organising principle has 
become obsolete. In addition, the underlying thought behind this state denial is that the 
globalising economy is only integrated by transnational capital and the market. Weiss (1998:3) 
therefore argues that: “state denial […] refers to the proliferation of theses which portend the 
diminution or displacement of states as power actors in the domestic and international arenas”.  
 
Literature on state capacity has always been discussed with reference to general capabilities- 
both in the domestic and international arena, and across industry, foreign and social policy 
sectors. Weiss (1998) asserts that such a generalised argument has served little purpose and 
that a state’s capacity to mobilise consent shares little in common with its capacity to get one’s 
way despite opposition. Therefore, Weiss (1998) suggests that there is no such thing as state 
capacity in general but rather capacities in particular arenas. In agreement with Skocpol (1985), 
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Weiss (1998) argues that to understand state behaviour in certain spheres, the most significant 
explanation lies in the concept of unevenness of state capacity.  
 
The views of Weiss (1998) reflected the global economic and political situation of the time, 
when nation-states were undergoing a period of adaptation, caused by the challenge of 
globalisation. However, when taken into consideration the political and economic dynamics of 
the current age (post-2000), one could argue that Weiss’ (1998) claim of state-decline or lack 
thereof can be viewed in the light of the current challenge to nation-states, namely the 
assertiveness of actors and institutions from the South, whose power has increased due to the 
overall economic power of the countries from which they originate, such as China and Brazil.  
During the 1990s globalisation was still a novel concept, one that was at the time more intensive 
and extensive in scope and theoretical focus than any other period. The difference lies behind 
the fact that the process of globalisation in the late twentieth century depended on an 
environment that was structured quite differently from global movements in the pre-industrial 
era. This difference is well captured in the work of Mann (1993:61) when he conceptualised 
state power as social ‘caging’, in which the power of the modern state does not concern state 
elites exercising power over society, but a tighter state-society relation. The key idea behind 
the metaphor of caging refers to the nationalisation of social life, as much of the activities and 
social relations that were previously constituted at local or supra-national levels came to be 
regulated through the nation-state; thus, depending increasingly on the latter for its existence. 
This speaks to the state’s ability to effectively deal with the internationalisation30 of its firms.  
 
According to literature on internationalisation of firms31 (Amsden, 1989; Aoki, 1990; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990), since World War II there have been three waves of internationalisation. The 
first wave (1950s, 1960s) saw firms from advanced industrialised countries (US), settle 
subsidiaries in other countries that replicated all the functions performed by the companies’ 
headquarters, only on a smaller scale. This model was later called the ‘multi-domestic’ model 
(Porter, 1986). The second wave of internationalisation was brought on by Japanese firms in 
the 1970s. Terms such as ‘catch-up’32 and ‘leapfrogging’ were used to describe the need of 
                                                          
30 “Internationalization refers to the increasing importance of international trade, international relations, treaties, 
alliances, etc. International, of course, means between or among nations. The basic unit remains the nation, even 
as relations among nations become increasingly necessary and important” (Saunders, 2013: N/A). 
31 Although there is no agreed upon definition of internationalisation of firms, it is widely understood to mean 
the process of increasing involvement in the international markets (Westhead et al., 2007).  
32 Chang and Grabel (2004) propose a set of policies that contemporary developing countries could use to 
facilitate economic catch-up. These include: “protection of strategic industries to ensure long-term national 
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these new MNCs to relatively quickly achieve levels of productivity, technological capabilities, 
and competitiveness33 that were equal to those of global leaders.  
 
The third wave of internationalisation (post-1990) claims as its main protagonists the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). As late-comers in the international markets, their 
movements have to be analysed against the backdrop of the early-movers that already have 
established value chain configurations, or at least are in the process of establishing them. In 
essence, their room for manoeuvre is smaller and somewhat shaped by the MNCs that have 
preceded them (Fleury et al., 2013). Fleury et al. (2013:100) mention four dimensions of the 
third wave MNCs manoeuvre: (i) spaces left by incumbents from developed countries moving 
towards knowledge intensive industries; (ii) positions created by incumbents upon 
establishment of international supply and distribution chains; (iii) new frontiers created through 
regionalisation and globalisation; and (iv) positions conquered in internationally competitive 
markets. In addition, literature on innovation and learning suggest that firm-level competitive 
advantage, or rather improved organizational performance depends predominantly on the 
firm’s ability to be good at technological learning and innovation (Siyanbola et al., 2012:1). 
According to UNCTAD (2007) for poor developing countries, technological change occurs 
through learning based on acquisition, diffusion and upgrading of already existing technologies 
from developed countries, not by trying to push global knowledge to new frontiers. According 
to UNCTAD (2007:4, 6) the key to technological progress in developing countries is 
technological catch-up through learning rather than research and development (R&D) activities 
to invent new products and processes. The OECD (2005b) concurs with this view, by stating 
that innovation in latecomer contexts occurs mainly in form of creative imitation, in other 
words it could be said to follow the linkage, learning, leverage (LLL) framework as outlined 
by Matthews (2006) and outer context factors34 (Pettigrew, 2011). 
                                                          
growth; prioritising organisational reforms over privatization; prioritising the education of the population and 
specifically the workforce as a means of stimulating intellectual advance (as opposed to supporting rigorous 
intellectual property rights); tying foreign direct investment (FDI) to a national development strategy, rather than 
allowing it free rein; subordinating the financial sector to national development needs via, for example, currency 
and capital controls and state-directed lending; and using monetary policy to pursue growth rather than (as under 
the contemporary orthodoxy) to reduce inflation” (Selwyn, 2015:42). 
33 They had to develop specific competencies (such as distinctive company management models) that would 
allow them to emerge as champions in nationally competitive schemes (Amsden, 1989; Aoki, 1990; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Schonberger, 1982). This led to other MNCs in the field having to restructure their management 
models in order to remain competitive on the market. 
34 “Outer context refers to the economic, political, and business environment of the firm and the way changes in 
those factors help shape the market and competitive position of the firm relative to otters operating in similar 
markets or industries” (Pettigrew, 2011:455).  
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What can be derived from the above-mentioned literature is that MNCs from developing 
countries link their operations with already existing ones from the developed world and acquire 
knowledge and know-how to have leverage to establish their own competitive advantage in a 
specific industry. This ultimately highlights the central position that the firm holds, i.e. the firm 
is the locus of innovation, and innovation does not necessarily depend on inventions.  
 
Similarly, according to the work of Lall (1990, 1992) technological capabilities of a firm 
comprise of three characteristics: production, investment and linkage. Production capabilities 
include skills, knowledge and experience to operate a plant efficiently. Production capabilities 
comprise three broad types of technical/engineering functions namely: process, product and 
organisational. Investment capabilities are the skills, knowledge and experience to identify, 
prepare, design, set up and commission a new industrial project. Linkage capabilities are the 
skills, knowledge and experience necessary to promote or foster interactive learning or transfer 
technology from one firm to another, from service firms to manufacturers and from the Science 
and Technology (S&T) infrastructure to industry (Lall, 1990). Furthermore, linkage 
capabilities are defined as forging cooperation between managers and workers within a firm 
and for securing cooperation between firms and the wider institutional milieu locally, 
regionally and globally (Cooke and Morgan, 2000). In addition, firms’ external linkages are 
critical for the building of capabilities. The question however arises as to who drives innovation 
and to what end?  
 
According to the writings of Rigby et al. (2013:9) “the development of new products, processes 
and services can be organised and led by many different actors in the economy and takes place 
at many different levels”. In addition, innovation has changed over the course of the last 40 
years to include latecomers (China, Brazil, South Africa), and sparking a shift in the role of 
governments. Prior to 1980 Western governments were heavily involved in the innovation 
process, but started withdrawing form it in the 1990s when they assumed enabling and 
regulatory roles, thereby seeking to facilitate instead of driving innovation. However, 
according to recent policy initiatives in the EU (such as Horizon 2020 (European Commission, 
2017); or Smart Specialisation (OECD, 2013)) a new trend is taking shape, one where 
governments are once again trying to position themselves as key actors in the innovation 
process, through public procurement and through the coordination of so-called social 
innovation (OECD, 2013; European Commission, 2017). 
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Most literature dealing with the analysis of the role of the state in the internationalisation of 
firms studies it from a liberal economic perspective whereby the state’s role is only to 
encourage firms to enter other markets rather than subsidising export revenues (Harris and Cher 
Li, 2005). Historically, government policy supported the international expansion of domestic 
firms, based on three premises: the domestic market was saturated and over-capacitated, and 
firms were encouraged to look for resources (linkage by acquiring knowledge, know-how and 
technology) to create competitive companies in a specific industry. This implies an 
interdependent relationship between state and firm, as the internationalisation of the firm brings 
with it benefits (in terms of resources) for the state’s further development.  
 
While studies on the internationalisation behaviour of emerging market MNCs’ (EMNC) have 
proliferated (Goldstein, 2007), most of these studies focus on the EMNCs from the BRICS 
countries and their internationalisation in developed country markets (Carvalho et al., 2010; 
Kalotay, 2008; Sauvant et al., 2010a, b; Milelli et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2012). In 2013 in the 
“Global Fortune 500” it was stated that there are more MNCs with headquarters in Asia, than 
in either Europe or North America. There were over 90 Chinese MNCs (in 2002 there were 
only 11), 13 in South Korea and eight in each in Brazil and India in 2013 (Shaw, 2014). In 
addition, each of the BRICS hosted some global brands: Geely, Haier, Huawei, Hisense, 
Lenovo (China), Hyundai, Samsung, LG (South Korea), Embraer, Odebrecht, Vale (Brazil), 
Reliance, Tata (India), and Anglo American, De Beers, SABMiller (South Africa) (Shaw, 
2014); each of which has internationalised into both developed country and developing country 
markets. However, studies on the internationalisation behaviour of EMNCs in other emerging 
markets, have been few and far in-between, despite the fact that other emerging markets present 
ampler opportunities for EMNC internationalisation (Yilmaz et al., 2015). Furthermore, while 
the competitive advantage of firms from developed countries are well known, knowledge on 
the advantages that enable EMNCs to internationalise, remain limited (Hong et al., 2014). This 
directly relates to the role of the state as a potential enabler of that advantageous environment.  
 
Cox (1981) claims that the internationalisation of production is associated with the 
internationalisation of the state. This signifies the integration of production processes on a 
transnational scale. International production plays the formative role in relation to the structures 
of the state and world order; the same role that national manufacturing and commercial capital 
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played in the middle of the nineteenth century. International production expands through direct 
investment, while rentier imperialism expanded through portfolio investment35.  
 
Cox further explains that action and exercise of power happens within a framework, otherwise 
called a historical structure, which is a picture of a configuration of interacting forces: material 
capabilities, ideas, and institutions. Material capabilities in their dynamic form exist as 
technological and organizational capabilities and in their accumulated form as natural 
resources, transformable by technology (Cox, 1981). Ideas or intersubjective meanings reflect 
the notion that people, territories and diplomatic agents are controlled by states. Institutions, 
reflect the power relations that prevail at their origin and “provide ways of dealing with 
conflicts so as to minimize the use of force” (Cox, 1981:99); therefore, there is a close 
connection between institutions and hegemony, according to Gramsci’s (1971) 
understanding36.  
 
This does not imply political and economic dominance of one power over others, it is not about 
one military superpower and the exercise of power; “it is about the way people think about the 
structure of the world and the way in which things are done in a certain manner as being 
normal” (Drache and Valdes-Ugalde, 2009:172). The question that arises is whether the 
Gramscian understanding of hegemony could be applied to the world order level. In terms of 
states and MNCs for instance, hegemony in Gramscian terms would imply a capitalist state, 
made up of two overlapping spheres, a ‘political society’ (which rules through force) and a 
‘civil society’ (which rules through consent).  
 
Per Gramsci’s (1971) understanding, civil society is a public sphere where trade unions and 
political parties gain concessions from the bourgeois state, where ideas and beliefs are shaped 
and where the bourgeois exercises hegemony in order to manufacture consent from unions and 
political parties so to maintain legitimacy. If applied to today’s circumstances, the Chinese 
government’s legitimacy depends on economic development (Saich, 2001); thus, it is 
hypothesised that the government exercises hegemony over economic actors, who in exchange 
for incentives, willingly consent to this exercise of power. However, this does not necessarily 
                                                          
35 With portfolio investment, the control over productive resources is passed from owner to borrower, while with 
direct investment, control is inherent in the production process itself (Cox, 1981). 
36 While historically conditioned; for Gramsci (1971) hegemony stands for the exercise of power over others, by 
force and consent. 
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represent the accurate nature of things in Chinese society, or between the state apparatus and 
MNCs in relation to foreign policy. It does not necessarily mean that it is even like this between 
China and other states in the international arena, despite a potential Second or Third World37 
country-based hegemony (as opposed to a First World one, dominated by the United States)38. 
In other words, a world order in which countries such as China or Brazil for instance would be 
the new hegemons. The division between the three worlds is caused by an asymmetry in their 
respective economic development. Therefore, focusing on the economy as the structural force 
of the systemic configuration, has caused the emergence of a group of states with intermediate 
characteristics, that lie somewhere between development and underdevelopment (Christensen 
and Bernal-Meza, 2014); thus, contributing to the emergence of a new international economic 
order. This new international economic order would then also have to account for changes in 
state’s capabilities of adaptation to the forces of globalisation and increased internationalisation 
of EMNCs. According to Weiss’s (1998), as time goes by, the ability of nation-states to adapt 
to internationalisation of economic activities of its companies, will continue to increase, rather 
than diminish national differences in state capacity, as well as the advantages of national 
economic coordination.  
 
2.2.1.3 State Capacity in Relation to MNCs  
This part of the literature survey deals with the work of Weiss (1998) in which she outlines 
four principal hypotheses to explain cross-national differences in state capacity and economic 
performance and thus, in the broader debate about state-MNC relations. It is important for the 
purpose of this study as it centres on the idea that the role of the state in relation to economic 
actors (MNCs) is not necessarily declining, but adapting to its own and the MNCs needs. State 
capacity is highlighted as: social bargaining/corporatism; the strong-state thesis/coercion; the 
role of national financial systems/policy instruments; and/or organisation of state and 
society/embedded autonomy. These four state capacities will be explored in the following 
sections, so to find out whether the state is in fact the strongest actor in international relations 
(and by extent FP) due to its perceived adaptability; or whether it is complemented and 
                                                          
37 Third World is a term that arose during the Cold War period, to describe the congregation of states that were 
neither aligned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members nor with the Communist Bloc. This is 
important to note as both Brazil and African states fall under the non-aligned Third World country definition. 
38 “Before 1989, two binary axes divided the world politically and economically: an East-West axis, as well as a 
North-South axis. Regarding this last axis, but in the context of the bipolar systems, “three” worlds existed; the 
First World was represented by the developed “core” capitalist countries; the Second World was represented by 
the USSR and the Soviet bloc, and finally, the Third World that was integrated by the semi-periphery and the 
undeveloped periphery” (Christensen and Bernal-Meza, 2014:38). 
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strengthened (or weakened) in certain aspects of foreign policy by MNCs, thereby creating a 
mutually interdependent relationship.  
 
State capacity as social bargaining: Corporatism 
Weiss’s (1998) main hypothesis is that most emphasis is supposed to be directed at social 
organisation, particularly social interests, where centralised interest groups are seen as the key 
to a system of social partnership based on stable, long-term political bargaining. This is 
otherwise known as corporatism, which emphasizes the relationship between organised 
interests and the state, implying an encompassing representation of organised interest (labour 
and capital) enabling them to exercise strong negotiating powers in policy formation with 
government, and strong implementation powers in delivering member compliance. 
Corporatism often figures in comparative analysis as the key to state capacity and superior 
economic performance in modern democracies  
The relationship between corporatism and state capacity centres on two main principles: 
a) State facilitates corporatist bargaining via legal recognition of the underlying 
organised interests and provides for policy resources as a quid pro quo in labour-
industry negotiations over wages; 
b) Corporatist bargaining in turn underpins the state macro-economic efforts to control 
inflation and oversee modest industrial adjustment 
 
According to Crouch (1993), the essence of corporatism is revealed less by the structure of 
political bargaining than by the mode of interaction with the state (power-sharing or the sharing 
of public space). As mentioned above, corporatism is regarded as superior economic 
performance in modern democracies, but the question is, can this be applied to China for 
instance where the political system is not a democracy, but the economic structures follow a 
market based approach? Do private and even state-owned enterprises have the capacity to 
bargain with the state in terms of policy, and if so, what policy? One would assume that if 
business is allowed to bargain with the state, they would collectively focus on investment and 
fiscal policy rather than for instance foreign policy. However, the underlying assumption is 
that business lobby groups have some sort of say in terms of foreign policy based on the 
internationalisation of their production, capable of causing either a positive or negative (see 
examples of labour abuses by Chinese companies in Zambia (HRW, 2011) effect on the 
relations between the host and home state.  
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State capacity as coercion: the ‘strong-state’ thesis 
The main debate in the literature regarding this sub-section is about the strength of the state. 
This approach converges with the classic statist conception of state power where development 
is state-centred, and where agencies and actors in the national government routinely implement 
policies that differ from those advocated by the best-organised societal interests (Weiss, 1998; 
Tillotson, 1989:341). This encapsulates the conventional thinking about state capacity: the state 
is only capable of industrial adaptation if it is strong, and it is only strong as far as it is able to 
achieve its own tasks and goals, over and against opposition from dominant groups in society; 
therefore, it would exercise coercion to achieve these. Moreover, a strong state is one whose 
unitary structure allows it to impose [its objectives] over the objection of particularistic 
interests (Gourevitch, 1978:902). In accordance with this, Skocpol (1985) argued that state 
capacity is the ability of states “to implement official goals, especially over the actual or 
potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic 
circumstances” (Skocpol, 1985:9). However, when states are no longer capable of delivering 
political goods, their governments lose credibility in the eyes of its citizens; thus, rendering the 
state questionable and illegitimate (Rotberg, 2004).  
 
The states capacity to provide economic guidance or leadership also tends to be defined as 
coercive, as traditional neo-liberal views on the role of the state in relation to the market only 
allow for the state’s involvement in case of market failure, so to mitigate negative impacts 
through regulation. This differs from the theoretically most influential understanding of state 
power as provided by statist theory. However, statist theory has at the same time become the 
most contested empirically, as it conceptualises state power in a way that “makes it virtually 
impossible to apply to modern states” (Weiss, 1998:27).  
 
More recently, Selwyn (2015) argues that the rise of NIS from the South and the evident failure 
of neoliberalism to alleviate the conditions of the world’s poor, portrays the strong state theory 
in another way, through statist political economy (SPE). “The rise of formerly peripheral 
powers, in particular China, increases the attraction of statist over free market models of 
development” (Selwyn, 2015:39). In this theory, state authorities combined with capitalist 
entrepreneurs are identified as key developmental actors, whose policies can and must be 
achieved through the manipulation of labouring classes (Selwyn, 2015:4; Nölke, 2014a, b, c). 
Selwyn (2015), however, asserts that political economy and SPE do not represent a genuine 
human developmental alternative to neoliberalism, as they rest upon and require the repression 
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and exploitation of labour. When speaking of China, Chang (2015) and Posen (in Lardy, 2014) 
claim that despite the perceived strong state theory and the state being the driver of 
development (as presented by developmental state theory39); China has had such unprecedented 
economic growth and development because it has grown more capitalist and more neoliberal.  
 
State capacity as policy instruments: the role of national financial systems 
In contrast to the notion of statism, this approach distinguishes the state’s ability to formulate 
goals from the capacity to devise and implement strategies to achieve those (Weiss, 1998). 
Zysman (1983) outlines two characteristics of a state with transformative capacity: the 
independence from constant pressures employed by particular political groups and the 
legislature; and the ability to influence relevant groups in economy and society. This is the 
policy instrument explanation of state capacity. Moreover, as Okimoto (1989) observes, the 
harder instruments have gradually lost ground to the softer means of governing industrial 
change, as seen in the example of the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI). Its 
influence depends less on control of credit allocation or the possession of formal authority, but 
rather on its power of persuasion and coordination vis-à-vis the private sector (MNCs), through 
“its capacity to gather and process information, set directions and priorities, promote private-
sector and collective interests, and serve as an intermediary between domestic and international 
economies” (Okimoto, 1989:144).  
 
The works of Katzenstein (1978) and Krasner (1978) have gone further from state-structure 
when talking about state capacity, saying it also depends on the organisation of groups in 
society. The dominant assumption has been that “organisational weakness, or fragmentation, 
of dominant groups in society is the key condition of the state’s capacity to formulate and 
implement policy” (Weiss, 1998:34). Hall (1986) specifies three arenas of state capacity: the 
states internal structure (relationship between political and career executives, and internal 
decision-making); relationship between state and society (the kind of leverage government has 
over society through the control of finance); and the structure of society, which facilitates or 
constrains effective intervention (industry organisation enhances policy implementation) (Hall, 
1986; Weiss, 1998:34). 
                                                          
39 The term developmental state was first conceptualised by Chalmers Johnson in 1982. Johnson (1982) defined 
the developmental state as focused on economic development; thus, implementing necessary policy measures to 
accomplish that objective. He argued that Japan's economic development happened because of the intervention 
by bureaucrats, particularly those in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In states that were 
late to industrialise, the state itself led the industrialisation process as it took on developmental functions 
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The writings of Evans (1989, 1995) add another aspect to the comparative political economy 
of states from the South; the notion that state capacity in the industrial arena is founded upon 
a set of institutions which simultaneously insulate the economic bureaucracy from special 
interests, and establish cooperative links between bureaucrats and organised business. As can 
be seen in the case of China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC). This will be further discussed in chapter three.  
 
State capacity as embedded autonomy: organisation of state and society 
Weiss (1998) and Evans (1989) argue that those states, which are more effective in achieving 
their transformative goals, are not only sufficiently autonomous but also sufficiently embedded 
in particular industrial networks to implement them. Thus, the concept of embedded autonomy 
was to solve the puzzle of why some highly interventionist states, such as Korea in the 1960s40, 
have been able to translate their developmental goals into practice, while others such as Brazil41 
have been far less effective in economic management. With the embedded autonomy concept, 
the analytic focus shifts from state structure and autonomy per se, to the effectiveness with 
which the state carries out its transformative tasks in relation to its linkages to the economy42.  
 
Although the relationship between state and economy has changed over the years, the 
developmental state concept may be useful in explaining the historical efficiency of the state 
apparatus of rising powers from the South. Evans (1989) claims that the efficacy of the 
developmental state depends on meritocratic bureaucracy complemented with a strong sense 
of corporate identity and a set of institutionalised links to private elites. “Embedded autonomy 
depends on the existence of a project shared by a highly developed bureaucratic apparatus with 
interventive capacity built on historical experience and a relatively organised set of private 
                                                          
40 In the case of Korea, in order to coordinate its developmental drive in the 1960s, the central authorities set up 
a system of industrial organisations, such as: Federation of Korean Industries, the Korean Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, the Central Association of Small Business Cooperative Associations and the like which resulted in 
high growth figures. “Korean officials and industrialists consider the growth period to be the high point in 
government-business cooperation” (Weiss, 1998:60).   
41  In 1990, after being sworn into office, president Fernando Collor de Mello introduced a stabilization plan for 
the rescue of the virtually bankrupt private sector, which included a set of reforms, aimed at removing restrictions 
on free enterprise, increasing competition, privatizing public enterprises, and boosting productivity; however, the 
plan failed in the end due to management errors on behalf of the administration (Franko, 2007).  
42 While important, state-society linkages in this instance do not represent the focal point of Evans (1989) 
approach.  
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actors who can provide useful intelligence and a possibility of decentralised implementation” 
(Evans, 1989:561, 575).  
 
Evans’ (1989) mention of useful intelligence as provided by private actors goes hand in hand 
with Strange’s (1996) notion of knowledge, controlled predominantly and increasingly by 
private actors, most notably MNCs; thus, whoever controls knowledge controls power. Weiss 
(1998) on the other hand argues that the state can have transformative capacity only while 
capital remains in a relatively dependent subordinate relationship to the state. This may be the 
reason why Evans (1989) thought that transformative states in East Asia will have a short life, 
given that embeddedness is both their strength and their eventual undergoing: by making 
capital stronger they undermine their own power. However, as can be seen over the years since 
1980s, East Asian developmental states have not only persisted, but their economic growth has 
been unprecedented. East Asian states tend to intervene in the economy, capable of devising 
and implementing industrial policies. They have the power to mobilise private players for 
planned goals, while displaying organisational coherence and autonomy (Chang, 2015:182).  
 
However, Chang (2015) argues that the developmental state theory reduces the complex social 
relations of development to relations between two institutions – the market and the state, 
focusing only on how the state as a legitimate representative of individual citizens intervenes 
in social relations behind those two institutions, by effectively allocating or mobilising sources 
of revenue (Chang, 2015:184). In essence, developmental state theory naturalises and 
eternalises capitalism as given; and thus, echoes the very neoliberal approaches to state-market 
relations that it claims to be an antidote to. Chang (2015), Lardy (2014), Qian and Wu (2003) 
all agree that East Asian development needs to be understood as internal, rather than external 
to global capitalism through history, as East Asian states have over time become neoliberal 
states, whose prime goal is to secure the best market conditions for capital accumulation at any 
cost; thus, being rather characterised as entrepreneurial states.  
 
In terms of China, Gabusi (2012) postulates that it shares some aspects of both entrepreneurial 
and developmental state, thereby positioning itself as a claiming state. The claiming state43 
requests from all economic actors the delivery of results in form of output, profit and trade, 
believing it is in its right to do so, without putting its own political legitimacy into question 
                                                          
43 It is more concerned with technology and profit than with ownership issues (Gabusi, 2012:62).  
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(Gabusi, 2012:62). This implies that the state is in power over market forces and economic 
actors. However, it is argued that the legitimacy of the CCP and thus the state itself depends 
on the provision of economic stability and development (Saich, 2001); thereby positioning the 
state and non-state actors as equal partners.  
 
Wooldridge (2012) says that due to the close relationship between the state and the market, the 
term best applicable would be ‘state capitalism’. However, Nölke (2014a) claims the more 
appropriate term is state capitalism 3.0, as the latest wave which includes China and Brazil 
differs from the previous two, as seen in table one below.  
 
 
 
While state capitalism 3.0 as presented by ten Brink and Nölke (2013) and Nölke (2014a, c) is 
a new term, the content is very closely aligned with Stopford and Strange (1991) and Weiss 
(1998) understanding of the connection between home state and MNCs in IPE. Weiss (1998) 
argued for the development of a concept that is able to incorporate both the strength of the state 
and that of the private sector. She argues that such a concept should be able to make sense of a 
range of different situations, which involve different forms of government – business 
cooperation, reflecting the changing tasks of economic management. She thus develops the 
concept of governed interdependence (GI) defined as: “a negotiated relationship, in which 
public and private participants maintain their autonomy, yet which is nevertheless governed by 
broader goals set and monitored by the state” (Weiss, 1998:38).  
 
In this relationship, leadership is either exercised directly by the state or delegated to the private 
sector. However, if the latter is the case, the robust organisational infrastructure has been 
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nurtured by state policies. Through the concept of GI, Weiss (1998) is trying to convey a reality 
in which both the state and dominant economic groups are strong, i.e. “the state is well insulated 
and industry is highly organised and linked into the policy-making framework via a robust 
negotiating relationship” (Weiss, 1998:38). In opposition to the previously mentioned 
embedded autonomy as outlined by Evans (1989) which seeks to solve the issue of preservation 
of state autonomy without compromising its effectiveness when the state is strong; GI solves 
the problem of preservation of state effectiveness and autonomy when capital is strong (Weiss, 
1998:38). Weiss (1998) recognises the power of capital and associated corporations while 
maintaining the view that the state’s autonomy is uncompromised even in situations where 
capital is in power.  
 
Weiss (1998) acknowledges that interdependence is a generalised aspect of state-MNC 
relations, given that MNCs rely on their home states to establish and nurture conditions that 
are essential for capturing world markets and for access to stable markets, such as bilateral 
agreements made between home and host state to foster easier entrance to new markets. This 
can for instance be seen in official visits to African states on behalf of Chinese and Brazilian 
heads of state and ministers that are often accompanied by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
large MNCs (Lapper, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, states are dependent on firms to increase wealth by generating jobs and 
growth (Weiss, 1998; Coggan, 2014). Weiss (1998) claims that in GI, mutual dependence is 
formally recognised (unlike in ordinary interdependence), through the creation of opportunities 
for institutionalised cooperation. In GI the state takes a proactive role in attracting and drawing 
business into a negotiating relationship to further its developmental projects (Weiss, 1998:38). 
Weiss’s (1998) GI theory rejects the traditional view of an imposing state, rather viewing the 
state’s ability to use its autonomy to consult and to elicit consensus and cooperation from the 
private sector as central to its transformative capacity. This reflects a form of infrastructural 
power, where linkages with key economic groupings, provide the state with the opportunity to 
extract and exchange vital information with producers, stimulate private sector participation in 
key policy areas, and mobilise a greater level of industry collaboration so to advance national 
strategy (Weiss, 1998:39). Contrary to much traditional thinking about the state’s place in 
economic management, Weiss (1998) says that tasks of national economic management are 
ever-changing, and those changes imply state adaptivity not state retreat, and tighter rather than 
looser connections with economic actors.  
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Considering Weiss’s (1998) claims that states adapt to the changes in economic management 
and economic structures, while at the same time using economic actors, predominantly private 
sector corporations to advance their national strategy (Duanmu, 2014; Klein, 2006), how does 
this relate to China and Brazil? If part of a state’s national strategy is to continue with economic 
growth, a surplus of economic actors in an over-capacitated domestic market (as is the case 
with Chinese construction and mining companies, and Brazilian mining and agriculture 
companies) will drive those actors to seek markets elsewhere. Combined with the state’s 
recognition that if it wants to achieve a change in the world order, as China and Brazil often 
proclaim, it realises the necessity to step up its role in international relations, thereby adapting 
its foreign policy towards partner countries from the South. However, as China and Brazil often 
claim to not use aid or charity in their dealings with developing countries, but rather 
investments and trade as part of their SSDC strategy, this opens opportunities for the previously 
mentioned Chinese and Brazilian economic actors who are also looking for new markets.  
 
Therefore, the question remains, is the role of these economic actors to advance China and 
Brazil’s national strategy, while at the same time garnering profit benefits for themselves by 
entering into new markets, or is their role something else? In addition, does the role of 
economic actors remain the same over time and place, and regardless of ownership, i.e. private 
vs. state-owned? This last question is of particular interest in the case of China, considering the 
limited, yet increasing number of privately owned Chinese firms operating in the domestic 
market and beyond (Shen, 2013).  
 
Private firms are regarded as the main challenge to states and state authority (Strange, 1996). 
Impersonal forces of world markets have been more integrated by private enterprises in 
finance, industry and trade then by cooperative decisions of government, and have become 
more powerful than states, the historical owners of political authority over society and economy 
(Strange, 1996:4). This however changed dramatically in 2008 at the dawn of the global 
financial crisis (Coggan, 2014), where states yet again performed the role of interventionists. 
Similarly, although indirectly linked to the economic situation in the EU, the state was again 
pivotal in the 2016 UK’s exit from the EU.  
 
Nevertheless, and to a certain extent sharing Weiss’s (1998) view, Strange (1996) asserts that 
there are three paradoxes to this reversal of the state-business power balance. Firstly, the main 
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disguise of the overall decline of state power is that the intervention of state authority and of 
the state’s agencies in the daily lives of many citizens seems to be growing. Secondly, while 
governments of “established states [from the West] are suffering this progressive loss of real 
authority” (Strange, 1996:5), the number of societies that strive for their own state is 
continuously increasing (most recent example being South Sudan). Thirdly, she claims that her 
contention of the hollowness of state authority is in the end in fact a Western phenomenon, one 
that is easily refuted by the Asian experience of the state. She claims that the Asian state, has 
in fact been “the means to the achievement of economic growth, industrialisation44, a 
modernised infrastructure and rising living standards of the people” (Strange, 1996:6), with 
Singapore being a prime example of a strong state achieving economic success.  
 
This last point is however up for debate, given that poverty levels in China for instance did not 
decline until there was a shift in economic planning from a centrally-planed to a market-based 
economic system in the late 1970s (World Bank, 2016). However, Strange (1996) also claims 
that while the Asian states were very fortunate in the beginning to reap high profits, mostly due 
to their geographical position on the western frontier of the US during the Cold War; they were 
under increasing pressure from the West to adopt more liberal market policies. Secondly, they 
were exempt from the normative pressures of the open liberal economy, being allowed to limit 
foreign imports and restrict entry of foreign firms into their domestic markets, while being 
given relatively open access to the US market (and later European) for manufacturers. Thirdly, 
the technology (which Strange argues is often a neglected factor in the state-MNC power 
dynamic) needed for the advancement of their industrialisation was already readily available 
for purchase on the market, mostly in the form of patents or through corporate alliances.  
 
Strange (1996) claims, and rightfully so, that those special dispensations are on the way out, 
and that Asian governments would be under increasing pressure from the West to adopt more 
liberal non-discriminatory policies on trade and investment (as can be seen by president 
Trump’s 2016 demands for fairer trade for American products in the Chinese market). Asian 
states, most notably China have in fact adopted a more liberal market economy from the 
beginning of the new millennium and have allowed for the inflow of foreign competition; 
however, they have also expanded to other markets, often the more marginalised ones (like 
                                                          
44 See appendix four for more detail on the distinct stages of industrialisation. 
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Africa) in an attempt to capitalise on the untapped resources and human capital (Cissé, 2013a, 
b; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; Bräutigam, 2009).   
 
Strange’s argument has been a topic of discussion ever since 1996, and there is no doubt that 
international relations have seen a change brought on by the rise of newly industrialised states, 
such as China, Brazil, South Korea, India and Russia. Their rising global economic power is 
greatly influenced by numerous MNCs, whom according to Strange (1996) and Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) are the cause for the retreat of the state as the main actor in IR. While Strange’s 
work was and still is pivotal in the analysis of state-MNC relations, particularly her earlier 
work (1988, 1991); in her later works (1996,1997) she mainly focused on the state and its role 
in IR, thereby to a certain extent neglecting to focus on the relations between states and non-
state actors and between states themselves as outlined in Stopford and Strange (1991). In other 
words, in her later work, she somewhat falls into the pitfall of the state centric approach to 
international relations, thereby indicating that despite the state retreating and losing some 
influence, it is still an important player in IR. However, Strange’s body of work is still crucial 
to the study of IPE, particularly her structural power theory. 
 
Strange (1988) explains that the structural power theory, consists of four main pillars: security, 
knowledge, production of goods and services and the provision of credit and money. However, 
Strange (1988) placed universities as the only conveyers and inventors and thus owners of the 
structural power pillar of knowledge, and MNCs in the production structure. This is of 
particular relevance when taking into account the rise of developing states and newly 
industrialised states of the South, such as China and Brazil, and the fact that MNCs are in 
today’s age often claimed to be key actors in the formation of knowledge. Forthcoming from 
this literature survey, this classification warrants the need for additions to this theory, which 
will be done in the theoretical framework section of this chapter.  
 
While realists such as Bull (1977) and Krasner (1994) argued that the difference between the 
international system of post-World War II and that of Machiavellian times in terms of the 
power of non-state actors is minimal, Strange (1994b) argues that accelerated technological 
change was leading to a “system of international production, organized, managed and planned 
by firms” (1994b).  
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Moreover, Strange (1994a) argues that knowledge figures centrally in the changing relationship 
between states and firms in the creation of a structure of power. “Knowledge is power and 
whoever is able to develop or acquire and to deny the access of others to a kind of knowledge 
respected and sought by other, and whoever can control the channels by which it is 
communicated to those given access to it, will exercise a very special kind of structural power” 
(Strange, 1994a: 30).  
 
While most literature agrees that traditionally the state has played a crucial role in shaping the 
relationship between power and production in the international economy; today (2017), 
diplomacy operates increasingly within the parameters set by knowledge (Mytelka, 2010). This 
knowledge is in turn generated, driven, and owned by MNCs. Thus, the privatization of 
knowledge has contributed to the growing dependence of states upon firms for the generation 
and application of knowledge; thus, contributing to the emergence of a consensual rather than 
conflicting relationship between states and MNCs based on their contribution to the 
competitiveness of a nation (Mytelka, 2010). Due to forces of globalisation and the inherent 
nature of international relations being one of competition between states, state and MNCs have 
become necessary partners, which may both challenge and support each other. In other words, 
the state’s capacity in relation to other states in the global economy depends on the importance 
the state assigns to economic actors in achieving its developmental goals preconditioned by a 
certain interdependence between them. This is of crucial importance for this study, as it is 
argued that the state’s achievement of political and economic development depends to an extent 
on the role of economic actors (MNCs) in its foreign policy, and how (and if) MNCs execute 
that role.  
 
2.2.2 Foreign Policy of States: what about MNCs?  
Foreign policy has historically been regarded as the domain of decision makers that sit in the 
highest circles of government, i.e. the elite. Furthermore, foreign policy has followed certain 
principles and trajectories depending on circumstance and the state in question. However, 
foreign policy has also changed over the years and focuses now not only on socio-political 
approaches and military intervention, but also on questions of economic development and 
integration. Foreign policy has in a way followed the changing patterns within IR, which have 
focused on increasing integration of economic and political aspects of inter-state relations. This 
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has also come with the realisation that different actors play different roles in IR and therefore 
in foreign policy of states, which reflect the broader IPE patterns of the current world system.  
 
Foreign policy is often confused with the term diplomacy45. In 1967, Raymond Aron argued 
that “the ambassador and the soldier live and symbolize international relations, which insofar 
as they are inter-state relations, concern diplomacy and war”. Today however, the number of 
actors in international politics alongside the multitudes of national diplomats and soldiers, 
include: lawyers, cross-border merchants and financiers, the World Bank (WB), World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and IMF technocrats, UN peacekeepers, World Health Organisation 
officials, humanitarians, Eurocrats and more; all of which are competing for influence in 
international diplomacy (Cooper et al., 2013:7). As this study’s main focus lies on the core of 
IPE namely how states utilise market forces and in extent MNCs to their competitive advantage 
against other states, it is argued that MNCs will therefore play an important role in a state’s FP. 
Therefore, the following sections will hypothesise the role of MNCs in FP making and the tools 
used.  
 
2.2.2.1 Foreign Policy Making  
Snyder et al. (1954, 1962) argue that “leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the 
way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are 
made, and what gets implemented” (Hermann 2001: 1). What stands out in this quote is the 
suggestion that foreign policy making is not only reserved for the elite within the diplomatic 
circle, but rather a multiplicity of actors. This is of importance considering the wide range of 
interests that different actors have and thus, the ways in which they go about accomplishing 
those interests. According to works by Hudson (2012) and Snyder et al. (1954, 1962) it is 
therefore imperative to look below the nation-state level of analysis to the players involved.  
 
While origins of foreign policy were focused on the state and its domestic policies and how 
those influence inter-state relations, Foot (2012) argues that it is artificial to try and divide the 
domestic and external spheres of policy making. Foot (2012) highlights two main matters of 
foreign policy: the power of domestic conditions and their influence on the foreign policy of 
                                                          
45 According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) diplomacy is defined as “the art of conducting the 
intercourse of nations with each other”; furthermore, it is: “The management of international relations by 
negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys”.  
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states; and how the choice of policies domestically can foresee but often un-foresee the external 
consequences, which in turn are powerful enough to cause the revision of both domestic and 
foreign policies.   
 
Foot’s (2012) statement is of importance when analysing China’s foreign policy, considering 
the political structures and domestic conditions, which often influence the trajectory of foreign 
policy depending on the timeframe one looks at. For instance, China’s foreign policy was 
widely different in the 1960s than in the 1990s, given its domestic conditions (isolationism) 
and international standing (particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident). This 
warranted a different approach as well as selection of international partners, resulting in the 
turn towards African states in the 1960s (for purposes of revolutionary solidarity) and then to 
the West in 1980s and early 1990s. Similarly, Brazil’s foreign policy has changed over time, 
not in its underpinning guidelines of solidarity and non-interventionism, but rather in the shift 
of focus from Latin America (in the 1960s and 70s), to US and the West (1980s and early 90s), 
and to Africa during the Cardoso (second term: 1998-2002) and Lula era (2003-2010). This 
will be further discussed in chapters three and four.  
 
Moreover, the current state of foreign policy making is rapidly changing due to an array of 
influences on the international political and economic level. Foreign policy and public opinion 
studies on both theoretical and empirical levels have been developed over the course of the 
years in reference to the US and a world order where the US is placed centre stage. It is 
therefore not only necessary to do more comparative analysis, but potentially refocus the entire 
field of FP to include actors from different geopolitical areas (Asia, Africa, Latin America) but 
also include an array of different groups of actors (NGOs, MNCs, civil society and the like) 
(Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1996; Weiss, 1998). The vast array of actors also brings 
with it a variety of aims and goals in FP. As Stopford and Strange (1991) claim, primary 
influences on the behaviour of states and MNCs are found in IPE, as most states have shifted 
their FP focus from power to wealth. This implies the inseparable nature of foreign policy and 
IPE. States have adjusted their frameworks of priority for allocating national resources in such 
ways to promote accumulation of wealth-creating resources. Considering that in order to 
accumulate wealth, the state needs MNCs to drive production, it can be said that “there are 
growing interactions between national strategies designed to achieve rising levels of social and 
economic aspiration and the global strategies of firms” (Stopford and Strange, 1991:204). 
Given the rise of NISs from the South and MNCs originating from them, it is crucial to explore 
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this interaction between the state and MNCs to see whether the theory set out by Stopford and 
Strange (1991) still holds ground and whether it is in fact applicable to actors from the South 
as opposed to just Western ones. 
 
As Foley (2003:164) claims, the overarching challenge for FP is the integration of ongoing 
transformations in international political structures and processes into theories about 
government processes and individual behaviour. Moreover, Foley (2003:164) claims that 
during this transformative period, it is likely that new processes will develop across and within 
traditional state boundaries, while the main actors will most likely remain the same. This 
however, does not necessarily mean that FP will be focused on governments alone. In fact, 
foreign policy has evolved over the years to include different sets of actors, and as Cooper et 
al. (2013) claim, since World War II the interactions between these different actors have grown 
dense and expanded to include new levels and modes of engagement, as illustrated by Heine 
(2006) in table two below.  
 
 
While the array of actors in foreign policy has increased, it is however still believed that states 
have the final say in the aims and instruments used to implement policies, especially when 
analysing the foreign policy of non-western states and states that are still regarded as 
developing states (Goldstein, 2013; Ozawa, 2014; Nölke, 2014a, b, c). With regards to a central 
actor in this study, MNCs; Cooper et al. (2013) claim that some popular writings would make 
believe that MNCs control and dominate world affairs, when in fact, they are more 
disenfranchised in global-decision making bodies than NGOs. This view is in direct contrast 
with the writings of Strange (1998); however, Cooper et al. (2013) claim that MNCs deserve a 
seat at the table of decision making to match their role and influence. Thakur (2013) concurs 
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by saying that may MNCs and NGOs have greater influence than several states when it comes 
to particular policies and setting the agenda in international behaviour, due to access to bigger 
budgets, to the extent that some have been “engaged in forms of activities associated with 
states” (Thakur, 2013:77).  
 
Pigman (2013:193) agrees, stating that “large firms that operate across national borders 
function increasingly as diplomatic actors in ways analogous to governments of nation states, 
multilateral institutions, and large civil society organizations (CSOs)”. This is a notion 
confirmed by Nölke (2014c) when speaking of Western MNCs; however, a different scenario 
is claimed when speaking of emerging market MNCs and their connection to their home states. 
Nölke (2014c:192) argues that close cooperation between emerging market MNCs and their 
domestic institutions is not limited to domestic issues, as it has been complemented by 
collaboration regarding transnational politics. The latter predominantly pertains to activities 
that support market access for these companies.  
 
Pigman (2013) continues by saying that the ways in which large firms operate internationally, 
resemble the structures and functions of more traditional diplomacy, through the opening of 
representative offices in national capitals headed by individuals who are corporate 
ambassadors. Pigman (2013) states that while these firms are ultimately petitioners and the 
government the ultimate decider; this may change if and when a firm crosses a certain threshold 
of size and cross-border activity. Consequently, a shift in the balance of power between the 
firm and government would occur, to the point where each approaches the relationship with a 
set of objects sought through negotiations and an offer of assets that “can (and must) be offered 
in exchange” (Pigman, 2013:193). This however implies high levels of production to give the 
firm leverage. However, Pasha and Qureshi (1984) and Salim (2007) found a negative 
correlation between the size of a firm and production realisation, given that large firms enjoy 
uneven advantage through political power in terms of easier access to loans and import licences 
and are therefore less obliged to realize maximum production capacity.  
 
This is of interest to this study, in the case of China, large SOEs are often said to be ‘puppets’ 
of the home state as it provides them with credit and security; thus, making them obligated to 
follow state directives in all aspects of their operations (Goldstein, 2013). This implies that 
Chinese MNCs are, as Pigman (2013) claims, petitioners or in a respect lobbyist for the 
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Chinese state in its relations with other states. It remains to be seen if it in fact is so, and 
whether it differs from Brazil’s state-MNC relations in foreign policy towards African states.  
 
Pigman (2013) claims furthermore, that diplomatic objectives of firms and governments 
towards one another are analogous, if not the same as diplomatic objectives of governments to 
other governments. Pigman’s (2013) analysis of government-firm relations somewhat overlaps 
with Weiss (1998) notion of governed interdependence (GI)46, while at the same time raising 
questions about degrees of influence47 as outlined in Stopford and Strange’s (1991) triad of 
relationships48. He further claims that diplomacy conducted between governments and firms is 
routine business in the sense that after the initial getting to know each other phase, the two 
sides engage in bilateral information sharing i.e. they provide each other with information of 
mutual interest (government data and data on trade and employment, as well as firms providing 
data on in-country operations). Van der Westhuizen (2013) somewhat concurs with this by 
saying that while at times the relationship between business and state may be cooperative; in 
other instances, it may be dysfunctional or even conflictual.   
 
Furthermore, given the interaction between firms and governments in foreign policy agenda 
setting, the question is in which ways this happens? Foreign policy is usually conducted by 
using three distinct tools: diplomacy (meetings between political leaders on a bilateral or 
multilateral level), foreign aid (provision of financial assistance, either military or economic 
aid), and military force (deployed by stronger states to get weaker ones to do what they want). 
However, these tools are often used by developed states in relation to developing states from 
the South. With the rise of NISs from the South, such as China and Brazil, the question remains 
as to the foreign policy tools used by them in relation to developing countries of the South and 
the role of MNCs therein. China and Brazil often proclaim SSS (Nel and Taylor, 2013) 
principles in relation to South states, abstain from military force, and proclaim a mutually 
beneficial cooperation through the platform of South-South Cooperation. This form of 
cooperation will be discussed in the following section, and compared briefly to North-South 
Cooperation. The aim of the following section is to see how China and Brazil use this tool and 
what role MNCs play in it, if any at all. 
                                                          
46 This will be further discussed in section 2.4.  
47 Whether in all aspects of foreign policy governments have the final say, or whether in some aspects business 
decisions prevail. 
48 This will be further discussed in section 2.4.  
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2.2.2.2 Foreign Policy tools of Newly Industrialised States  
It was mentioned in chapter one that the term South, used to describe developing states from 
Africa, South-East Asia, and Latin America, is preferred over other terms such ‘developing 
world’, ‘Global South’, ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs) and the like. In addition, according 
to Alden et al. (2010:1) it speaks to its endurance as a “descriptive term in the contemporary 
environment” (Alden et al., 2010:1). Alden et al. (2010) claim that by deliberately situating 
this concept within the IPE framework, it is assumed that it takes account of the international 
system as one that privileges states over other actors as well as characterising the processes of 
interaction as both conflicting and consenting in nature. However, the term South is not limited 
to questions of territorial integrity, security, and state sovereignty, but is concerned with the 
“peoples, communities and livelihoods that make up the developing world” (Alden et al., 
2010:1). Moreover, the term ‘the South’ is an important “…ideological expression for the range 
of concerns that developing regions are facing; [as it] forms a source of national and 
transnational identity for both state and non-state actors in the international system” (Alden et 
al., 2010).  
 
This study also takes account of the international system to be one that focuses on states, at 
least when it comes to foreign policy, as it is still understood to be the state’s domain; however, 
with MNCs playing an important role in it. The question remains, whether both states and non-
state actors from the South in fact uphold this national and transnational identity within the 
international system, or does that differ from state to state and actor to actor? In this case, do 
China and Brazil in their interactions with other states from the South harvest this identity of 
the South, and does this apply to MNCs originating from China and Brazil as well? And if so, 
does that mean that China and Brazil as well as their MNCs will feel compelled to implement 
principles of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) in their relations with and 
operations in other countries of the South?  
 
In their book, ‘The South in World Politics’, Alden et al. (2010:16) look at South organisations 
and their strategies to (re)construct the main foreign policy principles of post-colonial states. 
They claim that the first significant move towards the creation of a common South position and 
a subsequent foreign policy, took place in 1955 at the Asian-African Bandung Conference, 
during the time of the Cold War. Chaturvedi (2012) on the other hand states that the idea of 
developing countries coming together emerged in March/April 1947 at the time that India 
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hosted the Asian Relations Conference49. The Bandung Conference50 of 1955 is however 
regarded in most academic circles as the beginning of cooperation of countries from the South; 
even though SSC was not institutionalised until 1961 when 28 countries (25 members and 3 
observers51) attended the first non-aligned summit in Belgrade, Serbia (then Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia), which culminated in the announcement of the Non-Aligned 
Movement  
 
Further developments occurred in 1964, at the first ministerial meeting of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, Switzerland, an informal 
grouping of seventy-seven developing countries emerged, which later became known as the 
G77. While the G77 has over the years expanded, and now includes 132 countries52 as of 
February 2016, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2016), the name G77 is still in use for 
historical reasons (Chaturvedi, 2012). While the previous SSC efforts were more politically 
and socially based in their core, the idea behind the G77 was “to enable the South to articulate 
and promote its collective economic interest and enhance its joint negotiating capacity on major 
international economic issues within the UN system, and to promote SSC for development” 
(Chaturvedi, 2012:16). This was the first time that the importance of economic development 
was highlighted, opening the space for the inclusion of economic actors in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation efforts.  
 
However, despite major expansion of South-South linkages during the 1970s, the economic 
and financial crises of the 1980s had a significant impact on SSC, which almost resulted in the 
closure of regional and bilateral cooperation programmes. However, in 1978 UNCTAD’ s 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries was adopted by the UN General Assembly. According to Vaz and Inoue 
(2007) for Brazil, as well as for many other developing countries this was a landmark event 
that signalised a confidence in and commitment to the idea that South states could find their 
own development solutions. SSC therefore remained the goal of developing countries’ foreign 
                                                          
49 This conference saw 227 representatives from 27 countries, most of them still under colonial rule, come 
together (Sharan, 1997).  
50 The core principles include the promotion of goodwill and cooperation between Asia and Africa, consideration 
of social, economic and cultural problems of representative countries, consideration of special problems (national 
sovereignty issues stemming from racialism and colonialism), and the assessment of the position and potential 
future contribution to world peace and cooperation on behalf of the Asian and African states and their people. 
51 Both China and Brazil have observer status.  
52 Brazil is a member. China never officially joined, but provides continuous political support in the form of 
“Group of 77 plus China” and financial support since 1994 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2016).  
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policies, even though in practice it has been mostly confined in political speeches (rhetoric) 
(Chaturvedi, 2012). The reason why it has not trickled down to institutions that were at the 
time responsible for the implementation of SSC principles, is that the definition of what SSC 
is and what is should encapsulate was largely unclear. However, Chaturvedi (2012) claims: 
“The main elements of SSC are self-reliance and self-help. The evolution of SSC is 
characterised by three fundamental principles: mutual respect, equality, and a ‘win-win’ 
situation” (Chaturvedi, 2012:18). This was even further fortified in 1986 at the Harare Non-
Aligned Summit, where the four major goals53 of SSC were adopted. Again, the importance of 
economic actors is highlighted in these goals, as it says that SSC should introduce principles 
of the New International Economic Order. This was written at a time when in many South 
states, the perceived perpetual subjugation of developing states to developed states, caused 
discontent and the call for the restructuring of the international political economic environment.  
 
Although the Harare Non-Aligned Summit fortified the objectives of SSC, in the years leading 
up to the end of the Cold War and extending into the mid-1990s, the countries of the G 1554 
grouping drove the process of developing and coordinating the policies for the South. However, 
by the end of the 1990s emerging powers such as China, Brazil and India overshadowed the 
G15 in policy making for the South. This assertiveness of emerging powers was further 
noticeable in the ten major areas of SSC55 interest outlined by the South Commission 
(established in 1987; later the South Centre (2014)): finance, trade, industry and business, 
services, transport and infrastructure, food security, science and technology, environment, 
information and communication, and people-to-people contact (Chaturvedi, 2012). This signals 
yet again the importance of economic motives in SSC, fortified by the notion that trade, 
industry and business cannot be done between states alone, but require economic actors 
(MNCs) to step in. Moreover, SSC, which was primarily a slogan, had in the early 2000s 
become an important instrument in reorienting trade and investment away from its traditional 
North-South axis (Alden, et al. 2010: 100). However, according to the Third High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness, otherwise known as the Paris Declaration, SSC is also a valuable 
                                                          
53 Take advantage of existing complementarities between the South countries, create new complementarities and 
interdependence at various levels through coordination of development planning, to introduce major principles of 
the New International Economic Order (mutual benefit and solidarity), and to strengthen the South’s bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the North (RCCDC, 1987).  
54 G15 member countries:  Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Venezuela (G15, 2015). 
55 The SSC concept was lastly defined in 2010 by UNCTAD as: “the process, institutions and arrangements 
designed to promote political, economic and technical co-operation among developing countries in pursuit of 
common development goals” (UNCTAD, 2010). 
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complement to North-South Cooperation (NSC)56 as it aims to observe the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs, promoting equality among developing partners and respect for 
national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity (OECD, 2005a).  
 
This has been further elaborated on and supplemented at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea in 2011; where the representatives agreed that not 
enough progress has been made since the Paris Declaration and that cooperation must include 
more actors from both North and South as they complement each other. In addition, it was 
clearly highlighted that: “Aid should be used as a catalyst to leverage other development 
financing including trade, private investment, and domestic resources” (Busan Proceedings, 
2011:11); an aspect often used by China and Brazil in their relations with African development 
cooperation partners. This again echoes the importance that China and Brazil attach to MNCs.  
 
When speaking about NSC much of the discussion is on ‘Official Development Assistance’ 
(ODA) or on ‘foreign aid’, a highly ambiguous and contested term, which increasingly is being 
abandoned in service for ‘development cooperation’, a term used by SSC providers. However, 
the question arises, are these two terms so dissimilar? Saidi and Wolf (2011) suggest that: 
“these two [are] (complementary) philosophies: ‘international development assistance’ (the 
charity philosophy articulated by the [Development Assistance Committee] DAC) and 
‘international development investment’ (investing in the productivity and capacity of the 
partner country in pursuit pf mutual benefit)” (in Mawdsley, 2012:78). The centrality of 
investments in international development speaks again to the importance of economic 
institutions (ministries of trade and commerce) and actors (banks, MNCs).  
 
The DAC has worked hard to formulate the definition and measurement criteria for ODA for 
its members57, indicating that they must58 provide annual data on the volumes, type, nature, 
quality and destination of their assistance (Mawdsley, 2012:79). Furthermore, while several 
                                                          
56 While the Paris and Busan Declarations clearly position SSC and NSC as complementary aspects of a broader 
development cooperation, there are numerous differences between the two, as can be seen in Appendix one. 
57 DAC members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
(OECD, 2015). 
58 Nevertheless, there are numerous discrepancies among DAC members’ aid reporting, depending on the budget 
of the respective country, financial monitoring processes, political timescales, and diverse constitutional 
requirements that may in specific instances affect their ability to report comprehensively and per the requirements 
of the Creditors Reporting System (Sinha and Hubbard, 2011).   
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non-DAC countries report their ODA figures to the OECD-DAC, not all ODA from non-DAC 
countries can be fitted into the specific Creditors Reporting System categories. In addition, 
non-DAC countries that choose not to report to DAC, do not all use the term ‘foreign aid’. 
India for instance only uses the term ‘development cooperation’, even though it engages in 
practices and flows (concessional loans, grants, technical assistance) that would fall into the 
DAC definition of aid. China for instance (also non-DAC) makes a distinction between its 
foreign aid59 (similar but not identical to DAC ODA) and official support for economic and 
development cooperation.  
 
China also often blurs its foreign aid and development cooperation with more commercial 
decision-making and agendas, which it doesn’t claim to be aid (Grimm et al., 2009; Bräutigam, 
2009). This bundling approach includes grants, concessional loans, technical assistance and 
market-based loans, export credits, trade, infrastructure provisions, and formal development 
cooperation Rasiah et al. (2010:342).  
 
China often receives significant criticism for this approach, based on two reasons: one, given 
that DAC is orchestrated bilaterally from government to government, it leaves no room for the 
inclusion of MNCs, something that Chinese ‘aid’ does, thereby allowing for MNCs to play an 
important role on ground in facilitating this assistance through investments (while also 
benefiting themselves); the second reason is the rising concern about transparency and 
reporting. Bräutigam (2010) postulates that China (like many other non-DAC actors) seems to 
be willing to disclose information about the funding streams that are more compatible with 
ODA, but doesn’t report on its more commercially oriented official financial agreements. 
Therefore, it is rendered difficult to assess the volume of development assistance. Bräutigam 
(2010) however, notes that non-DAC and DAC actors are not so dissimilar when it comes to 
reporting, given that they are reluctant to report on their export credits and guarantee financing. 
Grimm (2011) expands on this by saying that there is no country-specific data coming from 
China, neither for ‘aid’ nor for its commercial loans. Non-reporting on ‘aid’ figures has its 
roots in China’s cultural traditions and philosophy, as aid in the sense of ‘handouts’ to other 
countries is considered to be ‘immoral’ (Grimm, 2011). Furthermore, China is reluctant to 
report on aid figures due to the specific rationale of mutual benefit in SSC, but also due to 
                                                          
59 For a more historical overview see Kragelund, P. 2010. The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in 
Africa. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Issue Paper no.11. 
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China itself being a developing country where domestic needs for development finance persist 
(Grimm, 2011).  
 
John de Sousa (2010:2) concurs with the above-mentioned when discussing Brazil’s approach 
to development cooperation reporting, stating that Brazil does not “systematically report its 
outgoing financial flows for development cooperation and there is no evaluation of its 
development cooperation budget”, and thereby making it difficult to assess the accurate volume 
of Brazilian aid. According to the most often cited approximation of Brazil’s development 
cooperation disbursements (UN Economic and Social Council, 2008), the total volume in 2006 
was estimated at US$ 345 million (the Brazilian Cooperation Agency says the amount could 
be around US$ 1,2 billion), representing 0.04% of the Brazilian GNI. However, these numbers 
are only estimates and have a high margin of error (John de Sousa, 2010:2).  
 
For the above-mentioned reason of transparency and (lack of) reporting, non-DAC actors are 
consistently brought under suspicion, particularly China. Therefore, to alleviate suspicion 
China published a White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011. Smith (2011) stated that China’s White 
Paper is a mammoth step for the aid transparency agenda. Another noteworthy occurrence is 
the launch of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in 2008, at the High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana. The aim of this initiative is to build a 
standard for publishing aid information that would be acceptable to both DAC and non-DAC. 
Hubbard and Sinha (2011: n/a) claim that lack of consensus between DAC and non-DAC on 
what ODA is, should not be a limiting factor to disclose information, as transparency should 
take precedence over definitions. Nevertheless, despite its membership growing slowly, both 
high-profiled DAC and non-DAC actors remain uncommitted, including Japan, China and 
Brazil. This could be because China (and Brazil to a lesser extent) is often sceptical towards 
membership in what is perceived as Western driven organisations and initiatives, controlled by 
Western interests (Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006). Given the differences between non-DAC 
and DAC actors as outlined above, what remains to be seen are the characteristics of SSDC 
providers60.  
 
                                                          
60 Zimmermann and Smith (2011:726) define SSDC providers as: “…developing countries that deliver expertise 
and financial support to foster the economic and social welfare of other developing countries”.   
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According to Zimmermann and Smith (2011) fostering economic and social welfare of other 
developing countries is best done through technical cooperation (TC). TC also known as 
technical assistance, has historically been an important modality of engagement for both DAC 
and non-DAC actors; however, there are important differences in its conduct, cost and nature 
(Mawdsley, 2012). While TC is aimed at strengthening individual and organisational capacity 
through the provision of training and equipment61, it can also be a stand-alone element of 
development assistance such as the provision of places on training programmes within the 
‘donor’ country (Mawdsley, 2012:123).  
 
In the past two decades (2000-2015) there has been renewed focus on TC for capacity 
development within the mainstream development community; however, several concerns have 
been raised about Western TC. The first concern revolves around the value for money, given 
that consultancy rates and salaries are often very high compared to those for local peers. Bilal 
and Rampa (2011) support this argument by saying that an EU engineer on a one-year contract 
cost the donor US$150,000, compared to a Chinese engineer costing US$19,000 for the same 
period. Secondly, while Western personnel may have technical skills, some may have a very 
poor grasp of local sociocultural, institutional, and political contexts, often accompanied by an 
“unquestioned belief in the superiority of their own systems and culture” (Mawdsley, 
2012:123). Thirdly, TC is not apolitical or separated from other economic interests. A range of 
different skill sets, capacities, expertise and knowledge are all embedded in political interests 
and agendas; however, they also have economic consequences in the sense that firms and 
governments can be locked into certain technologies and export markets (Rasiah et al., 2010). 
While all the above is applicable to both Western donors and non-DAC donors, there are 
specific differences. The main difference lies in the distribution of knowledge.  
 
While only the larger South partners, such as China, can provide significant grants and loans, 
and technical expertise in form of companies, patents, and training facilities; the poorest 
countries can contribute with an exchange of ideas (Rhee, 2011). This is echoed by Salim 
(2007) when saying that by establishing R&D centres close to their foreign customers, MNCs 
gain knowledge about market preferences which gives them a competitive advantage, while 
arguably at the same time contributing to the local environment. This indicates the importance 
                                                          
61 “It may include consultancies, the supply of technicians and expert advice; equipment and tools; scholarships; 
education support, study tours and research collaborations; short-term training in managerial, professional and 
technical skills, and so on” (Mawdsley, 2012:123). 
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of both MNCs and host states for successful cooperation. By involving such a vast array of 
actors, participation in development cooperation is more democratised, and should therefore 
be understood as an illustrative modality of SSDC. Moreover, the key difference between 
SSDC and NSC is that knowledge in the NSC model is conceived as moving vertically, from 
the West to countries perceived to be of lesser skills, abilities and technology. The knowledge 
provided by the North is often premeditated as superior62, and its transmission is intended to 
allow poorer countries to ‘mimic’ the more industrialised countries (Narayanaswamy, 2010). 
In contrast, Rhee (2011:264) argues that “South-South exchanges a horizontal process of 
experience sharing and knowledge co-operation rather than a vertical transfer in traditional 
North-South relations”; thus, it is based on equality.  
 
Rhee (2011) and Rasiah et al. (2010) suggest that this knowledge may be more experience 
based, given that South partners share certain circumstances, in health for instance (tackling 
HIV/AIDS), in agriculture it may include tropical weather regimes, droughts, substantial 
proportions of agricultural workers, as well as low degrees of literacy, and more. Therefore, by 
having shared experiences, the knowledge exchange is more appropriate and therefore more 
effective. Furthermore, advocates of SSDC claim similar advantages in infrastructure projects 
(roads, bridges, and energy production), science and research, and information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) (Mawdsley, 2012), indicating again the important role of 
MNCs as conveyors of that knowledge given that they are the ones involved in these activities 
on ground.  
 
Moreover, while Western donors have for instance over the years focused on primary schooling 
in African states, South partners, such as China have (in 1990s) focused on research 
collaborations and partnerships with African universities. Jordan (2010) says that China is not 
alone in this preference and names Russia63 and Brazil as supporters of higher education and 
training. Brazil for instance has a growing focus on joint research and development through 
                                                          
62 It is therefore of no surprise that the World Bank’s 1998/99 World Development Report on ‘Knowledge for 
Development’ begins with the words: “Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the 
world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere…Poor countries differ from rich not only because they have 
less capital but because they have less knowledge about technology and about ‘attributes’” (World Bank, 1998:1). 
63 Classifying Russia as ‘South’ is highly contested, considering it does not share a history of colonisation with 
the other South countries, and therefore not the same development trajectory. Furthermore, Russia does not regard 
itself as a developing state nor a part of the South, and is not perceived as such externally either. The Russian 
economy is closer to the developed countries of the West and tends to identify with Europe and the North in 
political terms (Kaczmarski, 2015).  
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technical cooperation efforts, such as Pro-poor Value Chain Development Project (PROSUL)64 
and PROAFRICA. These programmes are sponsored by the National Council for Scientific 
and Technological Development and focus on South America and Africa as priority regions of 
Brazil’s foreign policy (Vaz and Inoue, 2007).  
 
Similar to Brazil, China’s main focus of cooperation lies within TC, with partners stretching 
from regional partners in Asia, to Africa and South America. Also, like Brazil, but maybe even 
more, China has set its development cooperation within a formally articulated set of foreign 
policy principles65, which envision an alternative set of social relations between states. By 
looking at the principles and their formulation it is clear that this ‘alternative’ set of social 
relations includes a significant amount of economic engagement, one that also benefits Chinese 
companies (as stated in principles 5 and 6). This also echoes Strange (1996) notion of 
knowledge being primarily controlled by private entities, and as can be seen from the above, 
companies on ground in host states are the ones predominantly engaging in technical 
cooperation. While China’s eight principles of foreign policy came into existence in 1963/64 
under Prime Minister Zhou En-lai, at a time when Chinese companies were not yet expanding 
overseas; however, these principles clearly opened the way for their inclusion in the future. In 
addition, the principles have remained durable in China’s foreign policy; question is, whether 
the durability of these principles is something that remains on paper and in rhetoric, or can it 
also be seen in execution.  
 
While the above-mentioned, highlights Southern partner’s determination to include 
development cooperation as the main component of their foreign policy, the question arises: to 
what extent do countries such as China and Brazil utilise or cooperate with other actors, 
particularly MNCs, in their development cooperation efforts towards African partners as part 
of their foreign policy?  
                                                          
64 “PROSUL [Pro-poor Value Chain Development Project] was originally proposed by Brazil in the context of 
the 2000 South America Summit as a means to create regional strategy for science and technology development. 
It aims to enlarge science and technology cooperation by intensifying regional research initiatives” (Vaz and 
Inoue, 2007:15). 
65 1) China always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in proficient aid to other nations; 
2) China never attaches and conditions or asks for any privileges; 3) China helps lighten the burden of recipient 
countries as much as possible; 4) China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance and 
independent development; 5) China strives to develop aid projects that require less investment but yield quicker 
results; 6) China provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture; 7) In providing 
technical assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master required 
techniques; 8) The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities 
(China Daily, 2010).  
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This is an increasingly discussed topic and scholars such as Davies (2010) and Nelson (2011) 
claim that the private sector is a key driver of development, placed within the larger debate on 
development effectiveness (DE)66. While the UNDP definition of DE is associated with the 
Paris Declaration, therefore representing one specific view, it is speculated that non-DAC 
actors can at least contribute (if not challenge) the development of a new and more 
comprehensive definition of DE (Kindornay and Morton, 2009). However, what is clear so far 
is that with a growing number of non-DAC actors the key elements of DE have shifted to: 
exclusion of aid as a conceptual term to measure DE; economic growth is being elevated as the 
central plank of DE (increasing discussion about the role of the private sector); a move away 
from the term ODA to a broader notion of global public financing (including export credits and 
private sector loans and investment); and lastly, “the emergence of a new global development 
governance regime, in which DAC dominance is replaced by a more inclusive set of nodes, 
networks and norms” (Mawdsley, 2012:21). Again, the centrality of economic actors and 
avenues for engagement is paramount.  
 
With the new networks and norms emerging as highlighted by Mawdsley (2012) and the above-
mentioned knowledge sharing component of development cooperation, the question remains: 
who contributes to this new development of norms and who is the main driver behind 
knowledge sharing? Strange (1994a) argues that knowledge is a central pillar in the changing 
relationship between states and firms in the creation of a structure of power. Furthermore, 
Mytelka (2010) claims that the privatization of knowledge in the current global economy (most 
patents are not held by individual investors themselves, but by MNCs) has contributed to the 
growing dependence of states upon firms for the generation and application of knowledge. 
Thus, contributing to the emergence of a consensual relationship between states and MNCs 
based on their cooperative contribution to the competitiveness of a nation. While this can be 
characterised as interdependence, Strange (1996: xii) claims: “‘interdependence’ […] hides the 
truth behind a persuasive euphemism for asymmetric dependence”. This goes hand in hand 
with Weiss’s (1998) notion of governed interdependence, where the state and MNCs are 
interdependent, however, the state has an overall decisive role in all aspects of their interaction.  
                                                          
66 The UNDP defines DE as: “Development effectiveness reflects the extent to which an institutions or 
intervention has brought about targeted change in a country or the life of the individual beneficiary. Development 
effectiveness is influenced by various factors, beginning with the quality of project design and ending with the 
relevance and sustainability of desired results” (UNDP, 2001:11).  
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Considering Strange (1994a) and Mytelka’s (2010) views, supported by Davies (2010) and 
Nelson’s (2011) notion that the MNCs are a key player in both international relations and in 
development cooperation (as a tool of foreign policy); the question arises as to the role of 
MNCs in the foreign policy of China and Brazil towards developing states from the South. Do 
MNCs serve the role of contributing to the competitiveness of their home states through their 
operations in countries of the South, and if so how do they go about that? If their role is not to 
contribute to the state’s competitiveness through both development cooperation efforts, 
investments and the accumulation of knowledge, what is their role? Does the home state attach 
a certain role to MNCs, or are they autonomous actors only searching for profit (not excluding 
that profit generation may also be a foreign policy role attached to them by their home state)?  
 
From the above literature review, it is clear that numerous approaches can be taken to analyse 
the relations between states and MNCs in international relations and foreign policy. However, 
Strange’s (1988, 1991 (with Stopford) and 1996) works offer an approach that combines 
political and economic aspects of the relationship, while accounting for the possibility of 
change in structure and ownership over political and economic power between the two actors 
over time and space. In addition, in her work she touches upon the role of both home and host 
states in the state-MNC relationship within IPE. However, the home state-MNC relationship is 
diminished to a singular path of interaction where the state gives directions and MNCs follow. 
Accordingly, the theoretical framework developed below will address this limitation by 
expanding Strange’s four pillars of structural power to include Weiss’s governed 
interdependence so as to analyse the interaction between the home state and MNC and the 
subsequent role of MNCs in their home state’s FP.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework  
There is a renewed recognition that “…behind every contemporary market economy stands a 
state…” (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:332); a notion supported by Garcia (2011) who claims 
that behind a: “big company there is always a strong state, which finances and structures the 
legal and political framework for it to act”. While Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009) and to a lesser 
extent Garcia67 (2011) have clearly been influenced by the repercussions of the 2008 global 
                                                          
67 Garcia (2011) also claims that: “… behind a hegemon there are always MNCs that operate inside and abroad, 
bringing their brand and building their image with the image of the country”. 
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financial crisis in their assessment of the state, its role and its relationship with business and 
market forces; the question is whether their assessment is applicable to the current state of 
affairs in IPE, which sees states and MNCs from the South playing an increasingly more 
important role. Stopford and Strange (1991) claim that the home state-MNC relations follow a 
singular path, where MNCs (particularly state-owned) will follow state directives in FP and IR 
due to a psychological sense of belonging to that state.  
 
In a vast amount of literature on state-MNC relations, the dominant approach is still to look at 
aspects of functionality from a business perspective. The works of Stopford and Strange (1991) 
and Strange (1996) incorporate both elements of Political Science and International Business 
theory to explain state-MNC relations, and are accordingly deemed appropriate to be the 
theoretical foundation for this study. The structural power theory that Strange (1988 and 1996) 
developed, remains applicable as it describes historical shifts in centres of power, how they 
have changed over time to affect the distribution of power among different actors, and therefore 
reflects the dynamics of the state-MNC relationship. Furthermore, it is the only theory that does 
not take either political or economic aspects as given, but rather brings into question how they 
came about, how they are in the process of change, and how this affects the dynamics between 
different actors, refraining from the state-centric view that has guided IR for so long. It also 
allows for the emergence of other structures and actors in IPE; thus, given the rise of new actors 
(both state and non-state (MNCs)) from the South, like China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 
it is important to analyse state-MNC relations using the above-mentioned scholars work as a 
departure point. In addition, based on these scholar’s work which focuses to a very limited 
extent on home state-MNC relations, it is this study’s aim to make a contribution in that respect, 
to both their work and the general work on state-MNC relations in IPE. It is envisaged that the 
analysis of the dynamics between home states and MNCs will lead to a new way of looking at 
state – MNC relations, including the way they interact within foreign policy. Therefore, this 
study seeks to research what role MNCs (Chinese and Brazilian) play in China and Brazil’s 
foreign policy objectives towards developing states from the South. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms and tools used by China and Brazil in their foreign policy towards other states 
from the South, such as SSDC, will be analysed in chapters three and four when discussing 
MNCs use of those mechanisms in their operations in Africa.  
 
Strange (1997b) claims that the distribution of authority had changed within the parameters of 
IPE, but those in IR had in her view failed to acknowledge those changes. Strange (1999) 
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asserts that the inherent state-centric approach to IR needs to be moved away from and the 
study of MNC behaviour needs to be embraced, so to look at IPE at the state and sub-state 
level. This connects to aspects of both political behaviour (Boddewyn, 1988; Shi, 2012) and 
business behaviour (Dunning, 1988) of firms.   
 
In order to study the distribution of power in IPE, Strange (1999) developed her theory of 
structural power as a basis for conceptualising IPE, which was also her main contribution to 
the field of IPE. By defining power as the capacity to make decisions on four basic societal 
needs in the modern world economy – security, knowledge, the production of goods and 
services and the provision of credit and money (1989:165); Strange (1988, 1989) proposed that 
two types of power are exercised in IPE: 
 One is the traditional realist notion of power of an international actor (always a state) to 
force other actors in the system to do that which they would not do voluntarily. Strange 
(1996) defines this power as: “the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect 
outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others” (Strange, 
1996:17). In other words, power is to be gauged by influence over outcomes rather than 
mere possession of capabilities or control over institutions.  
 The other type of power is structural power, which exists at different levels and involves the 
power to shape and determine the structure of IPE within which other states, their political 
institutions, their MNCs, and their scientists have to operate. In other words, structural 
power outlines the realm within which states relate to each other, to people, and to MNCs 
(Strange, 1988: 24-25).  
 
Structural power is of greater utility when dealing with IPE, due to its non-distinction between 
economic and political power and is in fact a more actor-neutral theory (Strange, 1988); thus, 
allowing for the consideration of non-state actors in determining the nature and course of IR. 
While Strange (1988) may have favoured structural power for the explanation of IR, her work 
has been influenced and conducted in an era when the Western-centric approach to the study 
of IR did not (need) take account of the world outside of it, particularly of states from the South. 
However, her structural power theory gives space for the emergence of new actors and trends, 
as it is concerned with changes in IPE. The rise of MNCs from NIS (mainly BRICS) (Brennan, 
2011; Sauvant et al., 2010a, b), and the interconnectedness, and technological advances driven 
by both public and private actors from these NISs, calls for a modification of long-established 
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analytical instruments for the rise of companies (Dunning’s 1979 eclectic paradigm or Wells’ 
1983 product cycle model), as well as a new way of looking at state-MNC relations. While IPE 
literature has only begun to stress the implication of specific institutional backgrounds of 
emerging market MNCs on the global order (Nölke, 2014a, b, c; Wooldridge, 2012); Strange 
(1988) claims that state-MNC relations in general and stretching time, space and socio-political 
circumstances, may be explained by using either of the two types of power as outlined above.  
 
Several separate but interdependent power structures exist within the international system, and 
these are conceptualised as the four pillars of structural power within IPE: security, credit, 
production, and knowledge. Strange (1988) argues that structural power is the unevenly 
distributed systemic ability to define the basic structures of these four pillars. All other elements 
of IPE, such as trade or more specific, sectoral items are secondary structures that are moulded 
by the four fundamental power structures (Strange, 1985). Strange (1988) argues that: 
structural changes in finance, information and communication systems, defence equipment and 
production methods have together played the most important role in redefining the relationship 
between authority (the government) and market (firms), with the fundamental catalyst 
encompassing all of these changes being technology. Lawton et al. (2010:10) concurs: “The 
changing nature of technology has altered the allocation and exercise of structural power, 
through its transformative effect on the central pillars of structural power” In other words, the 
state, the market and technology together comprise the three broad vehicles of transformation 
(Strange, 1991). Each of these three systemic players shapes the nature of the four pillars of 
structural power. The question however is the degree of influence. Government and market 
influence continues to be significant; however, the rate of change introduced by technology is 
and continues to be far greater in terms of scope and depth (Lawton et al., 2010). Technology 
is not a tangible entity; therefore, the question remains, who controls technology?  
 
Direct control (with the exclusion of government/military research and development 
laboratories) rests with corporate enterprises. Van Creveld (1999) argues that in many cases it 
was MNCs rather than states, which were the first to develop and deploy the most modern 
technologies (such as aircraft, computers, and telecommunication). For this reason and because 
MNCs were in a better position to make use of these new technologies, it is in their hands that 
such technologies really took off. Furthermore, Van Creveld (1999) challenges the notion that 
firms need states to provide stability and defence; claiming that when states at some stage 
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become less capable of providing defence, parts of that task may be taken over by MNCs. This 
is already happening at large, with the rise of private security companies. If Van Creveld’s 
(1999) claim is to be taken as factual, then the state’s already considerable power and authority 
lost to the market within the international system; could furthermore be eroded by the rise of 
more MNCs (including from the South), thereby significantly enhancing the role and strength 
of MNCs within the state-MNC bargaining process.  
 
Despite the considerable move towards neo-liberal views of IR in the Western world, and the 
heightened role of market over state, the role of the state is not negated. It is rather suggested 
that there is a necessity to include MNCs as important actors in FP of states and IPE more 
broadly. However, even Strange (1996: xii) claims: “The market economy could not function 
properly without the political framework provided by the state”. Stopford and Strange (1991) 
assert that despite the increasing liberalisation of policy and falling costs of cross border 
transactions, only a few firms can operate in a ‘borderless’ world; thus, government, both host 
and home, continues to play a crucial role. This is also the core of IPE: the analysis of relations 
between states, and how each state uses market forces to its own advantage, as depicted in the 
triads of relationships figure (see figure one). Stopford and Strange’s (1991) argue that changes 
in IPE create new sources of asymmetry in the relative importance of the three sides within the 
triads of relationships, and that there have been numerous changes in IPE since 1991. The 
question that arises is: what kind of asymmetry has risen in the relative importance of the sides 
of the triangle?  
 
According to Stopford and Strange (1991), the most important side of the triangle is the 
interaction between states and firms, with state-state and firm-firm relations being secondary 
and bargaining serving as a modifying factor. State-firm interaction has become more 
important than state-state interaction; however, in their argument Stopford and Strange (1991) 
only refer to host state-MNC relations. One aspect that is acknowledged but not explored in 
depth in Stopford and Strange’s (1991) theory is the relationship between home state and 
MNCs (i.e. China-Chinese MNCs and Brazil-Brazilian MNCs) signalling that the role of the 
home state is secondary to the role of host states in their triads of relationships, despite 
acknowledging that it is important. They do not fully consider the ways in which the interaction 
between home state-MNC can influence the trajectory of the MNCs engagement in host states 
and ultimately how that interaction reflects on the relationship between home and host state. 
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Therefore, this study will only focus on the bottom left corner (in red) in the triads of 
relationships as seen in figure two below. 
 
  
Stopford and Strange (1991) argument of singular path interaction between home states and 
their MNC is particularly enhanced when speaking of state-owned companies, as they are 
claimed to adhere to any command or instruction that their home state directs at them, claiming 
that the national firm does, in fact, both psychologically and sociologically ‘belong’ to its home 
state. Klein (2006:123) concurs with this: “MNCs, particularly in the natural resource sector, 
sometimes perform functions associated with governance roles or responsibilities”. This 
statement and Stopford and Strange’s (1991) argument echo the previously discussed state-
MNC relations as outlined by Weiss’s (1998) GI theory, in which the home state still has the 
power (through consultation and persuasion) to influence the actions of its MNCs.  
 
Therefore, and particularly in the light of the rise of MNCs from the South, who are often 
claimed to follow home state directives, partially because of their ownership structure and 
partially because of the historically strong role of the state in facilitating their 
internationalisation; the need arises to investigate the home state-MNC relations in more depth 
through the application of the theoretical framework. Do Chinese MNCs really follow state 
directives blindly, because their ownership structure dictates adherence to national policy, 
and/or because of some overarching role imposed onto them by their home state? In 
comparison, while the home state-MNC interaction may in the case of China be singular, is it 
the same in Brazil? Do Brazilian MNCs (private and state-owned) follow Brazilian policies 
because of some, as Stopford and Strange (1991) claim, psychological and sociological sense 
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of belonging to Brazil? Lastly, does this hold ground in this capital driven neo-liberal time and 
across different political and economic systems, China being a nominally communist state, 
with increasingly liberal economic policies, and Brazil being a democracy with a semi-open 
market economic system? Also, does this hold ground when looking at China and Brazil’s 
foreign policy and relations with states in Africa in which their MNCs operate, where the 
heterogeneous nature of the African continent would rather warrant different foreign policy 
approaches; and thus, MNC’s varying operational features, and overall role?  
 
With this in mind, this study will first look at the mechanisms of interaction between home 
state and MNCs in order to determine whether (and if so, based on which factors) the home 
state has leverage to attribute a specific role to MNCs in its foreign policy. Thereafter, the focus 
will turn to the type of role and whether MNCs fulfil that role on ground, and consequently 
how this impacts on home state-host state relations. The aim of this study is to test the theories 
set out by Stopford and Strange (1991), Strange (1988, 1996) and Weiss (1998) and contribute 
to them by analysing the role of MNCs in foreign policy and see if, or how, this impacts on 
China and Brazil’s relations to the states in which the MNCs operate. Furthermore, this study 
aims to contribute to state-MNC theory by looking at home state-MNC relations in the South, 
and the structural constraints imposed by the home state onto MNCs autonomy.   
 
Strange’s (1996) theory of structural power and the four pillars that make it, are regarded as 
the ingredients that make the foundation of IPE, and thus, depending on who controls the pillars 
will ultimately have the upper hand in the state-MNC relation. Considering that two of the four 
pillars (production and knowledge (technology advancements)) are predominantly driven by 
private entities (MNCs), and the other two (security and credit) by the state; one could argue 
that whoever has power over most pillars, ultimately has the upper hand in the state-MNC 
relationship. In order to acquire new knowledge and increase production, expansion to new 
markets and acquisition of new technologies and the subsequent competitive advantage would 
then be limited to MNCs rather than states. However, considering that the provision of credit 
and security are in the state’s control (Strange, 1996), and that MNCs depend on the provision 
of credit and security from the state, it would mean that the state has the upper hand, as the 
provision of these incentives is immediate and thus puts MNCs in a subordinate position. 
However, the state depends on the provision of production and knowledge by MNCs in the 
long run (Strange, 1996); therefore, creating an interdependent if not symbiotic relationship. 
Consequently, if the division of control over the pillars is equal between the home state and 
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MNCs, it is argued that their relationship will be one of governed interdependence (as seen in 
figure three). Stopford and Strange’s (1991) argument, that knowledge is the main source of 
power, and is controlled and held by MNCs (in forms of technology and patents); gives way 
for the hypothesis that this control over knowledge gives MNCs a certain leverage to decide 
whether they want to adhere to a specific role attached to them by their home state in foreign 
policy, or not. This will be tested in this study. 
 
 
 
For the purposes of this study, the four pillars of structural power will be operationalised as 
follows:  
Credit – the provision of financial assistance to MNCs by their home state through national 
banks (loans or special funds); 
Security – this is operationalised as either legal security in forms of investment treaties signed 
between the home and host state; and diplomatic security in case of citizens (i.e. Chinese and 
Brazilian) casualties or diplomatic assistance to MNCs via the embassies on ground 
(establishing a footing in the host state to make MNC entrance easier); 
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Production – this will be measured by MNCs maximum production capacity realisation 
through economics of scale which can include mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures in the 
host state, as well as usage of local labour and materials (cost efficiency);  
Knowledge – this pillar will be measured based on two aspects: knowledge generation through 
innovation, including product and process innovation; and knowledge sharing through skills 
and technology transfer i.e. TC as part of SSDC.  
 
If the state-MNC relationship is of an interdependent nature, one could argue that this extends 
to all aspects of their interaction, including the state’s foreign policy aims. Interdependence in 
this case does not necessarily mean that MNCs have a direct say in a state’s foreign policy, but 
that they are important political institutions that have political relations with civil society. 
Furthermore, these political relations are deemed more important than their political 
involvement with other firms or specific governments. They are important at every stage of 
production, given the firms role as technical or organisational innovators, consumers, 
producers, sellers, and employers (Strange, 1996:44).  
 
As claimed by Stopford and Strange (1991), Strange (1996) and Weiss (1998) MNCs play a 
specific role in relation to both civil society and the domestic production sphere. However, 
with the expansion of global production and the insertion of MNCs in new markets and 
production systems, it is inevitable that they will have a specific role in relation to other 
governments, firms and people, i.e. a specific role in their home state’s foreign policy. This 
would imply that as the home state expects MNCs to create jobs and wealth domestically, it 
would attach a specific role to MNCs in its foreign policy. At the same time, MNCs would be 
dependent on the state to provide credit and security when expanding to new markets; thus, 
they would be interdependent. If the state does in fact attach a role to MNCs in its foreign 
policy, depending on whether the MNCs fulfil that specific role or not, the effect thereof will 
be felt in the relations between the home and host state as can be seen in figure four below. In 
relation to this study, role is defined as either of the following: wealth creator, national 
champion68, positive image creator through SSDC, or market access pioneer.  
 
                                                          
68 Albeit similar and often intertwined with wealth creator.  
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Based on Stopford and Strange’s (1991) assumption of a singular path of interaction between 
home states and MNCs and the cases of this study being portrayed as either authoritarian 
(China) or protectionist (Brazil) in relation to economic actors, yet also interdependent; it is of 
high importance to analyse the nature of this interaction anew. Stopford and Strange’s (1991) 
triad of relationships, supported by Strange’s (1996) work on structural power and Weiss’ 
(1998) theory of governed interdependence, forms the theoretical foundation of this study, 
through which the main research question will be answered: What role do Chinese and 
Brazilian MNCs play in the foreign policy objectives of their home states towards Africa? 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was divided in two main sections: the literature review of state-MNC relations in 
IPE, with an overview of the relations between states and MNCs in foreign policy, and the 
theoretical framework derived from Stopford and Strange (1991), Strange (1988, 1996) and 
Weiss (1998). Based on the first mentioned, the literature survey highlighted that state-MNC 
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relations in IR have predominantly been studied from either one of the following two 
perspectives: Political Science or International Business. In order to bridge this gap, and to 
account for both political and economic forces, the field of IPE emerged. However, even this 
field has been confronted with specific limitations. Literature on state-MNS relations in IPE 
has predominantly focused on host state-MNC relations, with home state-MNC relation only 
being analysed by looking at developed countries and their MNCs.  In addition, literature on 
this topic has been influenced by a Western perspective of the changes in the world economy 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This left a void, given that the rise of newly industrialised 
states from the South, such as China and Brazil in the early 1990s and 2000s could provide a 
new way of looking at home state-MNC relations.  
 
In order to research state-MNC relations of developing countries, more specifically Brazil and 
China, a theoretical foundation is needed that both acknowledges the importance of the state 
and the MNC, while at the same time allowing for changes in the global system. Therefore, 
Stopford and Strange’s (1991) triads of relationships was highlighted as a basis for the 
development of a theoretical framework that merges Stange’s (1988, 1996) four pillars of 
structural power and Weiss’s (1998) governed interdependence framework. These analytical 
tools were selected because they acknowledge that in the structural power structure the state 
provides certain incentives without which MNCs would not be able to function, while at the 
same time acknowledging the MNCs control over certain incentives that the state needs in order 
to stay competitive over other states in IPE. While all of these analytical tools analyse how 
MNCs challenge the dominance of the state, they do not negate the role of the state in IPE. In 
addition, these analytical tools can be applied in cases of home state-MNC relations as much 
as in host state-MNC relations for which they were originally developed. However, in the light 
of the emergence of new and more assertive actors (both state and non-state) from the South, 
these tools need to be applied to study the role of MNCs in relation to the home state in the 
home state’s (developing state) foreign policy towards other developing states. 
 
It is assumed that due to the provision of certain incentives (credit and security) the home state 
has leverage over MNCs and can ask them for favours as part of a larger role bestowed upon 
them. At the same time, it is assumed that due to the provision of production and knowledge, 
MNCs can have operational flexibility that extends to them choosing when, how, and if they 
want to adhere to a specific role attached to them by their home state. Depending on who 
controls which pillars of structural power, that actor will have more leverage in the home state-
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MNC relation; however, the guiding hypothesis is that the home state and MNCs function in a 
relationship of governed interdependence. This framework will be applied to the two case 
studies, China and Brazil in the following two chapters, with the aim to discover whether the 
home state has leverage to attach a certain role to MNCs in its foreign policy towards 
developing states from the South, particularly African states; whether MNCs adhere to that role 
based on whether they have their own leverage; and lastly, what effect this role and the 
execution thereof yields in terms of China and Brazil’s relations with host states in which 
Chinese and Brazilian MNCs operate (see red triangle in figure two).  
 
The following chapter sets out to contextualise the first case study: China. The first part of 
chapter three provides a short historical overview of China’s relations with other states, its 
foreign policy development and the actors involved and the modes of engagement. The second 
part of chapter three applies the theoretical framework to the relations between the Chinese 
state and MNCs. Thereafter, the role of MNCs in China’s foreign policy towards developing 
state in Africa (particularly Zambia) is analysed before moving on to chapter four where the 
same is discussed with regards to Brazil with the aim of drawing comparisons between the two 
cases in the final chapter.  
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CHAPTER III: STATE-MNC RELATIONS: THE CASE OF CHINA  
3.1 Introduction 
Scholars such as Goldstein (2013), Davies (2010) and Bartholomew (2012) argue that 
Chinese’s MNCs in Africa are a direct extension of the Chinese state and are used by it to do 
its foreign policy bidding. Chinese MNCs are important players in China’s foreign policy and 
have become increasingly more important since the 1990s. It is assumed that through the 
provisions of incentives to each other, as part of the four pillars of structural power, the home 
state and MNCs function in a relationship of governed interdependence. The provision of 
incentives such as credit and security (diplomatic and legal) gives the home state leverage to 
attach a certain role to MNCs in its foreign policy. I argue that role is guided by five indicators 
of MNC importance: timeframe/time period, sector of operation, region, current events, and 
MNC ownership structure. Accordingly, depending on the presence of these indicators, MNCs 
role will range from: national champion, image creator, capital creator, or to not having a role 
at all (autonomous player). I further argue that despite the provision of credit and (limited) 
security to its MNCs, the home state is dependent on them to provide incentives (production 
and knowledge) which gives MNCs leverage to choose if they want to adhere to an attached 
role. Due to the interdependent nature of home state-MNC relations, Chinese MNCs do not 
always have a role, as they have their own leverage over the home state through the provision 
of production and knowledge. While they from time to time preform certain tasks (SSDC 
activities) beneficial to China’s relations to African states, it is done on their own enticement; 
MNCs operate with the belief that SSDC has inherent benefits (minimisation of reputational 
risk and access to new markets). I also argue that as a result of China’s dependence on MNCs 
to generate profit and knowledge, MNCs have operational flexibility. Therefore, depending on 
MNCs leverage plus the five indicators of MNC importance for China’s foreign policy, I argue 
that the home state-MNC relation is one of conditioned governed interdependence. 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part provides a brief outline of China’s foreign 
policy, its history, the actors involved, and the changes that occurred over the past two decades, 
with specific focus on the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping era69. It also outlines and critically discusses 
Africa’s importance in China’s foreign policy. I confirm that different countries in Africa carry 
different levels of importance based on China’s diplomatic or economic motives, as well as 
other factors such as timeframe/time period. Consequently, I argue that different Chinese actors 
                                                          
69 I focus only on the last two decades since there were limited Chinese MNCs operating in Africa before 2000.  
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play different roles in African countries, dependent on the importance of that country as 
mentioned above. Related to the research question, this section only focuses on the foreign 
economic policy, with limited reference to politically motivated foreign policy. This sets a 
context for analysis in the second part of the chapter. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, I first contextualise Chinese MNCs, both state-owned and 
private as important actors in China’s foreign policy, the role of the state in governing the 
MNCs and the avenues through which their relations are facilitated. The last part of the chapter 
applies the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework (see 
chapter two) on China-MNC relations in Africa, so to determine what leverage the home state 
has in assigning a role to MNCs in its foreign policy towards African states. This is done by 
applying the process of state-MNC relations in foreign policy (see figure four) where it is 
argued that depending on the MNCs role in the home state’s foreign policy, it will either 
positively or negatively affect the home state-host state relations.  
 
3.2. Effects of China’s Economic Reforms on its Foreign Policy 
The complexities and nuances involved in a history as long as China’s are too many to be 
analysed in a concise and coherent manner in this study. Researching history that reduces 
specific problems to a simple conclusion is bound to sacrifice too much historical sensibility 
(Wang, 2014:1). There are however two dominant (self-reflexive) questions/narratives when 
researching China, that of empire and that of nation-state and the differences and 
complementarities between the two (Wang, 2014).  
 
The opposition between the two narratives is a derivative product of narratives of European 
nationalism (an important theme in the 19th and 20th century European theories of politics and 
economics); thus, the differences between narratives about China and those referring to 
European states may have several things in common. According to Wang (2014) while Chinese 
Marxist scholars condemn European nationalism and imperialism, they focus their narrative on 
capitalism as a distinct phase in history and the main cause of the eradication of traditional 
values and social relations, while simultaneously trying to uncover the roots of capitalism 
within Chinese history.   
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 82 
 
Some scholars (Weber, 1951; Levenson, 1958; and Fairbanks, 1968) conclude that China is a 
relatively self-contained civilisation with distinct values, institutions and culture, where 
internal forces of capitalism are lacking. They argue that changes that happened in China’s 
history, transforming it from empire to nation-state (i.e. traditional society to modern society), 
started with the Opium Wars (First war: 1839–1842: Second war: 1856–1860), due to the 
opposition and contrast between East and West. In short, challenges posed by European 
capitalism, imperialism (particularly British), and colonialism, and the painful confrontation of 
these factors; served as a catalyst for the emergence of modern China, implying a need for new 
narratives about China.   
 
However, these narratives were provided by the West without taking into account Chinese or 
at least East Asian narratives. In response to the above, historians such as Naito Konan (1866-
1934) and Miyazaki Ichisada (1901-1995) gave birth to the Kyoto School; thus, opening up a 
unique field of research on the history of East Asia centred on a Sinocentric East Asian region 
as a historical universe. To breakup European frameworks of ‘world history’, the Kyoto School 
used the analysis of nationalism in their argument that the 10th and 11th centuries marked the 
beginning of modernity in East Asia, through the birth of a Chinese version of capitalism.  
 
According to Kirby (1995), imperial aspects and beliefs about international relations, history 
and China’s relations to foreigners have not changed drastically over the years. The concept of 
uniqueness and national essence (guo cui) reflect certain centrality applied to all aspects of 
society, stretching as far as labelling socialism as socialism with Chinese traits (Kirby, 1995).  
When describing China’s role in global movements, modern Chinese leaders also promote this 
centrality (particularly President Xi). However, even more important than centrality is the 
maintenance of China, i.e. Sinocentrism, which is mostly visible in China’s relations to its 
neighbours (Rossabi, 1987). Rossabi (1987) notes that cooperation between China and other 
states (during dynastic times and modern times) is done on the basis of mutual benefit and 
equality; however, it is done so to obtain certain foreign policy goals, rather than a genuine 
desire to establish good foreign relations. For the fact remains that the underlying aim of most 
Chinese dynasties was to limit relations with foreigners (Rossabi, 1987).  
 
The aim to limit relations with foreigners stems from a deep-rooted scepticism of foreign 
countries and peoples, not least due to the numerous occupations that China endured over the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
 
centuries. This in turn contributed to the fact that there could not be one single foreign policy, 
as one deals with numerous people, which was the reason why there was no single foreign 
ministry at the time (Kirby, 1995). However, shortly afterwards this practice was abandoned 
and the beginning of the Nationalist period (1925 – 1948) restricted China’s diplomatic 
freedom of manoeuvre, forcing it to deal with foreign powers as a group rather than on a 
bilateral (individual) basis. Part of the reason why China lost its ability to deal with foreigners 
individually is because of its systematic exclusion from most strategic alignments and alliances 
between 1866 and 1917; resulting in the position where China had no automatic allies nor a 
tradition of trying to forge and maintain alliances. This continued to a certain extent (China 
forged an alliance with the US against Japan during World War II) all the way through the 
1960s where China suffered severe isolation characterised by growing oppositions to both the 
US and USSR. However, this also created space and momentum for the alignment of the 
countries of the South in a common united front against the two superpowers, with China at 
the forefront as a revolutionary bastion against imperialism and revisionism (Yahuda, 1983).  
 
In terms of foreign policy of that time, Mao’s central assumptions regarding Chinese relations 
with foreigners were based on historical lessons that were applied to policy formulation (Kirby, 
1995). These central assumptions include: the belief in the centrality of the Chinese experience 
followed by a determination to maintain autonomy and the ability to ‘stand up’; the assumption 
of strong linkage between foreign and domestic enemies, resulting in the need for strict 
supervision of Chinese elites in relation to foreigners; and a conviction that despite potentially 
harmful contact with foreigners, cooperative relations (if properly managed) were essential to 
China’s international security and domestic development, as well as potential aids in the 
strengthening of the Chinese state (Kirby, 1995).  
 
While the 1960s isolation from the mainstream political realm is a direct result of the century 
long suspicion towards foreigners, China’s foreign policy under Mao’s nationalist government, 
saw more pragmatism as it focused on the consideration of economic actors as important to 
China’s own development. This pragmatism was even more visible under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping70, whose realisation of importance of cooperation (both politically and 
                                                          
70 Deng was never elected head of state or head of government, but was nonetheless regarded as the paramount 
leader from 1978-1992. His legacy claims the many market-economy reforms that brought China from a poor 
agrarian country to an economic powerhouse.  
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economically) sparked market reforms, which led to China’s rise from a poor agrarian society 
to a world economic powerhouse.  
 
While the differences between China as empire and China as nation-state are minimal in terms 
of a reluctance and mistrust of foreigners, both Mao and Deng’s pragmatism have played 
crucial roles in China’s economic transformation and its inclusion in the global political 
economy in the late 20th century. However, despite economic interconnectedness, the 
increasing number of Chinese MNCs operating in international markets, and the adoption of 
liberal market policies accompanying that development; politically, China maintains the 
notions of centrality, Sinocentrism and Chinese exceptionalism, guided by communist socio-
political underpinnings. 
 
3.2.1 China’s Opening to the World 
For the purposes of understanding China’s foreign policy (towards Africa), the following 
sections will look at the evolution of China’s foreign policy from 1990 to 2015. While some 
crucial pre-1990s aspects will be mentioned, they will not be covered in depth. In addition, 
considering that this study is concerned with the role of MNCs in the home state’s foreign 
policy, this section will also focus on the evolution of the multiplication of actors in China’s 
foreign policy.  
 
Ideology plays a significant role in the way world affairs are seen and analysed. According to 
Levine (1995), ideas are crucial in foreign policy and many of the ideas that the leaders of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) have over the years brought to the arena are derived from 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. While Chinese communist leaders persisted in proclaiming 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism or Mao Zedong Thought as the ideological foundation of the state, 
in the years after Mao’s death in 1976, ideology began to lose its favourable place as the main 
variable for explaining Chinese politics (Levine, 1995). This decay of ideology threatened to 
undermine the central role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), thereby producing not only 
a “crisis of faith but a crisis of power” (Levine, 1995:31; McGregor, 2010).  
 
However, according to Schwartz (1970) even though ideology was disintegrating, “residual 
elements of ideology continue to shape the world image of Communist ruling groups” as being 
authoritarian and controlling in all aspects of social life including in relation to the economy. 
While, the Chinese state maintains Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its official/formal ideology, 
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it is ever changing and adapts itself to current circumstance; hence, it is not static71. However, 
informal ideology also plays a role and is derived from the attitudes that it encompasses, which 
usually unite contending Chinese political elites, even those that subscribe to opposing formal 
ideologies. It is uniting as it is rooted in a very dominant sense of Chinese national identity and 
Chinese exceptionalism. It is a more stable ideology than formal ideology, as the assumptions, 
prejudices, cultural values and expectations of informal ideology are not explicitly formulated 
or systematically linked together, and are far less subject to the impulses of partisan politics. 
Informal ideology, like political culture, changes much more slowly (Levine, 1995). This can 
also be seen in China’s shifting relations with African states. Despite the disintegration of 
formal ideology in the 1980s the leaders of the CCP decided to redefine it. They believed that 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was the ideological framework of long-term goals within which 
an advanced industrial economy and modern society would be constructed. Wang (1995:483) 
claims that international relations theory as understood by Chinese elites, is a guide for 
international action and foreign policy, rather than a tool or prism through which world affairs 
are observed. This way, China’s leaders have an accurate guide to the choices they face. 
Combined with this is the notion that without this ideological framework and the leadership of 
the CCP, development could not be achieved (Saich, 2001). This goes hand in hand with the 
discussion of the developmental state theory as mentioned in chapter two. However, following 
the economic boom and growing investments and trade, it was no longer important whether 
people believed in this formula, as long as they did not publicly challenge it. Considering that 
the formal ideology clearly does not form a stable compound, the question is does informal 
ideology?  
 
China’s informal ideology is nowhere more visible than in its Third World diplomacy of the 
Maoist era, not based on multilateralism but on a sheer sense of international morality. 
However, perhaps the most prominent aspect of China’s informal ideology in its foreign policy 
is the dimension of pragmatism, characterised by its ability to make-believe, to change, to be 
flexible and to emphasise the normative dimensions of politics (Levine, 1995), while having 
international economic aspirations as a foundation of its own development. This is seen in the 
use of SSDC rhetoric in its relations with South countries, where mutual benefit, cooperation, 
and solidarity are listed as the main guidelines (Nel and Taylor, 2013); yet where in many cases 
                                                          
71 Nominally, China is a communist state; however, in terms of economic governance, Marxism is completely 
absent.  
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the benefit is not mutual but skewed more towards one side (Chinese), and predominantly for 
economic actors (MNCs) (Simplicio, 2011). The importance of these economic actors is 
significant as their success, at least under Deng, was seen as a success in China’s attempts 
towards national development. Therefore, when the 1999 “Go Out Strategy” came into play, 
and formal ideology (promotion of Maoism) in China’s foreign policy was shrinking, informal 
ideology enhanced with economic drivers and actors (MNCs) turned China’s foreign policy 
into an economically driven foreign policy (Cornelissen and Taylor, 2000). This change in 
composition was further influenced by the behaviour of the US and Soviet Union behaviour, 
which served as a catalyst for what is known as the three most distinct periods in China’s 
foreign policy: 1) the Sino-Soviet alliance, 2) the Third World alignment and 3) the Sino-
Western alignment (Yahuda, 1983).  
 
While all three periods are of equal importance, this study will only focus in depth on China’s 
alliance with the Third World, as one of the main foci of this study lies on Africa. Zambia will 
be zoomed into in more detail, due to it being one of the key investment destinations for China 
and a country with a large presence of Chinese MNCs operating in the mining sector thereby 
reflecting the importance of economic aspects within foreign policy. Furthermore, Zambia was 
also one of only six countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique) that 
did not cease all collaboration with China in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
Incident that resulted in Beijing’s international isolation (Yun, 2014) and is therefore 
characterised as an all-weather friend (Chinese Embassy in Zambia, 2015).  
 
3.2.2 Liberalisation of Economy and Decentralisation of Foreign Policy under Deng  
According to Yahuda (1983), China’s primary impulse for change comes from an internal 
desire rather than an external force. With specific reference to China’s economic development, 
since the late 1970s: “There has been a progressive decline in the state control of the economy, 
with powers devolved from state agencies to enterprises” (Saich, 2001:203). This is significant 
for this study, as SOEs, especially mining SOEs are often regarded as the forerunners or 
“national champions” for developing countries who are claimed to be in control of all aspects 
of MNCs operations and decisions (Goldstein, 2013).  
 
While 1980s economic interest in foreign policy under Deng were increasing, they have not 
fully substituted political interest. Due to China lagging not only Japan and US, but also its 
smaller neighbours in terms of development, growth of the economy was Deng’s main priority 
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(Yan, 1994). This sparked the start of economic modernisations, which resulted in an eightfold 
increase (from 301.0 billion yuan in 1978 to 2488.2 billion yuan in 1993) in China’s national 
income in the first 15 years of Deng’s rule. This development had also its effects on foreign 
policy, in which Beijing’s modernisation drive consisted of two components: reform and 
openness. By the end of the first quarter of 1982 the Chinese central and local governments 
endorsed roughly 1000 cooperation agreements with a combined Chinese and foreign 
investment of US$ 290 million (Ji, 1982). Most of these investments were done in the realm of 
four special economic zones (SEZ)72 situated in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, which 
within the first year of operation (1980) attracted more than 3000 joint ventures, primarily with 
firms from Hong Kong and Macau (Yahuda, 1983). This sparked an enlargement of foreign 
policy to include economic and cultural aspects as well, as opposed to being purely focused on 
political campaigning.  
 
In 1992 Deng recognised that economics and politics are not mutually exclusive and that: 
“continued economic reform was vital for the party’s legitimacy” (Saich, 2001:70); a notion 
that goes hand in hand with the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence 
framework (state and MNC mutually depend on each other for success and survival). Due to 
the limited success of the early efforts to raise productivity and profitability of SOEs through 
the increase in enterprise autonomy, a second stage of economic reform was born following 
the Third Plenum of the 14th Party Congress in November 1993. According to Qian and Wu 
(2003:36), this plenum “marked a major turning point on China’s road to a market economy”. 
The plenum called for the creation of market-supporting institutions and emphasised the 
separation of SOEs from the government, while at the same time, for the first time, calling for 
the privatisation of smaller SOEs (Lardy, 2014:45). Furthermore, the CCP endorsed the 
‘socialist market economy’ at its 14th Congress in 1992, and in 1993 amended the Constitution 
by “replacing a reference to the ‘supplementary role’ of the market with a statement that ‘the 
state practises the socialist market economy’, […] and amended to remove the requirement that 
SOEs and collective enterprises are obliged to fulfil the state plan” (Shi, 2012:42). The private 
sector, although much smaller than the public sector, has been on the increase in both size and 
                                                          
72 Special economic zone is a term that describes a modern economic zone in which trade and investment laws 
differ from the rest of the country. These zones are usually established with the primary aim of attracting 
investment and trade and to create jobs. In order to encourage business to invest in these zones, liberal financial 
policies are applied. These policies usually involve taxation, trading, labour regulation, quotas and customs. The 
four major SEZs in China are Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai in Guangdong province and Xiamen in Fujian 
province. SEZs are also a feature in China’s dealings with Africa, which will be further discussed in section 3.3.  
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importance, and has been made “an important, integral part of China’s socialist market 
economy” (Lardy, 2002). This indicates a significant shift towards open market principles as 
integral to the capitalist global system. 
 
However, McNally (2014) and Nölke (2014a) claim that the evolution of Sino-capitalism 
cannot be understood by applying the zero-sum game, where either the state or private actors 
are strengthened. McNally (2014) proposes that Sino-capitalism evolved based on the process 
of mutual conditioning and strengthening of juxtaposed institutions. In short, China’s 
unprecedented economic growth has been driven by processes through which both state and 
private capitalist elements adapted to and empowered each other; thus, presenting an alternative 
to neo-liberalism. However, this view departs from an ongoing lack of convergence between 
Chinese capitalism and other (Western) modes of capitalism, as it treats capitalism and neo-
liberal forces as endogenous to the West but exogenous to the East. From the perspective of 
comparative capitalism, the dominant role of state agencies and national capitalists is not 
unique to China, but rather a typical attribute of the general type of capitalism that has been 
evolving in the big emerging economies. Nölke (2010, 2012) names this state-permeated 
market economy (SME) to extend the existing typologies within comparative capitalism, 
namely coordinated market economies and liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
However, Lardy (2014) overturns this view by arguing that China has maintained rapid growth 
since 1978 primarily because of the freeing of the private sector and the shrinking of the state, 
otherwise characterised as Markets over Mao. Lardy (2014) argues that China has grown 
because it has grown more capitalist, not less. Similarly, Arrighi (2007) argues that China and 
its economic rise are not an alternative to neo-liberalism; China is neo-liberalism. Whitley 
(1999), Chang (2015) and Arrighi (2007) see China and East Asia’s development of capitalism 
as internal to global capitalism throughout history, forming the totality of global capitalism 
from colonial time, to the Cold War, and to neoliberal development. Christensen and Bernal-
Meza (2014:33) concur: “China has played an indispensable role in the global triumph of 
neoliberalism and therefore has strengthened world capitalism in the current phase of 
globalisation”. This view was echoed by Key Informant R (August 2016) when saying that the 
assumption is that that state and business are closely knit in China, but that the shift from a 
centrally planned economy to neo-liberal open market principles has been very prominent, 
particularly since the 1980s.  
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China’s shift to open market principles can also be seen in that statement by Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, Fu (2006) who claims that 
contrary to popular belief: “China’s goal is not to overturn the world order but instead to 
participate in this order and to reinforce it and even to profit from it”. This would imply a 
significant turn to the neo-liberalist approach in IR and FP, as economic benefits are regarded 
as the main driver for closer ties with foreign countries. This statement is of importance when 
looking at the increasing penetration of Chinese MNCs (both state owned and private) in the 
African oil and mining sectors since the 1990s.  
 
Consequently, in December 1994, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that economic 
development is the most important goal of Chinese foreign policy, resulting in a rapid increase 
of China’s foreign economic activities, including trade, investment, joint ventures and the 
export of labour (Zhao, 1996; Bräutigam, 2009). This shift from dogmatism to pragmatism, 
sparked an increase in foreign trade (from 8 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1977 to over 16 per cent in 198173) (Yahuda, 1983); as well as investments.  
 
The situation in the 1990s and early 2000s warrants a different reasoning. China’s rising 
population, urbanisation and the subsequent demand for resources, sparked the creation of the 
“Go Out Strategy”, through which China pursues the middle kingdom in resource rich regions 
of the world: Africa, Latin America, Asia and Australasia (Cissé, 2013a). Finally, at the 15th 
Party Congress and Ninth National People’s Congress (September 1997 and March 1998, 
respectively) major reforms were outlined, which “if fully implemented would further reduce 
the intrusive role of the state in both economy and society and contribute to far greater social 
differentiation” (Saich, 2001:73). This indicates further steps to separate economy and politics 
and thereby allow for open market principles, combined with socialist principles underpinning 
politics and social relations.  
 
In addition to overarching nationalism and economic modernisation there is a third aspect to 
China’s foreign relations, namely regionalism. It has become the conventional wisdom that all 
major rising powers engage in regional exertion in one way or another, not least so, China 
(Zhang and Li, 2014). Most of Beijing’s international political, economic and military activities 
                                                          
73 Caution is warranted when interpreting these figures, as trade reflects prices of the international economy, 
whereas China’s domestic prices were considerably lower. Thus, the GDP value is understated in this ratio 
(Yahuda, 1983).  
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are directed at the Asia-Pacific region (Zhao, 1996) as seen in the on-going dispute in the South 
and East China seas. One could argue that this is due to the often-cited mistrust of foreign 
countries based on years of invasion of Chinese territory (most notably by Japan and the UK), 
therefore China focuses its foreign policy efforts strategically at the regional states so to keep 
an equilibrium. Elite Interview F (March 2016) says: “Neighbouring countries are very 
sensitive to China and its policies. They are more relevant to China’s immediate existence, 
such as the case of the South China sea dispute, so China uses more diplomatic resources on 
its neighbours”. In this sense, it could be argued that China prioritises diplomacy in its relations 
with its neighbours, while in relation to other states, for instance in Africa, it puts greater 
emphasis on economic diplomacy.   
 
Regardless of what the reason for China’s regionally focused foreign policy may be, it remains 
clear that in order to expand its influence globally, China had to undergo several monumental 
changes that have all impacted its foreign policy. Zhao (1996) claims that despite these 
changes, China’s foreign policy has remained consistent in four categories: continuous 
opposition to any party’s attempt at regional hegemony74; sensitivity to external threats; 
maintenance of support for countries of the South (albeit more moral than actual) and 
commitment to defending the interests of less developed countries; and lastly, albeit attempting 
to decentralise foreign policy decision making to include economic actors as well, until the 
mid-1990s this process was still controlled by a rather small group of people connected to the 
CCP. Saich (2001) states that even though the system may have plural interests that are highly 
fragmented with each level having to negotiate horizontally and vertically, it is not a democratic 
process. Liberthal (1992) claims that authority just below the apex of the political system is 
fragmented and that fragmentation has increased as a result of the reforms pursued since 1978, 
which in turn makes policy decision making difficult, and at times marred in ambiguity and 
fluidity.  
 
However, Zhou (1996) claims that China’s political system and decision-making process has 
remained fundamentally authoritarian in nature. This is particularly reflected in the formulation 
of foreign policy, which until Deng’s era continued to be highly centralised and personalised, 
thereby implying that decisions are based on one individuals’ (or a small set of individuals’) 
                                                          
74 This includes the USSR’s military endeavours in Mongolia and Afghanistan, as well as Vietnam’s attempts to 
establish regional hegemony in Indochina. 
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perceptions and preferences. However, under Deng’s rule things started to change slowly, with 
foreign policy decision making no longer being defined as totalitarian authoritarianism, rather 
consultative authoritarianism. Barnett (1985) describes this as a move from individual to 
collective decision-making, implying a pluralisation of actors. This shift has ultimately caused 
a change from vertical authoritarianism75 to horizontal authoritarianism76 (Zhao, 1996).  
 
According to Hamrin (1995), by the late 1980s, it was difficult for the tiny elite connected to 
the CCP to contain the multiplicity of actors in foreign policy; thus, a proliferation of policies 
was needed. This entailed issues such as military trade, science and technology, education, 
foreign publicity, trade, and technology transfer. However, perhaps the most important aspect 
of this change was the realisation that the situation requires another form of foreign policy, one 
that promotes economic development. Therefore, in 1985 general secretary of the CCP, Hu 
Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang directed that economic diplomacy (jingji waijiao) be given 
priority in China’s foreign relations.  
 
Hamrin (1995) claims that it is unclear which of the actors is responsible for the shift from 
Maoist ideological premises towards realist balance of power geopolitics and international 
economic interdependence theories. Wang (1995:505) however contends this viewpoint, 
stating that: “the Chinese leadership is not likely to opt for the logic of global interdependence 
over the logic of state sovereignty”. Furthermore, Hamrin (1995) claims that actors outside the 
central bureaucracy have had little direct influence over foreign policy; however, they have 
distinct foreign relations interests based on geographic, historical (time) and professional (work 
sector) factors. This is important to note, given that it suggests a rather informal way in which 
other actors (MNCs) besides the central bureaucracy exercise their influence on foreign policy.  
 
According to Yun (2014), in China the overarching decision-making authority in charge of 
foreign policy is monopolised by and exercised through the leadership of the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC). The paramount leader, the PBSC designated person for foreign 
affairs has the final say on all matters of foreign policy; however, “he is assisted and advised 
by the director of the Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) of the Central Committee of the CCP, 
                                                          
75 One-person domination of a single vertical command system, closed to outsiders, where political institutions 
and government bureaucracy only play a passive role. 
76 Several power centres at the top level represent and coordinate opinions, multiple command channels exist, 
both institutional and ad hoc; more players are involved in policy making, thereby representing often conflicting 
viewpoints. 
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usually a State Councillor and the highest official of the Chinese Foreign Service, who is often 
regarded as the Chinese version of the US national security advisor” (Yun, 2014:17). 
Furthermore, on the working level the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) oversees procedural 
and routine issues between China and its foreign partners. Considering that different foreign 
policy issues require different levels of decision-making, the authorities in charge of making 
those decisions will differ accordingly. Thus, procedural issues are handled within the different 
ministries; for issues that reach the State Councillor level, they will be decided on by him/her 
and the FAO. Only the issues that the State Councillor cannot decide on will be brought to the 
paramount leader. Similarly, those issues that the paramount leader cannot decide on will be 
pushed forward to the PBSC. Beyond this framework, larger matters including the introduction 
of new key policy are discussed and decided by the Politburo. Lastly, changes to founding 
guidelines and principles, as for instance China’s eight principles of peaceful coexistence, will 
be decided and voted on at the Central Committee (Yun, 2014) as can be seen in figure five 
below.  
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Considering that foreign policy issues have since 1985 increasingly included economic issues, 
the Division of Economic Diplomacy and Cooperation at the Department of Policy Planning 
at the MFA coordinates economic foreign policy issues with the Department of Foreign Aid 
and the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM). Within the foreign policy making system, line agencies (MFA, MOFCOM, etc.) 
are the primary source of information on foreign policy affairs, whose departments77 provide 
policy recommendations for China-Africa economic cooperation78. In addition, the agencies 
usually have their own think-tanks (such as China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 
attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; China Institutes of Contemporary International 
Relations (CICIR) of the Ministry of State Security; Chinese Academy of International Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), attached to MOFCOM) that act as additional 
researchers who focus on one specific geographical or functional area and keep decision 
makers up to date with the latest developments (Yun, 2014). The fragmentation of foreign 
policy decision making bodies also reflects the different approaches taken to deal with several 
different groups of states, with each carrying a different weight and importance (Gilley, 2014).  
 
Gilley (2014) divides these groups into: bordering states providing territorial security; great 
powers delivering strategic stability; and developing countries providing UN votes and natural 
resources for China’s economy (Gilley, 2014:50). Similarly, Yun (2014) categorises China’s 
foreign policy into three main areas of importance as can be seen in figure six below. 
 
                                                          
77 The MFA divides Africa in two regions and thus has two departments responsible for each region: Department 
of West Asia and North Africa; and the Department of Africa (Sub-Sahara). MOFCOM has its own Western Asian 
and African Affairs Department.  
78 “To formulate development strategies, programs and policies in respect of the trade and economic cooperation 
with related countries (regions) and organize the implementation thereof; to set up bilateral and regional inter-
governmental trade and economic mixed or joint commission meetings; to organize bilateral or regional trade and 
economic negotiations; to handle major issues in economic and trade relations with relevant countries and regions; 
to supervise the implementation of multilateral and bilateral economic and trade agreements signed by foreign 
governments with China, and conduct negotiations with foreign parties on issues concerned; to assist Chinese 
companies in their efforts to have access into foreign market; and to regulate trade and economic activities with 
countries without diplomatic relationship with China” (MOFCOM, 2017). 
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Africa in this case is seen to be the basis/foundation on which China’s broader strategic 
ambitions are built (Yun, 2014). China sees African states as means rather than an end to its 
relations with more important parts of the world, as it is the foundation of the foundation (Elite 
Interview, March 2016). Wang and Zou (2015) claim that China’s strong partnership with 
peripheral regions such as Africa and Latin America could increase China’s room for 
diplomatic manoeuvre in dealing with the West, particularly within the UN. Elite Interview F 
(March 2016) shares this view and says: “Keep political friends with Africa for UN purposes 
and support. For the UN security reform, China is banking on support from African countries”. 
Based on this it could be said that Africa plays a major role in China’s foreign policy, as 
claimed by Zhu (2013). However, Yun (2014) claims that “Africa does not rank the lowest in 
China’s foreign policy, but probably is the second-lowest, as it is slightly higher than Latin 
America”. Africa’s importance in China’s foreign policy will be further discussed in section 
3.3. While the above-mentioned actors each have their own role to play in China’s foreign 
policy, another factor causing shifts in foreign policy aims and approaches is the presidential 
figure. 
 
3.2.3 China’s Increasing International Role under Hu and Xi  
China’s foreign policy under President Jiang (1993-2003) came with a heavy burden of 
international isolation due to the Tiananmen Square Incident. Following in the footsteps of 
Deng’s low profile foreign policy, President Jiang was rather prudent and non-confrontational, 
resulting in a foreign policy lacking in splendour. However, already during his reign the 
importance of economic development was increased, resulting in the 1999 implementation of 
the “Go Out Strategy” and the subsequent overseas expansion of Chinese MNCs. President 
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Jiangs’ successor, President Hu (1993 – 2008 and 2008 – 2013) on the other hand left a different 
foreign policy legacy, one that is marked by increasing assertiveness in defence of the so-called 
national interests (Zhao, 2012). While never openly abandoning the low profile foreign policy, 
Hu reacted vociferously to all perceived threats to China’s national pride and sovereignty, 
which at his departure in 2013 left China in tension with both Western powers and Asian 
neighbours, making it “one of the loneliest rising powers in world history” (Lee, 2011).  
 
In relations with its Asian neighbours, Hu continued a mulin zhengce (good neighbour) policy 
with the aims of creating an environment conducive to economic development (Zhao, 2012). 
However, when China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2011 
(McCurry and Kollewe, 2011); Hu’s administration made a strident turn in making its foreign 
policy more assertive. China’s rise in economic status gave it an inflated sense of 
empowerment, making the Hu administration more willing to play to the popular nationalist 
fractions in society. However, with that came the responsibility of delivering public goods to 
keep the legitimacy of the government and the Party itself. Juggling its (economic) emerging 
great powers status with its narrow-minded core interests, left China exasperated, as it was 
never “psychologically prepared to play a full ‘great-power’ leadership role in confronting 
problems” Schell (2009).  
 
The appointments of Xi as the Party’s general secretary and President, and Li as Premier of the 
State Council in 2013, symbolized the beginning of China’s new political era, not only in 
foreign policy aims but also in the governing style and assertiveness79. Moreover, rising 
nationalistic sentiment (a legacy of the Hu administration) and a humble attitude of open-
mindedness and willingness to learn from others, is a challenging task for the Xi-Li 
administration (Wang, 2014).  
 
Differences in leadership from one president to the next are not based on personal style, but 
are rather tied to historical/time differences (Elite Interview F, March 2016). Although 
economic motives are pivotal, President Xi emphasises political and historical relations more 
than his predecessor, as is seen in the launch of the 21st century maritime Silk Road and silk 
                                                          
79 This assertiveness also rests on the notion that new Chinese elites are less constrained by history and more 
focused on future ambitions. Given that, both President Xi and Premier Li are the first “post-49” generation of 
leaders in China, their views on China’s place in the world and their developmental trajectories differ from 
previous generations. 
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economic belt (One Belt One Road (OBOR)). While highly profitable and market oriented in 
its core, the use of historical wording and the inclusion of numerous countries in its outline, 
make the OBOR initiative a political and cultural unicorn for China’s partners, and an 
economic Eldorado for both the Chinese government and Chinese MNCs.  
 
Furthermore, Elite Interview G (March 2016) says that there are numerous differences between 
President Xi and former President Hu, claiming: “Xi is much broader, he is more resolute and 
much less sophisticated and prudent than Hu. Xi in ideological terms believes in China’s 
national mission, superiority of the Chinese system under party leadership and has more 
confidence about Chinese entitlements/rights to play a bigger role internationally”. It can be 
said that President Xi’s foreign policy is driven by the historical notion of China’s 
exceptionalism; and thus, the perceived pivotal position that China is deemed to hold in world 
affairs. At the same time, however, it is driven by a personal need to see China rise to that 
occasion under his leadership, so to leave a personal legacy. Similarly, this can be said about 
former President Lula of Brazil in chapter four. 
 
However, Elite Interview G (March 2016) continues on a careful note: “He [President Xi] does 
not pay attention to the central gravity principle, he wants everything everywhere at the same 
time, he wants a lot of launched projects at the same time but if he should encounter problems 
he is not equipped to deal with them systematically. He is slow in adjusting to new realities 
and difficulties in comparison to Hu and Jiang”. This leaves a rather ambiguous situation, one 
in which President Xi’s assertiveness and drive leads to major foreign policy initiatives, such 
as OBOR and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as 
prolonged and further aggravated territorial disputes with neighbouring countries. The above 
mentioned can be seen even clearer in the list of shifts80 in the conceptual and practical focus 
of China’s foreign policy since the Xi-Li administration take-over (2013), such as maritime 
power aspirations, great power responsibility, and the integrated destiny of China and Africa. 
While all aspects are equally important, this study will only in detail focus on the integrated 
destiny aspect of China-Africa relations, as a wider array of countries and regions cannot be 
covered in one study.  
                                                          
80 Conceptual and practical focus of China’s foreign policy: “China Dream”; maritime power aspirations; “China-
US new type of great power relations”; periphery diplomacy (focus on neighbouring countries); setting the goal 
of the two “Silk Roads”; “integrated destiny” of China and Africa; great power responsibility; and leadership 
style: “carrot and stick” approach Wang (2014). 
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3.3 China’s Relations with Africa 
In 1965 China’s influence on the African continent was limited in terms of economy; however, 
its support for liberation movements presented China as a Third force beyond the West and the 
Soviet Union. “Because of its ambitious agenda of promoting world revolution, and its 
pragmatic and often desperate need for international recognition deemed crucial to regime 
survival, Beijing went to Africa during the Mao Era (1949-1976) with massive financial and 
military aid” (Wang and Elliot, 2015:41).  
 
In terms of assistance (financial and political) only one fifth81 of China’s foreign ‘aid’ went to 
the newly independent African states (Larkin, 1971; Wang and Elliot, 2015). However small 
this amount seems, it is of relevance in the global scheme of things as it reflected a revolution 
in terms of the status-quo of the prevalent world order and a beginning of the alignment of 
countries of the South (Larkin, 1971). Ten years later, China’s Africa assistance increased 
tenfold to more than US$ 200 million per annum, representing more than two-thirds of its 
worldwide total assistance (Hall and Peyman, 1976). However, what must be noted is that 
China refrains from using the term aid in describing its assistance to other developing countries, 
as it is seen morally wrong to give handouts to others, based on its horizontal approach toward 
cooperation with other countries of the South and because of its own domestic needs for 
assistance (Grimm, 2011). By 1975 China’s increased presence in Africa, including in mining 
activities, and in form of Chinese migrants and Chinese-designed development paths for 
Africa, contributed to the first surge in literature on modern relations between China and 
Africa, (Bailey, 1976; Hall and Peyman, 1976; Damachi et al., 1976; Rossi, 1978; Chang, 1981; 
Hirson, 1983; Human, 1984; Snow, 1988). Official Beijing saw itself as a mentor of the South, 
due to its advocacy for an increased role of developing nations in international affairs. 
However, since the 1990s, Sino-African relations have been more economically driven, 
following the general shift in China’s foreign policy from political diplomacy to economic 
diplomacy (Cornelissen and Taylor, 2000).  
 
China-Africa relations have developed an unprecedented dynamic over the last two decades 
(1999-2015), not least due to the significant influx of Chinese migrants into Africa, which is 
                                                          
81 The majority went to China’s neighbouring countries.  
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not a focus of this study, but certainly warrants a collage of studies82. However, what can be 
discerned from historical observation of China-Africa relations, is that current relations are 
predominantly being driven by economic interest, while ideological drivers have taken a back 
seat (Anthony and Grimm, 2013). This is partly due to the shift in China’s official world-view 
between Mao and Deng’s era, which can be explained by using Mao’s “Three-Worlds”83 theory 
(Jiang, 2013). Therefore, according to this theory, ideological reasons (revolution and the 
dissociation from the West) sparked an increasing alignment of the countries of the Third 
World, not least so China and Africa. However, with China’s increasing economic gravitas, 
initiated under Deng, China began to shift from a Third World to a Second World country, and 
accordingly so did its alignment towards it regional partners. However, with Africa’s 
increasing economic standing over the years, and the realisation that the continent offers both 
lucrative economic opportunities and a long-standing political support-base, China again 
turned to Africa in the late 1990s.  
 
In 1990, Sino-African trade stood at a rough US$ 3.5-4 billion, between 2000 and 2008 it 
increased tenfold from US$10.5 billion to US$106.8 billion (Alden, Large and Soares de 
Oliveira, 2008), and by 2012 it surpassed US$ 220 billion84 (Grimm, 2015; Cissé, 2012). China 
is Africa’s largest trade partner, exporting its manufactured goods to virtually all 54 African 
states; however, only four countries (Angola, Libya, South Africa and Sudan) account for over 
71 per cent of China’s imports from Africa. Out of China’s total imports from Africa, 84 per 
cent comprise of oil, mineral ores and timber and originate predominantly from Congo, DRC, 
Equatorial Guinea and Zambia (Wang and Elliot; Moyo, 2012b). Investments have also soared 
since the 1999 “Go Out Strategy”; growing at an annual rate of 114 per cent, with China’s FDI 
in Africa covering just about any industry imaginable (Wang and Elliot, 2015; Moyo, 2012b).  
 
These investments by Chinese MNCs have been supported through FOCAC, launched in 2000 
(Zhao, 2015). Judging by the establishment of structures such as FOCAC and China’s efforts 
in motivating South Africa’s inclusion in the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) grouping 
                                                          
82 For further details on Chinese migrants in Africa, please refer to the following authors (full references in 
bibliography): French, 2014; Park, 2013; Haugen Østbø, 201, and Park, 2009  
83 First world – United States and Soviet Union, which respectively engaged in imperialism and social 
imperialism. The Second World comprised of Japan, Europe and Canada, as they fall in the category of developed 
Northern countries. And lastly, the Third World, comprising Africa, Latin America and all of Asia (except Japan), 
which are regarded as exploited nations (Jiang, 2013).  
84 Trade figures differ. For instance, Zhao (2015) claims that China-Africa trade stood at US$ 198 billion in 2012. 
Busse et al. (2014) claim a figure of US$ 166 billion in 2012. This indicates the complex and at times uncertain 
statistics provided by Chinese authorities when reporting on trade and investment figures.  
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indicates several sides or motives for China-Africa relations. According to Alden (2007) 
observers of China-Africa relations and their subsequent reactions to that relationship falls into 
either of three categories: (i) China as a development partner (Freemantle, 2008); (ii) China as 
economic competitor; and (iii) China as coloniser (Alden, 2007). This notion of China as a 
coloniser, has most recently been voiced by former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton in 2011 
while on a state visit to Zambia, where she urged scrutiny of China’s investments and business 
interests in Africa85 (Moyo, 2012a).  
 
In contrast, official Beijing, loyal to its position of Chinese exceptionalism (Alden and Large, 
2015), maintains that while Western investments and diplomacy in Africa have not contributed 
to poverty reduction; China’s economic backing is giving Africans options they never received 
under Western influence (Zhao, 2015). This again indicates the importance of economic 
motives and actors in China’s foreign policy. In addition, Moyo (2012a:157) says that African 
states view their relations with China in a vastly different way from Western sceptics, arguing 
that their voices should be heard as opposed to just the Western.  
 
In general, literature on China-Africa relations is highly polarised, as it has a tendency to take 
either a doom and gloom or an overly positive stance. Hirono and Suzuki (2015) claim that 
both approaches are based on falsehoods and myths, and call for a ‘myth-busting’ approach. 
However, Hirono and Suzuki (2015) blame China and the West for lack of political will to 
solve Africa’s security and governance problems, thereby portraying African countries and 
people as passive onlookers of their own fate and neglecting African agency86. Hirono and 
Suzuki (2015) assert that the Western perception of China being a threat to Africa comes from 
historically Eurocentric international relations theories, that focus on historical periods of 
Western dominance with little attention being paid to Europe’s (and later US’s) interaction 
with militarily less powerful non-western states and non-state actors. 
 
                                                          
85 Similarly, at the 2012 FOCAC meeting, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma claimed that Africa’s burgeoning 
economic ties with China were ‘unsustainable in the long term’ (Hook, 2012). 
86 African agency is a term that refers to the concepts of Afrocentrism in which it is envisaged that Africans are 
the masters of their own fate and that through asserting their views, cultural traits and historical experiences they 
shape their own realities without the meddling of others, mainly Europeans and Americans (Williams, 2009). 
“Healthy groups of people are able to impose their reality on the world. They control their image and create stories 
about themselves, to place the things they cherish at the forefront of their expression. It is through agency that 
people practice self-determination, and are free to culturally contribution to humanity” (Shahadah, 2012). 
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Once could argue that this suspicion of China’s motives in relation to Africa, is based on the 
unprecedented economic rise of China, which according to traditional IR theories is depicted 
as something unknown (Hirono and Suzuki, 2015). Consequently, the rise of a non-Western 
power is deemed undesirable and dangerous. This view has previously been embodied in 1991 
in the words of France’s then Prime Minister Edith Cresson, when describing Japan: “…it is 
an adversary who does not respect the rules of the game and whose overwhelming desire is to 
conquer the world” (The Economist, 1991). However, lately and particularly in relation to its 
engagement with Africa, it has been applied to China, thereby resurrecting the concept of 
‘yellow peril’87 and its dangerous characteristics that frail African countries should beware of. 
This ‘fear’ of the ‘yellow peril’, implies that Chinese (and other Asian) actors, both political 
and economic (MNCs), are somehow different from Western. This sentiment is nowhere better 
expressed than by Zambia’s Patriotic Front deputy leader Guy Scott, who said in 2007 that: 
“People are saying: “We’ve had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were 
worse but the Chinese are the worst of all”” (in McGreal: 2007). Bangui (2011) and Alden and 
Davies (2006) disagree. Chinese MNCs “are in many respects, like other state-owned MNCs 
operating in Africa, for example France’s Elf-Aquitain or South Africa’s Eskom” (Alden and 
Davies, 2006:84); referring hereby to the close proximity between French business and political 
interests that ultimately resulted in a convergence or symbiosis. This is similar to Brazil and 
the connection between state and business interests that will be shown in chapter four. 
 
Moyo (2012b:157) further argues that China’s modern-day interests are mostly transparent and 
driven by its narrowminded motive of establishing commercial relationships. China is wholly 
disinterested in assuming sovereign responsibility and even more so, in shaping the socio-
political structure of host nations. Moyo (2012b) however states that it might not always be 
this way, and that China might eventually have visions of colonial grandeur88; nevertheless, to 
say that China’s incursion is a result of love or hate of any particular race or population is to 
“miss its unwavering focus on its economic motivation” (Moyo, 2012b:166). 
  
This can for instance be seen in the developments that happened after the third FOCAC summit 
held in Beijing in 2006, where new avenues of cooperation between China and Africa were 
discussed. These include the establishment of the China-Africa Business Conference, the 
                                                          
87 The term yellow peril was coined in 1895 by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, but in the context of Japanese 
immigrants (Röhl, 1994:203). 
88 The analysis of whether China is pursuing a colonialist path in Africa is beyond the scope of this study. 
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China-Africa Business Council, the China-Africa Development Fund, and the Sino-Africa 
Business and Investment Forum; indicating the importance of economic motives and the 
facilitation of Chinese MNCs expansion into African markets, and to a lesser extent the 
promotion of exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African entrepreneurs (Zhao, 
2015). These institutions in combination with the previously mentioned Chinese economic 
motivations for engaging its companies in Africa and thereby (presumably) contributing to 
African development, are traits of the Chinese model of development.  
 
It can be said that this model is based on “the recognition that the material requirements of 
economic improvement are dependent upon the pre-requisites of hard infrastructure – 
provisions for transport, communication – to mobilise the factors of production –capital, land 
and labour – in Africa” (Alden and Large, 2015:135). There are speculations amongst 
academics and policy makers as to why China decided to invest heavily in Africa. According 
to Cissé (2013a) Chinese enterprises are seeking international experiences (“Africa as a 
stepping stone”) and markets abroad (“Africa as the last frontier”). Deng (2004) and Yeung 
and Liu (2008) claim that beside the resource and market seeking objectives, technology, 
strategic assets89, and diversification90 also play an important role in China’s turn to Africa. 
While this indicates a complexity in China’s economic engagement with African states; 
Eisenman (2012), Moody (2011), Jiang (2009), and Alden and Alves (2009) argue that Africa’s 
abundant natural resources are the main motivating factors. Therefore, Africa has assumed a 
critical role in China’s quest to achieve the objective of economic growth (Wang and Elliot, 
2015; Zhao, 2015; Yun, 2014; Cissé, 2013a; Zhu, 2013; Moyo, 2012b). It is therefore 
understandable that when China first prompted its companies to “go out”, it was the 
construction, mining, and oil and gas companies that were the pioneers. Mining being for most 
resource-abundant African countries the main revenue generating business, has therefore seen 
a high number of investments from Chinese SOEs over the 2000s. In 2011, Sudan, Zimbabwe, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Nigeria accounted for 70 per cent of China’s outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) on the continent.  
 
                                                          
89 Reputation, R&D, brand names and more.  
90 Not only from the domestic market, which is highly saturated, but also a diversification of business fields. This 
can for instance be seen with Chinese construction companies that often specialise in different fields, instead of 
just their original fields of expertise, for instance Sinohydro (specialising in dam construction, but expanded its 
portfolio to include other civil engineering fields: road and bridges).  
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While China’s trade with Africa only accounts for four per cent of its global trade, 
economically Africa contributes to the legitimacy of the CCP as it supplies China with the 
much-needed raw materials to fuel its economic growth (Cissé, 2013a; Grimm, 2015). Yun 
(2014) however, claims that China also has political motivations in its relations with Africa, as 
it seeks the support from the African voting bloc (given its size) for the domestic legitimacy of 
the CCP and its foreign policy agenda in multilateral forums (UN). Gilley (2014) and Zhou 
(2007) concur that the main stage on which China plays out its foreign policy are multilateral 
cooperation forums and institutions, such as the FOCAC, BRICS, and Group of 20 major 
economies (G20). This was reiterated by Elite Interview H (March 2016) when saying: 
“Multilateral is the platform”. However, according to Wekesa (2015) there is significant 
ambiguity in the fact that FOCAC is a bilateral entity wrapped in a multilateral formation. In 
other words, although FOCAC commitments are presented in a multilateral forum, they are 
implemented bilaterally (Taylor, 2011; Jansson, 2009); thus, China sees it as a bilateral 
platform. In relation to guidelines and policies towards Africa, China published its first White 
Paper on its Africa policy in 2006, with the second White Paper published ahead of the second 
FOCAC Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2015.  
 
Both papers serve as guidelines for China’s policy towards African states and are divided into 
sections covering politics, economics and socio-cultural areas of cooperation. Although the 
second paper expanded and supplemented some of the guidelines of the first paper, the 
language used and the formulation of these guidelines leave much to be desired in terms of 
concrete measures and initiatives to be taken to further China-Africa cooperation. The papers 
speak of mutual benefit and solidarity, yet they do not provide any specific measures as to how 
this mutual benefit is to be facilitated, making it highly ambiguous. Furthermore, both papers 
refer in several instances to Chinese enterprises and how the Chinese government supports91 
and encourages its enterprises to play a crucial role in Africa’s development in sectors such as 
infrastructure and agriculture. It is stated that the Chinese government will explore new ways 
of promoting investment cooperation and the formulation of relevant policies, while also 
providing guidance, service, and convenience to its enterprises. This in turn signals the 
importance that China attaches to MNCs in its relations with Africa, i.e. home state-MNC 
relations in foreign policy.  
                                                          
91 “The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises’ investment and business in Africa 
and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end” (White Paper, 2006:379). 
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The second White Paper (Xinhua, 2015) although longer in wording, is equally ambiguous92 
in terms of execution of the things stated therein. The vagueness of the second White Paper 
(Xinhua, 2015) is clearly visible from the following: “China will support the efforts of Chinese 
and African enterprises to carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in various forms” (Xinhua, 
2015), without giving examples of these forms of cooperation.  
 
However, one thing that does stand out in terms of comparison between the two White Papers 
is the fact that the second paper seems to take a highly-institutionalised form of support for 
Chinese enterprises, by applying wording such as “China will support and encourage” instead 
of “the Chinese government will support and encourage”. This could imply two things: one is 
the increasing significance of economic actors (such as MNCs) in China’s foreign policy, thus 
resulting in a shift to foreign economic policy/economic diplomacy; the other being the 
realisation that it is not only the CCP’s legitimacy and survival that depends on economic 
development as claimed under Deng, but the stability and durability of China as a state. This 
could imply a certain advantage in relation to their home state.  
 
Furthermore, while the White Paper outlines guidelines for China-Africa relations, it does not 
allow for individual guidelines for each African state. However, Elite Interview G (March 
2016) claims: “China Africa policy does not exist in one monolithic way, it differs depending 
on needs”. It can consequently be argued that it differs depending on the African country in 
question and the timeframe in which the policy is carried out, echoing the above-mentioned 
difference between political and economic motivations (Cornelissen and Taylor, 2000).  
 
Yun (2013) argues that different countries in Africa carry different weight in China’s foreign 
policy and can generally be divided into two categories: regional leaders – South Africa, Kenya 
and Egypt; and problematic countries – Sudan, Zimbabwe and the DRC. China’ does not see 
all African countries in the same light: “Some are more important in diplomacy such as Egypt 
and South Africa, others are more important economically, such as Kenya” (Elite Interview G, 
March 2016). These distinctions are important to keep in mind when discussing the role and 
importance of Zambia in China’s foreign policy. From Yun’s (2014) assessment it would seem 
                                                          
92 “China will encourage and support Chinese enterprises and financial institutions’ expanded involvement in 
infrastructure development in Africa, [by providing] concessional loans and export credit insurance support to 
qualified projects” (Xinhua, 2015).   
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that Zambia is a third-tier country, whose importance is not as critical as other countries; yet it 
carries a certain historical and economic weight, falling into the category of traditional friend 
or an all-weather friend, a view shared by Elite Interview F (March 2016).  
 
From the above, I argue that in terms of categorising African states in importance, the 
distinction can be made between: 1) Big powers: Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia; 
2) problematic countries: DRC, Zimbabwe; and 3) traditional friends/resource abundant 
countries (main partners over time, market oriented common interest): Zambia, Tanzania, 
Angola and Sudan. Furthermore, I argue that depending on the foreign policy importance of an 
African country for China, different Chinese actors (MNCs, embassies, government officials) 
will also play different role.  
 
The unprecedented dynamic in China-Africa relations over the past two decades (1990-2015), 
is not only evident in economic terms, but also in terms of cooperation in the fields of 
education, health and civic projects, often described as part of the broader South-South 
Cooperation (SSC). SSC is often said to differ from Western notions of aid but is (allegedly) 
more inclusive as it fuses investments, trade, development assistance and technology transfer 
(Bräutigam, 2009; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; Ampiah and Naido, 2008; Grimm, 2015)93. 
 
China places a continuous effort in differentiating the way it approaches Africa, compared to 
other actors, given their ‘shared history of colonialism’94 and the shared status of developing 
country (Alden and Large, 2015). While asymmetry remains in the economic content, both 
parties recognise economic gains and political standing, such as mutual respect and equality. 
China’s foreign policy towards Africa (and China’s general foreign policy) is guided by these 
as well as five principles95 of peaceful coexistence as outlined at the 1955 conference in 
Bandung, Indonesia. These principles are the foundation upon which China’s eight standards96 
                                                          
93 For a detailed explanation of both NSC and SSC, please see Appendix one.   
94 While there are numerous differences between colonialism experienced in China and that of African nations, 
it is a go-to phrase used by China when wanting to emphasise better suitability as a cooperation partner as opposed 
to Western partners, for both its own benefit but also Africa’s benefit. 
95 The principles included: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-
existence (Grimm, 2015). 
96 Emphasize equality and mutual benefit; Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions; Provide interest-free 
or low-interest loans; Help recipient countries development independence and self-reliance; Build projects that 
require little investment and can be accomplished quickly; Provide quality equipment and material at market 
prices; Ensure effective technical assistance; and Pay experts according to local standards (Chin, 2012). 
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for development cooperation are built, otherwise known as “Eight Principles of Foreign 
Economic and Technical Assistance”. 
 
Grimm (2015) argues that agreements on Chinese cooperation are often made in government-
to-government negotiations (in the same way that NSC bilateral aid is provided). However, 
with the end result being package deals that include aid measures, commercial loans and some 
support for strategic investments by key Chinese MNCs, which indicates the importance that 
China attaches to its MNCs in its foreign policy. Grimm (2015) claims that the selling point to 
African partners are aid and infrastructure deals as prominent features, which thereby present 
a benevolent picture of Chinese engagement. However, this engagement often follows a 
business rationale, as investments form one of three (trade, and provision of development 
finance) substance elements of Sino-African relations. This is what scholars such as Ramo 
(2004), Zhao (2012, 2015), Sautman and Yan (2007), Breslin (2011) and Zhu (2013) label as 
the Chinese Model of Development or alternatively the Beijing Consensus97, which is presented 
as an alternative to the Washington Consensus.  
 
China is often criticised for applying this type of cooperation model and for not implementing 
skills and technology transfer to local operations in Africa. However, rising labour costs 
domestically and a higher valued currency in China, are now beginning to force it to outsource 
much of its lower-end production to Africa; which follows the same pattern as that of Japan in 
its relation to China in the early 20th century, termed the flying geese phenomenon. Friedman 
(2009:1) claims this pattern could extend Asian dynamism to Africa, and see African countries 
“move up a value-added ladder and take advantage of the opportunities inherent in China’s rise 
to join the flock of flying geese” (Friedman, 2009:1). This perspective implies that 
disadvantaged Africans would be lifted out of poverty through Chinese investments. If this 
happens, according to Friedman (2009:2): “China [would become] less as a model and more 
as a catalyst for [African] development”.  
 
However, this does not mean that the state of China or its government would be the catalyst 
for African development, as its biggest challenge is that it is no longer the sole player in 
                                                          
97 There are opposing views as to whether the China Model and Beijing Consensus should be used 
interchangeably; however, even critics use it interchangeably when comparing the Beijing Consensus to the 
Washington Consensus claiming that the Chinese model of development encapsulates a diverging development 
path from that of the Washington Consensus.  
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international relations (Grimm, 2015). Grimm (2015), Zhu (2013) and Yun (2014) argue that 
Chinese MNCs are increasingly taking the role of an alternative actor in China’s foreign policy 
i.e. making China’s foreign policy in effect economic foreign policy. The economic nature of 
the engagement has prompted China to establish policies to promote international engagement 
of Chinese big corporations, including the above-mentioned Africa-specific FOCAC. The 
increasing importance of economic aspects within China’s foreign policy has resulted in the 
growing power of MOFCOM and centres attached to it. The MFA is said to believe that China’s 
broader strategic agenda is being undermined by the increasing importance ascribed to 
economic pursuits; MOFCOM on the other hand sees its foreign aid and economic pursuit of 
markets and natural resources as being aligned with and serving China’s overall national 
priority, development. The question is, how does this play out in the context of China’s 
relations with African states? It has been said previously, that different African countries carry 
different importance for China’s foreign policy; consequently, depending on either political or 
economic importance of an African country, I argue that this will warrant varying importance 
of Chinese actors (embassies, MNCs, diplomats) in the country in question.  Lastly, given the 
rising importance of economic motives and economic actors in China’s foreign policy, the 
question is what role do MNCs play in this? This will be analysed through the application of 
the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework in the following 
section. 
 
3.4 Four Pillars of Structural Power and Governed Interdependence Framework 
Collinson (2013) suggests that MNCs internationalisation is strongly influenced by a strong 
government that leads the liberalisation process, seeking ways to open up access to local 
resources and markets to foreign firms. In terms of MNCs from BRICS, Cyrino and Barcellos 
(2013) and Xu (2012) argue that the prominent role of the Chinese state in regulating and 
supporting business is very well known regarding its SOEs, and that the support given to 
Chinese MNCs is obvious as it involves Chinese national banks (China EXIM Bank and China 
Development Bank). There are two broad types of state support for MNCs from emerging 
economies: domestic measures supporting MNCs in their home economies through financial 
support or regulatory measures geared towards particular requirements of these MNCs; and 
outward expansion support of MNCs (Schneider, 2009), by providing diplomatic support for 
access to natural resources in other countries or by negotiating bilateral or multilateral 
agreements (Nölke, 2014c).  
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The state’s role in the economy at large has been a highly-contested issue in general IPE (see 
section on theories of state in chapter two), but even more so in the case of China and Chinese 
MNCs (McNally, 2014; Nölke, 2014b; Goldstein, 2013; Oi et al., 2006). Fornes and Butt-Philip 
(2012) argue that previous works on the topic of state-MNCs relations in China, found that the 
CCP retains full control of the country’s affairs and that state agencies provide most of the 
country’s still-limited financial services. “Indeed, the state – and the Party – [are] central 
players in nearly all aspects of China’s economy, guiding a development trajectory often 
labelled as capitalism with social characteristics” (Oi et al., 2006:1). Buckley et al. (2007) claim 
that many Chinese MNCs remain in the state’s hands, albeit corporatized, which means that 
they still align their operations, both domestically and internationally, with the five-year plans 
and national imperatives; a notion that was challenged by Key Informant and Elite Interviews 
conducted in Beijing.  
 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and Duanmu (2012) claim the state’s control over SOEs extends to 
Chinese SOEs and state-controlled companies to follow strategic needs of their home country 
government, most notably by investing in natural resources, including in host countries with 
difficult institutional contexts (Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria). However, Key Informant M (April 
2016) disagrees: “They just need to seek for new developmental space in overseas market so 
as to escape from the increasingly fierce competition in Chinese domestic market. In a word, 
to some extent, the major cause of some SOE’s “going out” is the increasingly deteriorated 
domestic economy”.  
 
Hsueh (2011:267) claims that latecomers in the capitalist market economy, such as China, 
Brazil and India “embrace foreign competition and know-how, rather than protecting domestic 
private industry”; thus, departing from the concept of developmental state. However, they 
pursue “sectoral deregulation based on a strategic value logic, rather than working closely with 
private industry to achieve national development goals”; and for that, privilege SOEs over 
private actors when strategic assets are at stake (Hsueh, 2011:267). Latecomers have always 
initially protected their economies, including a more organised and coordinated version of 
capitalism typically steered by banks, families and the state. The state’s strong role is per Hsueh 
(2011) the main driver for China’s economic success. China has successfully gone through the 
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relatively easy initial phase of catch – up industrialisation (tier-I and -II stages), which 
corresponds with Krugman’s (1997) perspiration (or input)-driven phase98.  
 
China’s success in catching up with industrialisation patterns and internationalisation of MNCs 
in the beginning phases can be ascribed to state capitalism. However, according to Ozawa 
(2014:51) higher levels of industrialisation require freer and more transparent socio-political 
environments. “In essence, economic development is nothing but a sequence of structural 
changes driven by innovations, entailing different stages of growth. In this sense, MNCs are 
basically a creature of structural changes at home” (Ozawa, 2014:51). These preconditions to 
acquiring higher levels of industrialisation have already been seen in China’s continuous 
economic reforms that increasingly grant MNCs (both SOEs and private) more liberty and 
autonomy. Ozawa’s (2014) assessment of China’s success and development echo Lardy (2014) 
who claims that market principles have increasingly become more important than 
political/ideological drivers. Both authors echo Strange’s (1996) assessment of structural 
changes in finance, information and communication systems, and production methods that play 
the most important role in redefining the relationship between states and MNC, as they are 
encompassed by a fundamental catalyst, namely technology/innovations in an ever more 
globalised world.  
  
In order for MNCs to operate abroad, they need to belong to industry clusters organised and 
monitored indirectly by the CCP through the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) (Lardy, 2014). Shi (2012:125-6) claims that SASAC is 
mandated to consolidate functions scattered over different agencies, such as the representation 
of state ownership, and regulation and supervision of central SOEs. Furthermore, SASAC 
drafts laws and regulations on the management of state-owned assets. From this, it seems SOEs 
are under direct control of SASAC and by extension the CCP (Huang and Wilkes, 2011).  
 
However, decisions regarding SOEs corporate governance and activities are made at industry 
cluster meetings99, after which they are given to the government who will further communicate 
it to MOFCOM (Key Informant K, March 2016). Through this, the MNCs have some influence 
on policy, especially the ones that do well within their own industry (such as infrastructure), 
                                                          
98 For further detail, see Krugman, P. 1997. ‘What Ever Happened to the Asian Miracle?’ in Fortune, 136 (4):26-
29. 
99 An SOE cannot operate as an MNC if it does not belong to an industry cluster. 
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so the government will listen to them and their suggestions on policy; “question is, whom do 
they listen to” (Key Informants K and L, March 2016).  
 
While state control is of importance in China and particularly in natural resource industries, 
the extent of state control over these companies is either over- or underestimated, given that 
most surveys only look at the share of public ownership. Before the 1978 enterprise and 
economic reforms, economic activities of SOEs were managed through various government 
departments100. In terms of regulations: “China’s regulatory environment has its own unique 
characteristics; …administrative measures play a bigger role in improving corporate 
governance in China than do formal legal measures, such as Company Law” (Jia and Tomasic, 
2010:57). A unique feature was that the Company Law provides for the presence of a CCP cell 
in each company, allowing the grass-root organisations of the CCP to carry on their activities 
inside companies. Hence, the political party plays a role in the corporate governance of 
companies. This was an important theme during a number of interviews and the following 
section will highlight noticeable statements.  Key Informant I (March 2016) summarised it as 
follows: “SOEs that are affiliated to the Chinese government have very close relations to 
central government, that is one topic that Western media criticise the government for. SOEs 
always hire CEOs that are retired ministers from the CCP”. Elite Interview F (March 2016) 
concurs: “Leader of SOE is appointed by government”. Key Informant F (March 2016) extends 
the assessment:  
“SOEs CEO is selected by SASAC, the CEO will rotate within the sector, so he 
can be a CEO for several companies during his lifetime. Mechanisms are however 
put in place to make sure that decisions are not just made on government level, 
because that cannot just be imposed on companies on consultative meetings”.  
 
However, SOEs connection to government does not mean that in terms of investment strategies 
and relations with investment destinations, SOEs follow government policy. The above-
mentioned interviewees also mentioned that government control over SOEs is mostly executed 
in the domestic realm.  
 
                                                          
100 A department that was directly under the supervision of a government ministry was ranked Si or Ju, a 
department under a Si or Ju had a lower-level ranking and was called Chu. After the reform in 1978, some of the 
Si (Ju)-level SOEs were transformed into corporations, with their subdivisions (Chu) being transformed into 
subsidiary corporations (Jia and Tomasic, 2010:19). 
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Furthermore, to exercise even greater control over state assets and in extent SOEs, the Asset 
Management Agency under the Ministry of Finance, established four Asset Management 
Companies (AMC) to manage each of the four commercial state-owned banks101 of China. 
AMCs major task was to recover huge non-performing loans owed to the four banks by loss-
making SOEs, and in the long run to rehabilitate large SOEs and liquidate their stakes on the 
shares market (Shi, 2012:125). However, the AMCs abilities to revive SOEs were limited, 
partly because two critical separation issues have not been resolved: “the separation of state 
ownership from control; and the separation of the state’s role as an administrator from its role 
as a shareholder” (Shi, 2012:131).  
 
In terms of China’s foreign policy, (particularly toward Africa), one cannot discuss it without 
the consideration of agent drivers (state agencies, SOEs, private sector). Zhao (2012) and 
Grimm (2015) claim that in the realm of the state administration, economic actors are mainly 
managed by MOFCOM given its role as the central funding provider. However, even though 
Chinese enterprises are managed by MOFCOM, which is under the domination of the CCP 
itself; Jansson (2012), Kernen and Lam (2014), and Grimm (2015) claim that they are not just 
passive onlookers when it comes to policy making. They can initiate and lobby for projects 
and policies that are deemed beneficial to the diversification of their activities. This point was 
also brought up during my interviews with Key Informants I, K, L, R, and Elite Interviews G, 
F, and H. As seen in chapter two, while these firms are petitioners and the government the 
decision maker (Pigman, 2013); this may change if and when a firm crosses a certain threshold 
of size and cross-border activity. Consequently, a shift in the balance of power between the 
firm and government would occur, where each must offer to the other specific assets/incentives 
in exchange. This is of interest to this study, as media outlets and academics (Goldstein, 2013) 
would want us to believe that Chinese MNCs (particularly SOEs) from China follow directives 
of the state in all aspects of their operations and thus are petitioners or in a respect lobbyist for 
the Chinese state in its relations with other states (Pigman, 2013). Furthermore, diplomatic 
objectives of firms and governments towards one another are analogous, if not the same as 
diplomatic objectives of governments to other governments, as argued by Pigman (2013). 
 
                                                          
101 China Great Wall Asset Management for the Agricultural Bank of China; China Orient Asset Management 
for the Bank of China; China Huarong Asset Management for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; and 
China Cinda Asset Management for the China Construction Bank. 
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Elite Interview F (March 2016) said that “Policies are pushed by enterprises: they are the first 
to test the water so they push the policies”. Key Informant K (March 2016) says: “Most 
companies would lobby the government, a thin line between that and corruption”. Large SOEs 
can have significant influence on policy (this refers to industry policy, i.e. those policies that 
directly affect the MNCs operations, not necessarily other policies, such as foreign policy). 
One must know which companies do well, as they will have impact on policy. However, there 
is no specific structure where companies can exert influence other than China Development 
Forum (Key Informant K, March 2016).  
 
While MNCs may lobby for certain projects and policies (industrial policies), they also from 
time to time perform certain tasks for the home state, particularly in terms of SSDC, which 
boasts well for both MNC and the home state (Key Informants K and L, March 2016). Key 
Informant K (March 2016) also put a caveat in saying: “It is encouraged and incentivised, but 
specific companies will be handpicked”. Key Informant I (March 2016) argues: “MOFCOM 
has some documents to ask for the SOEs to do things that should give good images to both 
Chinese government and Chinese people”. These favours are often procured in such a way that 
SASAC receives policy (about SSDC activities for instance) from government and then adapts 
the policy before forwarding them to the SOEs. When referring to SSDC activities, Elite 
Interview F (March 2016) said that “SOEs, they can do something that private enterprises 
cannot, particularly strategic programs for the benefit of diplomatic relations, despite being 
risky and not profitable”, thereby indicating the differing importance of SOEs and private 
MNCs in China’s foreign policy. This implies that the home state has influence over 
companies, and attaches a certain role to them in terms of foreign policy, such as national 
champions in terms of resource acquisition, or enforcement of a positive image of China 
through MNCs SSDC activities. This will be discussed in detail in section 3.4. 
 
Lastly, while Key Informants E, F, K, L and Elite Interviews E, F, G, H said that MNCs have 
influence on policy, including economic foreign policy; the ways and avenues used by MNCs 
to exert influence over their government and its policies in extent, remains largely inaccessible 
to researchers and analysts, as it is kept in secret (Elite Interview G, March 2016).  Additionally, 
the notion that MNCs exercise influence on policy making, only applies to SOEs, not private 
MNCs as stated by Key Informant I (March 2016):  
“The private sector has very little influence on Chinese government. If they can 
influence the path it is that entrepreneurs join the Chinese People's Political 
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Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to give their voice. The most influence have the 
SOEs. There are two categories for them: 1) companies that are affiliated to the 
Chinese government that also have business in Africa, like China Power; and 2) 
companies operated by provincial and local governments. They have impact on 
central and local government respectively”. 
 
Given that the ways in which MNCs influence policy is highly complicated and secret and can 
thus only be speculated about; the focus remains on the role that MNCs play in China’s foreign 
policy. This will be analysed in the next sections, through the application of Stopford and 
Strange’s (1991) four pillars of structural power: security, credit, production, and knowledge. 
In the following sections, the role of the home state in providing credit/finance and security 
(diplomatic and legal security) to its MNCs in their international operations will be analysed, 
followed by the role of MNCs in providing the two other pillars (knowledge and production) 
of structural power in return. 
 
This forms the main part of the chapter, where the four pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence framework will be applied to the study of home state-MNC relations in the 
case of China. The role of MNCs in China’s foreign policy towards Africa will be analysed by 
applying the process of state-MNC relations structure and the use of examples from Zambia.  
Strange’s (1996) four pillars (security, credit, production, and knowledge) serve as indicators 
for the analysis of power on behalf of the home state and MNCs respectively, which ultimately 
forms the basis for the interaction between home state and MNCs in foreign policy. The 
following section will address the first pillar of structural power, namely credit provision as 
part of the home state’s role in the governed interdependence framework.  
 
3.4.1 Financing and the Role of National Banks and MOFCOM 
As argued in the first part of this chapter, different Chinese actors play different roles in China’s 
foreign policy. However, this notion of heightened importance of economic actors and 
institutions in international relations does not coincide with some scholars (Nölke, 2014 a, b, 
c; McNally, 2014), who state that China’s unprecedented economic growth has succeeded 
through state capitalism i.e. the state has the main and final authority over both political and 
economic affairs, and development is state driven. Adherents of that view believe that China 
largely avoided  
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“reliance on market forces in favour of retaining direct ownership of the 
commanding heights of the economy. Despite China’s undeniably growing private 
sector, it was assumed the government exercised substantial indirect control of the 
rest of the economy by allocating credit via the state-owned banking system” 
(Posen in Lardy, 2014: ix).  
 
In addition to credit incentives, the increasing internationalisation of Chinese MNCs in the 
1990s was supported by numerous other incentives (special funds) provided by the state; that 
some scholars would ascribe to the essence of state-capitalism. However, this is no different 
from what the US is doing in terms of tax incentives for businesses; thus, signalling the 
adaptation of state to market principles in various ways. Although the “Go Out Strategy” was 
first mentioned in 1999 in the State Council’s ‘Opinion on encouraging companies to carry out 
overseas material processing and assembly’ document, it was not before 2000 and the 15th 
Congress of the CCP when the “Go Out Strategy” was finally decided on. The “Go Out 
Strategy” was accompanied by the establishment of several funds that supported Chinese 
companies’ overseas investment, including but not limited to: resource investment funds, 
outward economy and technology cooperation funds, favourable taxation policies, and credit 
provision (Huang and Wilkes, 2011).  
 
Credit provision is done through EXIM Bank, China Development Bank (CDB), and in relation 
to Africa, through the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund). In 2003, EXIM Bank 
published the ‘Circular on prior support to significant102 overseas investments’ document, 
which stipulated that EXIM Bank would every year take a certain amount of money from the 
export crediting plan in support of these investments. CDB works in a similar way, as it 
provides a credit quota from its stock to support significant overseas investment projects 
(Huang and Wilkes, 2011).  
 
The Africa specific CADFund was established in 2007 after the proclamations of President Hu 
at the 2006 FOCAC Summit that China would further support its strategic partnership with 
                                                          
102 These investments can include: “overseas exploration projects for resources that are in domestic shortage; 
overseas manufacture and infrastructure projects that can stimulate exports of domestic technology, product, 
equipment and labour services; overseas research and development centre projects that can make use of 
international advanced technologies, management experience and intellectual property resources; and overseas 
merger and acquisition project that can enhance international competitiveness and expand international markets 
for Chinese companies” (Huang and Wilkes, 2011:13). 
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Africa through specific measures. The “aims of the CADFund are to promote economic 
cooperation between China and Africa and to advance Africa’s economic development” 
(Huang and Wilkes, 2011:13). CADFund invests directly in Chinese MNCs that have or will 
set up operations103 in Africa, and by doing so; it seeks to support Chinese MNCs in achieving 
their cooperation targets as well as enhance social and economic development of African 
countries. Since CADFund invests directly in projects by Chinese MNCs, it requires returns on 
those investments. The difference between CADFund and credit provision via EXIM Bank or 
CDB, is that it invests together with MNCs, taking on part of the risk, thereby lowering MNCs 
risk, without increasing African countries debt. CADFund is based on market principles and is 
independently operated, and thus assumes sole responsibility for its profit or loss (Huang and 
Wilkes, 2011).  
 
In addition to the provision of credit through the three platforms mentioned above, shortly after 
the “Go Out Strategy” was implemented, the State Administration of Taxation improved the 
taxation management system by defining tax exemptions and reduction methods for Chinese 
MNCs investing abroad. Additionally, since 1983 China signed taxation agreements with more 
than 100 countries in order to avoid dual levying agreements (Huang and Wilkes, 2011).  
 
Due to the provision of these incentives, Chinese SOEs are often regarded as a threat to Western 
interests (Breslin, 2012). In addition, the provision of these incentives has contributed to the 
blanket hypothesis that the home state has influence over every aspect of MNCs decision 
making and operational procedures and can tell them where to invest, based on its own needs 
(Goldstein, 2013). However, according to Breslin (2012:38) neither for state owned nor state-
controlled companies (such as Huawei) does the state really matter much. Also, due to the 
significant move towards open market principles, these principles need to be respected (Elite 
Interview F, March 2016); thus, the state’s role is limited. If the government would tell the 
companies where to invest, that would not be very entrepreneurial behaviour; it would be 
politically driven but would bring limited economic benefits (Key Informant J, March 2016), 
upon which the state itself is dependent. 
In addition, contrary to mainstream (Western) views of China’s relations to its companies, Key 
Informant K (March 2016) argues: “China also does not know everything that goes on!”. One 
                                                          
103 The target sectors for investment are: agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, natural resources (oil and 
gas, minerals), and industrial parks.  
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should not assume that central Beijing will be aware of all operational procedures executed by 
all Chinese related companies. Key Informant R (August 2016) concurs:  
“The Chinese state has progressively more so moved out of the market, and put 
open-market/self-regulating market principles in place. China has no capacity to 
deal with issues of economic nature on ground in a host country due to several 
reasons: lack of knowledge of company activities, lack of personnel, lack of 
communication between Beijing, the embassies and the companies”.  
 
While the connection between the Chinese state and SOEs is according to Nölke (2014c) one-
directional, much less well known are the numerous ways in which the Chinese state allies 
itself with private Chinese MNCs.  
 
For private MNCs the local or provincial government is more important than the national one, 
as they are in direct control over means of production, land and taxes; however, this again 
applies only in the domestic realm. Also, the ownership structure is difficult to assess, as many 
private MNCs are still controlled by the state via complex control chains. Funding from 
national banks (EXIM Bank and CDB) has mostly been geared towards SOEs as they spend 
more time cultivating relations with the government (Liang et al., 2012). However, a close 
relationship with state actors in this sense matters more for private MNCs as they depend on it 
for funding in domestic operations. However, Elite Interview F (March 2016) says: “Private 
companies are getting less support in Africa, if they go bankrupt and get finances from banks 
then they [banks] have to take responsibility and nobody wants to take that”. Elite Interview E 
(March 2016) concurs: “Private enterprises are dependent on themselves”. This also echoes the 
open market principles, which have also been the decisive factor in 2003 when private MNCs 
were allowed to invest abroad, and have since accumulated larger shares in manufacturing than 
SOEs. For instance, in Africa in 2006, there were an estimated 800 Chinese MNCs, 85 per cent 
of which were private. However, Gu (2009) claims that Chinese embassies and Chinese 
business communities in Africa estimated that there were over 2000 MNCs between 2007 and 
2008, further stating that there may be as many as 28,000 across the continent. In addition, 
there is a growing number of Chinese private enterprises established in Africa, under the 
African country’s laws, and are therefore not under the perceived control of Beijing. 
 
Furthermore, this indicates several things; the difference between SOES and private MNCs and 
their connection to the home state in FP – SOEs are of more importance; thus, they also 
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received more credit provisions through the national banks. Also, based on the speculation of 
the number of both SOEs and private Chinese MNCs in Africa, indicates that even high ranking 
Chinese officials do not know the exact number (Gu, 2009). This implies that, the control of 
the home state may in fact not be as prominent as some claim. This leads into the discussion of 
MNC registration with the Chinese embassy on ground in the host state, as the provision of 
diplomatic and legal security depends on it. In conclusion, while the provision of credit as part 
of the home state’s role according to the four pillars of structural power differs from SOEs to 
private MNCs; control of the home state over either SOEs or private MNCs cannot be taken as 
a given particularly in terms of operational decision making. This is due to China’s separation 
of economy and politics and an increasing respect for market principles; and thus, MNCs 
autonomy in decision making relating to operational priorities. Accordingly, I argue that 
despite the home state’s provision of credit to its MNCs, the home state has little to no influence 
in terms of MNCs operational priorities; thus, MNCs have operational flexibility. 
 
3.4.2 Diplomatic and Legal Security   
With the increased importance of economic ties with the South, MOFCOM has in recent years 
increased its role in influencing China’s policy towards Africa and is responsible for economic 
and trade cooperation as well as foreign aid (Zhu, 2013). In most African countries there will 
be an Office of Economic and Commercial Affairs, which is under direct authority of 
MOFCOM and does not respond to the MFA, nor is it located at the resident Chinese embassy. 
For instance, when doing fieldwork in Lusaka it was observed that the Chinese embassy and 
the Office of Economic and Commercial Affairs are located nine km apart from each other. 
Moreover, MOFCOM is responsible for the appointment of the staff of this office, including 
the counsellor for economic affairs him/herself, and the bureaucratic framework dictates that 
all staff reports directly to MOFCOM instead to the ambassador of MFA. The role of the Office 
of Economic and Commercial Affairs is to “cultivate relationships with local African 
government economic agencies and assist Chinese companies in their business endeavours on 
the ground” (Yun, 2014:22). Chinese MNCs have in general a better and closer relationship 
with this office than with the embassy itself104. The office’s role is also to convey the grievances 
that Chinese companies experience on ground back to Beijing. In order to do this however, 
MOFCOM initiated a registration system in 2005, which stipulates that Chinese companies are 
                                                          
104 Although the office is an integral part of Chinese embassies, it is based at a different location.  
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required to register with the business department of the Chinese embassy in the host state 
(Huang and Wilkes, 2011).  
 
This is a contested aspect, as fieldwork conducted in Beijing found that Chinese companies 
often do not have any kind of relation to these offices, nor the MFA, as they do not register 
upon arrival. This also indicates that they are not dependent on the government in Beijing to 
solve their grievances on ground in Africa using the MFA. This also brings with it the 
implication of different decision-making bodies for political and economic policies. For 
instance, political policy (cooperation and exchange) is decided on by the MFA; economic 
policy, (including investment, trade, and economic cooperation) are under the domain of 
MOFCOM; and the Ministry of Finance enjoys a unique position in determining China’s aid 
activities on ground in Africa. 
  
However, the MFAs role in furthering China’s foreign policy has changed over the years, not 
least due to increasing importance of economic diplomacy influenced by the prominence of 
MNCs and MOFCOM. Elite Interview F (March 2016) echoed this view: “Enterprises and 
economic relations are most important pillars for African relations. In the FOCAC action plan, 
measures are decided by MOFCOM. Thus, MOFCOM is more important than MFA depending 
on situation”. While this indicates that there are numerous stakeholders in China’s foreign 
policy towards Africa, they often have differing priorities and conflicting interests (Elite 
Interview E, March 2016). Indeed, “the MFA has its weak position in the governmental 
institution of China. The overseas economic issues are mainly on the head of the Ministry of 
Commerce and is little involved in MFA. Chinese MNCs don’t need to be responsible for MFA 
and MFA has little impact on MNCs” (Key Informant M, April 2016). In addition, Elite 
Interview E (March 2016) said that “Commercial section of embassies in Africa are dispatched 
by MOFCOM, not MFA”; which means they take the initiative to report to Beijing on the 
feasibility of investments. However, as mentioned in section 3.4.1 if the home state would tell 
MNCs where to invest, it would not be according to market principles; thus, MNCs have 
operational flexibility and can decide if they want to invest in a specific destination or not.  
 
In relation to MNC registration in host country, in Zambia for instance, businesses need to 
register with the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA), once they enter the Zambian market. 
However, there is no way of knowing how many Chinese companies there are in Zambia, let 
alone throughout the African continent (Gu, 2009), as many avoid making the initial contact in 
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fear of incrimination or judgment (Key Informant N, May 2016). Combined with the above-
mentioned non-registration with the Chinese embassy in the host state, this has significant 
repercussions for MNCs in terms of security (diplomatic and legal). 
 
When asked whether the home state would protect its MNCs operating in Africa in case of 
legal trouble, the answers were formed differently, but boiled down to the same: the Chinese 
state would not protect its MNC (regardless of ownership structure), unless it involves Chinese 
citizen casualties. From my primary data collected, I can highlight two quotes to illustrate this 
point:  
 
Elite Interview H (March 2016) says: “Some Chinese companies never go to register with the 
Chinese embassy in the county in which they operate, so they turn a blind eye to the rules, so 
the government will not protect them if they should require legal protection”.  
 
Host state issues are also considered important factors in evaluating MNCs performance, 
indicating the importance of adherence to host state laws, particularly those pertaining to 
environmental and labour issues. Elite Interview G (March 2016) says that the home state first 
encourages the MNCs to do good and abide by the rules of the host state. However, due to lack 
of knowledge of the way things work in Africa, the home state and MNCs find themselves in 
often troublesome territory, and then if the MNC should get into trouble, the home state will 
not bail it out.  
 
In fact, according to Huang and Wilkes (2011) MOFCOM, MFA and SASAC jointly published 
the ‘Circular to regulate the overseas investment and cooperation of Chinese companies’ in 
2008, which stipulates that companies that violate laws and regulations and cause serious 
incidents in the recipient country will be penalised. This penal system is based on point 
deductions, and stipulates that breach of host state laws will result in 10 per cent point 
deduction. According to Huang and Wilkes (2011) this has repercussions for the MNCs, as a 
low percentage score could mean deprivation of benefits such as credit and special fund 
support. However, there are no explanations given as to how the deduction of points is 
facilitated, nor how the home state will go about this and what information channels it uses to 
find out if MNCs are not performing according to standards. 
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In addition, breach of rules by MNCs in host countries does not necessarily mean breach of 
Chinese rules (Elite Interview E, G, H, March 2016). Also, due to a very strong idea of market 
liberalism, particularly under the current leadership (2017), China sees politics and economics 
as separate and is therefore reluctant to get dragged into business disputes. In addition, 
meddling in business disputes in a host state would mean breach of the non-interference policy.  
Therefore, China will not meddle in domestic (host state) disputes.  
To illustrate this Key Informant K (March 2016) said:  
“If a company loses face then they will try and rectify the situation by taking the 
CEO and punish him and make him laughing stock”; “Even if you broke both 
Chinese and host country law, they will not bail you out because they will not have 
time to deal with that and it would be breach of the non-interference policy because 
it would be a change of the host country law!”.  
 
During an interview conducted in Beijing, Elite Interview E (March 2016) commented the 
following on the topic of legal protection: “If the companies do not abide by the laws of the 
African countries, the Chinese government wants them to be punished, they will not protect 
them. If, however they do abide by the laws, but there are issues, the Chinese embassy on 
ground has to protect them”. To confirm the above, during Elite Interview J (May 2016) the 
respondent specifically referred to the example of METOREX and commented that the Chinese 
government would not intervene if Chinese MNCs are in legal trouble in Zambia, as all 
contractual obligations are tied to Zambian law, which indicates that China is more aligned 
with the global system that uses international investment treaties as opposed to its own.  
 
Lastly and most importantly, legal security cannot be considered without discussing the current 
global investment regime, which is faced with structural challenges due to the increasing 
discomfort about the effects of security measures (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015). In this 
sense security measures refers to International investment agreements, the most common of 
which are bilateral investment treaties (BITs)105. In addition to specifying the terms of 
investments, BITs also specify the degree of protection and compensation that investors can 
expect in volatile situations, such as war or civil unrest in the host country. The most important 
element however relates to dispute settlement between the investor and the host state, otherwise 
                                                          
105 BITs are defined as: “an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection of investments 
made by investors from respective countries in each other’s territory” (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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known as Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). These ISDS have also increasingly become 
a point of debate and unrest, as their controversial content often allows for the protection of 
private property at the expense of the host state’s rights to regulate in the public interest. This 
has sparked an increase in alternative measures, such as state-state dispute settlements (SSDS) 
where in case of legal trouble in a host state, the MNCs would not be involved in the dispute 
settlement if it reached the court level. Instead the dispute would be escalated to a home state-
host state dispute (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015); thereby indicating a certain level of 
home state protection for its MNCs. In addition, there are avenues that can be pursued to resolve 
disputes, such as domestic arbitration (home state laws) or international arbitration, which 
effectively places the control of the dispute into third party hands according to international 
investment laws.  
 
Contrary to widespread belief, China prefers international arbitration instead of domestic 
arbitration to solve disputes between MNCs and host states (Key Informant E and Elite 
Interview E, F, G, H, March 2016). This serves as an important comparative element with my 
second case study, Brazil, and will be further commented on in chapters four and five.  
 
Given that China mostly leaves SOE legal issues to be resolved either by host country laws or 
by international arbitration, it was expected that it would care even less about private Chinese 
companies’ legal troubles in a host country. This topic was explored during data collection and 
Elite Interview H (March 2016) said: “Corner Mining Company in Zambia is a private Chinese 
company. Chinese diplomats in Zambia are very angry at the company and other private 
Chinese companies for bad behaviour, the Chinese government has no willingness to protect 
them if they get into legal trouble”. This quote suggests that there is little difference in the 
provision of legal protection regarding private and public MNCs. Again, on the topic of private 
MNCs, it was also further pointed out by Key Informant F (March 2016): “MOFCOM and 
SASAC do not have direct control over private companies, so they use blacklisting if the 
companies do something wrong”. However, this is mostly related in case of domestic issues. 
 
From the above it can be distinguished that the Chinese government is supportive of its 
enterprises as it provides credit (mostly through China Development Bank and China Exim 
Bank) and some form of diplomatic security, albeit more in form of paving the way for Chinese 
MNCs to enter the host state more easily. This suggests that the government mostly serves as 
a service provider in terms of establishing bilateral relations with national and local 
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governments of host states. This was echoed by Key Informant J (March 2016): “The 
government is just a waiter for the entrepreneurs! They can do service work for Chinese 
investments, they must pave the way for the companies to enter the market!”. 
 
The discussion of security and credit as the first two pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence framework has confirmed several aspects. First, through the provision of 
incentives (security and credit), the home state (China) has leverage over its MNCs, albeit 
limited. The conditionality attached to the provision of security (no legal protection for 
MNCs106) proves the security incentive to be of limited significance, only in as much as China 
assists its MNCs with diplomatic ties with the host state. Second, due to increasing shifts 
towards market liberalism in China, the state’s role of providing credit to MNCs is no longer 
an incentive for MNCs to go abroad (it was in the early 1990s) but a beneficial aspect for both 
home state and MNCs; thus, creating an interdependent relationship. The analysis of 
interdependence continues when looking at the provision of production and knowledge as part 
of the MNCs role in the structural power and governed interdependence framework as will be 
seen in the following section.  
 
3.4.3 MNCs Production Responsibility  
Production is one of two of MNCs domains in the four pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence framework. Output of Chinese SOEs has however not been as envisaged 
(Shen, 2013). There are however avenues that China can pursue to get companies to perform 
better. These include incentives such as provision of more credit, but also awards and 
punishments, like point deductions (as explained in the previous section); thus, placing the state 
at the forefront again. In order to ensure that SOEs remain competitive and increase their 
profitability and the value of assets under their control, the State Council established SASAC 
in 2003, whose existence is based on the government’s directive for it to transform large SOEs 
into “national champions” (Lardy, 2014:49). However, Clarke (2003) argues that it is debatable 
whether SASAC can achieve this objective, given that it controls over 120 national companies. 
 
Another avenue that is often pursued in order to boost MNCs productivity, and was frequently 
used during the Hu and Wen era (2003-13), is the promotion of industrial policies geared 
towards SOEs at the expense of private and foreign firms, yet again in the domestic realm. 
                                                          
106 Only when there are Chinese civilian casualties involved. 
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However, it was largely unsuccessful, as efficiency of SOEs is at 1/3 of private firms according 
to Lardy (2014).  
 
This sparked the debate about the dramatic increase in the number of private domestic and 
foreign MNCs and a decline in SOEs (Elliott and Zhou, 2013). The rise of private MNCs and 
the decline of SOEs is easiest to measure in the manufacturing sector. The number of private 
MNCs by sector in 2009 indicates that out of 7, 402 000 companies, 1,745 000 were in 
manufacturing, 2, 632 000 in wholesale and retail trade, 367 000 in construction, and 60 000 
in mining (All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and China Non-state (Private) 
Economy Research Association (2011)). 
 
In terms of Chinese MNCs sluggish performance domestically, one of the respondents that was 
interviewed, commented the following: “You cannot just shut them down, so you have to make 
them transform and transport to Africa” (Elite Interview F, March 2016). This was also echoed 
by Elite Interview G (March 2016): “Expansion in Africa is easier than establishing domestic 
ties and operations”. This fits in with the structural pillar of production, given that overcapacity 
in the domestic market, forces MNCs to look for market and production options elsewhere.  
 
In Africa, Xu (2013) claims that by 2011, 36 per cent of private Chinese projects were in the 
manufacturing and 22 per cent in the service sector, compared to SOEs holding 35 per cent in 
construction and 25 per cent in mining. This indicates how little SOEs engage in manufacturing 
(only 6 per cent) and how small the private sector’s involvement in the construction sector is 
(only 5 per cent) (Xu, 2013). However, one thing that stands out is the increase of private 
MNCs investing in capital intensive sectors and catching up with their SOE peers, reaching a 
total of 16 per cent of the total investments by end of 2011 (Xu, 2013). Nevertheless, SOEs 
comprise roughly 30 per cent of Chinese MNCs in Africa, and they account for roughly 70 per 
cent of contracts, predominantly in mining and infrastructure. SMEs are more engaged in 
agriculture and manufacturing, considering that incentives to invest in capital intensive sectors 
are limited and mostly geared towards SOEs.  
 
Furthermore, if a company is not performing as it should (production is lacking or 
environmental protection measures are not adhered to), China will not deregister or close it 
down as that is more of a hassle than getting them to rectify their wrongdoing. The following 
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quote relates to this: “The attitude is: if there is a problem overseas, you [the MNC] fix it!” 
(Key Informant K, March 2016).  
 
Elliott and Zhou (2013) on the other hand argue that the declining number and productivity 
levels of SOEs is a misconception. They claim that SOEs are in fact stronger than ever; placing 
a caveat saying that performance and productivity levels of SOEs differs markedly between 
those that export and those that only supply the domestic market. According to Cavusgil 
(1980), historically, MNCs that only export have a significantly lower production output 
compared to those that diversify their operations, as export accounts for only 10 per cent of 
production. This indicates that those SOEs that have focused on international competitiveness 
and a diversified operations portfolio are significant global players.  
 
While in the domestic realm, Chinese citizens whose tax money has been poured into non-
performing SOEs, have become increasingly dissatisfied with SOEs (Key Informant L, March 
2016); an incentive given to well performing SOEs is the Most Touching Chinese Company 
award, given by an NGO. Key Informant F (March 2016) says: “Good that they are giving 
award instead of MOFCOM, gives the company more credibility as good doers”. The domestic 
dissatisfaction with SOEs and the increasing complaints from private business and intellectuals 
has also caused the government to adjust its tune towards private business, as they have 
historically paid too much attention to SOEs (Elite Interview G, March 2016).  
 
It was mentioned earlier that the private sectors degree of influence on industrial policies 
depends on its relations and proximity to (local) government. To explain this, Saich (2001) 
says that in Xiqiao Township in Guangdong: “…local officials do not give priority to publicly 
– owned industry over the private sector and […] they do not insist on relationships in which 
private enterprises are subordinate to and dependent on them”. In a similar fashion, Zhang 
(1995) claims the same about Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, where market forces guide 
enterprises and local government does not interfere. The same can be applied in relation to 
private MNCs operating in Africa, where the dependence on the home state is logistically more 
difficult as companies often operate in settings where official Beijing has no surveillance 
capacity, nor do the Chinese embassies on ground have overview of companies (Yun, 2014; 
Xu, 2013). This means that MNCs are left to their own devices and have to find their own way 
of doing things to the benefit of the company and its reputation.  
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Based on the previously mentioned provision of credit by the home state (China) to its MNCs, 
predominantly SOEs, and the still high numbers of Chinese SOEs operating in Africa as 
opposed to private Chinese MNCs; it could be argued that the SOEs carry a bigger importance 
in China’s foreign policy. In addition, Chinese SOEs increasing internationalisation of their 
operations and the increasing focus on diversification of their operations, has placed them in a 
privileged position to negotiate better terms with their home state. Conclusively, despite their 
productivity at times being not as expected, the fact that they are important players in China’s 
foreign policy places them at the same level as the home state in the governed interdependence 
structure. 
. 
3.4.4 MNCs Knowledge Generation 
In the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework, it was 
stipulated that MNCs control two of the pillars: production and knowledge. Knowledge is 
regarded as the most important pillar (Strange, 1996); thus, who controls knowledge controls 
the ultimate power in the governed interdependence framework. Strange (1994a) argues that 
knowledge is a central figure in the changing relationship between states and MNCs. 
Privatization of knowledge in the current global economy (most patents are held by MNCs) 
has contributed to the growing dependence of states upon firms for the generation and 
application of knowledge (Mytelka, 2010). Thus, contributing to the emergence of a consensual 
relationship between states and MNCs based on their contribution to the competitiveness of a 
nation. 
 
It was argued in chapter two that technological progress in developing countries is in fact 
technological catch-up through learning rather than the invention of new products and 
processes. The OECD (2005b) says latecomers usually innovate through a form of creative 
imitation, or a form of linkage, learning, leverage (Matthews, 2006). This implies that they link 
their operations with already existing ones from the developed world and acquire knowledge 
and know-how to have leverage to establish their own competitive advantage in a specific 
industry. This highlights the aspect of innovation not being based on invention of products, but 
rather ways of doing business.  
 
Lall (1990) claims that technological capabilities of a firm comprise of three characteristics: 
production, investment and linkage. These involve skills and knowledge to operate a plant 
efficiently, and to have knowledge about process, product and organisational structures. 
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Linkage capabilities refers to the skills, knowledge and experience necessary to promote or 
foster interactive learning or transfer technology from one firm to another, from service firms 
to manufacturers and from the Science and Technology infrastructure to industry. In short, 
forging cooperation between managers and workers within a firm and securing cooperation 
between firms and the wider institutional milieu locally, regionally and globally, is critical for 
the building of capabilities (Cooke and Morgan, 2000). 
 
In terms of Chinese MNCs control of knowledge, it was noted by Elite Interview E (March 
2016) that previously, SOEs only imported technology and knowhow from the West, and there 
was no innovation. This echoes the above-mentioned imitation as a way to innovate. It must be 
noted, however, “Accumulation of knowledge is [still] limited, but more and more important, 
from all actors and sides” (Key Informant F, March 2016). This has changed significantly and 
SOEs nowadays realise that without innovation and knowledge generation, their existence is 
in danger.  
 
While Chinese SOEs may not be great innovators in terms of products, it was mentioned above 
that knowledge creation has many forms, and can encompass process innovation as well as. 
While the linkage, learning, leverage framework (Matthews, 2006) stipulates that latecomers 
link their operations with already existing ones from the developed world and thereby acquire 
knowledge and know-how to have leverage to establish their own competitive advantage in a 
specific industry; this is debated in the case of China. Another way to generate knowledge and 
innovate is through further immersion in markets where different institutional settings and 
business environments offer new avenues for knowledge acquisition. In terms of Chinese 
MNCs engagement in Africa, Chinese MNCs have been accused of operating in dangerous 
environments and in countries known for human rights abuses (Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC) 
where Western companies will not operate (Chen et al., 2015; Sun and Olin-Ammentorp, 
2014). However, by operating in such environments Chinese MNCs acquire a different set of 
skills, as they have to deal with difficult institutional and political backgrounds, geographical 
areas that are difficult to reach, for example Gabon’s Belinga Iron ore mine, and terrain that 
requires adaptation and development of new ways of doing business. Thus, they are innovating 
in terms of process or organisational patterns, which contributes to their competitiveness and 
opens ways to new markets.  
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In order to get access to new markets however, MNCs also depend on the provision of 
knowledge in their existing operations, as knowledge generation is a circular task. In short, 
knowledge acquisition cannot happen without knowledge provision and vice versa. Key 
Informant E (March 2016) echoed this view: “If there is no knowledge transfer the company 
will have significant reputational risk”. Reputational risk can potentially deter other host states 
in allowing that particular company entrance into its markets.  
 
In terms of Chinese mining MNCs, a prevailing myth is that they are only in Africa to extract 
mineral resources without caring for the local population or contributing to local development 
through job creation and skills transfer. Bräutigam (2015) argues that this is far from being 
accurate, as “in 2014 alone, Chinese companies signed over US$70 billion in construction 
contracts in Africa that will yield vital infrastructure, provide jobs, and boost the skill set of the 
local workforce”. Technology companies have also done much to accelerate local 
development, as can be seen from the case of Huawei, which established a training school in 
Abuja, Nigeria in 2005. This school has been enhancing the skills of local engineers who are 
underpinning Africa’s telecommunication revolution thorough a fast rollout of cell phones 
(Bräutigam, 2015). Another example is Hisense, a state-owned Chinese white goods 
electronics manufacturer that has been in the South African TV market since 1996. Hisense 
has since then significantly expanded its operations, working with local distributors and local 
retailers. In addition, Hisense employs more than 500 workers in its TV manufacturing factory 
on the outskirts of Cape Town, 98 per cent of which are locals from the underdeveloped 
Atlantis community (Kim, 2016).    
 
Another aspect of Chinese engagement that has been regarded as negative is the import of 
Chinese labourers and Chinese equipment for African mine projects (Bräutigam, 2015); 
however, Key Informant L (March 2016) says: “If they bring engineers to work in Africa they 
will give scholarships for African students to study in China. They are open to knowledge 
transfer and through this they get to do skills transfer. Through this technology transfer they 
also open more markets for themselves”. In addition, by opening pathways to enter new 
markets they also increase their capacity for the generation and acquisition of new knowledge. 
This is another important comparative theme that will be further explored in the following 
chapter on Brazil and in the final comparative analysis of the two selected cases for this study.  
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On the topic of skills and technology transfer, Chinese SOEs have training programs for local 
workers. For instance, in Zambia they have training programs for medium managers. Also, 
they often provide workers with scholarships to go study in China. This echoes Cooke and 
Morgan’s (2000) argument that by forging cooperation between managers and workers within 
a firm and securing cooperation between firms and the wider institutional milieu locally, 
regionally and globally, they build up capabilities both for the workers and for the company. 
In addition, they provide more and more scholarships to African students that they send to 
China for Bachelor and Master’s degrees; however, under the condition that they come back 
and work for the company for a specific time (Elite Interview E, March 2016). “However, some 
Africans that are trained in China and have to go back to work for the company often quit to 
find better jobs, so they breach contracts. Bilateral agreements include technology transfer, but 
official Beijing cannot control what you [MNC] do on ground, nor what students do with their 
education provided in China” (Elite Interview E, March 2016). This again indicates that the 
assumption of a controlling home state does not always hold ground in China. 
 
However, this implies that MNCs do engage in skills and technology transfer, sometimes due 
to China’s incentives (as some SOEs will be handpicked to do SSDC, Key Informant I, K, 
March 2016) but predominantly due to own survival objectives and further market access. 
Thus, individual MNCs motives (profit, market access, survival) are on par in terms of value, 
as the home states incentives; therefore, the typical depiction of China’s top-down exercise of 
control, or also known as corporatism (as outlined by Weiss (1998) as one of the state’s 
capacities in relation to MNCs), is not applicable in all cases. Furthermore, the development of 
new (social) organisations can have considerable impact on the policy-making process by 
maintaining strong linkages to the home state (and party), implying an interdependent 
relationship between home state and MNCs as outlined by Weiss (1998).  
 
Provision of production and knowledge as two of the four pillars of structural power is the 
responsibility of MNCs. Limited provision thereof would imply that MNCs are subordinate to 
the home state in the structural power framework, as the state provides them with much needed 
credit. However, the state also depends on the MNCs generation of profit, acquisition of 
knowledge, and the immersion in new markets, which in turn depends on the MNCs knowledge 
transfer and minimisation of reputational risks. This gives MNCs operational flexibility. This 
operational flexibility is preconditioned by the fact that profit and market access open the 
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possibility of greater production and knowledge acquisition along the way, yet, MNCs have to 
tread new waters at their own expense, as the state will not protect them. In cases of their 
misbehaviour, the state will also not intervene as seen above, which is ascribed to the logistical 
and bureaucratic constraints that deregistration or shut-down poses. 
 
Moreover, MNCs knowledge transfer initiated on their own, places them in an opportune 
position to acquire more knowledge and profit due to two reasons: one; by transferring skills 
and knowledge in their local operations, MNCs portray themselves as “good-doers” which 
provides them with competitive advantage in terms of further market access. Second to that, it 
indirectly reflects a positive picture of China, associating the MNC with its home state. Two, 
through immersion in new markets, acquisition of new skills and technology (knowledge), and 
the creation of a positive image for themselves and their home states, puts MNCs on par with 
their home state in the governed interdependence structure. Stopford and Strange (1991) argue 
that in the context of host state-MNC relationships, whoever controls knowledge controls 
power. However, they regard home state-MNC relationships as one directional (power resides 
with the state). I concur with the first hypothesis and extend this to home state-MNCs based on 
this case study: Chinese MNCs operating in developing states in Africa get market access 
through the assistance of the home state. However, through further immersion into the global 
economy they garner knowledge, and thus, power. Therefore, the home state-MNC relationship 
is not one directional, but rather one of governed interdependence as both home state and 
MNCs depend on each other as seen in table three below. 
 
 
The following section will focus on selected Chinese mining MNCs operations in Africa, with 
focus on the analysis of the relations between the home state and MNCs in foreign policy. The 
aim is to see whether the relationship as outlined above is in fact interdependent, even with 
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MNCs playing different roles in their home states foreign policy. The discussion will be guided 
by figure four (the process of home state-MNC relations in foreign policy) in chapter two (also 
regarding figure three, previously engaged with).  
 
3.5 MNCs Role in China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa 
Of critical importance to the discussion of Chinese foreign policy goals and implementation in 
Africa, is the notion of role attached to MNCs by the home state.  Case in point: with the launch 
of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in 2015, MNCs (either SOEs or private) from 
varying sectors play a crucial role. Elite Interview H (March 2016) states: “When it relates 
closely to national strategy (for instance OBOR) the company will give input for the party to 
make adjustments for its policy!”. OBOR being initiated by President Xi confirms the 
previously mentioned presidential ambitions. In addition, the revitalisation of the maritime Silk 
Road, signalises the importance of Africa as foundation of China’s foreign policy. Also, I argue 
that although the Africa connection as stated in plans and maps of OBOR only positions 
Djibouti and Kenya as pivotal to the maritime silk road, other Chinese infrastructure and 
mining projects across Africa (predominantly East and Southern Africa) are equally important, 
as they tie in with OBOR. Clarification is however needed on the concept of importance. As 
an example: the importance of OBOR relates to national strategy; mining, to national strategy 
and China’s economic development over time and the activities of Hisense and Huawei to 
technological advancements. As time and interests change, so does the importance of specific 
MNCs, and therefore their role in China’s foreign policy. Thus, the following five indicators 
of MNCs importance can he highlighted:  
1) Timeframe/time period aspect – “Influence from enterprises is increasing compared to 
10 years ago” also based on the shifts from political to economic foreign policy; 
2) Sector importance – “Point is the sector in which they operate, so infrastructure may be 
more important as it is connected to the country’s image: if this is the case then the influence 
will be bigger”  
3) Ownership structure and size of company – “Different enterprises ownership, joint 
venture (ZTE, Huawei, Lenovo, not purely private enterprises), SMEs and SOEs; role is 
different depending on ownership and size (output matters), even if it is state owned it may not 
be that relevant” 
4) Region of operations – “region is the fourth important part: if remote area, it may not 
be relevant for China. Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria important currently”  
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5) Events in and around region of operations – “If something unexpected happens, the 
MFA has no information as to how to handle it, so companies play major role in giving 
information: comparative advantage between government and company”  
 
Thus, the linkages between governed interdependence (home-state MNC) and the process of 
state-MNC relations in foreign policy can be explained by looking at figure seven below:  
 
Figure seven shows that the state’s power in attaching a role to MNCs in its foreign policy 
depends on the presence of the five indicators of MNC importance. The state’s influence on 
MNC decisions and their role in its foreign policy will differ according to the presence of the 
five indicators. In other words, if an MNC only has one indicator present, importance will be 
lower, than in the case of four or five; thus, the role will rank proportionately and can include 
the role of national champion, image creator, market expansionist, but it can also mean that 
there is no specific role attached. Indeed, Key Informant R (August 2016) stated that in areas 
of high political attention (event indicator), there will be a significant amount of state 
surveillance and control. One such example of differing importance and thus also role, stems 
from the oil and gas SOE, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) operating in Sudan 
as a major stockholder in the PetroDar consortium107. Due to rising tensions and conflict 
                                                          
107 The PetroDar Operating Company Ltd is a consortium of oil exploration and production companies operating 
in Sudan, headquartered Khartoum. PetroDar consists of several stockholders: China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) (41%), Petronas of Malaysia (40%), Sudapet of Sudan (8%), SINOPEC of China (6%), and 
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between Sudan and South Sudan in 2008 and the kidnapping and murder of five Chinese 
oilmen, CNPC attempted to temporarily halt operations, but Beijing (allegedly) asked them to 
stay on for diplomatic and economic reasons (Patey, 2014). However, Patey (2014) also 
explains that despite Beijing asking the company to stay on, Chinese national oil companies 
are not part of the monolithic Chinese state as disagreements between the two exist. Although 
the company and the government often cooperated, there were also many occasions when their 
interests diverged, as can be seen from the above-mentioned situation in Sudan, echoing 
Strange’s (1996) retreat of the state argument saying MNCs are eroding it from below.  
 
This signals that the five indicators as mentioned in figure seven played a crucial role in the 
home state-MNC relationship given that CNPC’s importance was high due to the presence of 
all five indicators; thus, China assigned and enforced a specific role to CNPC as that of national 
champion and facilitator of China’s international image as global economic power, and 
persuaded them to stay on. Considering that China’s foreign policy ambitions have shifted over 
the years to include for instance initiatives such as OBOR, it could be said that the importance 
of companies like CNPC will take a back seat as opposed to infrastructure companies (such as 
Sinohydro and/or China Road and Bridges Corporation) and by extent their home state will not 
attach nor impose a specific role on them. However, should a region in which Chinese MNCs 
of high foreign policy relevance are present be in turmoil for a specific time, and three or more 
indicators of MNC importance are present, then their role will change accordingly.  
 
The companies that have been mostly regarded as fulfilling the role of national champion in 
China’s foreign policy, are mining SOEs, that receive state support in form of credit provision 
and establishment of diplomatic ties; whereby they state has power over them and allegedly 
uses them to expand “its influence in Africa to secure supplies of natural resources, to counter 
Western political and economic influence” (Brooks and Shin, 2006; Campbell, 2008). The idea 
that SOEs are used by the central government in Beijing, stems from the notion supported by 
many Chinese (and international scholars) (Yun, 2014; Goldstein, 2013; Bartholomew, 2012; 
Davies, 2010) that SOEs are ambassadors of the central government and the CCP, instructed 
to: “pursue […] strategic goals set by the CCP, either by getting control of natural resources, 
inserting its power and influence, or undermining the values and practices of Western 
                                                          
Egypt Kuwait Holding Company through its subsidiary Tri-Ocean Energy of Kuwait (5%) (Petrodar Operating 
Company, 2010-2011). 
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democracies” (Xu, 2015). Xu’s (2015) quote could be said to follow the internationalisation 
pattern of emerging market MNCs, whose primary role was to garner natural resources from 
other emerging market economies so to establish competence and global value chains through 
the linkage, learning, leverage framework108 (Matthews, 2006).  
 
However, Yun (2014:29) claims that although not all Chinese companies “represent – or even 
respect – China’s policy towards Africa, […] they are frequently perceived to do so. Xu (2015) 
on the other hand supports the notion that Chinese SOEs in the ways they perform their 
activities in Africa undermine the central government’s objectives and work against its and the 
interests of the CCP. While these two opposing views of the relationship between the Chinese 
SOEs and government have been highlighted in much of the literature available, this study 
presents an alternative scenario of interdependence between the home state and MNCs. Xu 
(2015) claims that SOEs have become “profit-driven market privateers and powerful interest 
groups that can set policy agenda in Beijing”.  
 
In line with the before mentioned shift from political to economic drivers in China’s foreign 
policy (Cornelissen and Taylor, 2000) and the post-2000 unprecedented expansion of Chinese 
MNCs in the global market, access to resources has become a secondary driver, as profit is the 
primary (Lardy, 2014). Also, China’s shift from demand to supply driven economy 
domestically have caused a decline in imports of minerals. This was echoed by Elite Interview 
F: “Totally different relations today, more economic driven. SOEs are not extensions of 
government: it is market oriented, so it is profit that drives” (Elite Interview F, March 2016); 
and Key Informant M (April 2016):  
“…many Chinese MNCs don’t care about whether they can get locally natural 
resources. They just need to seek for new developmental space in overseas market 
so as to escape from the increasingly fierce competition in Chinese domestic 
market. It is also hard to say that the investment of Chinese MNCs is decided or 
prompted by Chinese foreign policy” (Key Informant M, April 2016).  
 
                                                          
108 “The critical starting point for the latecomer and newcomer is that it is focused not on its own advantages, 
but on the advantages which can be acquired externally, i.e. on resources which can be accessed outside of itself 
[linkage]; Secondly, the focus of analysis will be on the ways that links can be established with incumbents 
or partners so that resources can be leveraged; Repeated application of linkage and leverage processes may result 
in the firm learning to perform such operations more effectively (organizational learning)” (Matthews, 2006:19-
20). 
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However, when asked why Chinese mining MNCs decide to invest in Zambia or any other 
African state for that matter, it was argued by most Elite Interviews and Key Informants that it 
is firstly and mostly for profit. As many SOEs are under SASAC’s administration, profit 
generation may be another role attached to MNCs by the home state. However, as mentioned 
earlier, SASAC controls in excess of 120 MNCs; thus, questions of efficiency of control and 
directives arise. Nevertheless, while directives from the home state may have been relevant in 
the late 1990s as envisaged by the “Go Out Strategy”; China’s current economic status and 
MNCs deeper embeddedness in the global market, warrant a critical analysis of profit 
generation being a role that is imposed by the home state onto MNC (through SASAC), as 
opposed to being the MNCs internal driving factor.  
 
What is visible from these statements by Key Informants and Elite Interviews is that the 
common denominator for MNCs investment motives is profit; the relation to the home state 
and directives from government are often only speculated about and treated as a minimal 
deciding factor. Therefore, the assumption that Chinese MNCs are representatives of the 
Chinese government does not always hold ground, nor is their assumed hunger for natural 
resources a reflection of their assumed role of national champion in China’s foreign policy; as 
market access and company profit have become the most important motive, otherwise known 
as “Markets over Mao” (Lardy, 2014). In addition, due to falling commodity prices and 
China’s domestic economic restructuring (from demand to supply driven economy), warrants 
that access to natural resource and thus, the role of national champion is either waning or 
alternatively (and more plausibly) shifting from the natural resource sector MNCs to MNCs 
operating in the infrastructure or telecommunications sectors.  
 
In relation to the ownership structure indicator, in chapter two it was mentioned that the 
ownership structure of a company does not necessarily make a difference in terms of its 
relations with the central government and scholars such as Goldstein (2013) claim that it 
particularly does not make a difference in the case of China. Goldstein (2013) claims that all 
Chinese MNCs are under direct influence of central Beijing, thus implying a certain level of 
convergence of autonomy between state and company. However, what does make a difference 
are the five indicators of MNC importance in figure seven. Elite Interview H (March 2016) 
states that:  
“Even the same company, like Sinohydro, can have impact in one case but not in 
another, depending on region and current event status. It is country specific, as well 
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as sector specific in order for the company to be of importance. For instance, when 
Libya was war stricken, hydropower played a major role for evacuation, so 
companies played a major role in the way China dealt with Libya: the Chinese 
government knows less than a company that is based on ground and can give first 
response”.   
 
In the quote above it is mentioned that the same MNC can have impact/influence on the actions 
taken in one case but not in another (event specific). What is meant by this is not that the MNC 
will have influence on China’s foreign policy, but rather that those indicators will play a role 
in terms of the home state having power to attach and enforce a specific role to the MNC, and 
how the home state interacts with that MNC. In this case for instance, Sinohydro played a 
humanitarian role by assisting in evacuations. However, from the above mentioned it could be 
discerned that the company’s footing in the turbulent region made it more aware and thus more 
adaptable to the pressing situation around it as it was the first point of call. A secondary benefit 
of Sinohydro’s actions was the positive international image of the company, but also China. 
However, it cannot be said with certainty that Sinohydro’s actions on ground in Libya were 
based on directives from central Beijing to fulfil the role of positive image creator for the home 
state, China. In regard to this, the discussion will now turn to two examples of Chinese mining 
MNCs (in Zambia) and their role in China’s foreign policy.  
 
3.5.1 MNCs Role in China’s Relations to Zambia 
Considering that this study focuses on the period between 1990 and 2015, and that mining 
sector MNCs were of national importance (i.e. national champions) in the early stages of 
China’s international expansion, the following section will focus on two Chinese copper 
mining MNCs operating in Zambia: China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Corporation (CNMC) 
and Metorex. While the focus is on two SOEs instead of private Chinese MNCs, Chow (2015) 
argues that SOEs have begun distancing themselves from the central government and implies 
that official Beijing may not have control over all aspects of company operations. This implies 
that it may also not attach a role to MNCs but rely on them to indirectly benefit the home state. 
This in turn makes the analysis of home state-MNC relations even more important. 
 
3.5.1.1 The Example of CNMC 
China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co., Ltd. (CNMC) importance and role in China’s 
foreign policy is vastly different today than what it was in 1999. In 1999, all five indicators of 
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MNC importance were present in the case of CNMC, and given the time and event indicators 
(“Go Out Strategy”) its importance for China was obvious and its main role in China’s foreign 
policy was that of national champion. CNMCs ownership structure (SOE) and time of 
expansion (just after the “Go Out Strategy” was launched), combined with the company’s 
operational inexperience in any other country/region but China, made it an easy target for China 
to exert its influence (through directives and incentives) and thus, attach and enforce the role 
of national champion onto the company. It was the first Chinese MNC to enter the Zambian 
mining sector on directives and incentives from China. Today, however, CNMC’s importance 
in terms of time and sector has taken a back seat, as China’s foreign policy goals have shifted 
to prioritise different sectors (infrastructure) as well as different regions (East Africa 
predominantly). 
 
CNMC was founded in 1983 and is a large-scale central enterprise under the management of 
SASAC of the State Council109. It operates numerous mines abroad, including Chambishi 
Copper Mine (CCM) in Zambia110 (CNMC, 2011). In 1998, CNMC bought 85 per cent stake 
in CCM111, located in the Zambian Copperbelt province, for a total price of US$ 20 million112 
(US$ 27 million in 2011- $ value). “It is the first and, to date, the largest nonferrous metal mine 
overseas approved by Chinese government for development and construction. It has been 
hailed as the project that symbolizes Sino-Africa cooperation” (CNMC, 2009). 
 
According to Bastholm and Kragelund (2009:129), the purchase of CCM symbolises the 
crucial role played by Chinese diplomatic support for Chinese investors. Bastholm and 
Kragelund (2009) continue by saying that the Chinese government paid a lot of attention to this 
mine, and that the decision to invest in it was made at CNMC headquarters in cooperation with 
the Chinese government.  According to a CNMC management secretary: “We have a lot of 
support from the Chinese government (…) I do not think CNMC would have invested in the 
                                                          
109 For a detailed organizational and ownership structure see Appendix five.  
110 Chambishi 150,000-ton copper smelter, Chambishi Leach Plant, Chambishi Sulfuric Acid Plant, Tumurtin-
Ovoo Zinc Mine in Mongolia, and Thai-China Lead-Antimony Alloy Plant in Thailand. (CNMC, 2011). In 
addition, CNMC has a vast array of projects underway:  Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone, 
western ore body of Zambia Chambishi Copper Mine, Myanmar Tagaung Taung Nickel Mine, and bauxite in 
Laos (CNMC, 2011). 
111 “Chambishi Copper Mine was obtained by CNMC through an international bid in 1998, at which time CNMC 
also obtained the use right to 41 square kilometres of land on the surface of the mine for a term of 99 years. The 
mine, with resources including 5 million tonnes of copper and 120,000 tons of cobalt, and involving a total 
investment of US$ 160 million” (CNMC, 2009). 
112 CNMC further invested another US$ 130 million for purposes of rehabilitating the mine. 
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Chambishi mine without the support from the Chinese government” (in Bastholm and 
Kragelund, 2009:129). It was further mentioned (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009) that the most 
important advantage for CNMC were loans at favourable conditions from China Exim Bank 
(for the mine and leaching plant) and the China Development Bank (for the copper smelter), 
plus the political support from Chinese diplomats in establishing the initial ties. This goes hand 
in hand with the structural pillar of credit and diplomatic security provision as part of the home 
state’s role. 
 
However, CNMC has been plagued with issues. Shortly after production started in 2003, the 
company realised the necessity of establishing a smelting plant close to the mine for easier 
processing of ores; thus, Chambishi Copper Smelter (CHCS) was constructed from 2006 to 
2008, and commenced production by the end of 2008. The intention was to create over 1000 
local jobs during and after the construction phase; however, most workers were Chinese, not 
Zambians (Kay Informant N, May 2016). In addition, CNMC was brought to the public 
attention in 2005, in what is known as the deadliest event in Zambian mining history, as 46 
miners died in a CNMC-owned factory for manufacturing of cheap mining explosives (HRW, 
2011). Lastly, in early 2013, Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) ordered 
the CHCS to shut down the plant and put in place measures to minimise sulphur dioxide 
emissions after farmers in the adjacent Kalulushi community, complained that the excess 
emissions polluted the environment and caused acid rain, causing the destruction of crops in 
the surrounding farming communities. 
 
While CNMC claims to adhere to the “mutually beneficial win-win and common 
development”, idea of a positive implementation of “going out” strategy, carried out inside and 
outside the field of non-ferrous metal mineral investment and cooperation” (CNMC, 2011), the 
abovementioned incidents imply the opposite. However, CNMC put in place logistics to 
compensate affected farmers and has been consulting with the Kalulushi Municipal Council 
and other government departments (Lusakatimes, 2013). Furthermore, due to complaints by 
locals about lack of skill and technology transfer, CNMC has made efforts in that regard as 
well.  In order to get a better understanding of what prompted CNMC to make such a decision 
and to see whether the orders to transfer skills and provide better job opportunities for local 
people came from official Beijing, i.e. the home state (in an attempt to rectify the situation and 
remedy China’s tarnished image), CNMC was contacted. A former colleague from the CCS 
(Key Informant H, March 2016) assisted in getting in touch with CNMC, through a family 
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member employed by the company. After requesting an interview and visit permission on my 
behalf, the request was denied and the following explanation was provided:  
“The management board rejected your visit. I am sorry about it. They were still 
angry with the previous University of California Los Angeles and British 
Broadcasting Commission’s (BBC) visit, because after their visit, they wrote too 
much negative stuff on China Nonferrous Metals Co Ltd so that as sub-division of 
the company they refused your visit. I am afraid other big state-owned company 
also heard from CNMC's previous bad experience with ‘Western’ visit so that 
maybe you need prepare yourself mentally towards state-owned companies” (Key 
Informant H, March 2016).  
 
Reputational risks incurred during previous correspondence with Western academics and 
media, made CNMC fearful of being incriminated yet again (wrongfully or not, it is beside the 
point). Even upon explaining that this study does not focus on social or environmental aspects 
of CNMCs operations in Zambia, but on its connection to its home state in foreign policy, 
neither the Key Informant nor any company representative replied. Considering that CNMC 
was the first of its kind non-ferrous mining operation outside of China shortly after the “Go 
Out Strategy” was implemented, it is of understanding that it received significant government 
support; not least due to the importance of the sector (mining) and timeframe (China’s 
international expansion) indicators as outlined in figure seven. However, based on limited 
knowledge acquisition (and transfer) on behalf of the company but significant provision of 
credit and diplomatic support as part of the four pillars of structural power, the home state had 
the upper hand in this relationship. Therefore, the home state had leverage in attaching and 
enforcing the role of national champion to the MNCs.  Question is, is this the case in other 
cases involving Chinese mining companies, like Metorex as seen below.  
 
3.5.1.2 The Example of Metorex  
Metorex was established in 1975 after the founders acquired Rand London Mines. In 2011, 
Metorex announced that Jinchuan voiced its interest in acquiring the entire issues share capital 
culminating in Metorex becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of the Jinchuan Group in January 
2012. Following this acquisition, in November 2013 Metorex was incorporated into Jinchuan 
Group International Resources Co Ltd, a Jinchuan subsidiary, and its shares were no longer 
trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, but on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Metorex, 
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2017)113. Metorex mining company operates several mines in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo as well as one in Zambia, the Chibuluma South Mine in the Copperbelt. Mine 
production in Chibuluma began in 1955 (not by Metorex) and currently has an annual 
production capacity of approximately 19 000 tons of copper in the form of concentrate 
(Metorex, 2017). According to Metorex (2017): “Chibuluma continues to be described as 
Zambia’s model mine”.  
 
To get a better understanding of Metorex’s operations in Zambia and its connection to its home 
state (China) after acquisition in 2012, contact was established with Metorex management and 
a very positive and welcoming reply was received. Due to geographical distance and conflicts 
in schedule, a structured interview schedule114 was emailed115 to Metorex representative (Elite 
Interview J, May 2016). The response provided, paints a different picture of MNC-home state 
relations, even when the MNC is an SOE.  
 
Upon asking why Chinese companies invest in the Zambian Copperbelt, Elite Interview J (May 
2016) said: “Always for profit, but partly due to government decision, as countries are looking 
for security of resources for the development of their countries and companies may have this 
directive from the country they come from”. Given that Metorex entered Zambia before it 
became a Chinese SOE, the motives for investment cannot be ascribed to directives from 
China. However, from the interview it can be discerned that some companies invest in specific 
projects due to several reasons. For example, the political and/or economic importance of that 
country/region for their home state, or for purposes of mutual win-win cooperation efforts as a 
sign of the home state’s benevolence and its stance as being part of the developing world. This 
goes hand in hand with the argument of five indicators of MNC importance, upon which the 
attachment of role to MNCs (national champion, representative of the Chinese state by image 
creation, SSDC partner) on behalf of the home state rests. The example of Metorex may not be 
as important in terms of the original motivations for investment in Zambia (as it invested there 
before it was incorporated into the Jinchuan group); however, it offers an explanation of the 
importance of model activities (as part of the role of image creator), and how that affects the 
relations between the home and host state.  
                                                          
113 See Appendix six for further details on ownership structure of Metorex.  
114 Full interview schedule can be seen in Appendix seven.  
115 Due to budgetary and time constraints (public holidays) while on fieldwork in Lusaka in May 2016, a visit to 
Metorex’s Chibuluma mine was not possible, so email was the chosen way of communication.  
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3.5.2 Effect of MNC activities on host state - home state relations 
If one takes the notion of SOEs being representative entities of China’s Africa policy, this 
would mean that these MNCs also follow SSDC principles as foundation of China’s foreign 
policy. The question is, do they follow SSDC principles, in what way, and what repercussions 
does this have in terms of China’s relations with the state that the MNC is operating in, i.e. 
home-host state relations.   
 
Chinese mining companies have been under scrutiny from environmentalists and labour unions 
for the disrespect of environmental regulation and labour laws in African countries in which 
they operate (HRW, 2011). It needs to be said however, that not all MNCs with Asian workers 
are necessarily Chinese, therefore one needs to be careful when making assumptions about ‘the 
Chinese’116 (Sautman and Yan, 2014), and their connection to official Beijing. The most 
infamous case of bashing of ‘the Chinese’ stems from Collum Coal Mine (CCM)117 in 
Sinazongwe in Southern Province, Zambia (Sautman and Yan, 2014). Due to the uproar it 
caused and the front-face of the incident being a ‘Chinese-looking-person’, the general public 
immediately assumed it was a Chinese owned mine, and assumed a negative view of China in 
general. An interesting aspect of this event is that on the insistence of the Chinese embassy in 
Lusaka, CCM had to compensate the wounded miners, as well as apologise to its Zambian 
workers and to Zambia’s Chinese-owned firms. What makes this even more intriguing as a 
potential showcase of the power of the Chinese state is the fact that CCM is not owned by a 
Chinese, but a Chinese-born Australian citizen, thereby effectively making it an Australian 
company out of the reach of China’s control. The influence that the Chinese embassy had over 
an MNC that is not even Chinese (to protect its own interests) could be indicative of the power 
that it has over Chinese SOEs and Chinese private enterprises. This assumption is often made 
by onlookers who claim that official Beijing has a controlling arm over all Chinese MNCs, 
regardless of time or space of operations (Goldstein, 2013).  
 
                                                          
116 This term has been placed under quotation marks as it indicates the importance of caution when applying 
labels to people or organisations believed to be representatives of a specific group of people, when in fact they 
may not even be Chinese. This is particularly correct in the case of CCM in Zambia, where in 2010 13 miners 
were shot at and wounded by their supervisors, employed by CCM that was instantly taken as representative of 
all Chinese people and operations in Zambia and broader. The fact however is that, CCM was founded by an 
Australian with a ‘Chinese face’ and is therefore not representative of Chinese people nor of China as a whole 
(Sautman and Yan, 2014).   
117 For a detailed explanation of the situation see Appendix eight.  
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Although this company was not Chinese and the owner had Australian citizenship, it employed 
Chinese nationals. Despite this, to protect state interests (good image) China gave in to the 
public’s perception of a Chinese MNC and thus assumed a controlling role. Lastly, what needs 
to be noted here is the role of the Chinese embassy in Lusaka, which has been grappling with 
out lashes against Chinese people by Zambians, including former president Michael Sata, for 
many years. The embassy’s role in general is to promote cultural, political and economic 
cooperation, as well as being the first representative of China on ground in a host country; thus, 
having the responsibility of image creation. Considering the negative image that the CCM 
incident caused, the embassy took it upon itself to mitigate the negative image of China that 
was created. This however, does not mean that the embassy would oversee disputes between 
Chinese MNCs and Zambia, as in most cases it does not even know how many Chinese there 
are in Zambia nor how many MNCs, as they do not register with them upon arrival, as 
mentioned in section 3.4.2. 
 
Chinese MNCs footprint in Zambia has been met with vast criticism, not least due to CNMCs 
involvement in disputes with local communities and the ZDA in terms of their social and 
environmental impact. This has had a significant impact on the company’s operations that are 
“burdened by production capacity surplus, demands of technical skills transfer and 
environmental protection, coupled with the slow recovery of the global economy, twin issues 
of low price/high cost facing the nonferrous metal industry, and downward pressures of the 
Chinese economy” (CNMC, 2011).   
 
It is evident that CNMC’s management considers technical skills transfer and environmental 
protection demands to stand in the way of the company’s performance and future development, 
which corresponds with Key Informant F (March 2016) when stating that SSC activities are 
not profitable. Furthermore, Key Informant F (March 2016) says that: “When the “Go Out 
Strategy” came into play, CRBC and CNMC went out due to SSC projects, but they stayed in 
Africa due to large opportunities. No single project is just SSC based, money comes from 
different sides”.  
 
This reflects the notion mentioned in section 3.2.1 where political motives played a decisive 
role in the expansion of Chinese MNCs to Africa, but were subsequently overpowered by 
economic drivers. In addition, realisation of opportunities in the African market, sparked the 
increased interest in Africa. However, in order to enter new areas and build their own 
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knowledge and skills, Chinese MNCs retorted to proclamations of mutual benefit and 
cooperation, such as skills and technology transfer via SSDC activities.  China uses SSDC as 
a rhetorical camouflage to legitimise policies, and it gives Chinese MNCs a competitive edge 
as it somehow signals that they are different from the West (Key Informant R, August 2016). 
Elite Interview H (March 2016) disagrees to a certain extent, saying: “China regards itself as 
a South country so it is not just rhetoric but a way to gain shared experience and growth”.  
 
This is further explained by the fact that Chinese MNCs expansion to developed countries and 
the establishment of operations there is not as easy, given their somewhat lacking knowhow 
(see section on internationalisation of firms in chapter two). It is therefore easier to expand to 
developing countries, where they can develop new experiences; through dealing with labour 
unions, for instance they can develop new skills, management and technical knowhow, and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). In turn, this puts them in a better position to then expand 
their operations further to developed countries, as illustrated by Huawei and ZTE. This signals 
the knowledge generation pillar, which puts MNCs in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the home state as opposed to when they first internationalised.  
 
Through this realisation of the inherent benefits of skills and technology transfer, which then 
puts Chinese MNCs in a better position to negotiate new contracts as well as equips them with 
new management and technology skills, Elite Interview F (March 2016) argues that: “China 
is very open to transfer skills to Africans, but not to Westerners. China is willing to help with 
industrialisation, it has financial resources”. Elite Interview H (March 2016) states that 
companies must engage in technology transfer for their own sustainable existence, but also 
because “the [home] government will push them to do this and increasing demand also coming 
from people, NGOs and governments of African states, so generating a joint push-force”.   
 
However, it was mentioned previously that if the Chinese government does not advocate 
sustainability, the MNCs do not do it, unless they are handpicked to do SSDC projects. MNCs 
have, however, increasingly started realising that it is in their interest to engage in such 
activities, while at the same time indirectly contributing to a positive image for China. The 
joint push from people, NGOs and African governments is also visible in the case of CNMCs’ 
CHCS. Key Informant N (May 2016) said: “In order to refine copper at the mine, they brought 
in a lot of Chinese to put up a smelter which was brand new and Zambia did not have the skills 
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to do that. CNMC has two smelters in Chambishi. They brought 300 Chinese workers to build 
the first one”.  
 
This caused bad publicity for the company, which then decided to transfer skills and technology 
in the establishment of the second smelter: “they only brought 20 Chinese because the 
Zambians that worked on the first one did the majority of the work on the second one due to 
the acquired skills. Mining companies are always employing better ways of doing things, so 
there is skills transfer” (Key Informant N, May 2016). 
 
In terms of Metorex, when asked whether Chinese MNCs engage in development cooperation 
in Zambia, Elite Interview J (May 2016) said:  
“Yes.  Activities include on the job training, college/university level education 
sponsorship of employees, and support of training initiated through the Zambia 
Chamber of Mines.  Operations and processes improvement programs to increase 
productivity are carried out vigorously. Innovation and application of the most 
relevant technology is evident in all companies”.  
 
When asked if this is done as a mandate by the home state (China), Elite Interview J (May 
2016) replied: “Mandated may not be the right word but these companies are encouraged to 
abide by world best practices and it makes economic sense to do this”.  
 
The last question in the interview schedule read: Can you tell me what specific development 
cooperation programmes Metorex does on ground in Zambia? Do you provide scholarships to 
students to go to China for further education for instance?  
Elite Interview J (May 2016) replied the following:  
“Our involvement starts in the community where we have partnered with the 
Zambian Government to work with them at three primary to secondary schools.  
We develop the physical infrastructure including classroom blocks, teacher’s 
houses, power supply, water reticulation, ablution blocks, school requisites such as 
desks, children’s school uniforms and books.  We further sponsor some children to 
technical secondary schools.  We also sponsor employees to colleges and 
University.  We have done and continue to undertake technical exchange visits to 
China but not sponsorship to go and study in China”.  
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This is in accordance with the previously mentioned sponsorship of African workers to receive 
technical skills from China. It also signalises a shift in terms of CSR and the previously stated 
improvement of Chinese mining MNCs operational practices. The issue at hand is that media 
coverage of Chinese companies actually doing positive things for the local people and 
environment are few and far in-between, and companies do not want to make it public how 
they go about good-doing (Key Informant I, March 2016). An explanation for this was given 
by Key Informant J (March 2016): “If I help you and then in public speak out about it, it is not 
right according to Chinese culture. If it is applied on the international stage, it should be 
publicised but due to tradition they do not do it”.  
 
According to Key Informant G (March 2016), in China, workers learn through observation, 
something that is applied in international operations as well: “If you want to learn, you can 
learn! But the companies will not babysit you. It is the same in SSC. This is the philosophy 
difference between China and DAC”. Another crucial difference is: “In China there is no 
division between economic and development cooperation. Development cooperation in China 
is a new discourse and the development narrative is very weak” (Key Informant G, March 
2016). This is observed across both China and Brazil in their capacity as developing states and 
emerging SSDC partners. Therefore, one could expect that SSDC activities of Chinese 
companies on ground in Africa will also be weak. However, according to Key Informant Q 
(May 2016), while the conditions may not be very good, Chinese mine workers make sure to 
impart skills to their peers. It is not always easy to tell among the Chinese miners who is the 
engineer and who is not, as they work on the same level as everyone else. “This makes the 
imparting of skills much easier because the Zambians and the Chinese end up doing the same 
things. The language difficulties ensure that some of the tasks go to the Zambians, so that the 
worker progresses quickly”.  
 
In general, Chinese mining operations do contribute in terms of sills and technology transfer 
(Key Informant O, May 2016). However, Key Informant Q (May 2016) says that Chinese 
presence in Zambia is not on the domestic research agenda: “Apart from a few articles in the 
press, and about Confucius Institutes and what it means for Africa, not many more things 
written about it”.  Furthermore, it was mentioned that the Zambian academic environment is 
simply struggling with the rising number of students; thus, there is hardly any research being 
conducted. Interestingly, the field-research in Lusaka coincided with the 2016 Annual Meeting 
of the African Development Bank with the theme being “Energy and Development” (23-27 
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May) attended by delegations of, amongst other, Chinese businessmen and government 
officials. Respondents interviewed during that week did not express much interest in nor 
knowledge about the event. 
 
It appears that research on Sino-Zambian relations is mostly done by Western media and 
academics, and thereby raising the question of biasness. In addition, it has been mentioned that 
per Chinese culture it is not right to boast about good doing, confirmed by limited Chinese 
publications on this matter. This is in close association with the previously mentioned aspect 
of separating China as empire and China as nation state, as cultural traditions and informal 
ideologies, still play a major role in Chinese interaction with the rest of the world.  
 
In the case of CNMC and Metorex, both SOEs operating in the same African country, there are 
significant differences to their operational approach. The five indicators of MNC importance 
in foreign policy can be applied to these two cases in the following way: CNMCs importance 
to China’s foreign policy was well-timed and sectorally significant following the 1999 “Go 
Out Strategy”. The limited skills transfer and knowledge acquisition on behalf of CNMC (due 
to them being new in the field at the time), but the home state’s provision of credit and 
diplomatic support contributed to the home state having leverage in attaching the role of 
national champion to the company. Therefore, it can be said that this relationship was more 
skewed towards one side (home state had more power) and thus, it was not governed 
interdependence but rather MNC dependence on home state support.  
 
However, due to China’s domestic changes and its emergence as the second largest economy 
globally, warrant that Lardy’s (2014) Markets over Mao or rather neo-liberal/capitalist 
approach to global affairs is more applicable in the current timeframe (2010-2017). 
Furthermore, this approach coupled with the increasing importance of MNCs on a global scale, 
warrants that China’s foreign policy has shifted to become foreign economic policy/economic 
diplomacy. Therefore, this shift in the way China approaches relations with other states, 
combined with any given combination of the five indicators of MNC importance in foreign 
policy, causes the role of MNCs to fluctuate accordingly. This is best illustrated by the cases 
of CNMC and Metorex. While CNMC maintains a certain historical importance in China’s 
foreign policy, its role today as opposed to 1999 (national champion) is not as clear. However, 
it could be argued that based on China’s shift from demand to supply driven economy, CNMCs 
role of supplying the domestic market with minerals is no longer the main one. Combined with 
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CNMCs long-standing footing in Zambia and the acquisition of knowledge, has caused it to no 
longer have a specific role in China’s foreign policy, but to remain in Zambia due to business 
opportunities valuable to the company itself. 
 
In terms of Metorex, even though the company is also a state owned MNC (ownership 
structure), and sector, and region of operation (as indicators of MNC importance in foreign 
policy) are the same as CNMC; the time and event indicators (China’s shift from foreign policy 
to foreign economic policy, its move from demand to supply driven economy, and falling 
commodity, particularly copper, prices since 2012  (Investment Mine, 2017)) played out in 
such a way that Metorex does not have a specific role attached to it by its home state. This has 
also contributed to their operational approach being different from CNMCs, indicating 
autonomy and operational flexibility like private MNCs. In fact, Metorex appears to have 
continued business as usual and could be regarded as just another Chinese MNC operating in 
foreign markets driven directly by its own profit maximisation motives, independent of central 
Beijing attaching a certain role to it118. However, through the company’s (until now) incident-
free operations in Zambia, and the provision of skills and technology transfer in their 
operations, it has indirectly benefited China’s image (mutual win-win partner) and in extent its 
relations with Zambia. This creates a feedback loop in terms of the process of state-MNC 
relations in foreign policy as outlined in figure four in chapter two and will be shortly discussed 
in the following section. However, what needs to be noted here is the claim by Stopford and 
Strange (1991) that due to a psychological sense of belonging to their home states, MNCs will 
do what the home state asks. The above-mentioned case of Metorex suggests that despite the 
benefit that its activities in Zambia create for China’s image, Metorex has done so for its own 
competitive advantage and survival, in line with open market principles.  
 
China’s relations with African states in their nature can either be guided by political or 
economic motives; however, increasingly since the turn of the century economic relations have 
taken the front seat. However, the inter-state relations also depend on a multiplicity of actors, 
one of which is MNCs. Considering the above-mentioned cases of CNMC and Metorex for 
                                                          
118 It needs to be said that Metorex already operated in Zambia before Jinchuan Group incorporated it as a 
subsidiary; thus, the historical role of Metorex for China’s foreign policy can only be speculated about. However, 
this does not mean that the role cannot change depending on changes and fluctuations in the five indicators of 
MNC importance.   
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instance, but also on a more general level, the question is: what is the effect of Chinese MNCs 
activities (depending on their role in foreign policy) on China-Africa relations?  
 
According to Key Informant P (May 2016), sometimes companies engage in activities that are 
not consistent with international business laws or expected behaviour patterns, and do not pay 
attention to codes of conduct. Key Informant Q (May 2016) agrees: “Chinese companies are 
free to operate as they wish, the Chinese government does not pay much attention to what is 
going on”, and as mentioned previously, it does not know everything that goes on.  
 
In terms of Sino-Zambian relations as a repercussion of Chinese MNCs activities in Zambia, 
the following answer was given by Key Informant P (May 2016):  
“Regardless of what the companies do, it will not make China look bad in the eyes 
of Zambian government and elite as they do depend on the benevolence of Beijing, 
so companies can do what they please. So, China’s relations with Zambia, is not in 
any negative way impacted by the companies”.  
 
This is also evident in the fact that former President Sata ran his 2011 presidential campaign 
on severe anti-Chinese sentiment to gather votes, but soon after election changed the tune and 
invited the Chinese prime minister on an official visit (Key Informant Q, May 2016). This 
follows the notion of Africa’s dependence on Chinese companies (investment and production) 
and consequently to President Xi’s FOCAC 2016 promise of US$60 billion for Africa’s 
development. This is regarded as compensation for the losses incurred by African states 
dependent on Chinese companies and their investments in capital-intensive sectors that are now 
shrinking in importance (Elite Interview G, March 2016).  
 
Considering the above mentioned, the feedback loop (home-host state relations as depicted in 
figure four) will not be negatively impacted by MNCs wrongdoings, so long as the host state 
is dependent on the investments by MNCs and the benevolence of their home state, in this case 
China, to provide abundant financing. Thus, even if MNCs get a specific role attached to them 
by the home state (positive image creator) and they do not adhere to it, or tarnish it through 
negative performance; it will not cause negative repercussions for home state-host state 
relations, as long as the host state is dependent on the investments and revenue. Consequently, 
it will also not warrant punishment on behalf of the home state, despite the afore-mentioned 
deduction of points.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter contextualised the Chinese case study and placed it within the broader debate on 
emerging powers of the South. In the first section an outline of China’s foreign policy, its 
history, the actors involved, and the changes that occurred over the past two decades was 
provided. In relation to China’s engagement with Africa, it was confirmed that different 
countries in Africa carry different levels of importance based on China’s diplomatic or 
economic motives. In addition, different Chinese actors play different roles in African 
countries, depending on the importance of the respective country.  
 
The second part of the chapter contextualised Chinese MNCs, both state-owned and private as 
important actors in China’s foreign policy towards Africa. I applied the four pillars of structural 
power and governed interdependence framework on the home state-MNC relations and found 
that the provision of incentives (credit and security) gives China leverage to attach a specific 
role to MNCs in its foreign policy. However, this role is dependent on five indicators of MNC 
importance in foreign policy (time, sector, region, event, ownership status) and can range from: 
national champion (mostly applicable to mining MNCs in the 1990s); positive image 
representative/creator (applicable to any MNC that is handpicked to do SSDC projects); but 
also, in cases where the MNC in question does not have any or only one of the indicators 
present, they will have no role. In addition, it was assumed that that due to the provision of 
incentives (credit and security) as outlined in the four pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence framework, the home state will have leverage to request certain tasks and 
attach a certain role to MNCs, as they operate in a structure of interdependence that is governed 
by the dominant (yet mutually dependent) actor, the home state. However, I argue that MNCs 
adherence to a specific role is not a given. Due to China’s dependence on MNCs (as part of the 
governed interdependence structure) to generate profit and knowledge, MNCs have operational 
flexibility. In addition, even in instances where they do not generate profit and knowledge, they 
will still be able to operate according to their motives, as deregistration (of underperforming) 
MNCs is an administrative hassle for the home state. In addition, the enforcement of a role and 
the subsequent adherence to that role are also conditioned by the dependence of the host state 
(in this case Zambia) on the investments and activities of MNCs (and in extent their home 
state). In other words, if the host state is overly dependent on MNCs investments and the 
creation of jobs that comes with it, it will not jeopardise the possibility of further investments 
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and diplomatic ties with China. Therefore, even if MNCs have a specific role to play as dictated 
by the home state, it does not have to be followed as there are no inherent negative 
repercussions for the MNC, neither from the host state nor home state; thus, they remain 
operationally flexible.  
 
In addition, Chinese MNCs increasingly act on their own mandate, motivated by profit 
maximisation and are no different from Western MNCs in that sense. Even in cases where they 
display SSS and engage in mutual benefit SSDC; it is done on their own incentive as they 
perceive it to have inherent benefits (the example of Metorex). However, this can have an 
indirectly positive impact on the image of China as well, without image-representation/creation 
being mandated by the home state (China) as part of the MNCs role. Therefore, taken all the 
above-mentioned factors into consideration, it can be argued that the governed interdependence 
framework when applied to China renders the relations between the home state and MNCs to 
be one of conditioned governed interdependence, as the pivotal role of the state implied in the 
word governed is not always a given.  
 
To summarize: the role of MNCs in China’s foreign policy towards Africa differs based on 
several factors and indicators. Historically, the role of Chinese MNCs operating in the natural 
resource sectors (mining and oil and gas) was that of national champion. Due to their 
inexperience and limited knowledge of overseas markets, Chinese mining MNCs had the 
underhand in their relations with their home state, given that the home state provided credit 
and security. This in turn gave the home state leverage to impose a specific role onto MNCs in 
its foreign policy. As time progressed and Chinese MNCs got a better footing in international 
markets combined with China’s shifting priorities in foreign policy (economics over politics), 
the governed interdependence structure changed to a more equal footing (as the state realised 
the importance of MNCs for the realisation of its aims), if not one where MNCs have the upper 
hand. Consequently, this contributed to a shift in the roles imposed onto MNCs and their 
adherence to the same. Their roles expanded from just national champions (albeit in different 
sectors), to image representatives/creators, to wealth creators (although not necessarily a 
directive from the home state but rather MNCs internal motivating factors), to having no 
particular roles at all (mostly in relation to MNCs operating in sectors and regions that are of 
little to no relevance for China’s foreign policy).  
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Lastly, China’s dependence on MNCs for the creation of wealth and generation of knowledge, 
contributed to MNCs increasing operational flexibility and the possibility of choosing if they 
want to adhere to and fulfil a specific role; thus, indicating a conditioned governed 
interdependence relationship. The following chapter follows the same pattern as this one in 
applying the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework on the 
process of home state-MNC relations in foreign policy, in the case of Brazil.  
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CHAPTER IV: STATE-MNC RELATIONS: THE CASE OF BRAZIL 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, Brazil has gone through significant domestic changes, both politically and 
economically. Globalisation forces have affected the way in which the Brazilian state interacts 
with MNCs, both domestically and internationally. While the four pillars of structural power 
and governed interdependence framework outline that through the provision of certain 
incentives to each other, the home state and MNCs operate in a governed interdependence 
relationship, in this chapter, I argue that it is in fact a relationship of dependence of MNCs on 
the home state. The provision of credit (through BNDES) and legal security (through 
Agreements on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation or legal counsel) to its MNCs 
(regardless of ownership structure), combined with the home state’s leading pivotal role in 
driving knowledge, which is supposedly controlled by MNCs; places the MNCs in a 
subordinate position to the home state.  While Brazil’s history of protectionism is officially 
over, it is still visible in its relations to MNCs as will be illustrated through the application of 
the theoretical framework.  
 
This chapter consists of two parts and follows a similar structure as the previous chapter on 
China. The first part provides a brief outline of Brazil’s foreign policy, its history, the actors 
involved, and the changes that occurred over the past two decades (1990-2015). It focuses on 
the Cardoso and Lula era, with limited reference to the Rousseff administration119. It also 
outlines and critically discusses Africa’s importance in Brazil’s foreign policy. As discussed in 
chapter three with reference to China, different countries in Africa carry different levels of 
importance based on Brazil’s political and economic motives. In addition to this, historical ties 
(culture, language and colonial history) play a crucial role in Brazil’s engagement in Africa. 
Depending on the political, economic and/or historical importance that Brazil attaches to a 
specific category of African states, different Brazilian actors (MNCs, diplomats) will play a 
more or a less important role in relation to those states.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, I first contextualise Brazilian MNCs, both state-owned and 
private as important actors in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa. When I apply the four 
pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework (figure three in chapter 
two) on Brazil-MNC relationships in Africa, the governed interdependence hypothesis is 
                                                          
119
 Due to her short time in office (2011-2016).  
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disputed, as MNCs are fully dependent on the home state. Consequently, I argue that the MNCs 
operational flexibility is limited as the relationship is guided by the home state’s incentives as 
well as national development plans. This highly dependent relationship guided by the provision 
of incentives, gives the home state (Brazil) leverage to impose a specific role onto MNCs in its 
foreign policy towards African states. However, I argue that the role attached to MNCs by their 
home state (Brazil) will differ depending on one main factor, namely the political or economic 
importance in time of the African state in question for Brazil’s foreign policy aims. Thus, role 
can range from national champion, wealth creator, positive image creator, cooperation partner, 
to no role being imposed at all. The findings of this chapter paired with the findings of the 
chapter focusing on China set the stage for a comparative conclusion in chapter five.  
 
4.2 Effects of Brazil’s Economic Reforms on its Foreign Policy  
In order to understand the state-MNC dynamic, it is necessary to provide s brief historical 
overview of the factors which shaped Brazilian foreign policy in the Cardoso and Lula eras and 
how MNC came to play an increasingly important role. The following section will give a short 
overview of Brazil’s foreign relations, priority areas, actors involved, and general approaches 
to foreign policy. In addition, Africa as a representative region of the South and a particular 
area of interest in Brazil’s foreign policy will be analysed in section 4.3. After that, the 
increasing role of MNCs in Brazil’s internationalisation will be outlined before moving on to 
the next and most important section (4.5), where the relations between the Brazilian state and 
MNCs will be analysed through the application of the four pillars of structural power and 
governed interdependence framework. This will be done in order to pave the way for the 
analysis of the role of MNCs in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa in section 4.6.  
 
4.2.1 Brazil’s Opening to the World 
Brazil’s foreign policy has been and continues to be based on principles of multilateralism, 
peaceful dispute settlement and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign 
countries and territories, similar to those of China. Moreover, Brazil’s foreign policy is a direct 
result and reflection of the country’s position as the regional hegemon (although disputed) in 
Latin America, as well as an important representative of the developing world and an emerging 
power. However, Brazil’s foreign policy making is no different than other countries’, as it is 
always influenced by domestic conditions of the time, as also the case of China in chapter three. 
The military regime that came to an end with its last president João Baptista de Oliveira 
Figueiredo (1985) and the subsequent return to democracy are the historical underpinnings of 
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today’s Brazil. Although the consequences of military rule (1964-1985) are important to 
understand the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy, this chapter immediately commences with 
the period of the 1990s as this study’s timeframe only covers the era of Brazilian foreign policy 
from 1990 to 2015.  
 
The most important and arguably the most interesting part of Brazilian foreign policy started 
with the election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in January 1995. According to 
Vigevani and Oliveira (2007), the Cardoso administration attempted to replace the reactive 
foreign policy agenda dominated by a logic of autonomy through distance120 with a proactive 
international agenda guided by a logic of autonomy through integration121. During Cardoso’s 
two terms in office (1995-1998 and 1999-2002) his administration tried to internalize, absorb 
and consolidate the changes caused by globalisation during the early 1990s, particularly those 
of market liberalism. Cardoso’s administration sought to replace a Cold War dominant foreign 
policy agenda based on the import substitution development model; with a more proactive 
foreign policy, in which Brazil would assume greater control over its own future and 
development if it contributed more effectively to the norms and guidelines of the global order 
(Vigevani and Oliveira, 2007). 
 
This new approach to foreign policy meant that Brazil would begin to resolve its internal 
problems more effectively by actively seeking to organise and regulate international relations 
in a variety of contexts, while at the same time creating an environment favourable to economic 
development. In other terms, the Cardoso era could be characterised by a search for 
international regimes and norms, “aimed at fostering as institutionalised an environment as 
possible” (Vigevani and Oliveira, 2007:59).  
 
Brazil’s foreign policy during this time resisted the consolidation of institutions and regimes, 
which ultimately had the potential to freeze the Cold War hierarchy of power. For the Brazilian 
state, whose relative power had diminished, the institutionalisation perspective of a new 
international environment dominated by one single great power was favourable; as it promoted 
respect and adherence (by all parties) to the rules of the international regime (Vigevani and 
Oliveira, 2007). Vigevani and Oliveira (2007) claim that this approach to foreign policy helped 
                                                          
120 In this case it means isolation and detachment from international issues, due to a significantly inward-looking 
tradition of foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009).  
121 “…autonomy connected to the international situation rather than isolated from it” (Lampreia, 1999:11). 
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Brazil secure a place among nations embracing hegemonic values that were considered 
universal. In addition, this paradigm shift in Brazilian foreign policy was stimulated by the 
emergence of new configurations for the international economy, brought on by forces of 
globalisation.  
 
The emergence of new configurations in IPE, contributed to Brazil’s shifting views of trade 
and industrial policy, as well as foreign policy. Cason and Power (2009) claim that support for 
import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) had started declining already in the 1980s, and 
eroded what was the basis of the Brazilian development model for the previous 50 years. 
Consequently, the gradual abandonment of this model combined with the renewed commitment 
to market principles and financial institutions (WB and IMF) by the leaders of the more 
developed North (President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher), which echoed the North’s 
tune on development policy; had significant effects on Brazil’s trade policy (Cason and Power, 
2009:125).  
 
However, these changes in the international development context did not change Brazil 
overnight. In fact, Brazil was one of the last Latin American countries to adopt free market 
reforms (Cason and Power, 2009). Furthermore, the new structure of international relations and 
society emerged from an agenda that was based on new soft122 issues in IPE. These so called 
“soft issues” had begun to assume a greater importance in the international arena, ultimately 
contributing to how Brazil perceived itself as well as its foreign policy and relations to other 
countries. Abdenur (1994:3) claims: “the relative importance of each country [came] to be 
measured less by its military or strategic influence and more by its economic, commercial, 
scientific, or cultural projection”. In a sense, it could be said that Brazil followed the same 
pattern as China in terms of an increasing shift towards neo-liberal and capitalist drivers, as 
opposed to purely ideological ones; including in its foreign policy. Consequently, this 
preoccupation with economic stability contributed to a redefinition of foreign policy, which 
actively involved a pluralisation of actors, including the Finance Ministry as opposed to just 
being the premise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) of Brazil. This pluralisation 
was deemed necessary from Cardoso’s perspective, as diplomacy had to take long-term action 
while seeking to adapt to current transformations.  
 
                                                          
122 These included the environment, human rights, questions of minorities, and more. 
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Amorim (2010b) claims that “An ever-changing world requires a foreign policy with capacity 
of adaptation”; indicating that in a democracy, foreign policy is one amidst a number of public 
policies. However, this view requires a shift from accepting traditional conceptions of foreign 
policy as a perennial state policy, to thinking of it as public policy. Milani (2014:5) captures 
this in the following statement: “This change in mind set requires that the state and the 
government, which is in action at the international level, should be seen as the main producers 
of this policy”. This would imply that the Brazilian state and government have a specific 
foreign policy agenda in mind. Nevertheless, some argue (Key Informant A, July 2015) that 
Brazilian foreign policy is anchored in the state, it does not shift depending on the shift in 
government; thus, reflecting certain continuity, despite the multiplication of actors.  
 
Historically, Brazil’s foreign policy, as well as its domestic policy has been guided by the 
concept of development. While not all governments over the years promoted developmental 
actions, the idea of development has a fundamental value with remarkable political and policy 
resonance in Brazil’s political discourse (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012).  
 
The key concepts articulated through the national development paradigm123 included ‘centre-
periphery’, ‘industry’, ‘internal market’, and ‘deterioration of the terms of trade’. It also 
implied active state involvement in the country’s economy along with adopting an 
industrialisation model based on ISI (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Nölke, 2014c); as was often 
advocated by scholars within the developmental state school. As one interviewee (Key 
Informant A, July 2015) noted “Dependency theory is most applicable to Brazilian foreign 
policy”. This was applicable in the 1960s and 1970s when the main aim of Brazil’s foreign 
policy was the development of the country and its economy, through the inclusion in the G77 
and the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). By advocating for the inclusion 
of developing states from Africa, Latin America, and East Asia in this NIEO, Brazil received 
more political support from those regions, and thus more power in the international arena. This 
is similar to China’s increasing activity in multilateral initiatives post-2000, as outlined in 
chapter three. 
 
                                                          
123 In domestic politics, Brazil’s focus on development started in the 1930s with the adoption of the so-called 
‘national – developmentalism’ paradigm, further articulated in the 1940s through the work of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). 
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While the concept of development remained a central point, the understanding thereof and the 
means to achieve it changed during the 1990s, particularly with the waning of national-
developmentalist economic model of state and the subsequent abandoning of ISI, or rather a 
departure from state capitalism (Nölke, 2014a, b, c). Nevertheless, the concept of development, 
particularly within the aims of Brazil’s economic development surged during both Cardoso’s 
and Lula’s presidencies. In opposition to Cardoso’s priorities of strengthening alliances with 
developed nations, Lula took a different angle to foreign policy, in so much as placing Brazil 
firmly as a developing and emerging economy (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). Brazil’s 
diplomatic history is marked by consistent efforts to challenge the prevailing world order, while 
avoiding any suggestion or even thought that Brazil was seeking a leadership role in the region, 
or the world at large. Instead, Brazil’s approach “focuses on forming and leading coalitions of 
developing states to strengthen shared values and normative commitments” (Dauvergne and 
Farias, 2012:903), similar to China. 
 
In pursuing this kind of international strategy, it is inevitable that development would play a 
crucial aspect of Brazil’s foreign policy, particularly in terms of SSDC, global health, and 
environmental issues (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). What remains to be seen is how Brazil 
uses this strategy of development in foreign policy to secure its interests in the international 
arena, since it cannot achieve those goals through military force124. Brazil’s power in 
international relations is based on the pursuit of multilateral solutions to international problems, 
the tendency to compromise in international disputes, and to embrace good behaviour to guide 
its diplomacy (Cooper et al., 1993:19). 
 
By the early 1960s Wohlfers (1962) argues that trying to influence friendly countries with 
promises or benefits was in most cases more effective than making threats. This tradition of 
non-belligerence, negotiation, multilateralism and a stern focus on law and legal standings, has 
been followed by all Brazilian governments ever since the early 20th century (including the 
military regime (1964-84)). As stated by Brazil’s foreign minister of the Lula administration, 
Celso Amorim (2003-2010) “Brazil’s great skill is to be friends with everyone” (Amorim, 
2010a). In addition, using co-option rather than coercion, particularly through the assistance of 
                                                          
124 Within Latin America, Brazil has only fought three wars, all of which took place between 1822 and 1889 
during the imperial regime, while outside of Latin America it was only involved in World War I and II. After 
World War II Brazil’s role in regional and international warfare has been characterised by peacekeeping missions 
(Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). Thus, the realist notion of power cannot be applied to Brazil, or China (see chapter 
three). 
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its diplomatic corps as the norm125, and economic actors (MNCs), a country could get others 
to want the same outcome (Nye Jr, 1990). Despite it maybe being a simplified definition, it 
does assist in understanding Brazil’s soft power diplomacy and the importance of economic 
and political, rather than military gains, as also in the case of China.   
 
This approach to foreign policy by Brazilian leaders is according to some (Brands, 2010:13) a 
means to achieving the ultimate goal and grand strategy of making that transition from a 
unipolar to a multipolar international order. This is echoed by former Itamaraty secretary-
general under the Cardoso regime, Osmar Chohfi (2002), when speaking about Brazil’s 
position within South America; saying it does not want to impose, but is prepared to present 
ideas and strengthen its own positions while negotiating favourable conditions for all.  
 
This approach and even greater focus on cooperation and economic expansion of Brazilian 
MNCs has been implemented by both Presidents Cardoso and Lula, whose goals were to 
increase Brazil’s weight in international affairs by building coalitions such as MERCOSUR 
(Southern Common Market); and Brazil’s inclusion in the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) and IBSA grouping (India, Brazil, and South Africa) under 
Lula. Coalition building according to Flemes (2010) is a means to increase the bargaining 
power of developing nations in the international realm; thereby, leaning to a more multipolar 
world system. Flemes (2010:97) argues that the strategy of the IBSA states is to identify a way 
to challenge the dominant international strategy and to transform themselves into the main 
power poles of a multipolar world order in the future. In order to do this, soft balancing is a 
prerequisite; thus, involving institutional strategies such as the formation of limited diplomatic 
coalitions to constrain and undermine the superpower’s (US) unilateral policies (Pape, 2005; 
Paul, 2005). However, this comes with a significant emphasis on economic power in relation 
to the dominant power of the West. The main differences between Presidents Cardoso and Lula 
were how and to what extent to place economic development at the centre of both domestic 
and foreign policy. During the Lula presidency, development became a national identity 
(Dauvergne and Farias, 2012); and the role of economic actors in foreign policy was increasing, 
as will be outlined in section 4.4. This coalition building was done to create a soft balance 
                                                          
125 This norm was engrained in the early 20th century by the father of Brazilian foreign policy, Baron of Rio 
Branco; who was praised for his solving border disputes through diplomacy and the use of international law, while 
at the same time managing to extend Brazil’s territory by 900,000 km2 without ever firing a single shot 
(Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). 
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against structures that were perceived to be detrimental to both Brazil and the rest of the 
developing world, keeping developing countries in a perpetual state of dependence.  
 
This lean towards a more multipolar world is driven by Brazil’s long-standing desire to obtain 
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Burges, 2017; Amorim, 2010b; 
Bernal-Meza, 2010; Christensen, 2013; Key Informants A and C, July 2015). To do so, Brazil 
is aware that it needs more market share; thus, larger presence and influence in both the WTO 
and IMF. This is done with the assistance of large scale investments by Brazilian MNCs in 
international markets, as well as development cooperation efforts with South countries, 
particularly African states, who also represent the largest voting bloc in the UN (Key Informant 
C, July 2015). Due to the support of African states Brazil has managed to acquire international 
recognition, for example De Azevedo Brito heading the World Food Programme (1981-1982). 
This clearly indicates the importance of economic actors in foreign relations, and could 
furthermore signal a certain interdependence of the home state and economic actors for the 
acquisition of foreign policy goals. This will be further explored in section 4.4, when the four 
pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework will be applied to the 
home state-MNC relationship. Brazil’s increasing role in international affairs since the 1990s126 
and its status of 6th largest world economy (surpassing the UK) (Centre for Economics and 
Business Research, 2013) placed Brazil on the shortlist of countries that have the most potential 
to shape the 21st century (Bodman et al., 2011). This is due to Brazil’s success in lifting millions 
out of poverty, and thereby becoming a role model for economic development.  
 
4.2.2 Liberalisation of Brazil’s Economy under Cardoso  
From 1990 to 2015, Brazil’s foreign policy has gone through tremendous changes. This is by 
no means only due to globalisation patterns and Brazil’s realisation that the changing IPE 
climate also requires domestic changes, such as the shift away from ISI; but also, due to the 
personal influence exercised by Presidents Cardoso and Lula, as well as the multiplication of 
actors (MNCs, NGOs, civil society).  
 
During the Cardoso administration, the question of foreign relations within the domestic 
agenda gained much greater emphasis, probably in tune with tendencies abroad. International 
                                                          
126 The timeframe of Brazil’s increasing international role and economic actors’ increasing inclusion in 
international affairs coincide with the Cardoso administration and the reforms that ensued. See section 4.2.2.  
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relations, for various reasons - some related to criticism of government policy, and some related 
to greater emphasis being placed on economic activities - inspired greater attention and interest 
among society, business, and media (Burges, 2009). 
 
According to Burges (2009) and Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009) Cardoso’s administration 
sought to internalise, absorb and consolidate the liberal changes brought on by globalisation, 
by replacing the reactive foreign policy with a “proactive international agenda aligned in some 
issues with the canons of neoliberalism and guided by a logic of autonomy through 
participation” (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009:53). According to Fonseca Jr. (1998:368), 
autonomy does not mean distance from controversial international issues, but the wish to 
influence the open agenda with values that express traditional Brazilian diplomacy 
(multilateralism, non-belligerence, non-coercion).  
 
Due to Brazil’s sheer size, there are very few things that do not affect Brazilian citizens, and 
thus participation is integral. This called for Brazil assuming greater control over its future by 
efficiently solving its internal problems and actively participating in the elaboration of norms 
and guidelines of the global order. This also contributed to the establishment of an environment 
favourable to economic development, which has been a central aspect of Brazilian external 
action through most of the twentieth century (Fonseca Jr., 1998).  
 
Therefore, the Ministry of Finance became increasingly involved in foreign policy due to both 
domestic and international preoccupation with economic stability (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 
2009; Burges, 2009). This is similar to the rise in importance of MOFCOM in China. This 
came with the reiteration of the global trader127 concept (Barbosa and Cesar, 1994) and the 
realisation that MERCOSUR can be a platform for competitive insertion on a global level. In 
addition, this opened up opportunities for participation with other countries and regions128 
(Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009). By embracing the global trader concept, Brazil could adopt 
diverse agendas and positions in order to seek out markets and trade relations without tying 
itself to one single partner or region for that matter. According to Pinheiro (2000), this is the 
                                                          
127 “A global trader opts for multilateral trade liberalisation in order to maximise benefits” (Vigevani and 
Cepaluni, 2009:56).  
128 Similarly, the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) serves as a platform for economic, political, 
and social integration and cooperation. 
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reason why Brazil took a non-institutional approach129 to MERCOSUR, while at the same time 
taking an institutional approach to its multilateral agenda, particularly in relations to the UN 
and the WTO.  
 
During Cardoso’s era, with the renewal of the global trader concept, Brazil placed 
MERCOSUR at the forefront of the Brazilian agenda, as well as opting for a free-trade area 
with the European Union (Burges, 2009). This indicates the increasing importance of economic 
aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy, better characterised as foreign economic policy130. 
MERCOSUR was seen as a system of open regionalism and a strategic platform from which 
member states and their economic actors cold participate and exert their influence in wider 
international trends (Pena and Rozemberg, 2005). However, Caichiolo (2017:117) claims that 
despite the slow increase in the variety of actors involved, the role players were and still are 
restricted to high-level authorities in the governments of member states. Private sector role 
players such as class associations, industrialists, businessmen, consumers, and bankers were 
not consulted when MERCOSUR was forming; however, it is not to say that their interests 
have not been considered at all. 
 
In fact, according to Silva (2002:302) business associations, unions, NGOs and Congress were 
all involved in the debate over Brazil’s relations with the world. Caichiolo (2017:117) says that 
it is in fact incumbent upon MERCOSUR member states to “support and promote the interests 
of their own private sectors”. Nevertheless, decision-making has been vertical in the sense that 
states have taken decisions on behalf of their private sectors that were criticised by those same 
sectors; thus, amounting to a state-led integration process of MERCOSUR, resembling the era 
of military rule and state protectionism and interventionism.  
 
                                                          
129 “Since the beginning of the process, MERCOSUR’s institutional structure has been an intergovernmental 
one. Decisions were made by consensus and with the presence of all member states, with the goal of making the 
integration scheme more flexible and gradual. Thus, member governments maintained broad freedom of action 
without having to comply with the interests and autonomous decisions of a communitary bureaucracy, detached 
from the administration and/or internal policy-making process of each country. The dispute resolution format was 
also centered on this logic, characterized by the search for diplomatic or negotiated answers, rather than solutions 
based on rules, with an intergovernmental-type institutional design in which those that negotiated or litigated were 
the States themselves, with individuals maintaining a marginal function. Unlike the European case, Member States 
controlled the decision-making process in MERCOSUR” (Pena and Rozemberg, 2005:1).  
130 This study does not focus on the mechanisms and actors involved in the making of this foreign economic 
policy; rather, it focuses on the role of MNCs in executing a foreign economic policy designed by the Brazilian 
state and the associated ministries and departments.  
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In Cardoso’s (2000) view, conformity with international regimes would in the long run prove 
beneficial, conditioned by the fact that Brazil manages to transform external opportunities into 
internal benefits. In terms of concrete achievements and formulations, two central aims of the 
Cardoso administration stand out: maintaining strong pro-MERCOSUR rhetoric and building 
up relations with South America; whereby, Brazil would be granted better exercise of 
universalism and bolster the directive of autonomy through integration.  
 
Secondly, the adherence to international economic values meant increased domestic stability, 
as it exposed Brazil to more economic opportunities, which trickled down into the domestic 
realm. Three other actions taken by the Brazilian government, meant that the autonomy through 
integration strategy was further consolidated through: the signing of the Final Act of Marrakesh 
(which created the WTO in 1994); the decision of a common external tariff in MERCOSUR; 
and the negotiations for the creation of the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (Vigevani, 
Oliveira and Cintra, 2004:34). Like China’s reforms under Deng that prioritised economic 
transformation, due to stabilisation programs, economic concerns became more fundamental 
under Cardoso’s administration, than under his predecessor. This also spilled over into foreign 
policy approaches, where economic motives became more important than political ones, albeit 
not without difficulties. 
 
According to Cardoso’s administration, adherence to and utilisation of international regimes in 
order to achieve results favourable to Brazil, were regarded as fundamental. However, the 
state’s adjustment to the context of negotiations within these regimes, as well as the capability 
of the private sector to adapt and respond to this new interaction, proved insufficient (Vigevani 
and Cepaluni, 2009). While Cardoso’s main foreign policy premise was conformity with the 
global agenda, combined with a stronger international position for Brazil; Brazil’s positions in 
the WTO were not proactive. In cases where proactive positions were taken, they focused on 
Brazil’s competitive areas such as agriculture, which did not represent the totality of national 
interests. In diplomatic action, Cardoso’s administration made increasing use of presidential 
diplomacy. For example: “A bigger symbolic act was the 1996 accession to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. This decision ran against the traditional sovereigntist principles that cast 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as an unjust restriction on autonomy made egregious by 
the nuclear powers’ failure to take meaningful steps to disarm” (Burges and Chagas Bastos, 
2017:282). Although there was significant bureaucratic and congressional opposition to the 
move, Cardoso pushed it through (Burges and Bastos, 2017). This was in contrast to his 
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predecessor Collor de Mello; thus, contributing to the reconstruction of Brazil’s image, and 
legitimizing it in the eyes of multilateral institutions and foreign governments. By making use 
of presidential diplomacy, Brazil tried to “rebuild external credibility on the basis of internal 
stability” (Genoino, 1999:7). Danese (1999) claims that the Cardoso administration attempted 
to combine two things: national power based on stabilisation and economic incentives and 
openness (move towards open market economic system); and personal disposition and vocation 
of the president as the main protagonist in a presidential diplomacy. In addition to strengthening 
its multilateral relations, under the Cardoso administration, Brazil’s bilateral economic 
relations with the US became increasingly more important, as trade and investments surged131. 
Closer relations to the US came against a backdrop of Brazil not wanting to isolate itself, but 
rather maintain multiple partnerships across multiple arenas (Cardoso, 1993). This approach 
was also implemented in maintaining priority for MERCOSUR despite the increasing 
difficulties within the bloc. Cardoso (2000) stated that MERCOSUR is the most central 
agreement, but Brazil needs broader participation as well. This somewhat signals a pragmatic 
approach to both political and economic strategies one in which Brazil was not limiting itself 
to just one agreement. Brazil’s focus on South America granted it recognition as a regional 
power, and could in the long run prove beneficial for its aspirations of a UN Security Council 
permanent seat (Burges, 2017; Christensen, 2013; Lima, 1996).  
 
Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009) claim that the Cardoso administration believed that growth in 
Brazil’s regional role increased its extra-regional bargaining power, both politically and 
economically, despite Brazil’s traditionally inward-looking focus. Therefore, MERCOSUR 
signalled Brazil’s slow emergence away from this inward-looking tradition that has been 
dominant before the 1990s. While Brazil’s image somewhat improved internationally during 
the Cardoso administration due to the success of the Real plan132, Brazil’s efforts to play a 
greater role in Latin America were ultimately crumpled by its own domestic constraints 
resulting from financial instability and economic stagnation (Christensen, 2013). In addition, 
this had repercussions for Brazil’s economic bargaining power in the international arena being 
diminished. This left a legacy of a foreign policy that neither achieved great triumphs nor 
                                                          
131 “Two-way goods and services trade between the United States and Brazil has nearly tripled in the past decade 
to more than $100 billion in 2011.Since 2002, U.S. goods exports to Brazil have more than tripled, growing from 
$12.4 billion in 2002 to $42.9 billion in 2011. From 2002 to 2011, U.S. services exports to Brazil more than 
tripled, increasing from $5.1 billion in 2002 to $19.9 billion in 2011” (The White House, 2012).  
132 This refers to the attempts by the Cardoso administration to stabilise the domestic currency, real following a 
failed string of attempts at controlling inflation. 
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suffered significant losses (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009). Even though the Cardoso 
administration’s historical standing can be regarded as rather dispirited, some of the initiatives 
taken, such as the curbing of the high inflation rates; paved the way for the successor, Lula, to 
tread a more creative path through the international playfield. This also pertains to the increase 
in Brazil’s economic growth and further expansion of Brazilian MNCs.  
 
4.2.3 Brazil’s Increasing International Role under Lula 
During President Lula’s time, a shift occurred in Brazil’s willingness to bear the costs of 
leadership in the international arena, something that was only done in rhetorical terms under 
Cardoso, but lacked in practical application. Lula’s administration also took a step further in 
response to US unilateralism, and re-introduced multilateralism as a tool to decentralise and 
regulate power in the international society. Emerging powers have built different coalition 
groups to strengthen their bargaining power in the WTO (Conceição - Heldt, 2013). This was 
further elaborated by Brazil’s initiatives in forming the G-3, also known as IBSA; in creating 
the G-20133 for the WTO Doha Round and in ultimately and perhaps most importantly, reaching 
out to African and Arab countries and placing them on the global map as equal players vis-à-
vis the West. This is in addition more in line with Brazil’s historical foreign policy aims guided 
by the overarching aim of achieving a multipolar world order.  
 
The main difference between the Cardoso and Lula administration was the replacement of the 
concept of autonomy through integration with that of autonomy through diversification134,  
which ultimately led Brazil to consolidate a more affirmative foreign policy around the defence 
of its interests (economic and diplomatic) (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009; Vigevani, Oliveira 
and Cintra, 2004). However, perhaps the most crucial aspect of diversion between the two 
administrations was Lula’s increasing incorporation of a plurality of actors (MNCs, academics, 
unions and NGOs) in Brazil’s foreign policy, which is of particular relevance to this study as 
it deals with the relations between the home state and MNCs in foreign policy.  
 
                                                          
133 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, European Union   
134 While the Cardoso administration maintained multilateralism as the underlying principle of foreign policy, it 
attributed emphasis to international law and was to a certain extent limited to regional partners. Diversification 
under Lula meant that Brazil wanted to foster relations with other countries, including the African ones (especially 
the PALOPS). It also meant a diversification from IR being economically based, to include or rather “redeem the 
so-called human, social and cultural debt” (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009:93).  
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In the seven years during Lula’s presidency, Brazil had changed both internally135 and 
externally, portraying a more proactive role in international affairs. However, one thing that 
has not changed was the foundation of Brazil’s foreign policy (multilateralism and non-
interference in sovereign affairs), the main reason for Brazil’s longstanding international 
credibility (Amorim, 2010b). While different governments attach various degrees of 
importance to specific themes, issues, regions and agendas, thereby calling for an adaptable 
foreign policy; the underlying principles of multilateralism, diplomacy and pragmatism have 
been consistent, as pointed out by Key Informant A (July 2015). According to Celso Amorim 
(2010), former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Lula, foreign policy is only one of several 
public policies in a democracy; thus, it needs to be subject to scrutiny of public opinion. While 
staying faithful to the basic principles, the aims and targets changed, as Lula stated: “Change: 
this is the key word; this was the great message from Brazilian society in the October elections” 
(Lula da Silva, excerpt taken from BBC, 2003). This change is most clear in Lula’s open 
flirtation and inclusion of business in foreign policy and the expansion of numerous Brazilian 
MNCs in global markets.  
 
Due to Brazilian business’s mistrust of the Workers Party’s leftist orientation, Lula’s first 
couple of months were characterized by challenges stemming from the middle class and 
business elite’s fears about how he would manage the economy. In order to quell those fears, 
Lula pursued an effective bifurcation of government, characterized by the economically 
important ministries such as Finance and Agriculture, the Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade, and the Central Bank being left in the hands of centre-right figures; and the 
domestically less important, yet symbolic Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) “came to be dominated 
by the Worker’s Party line, thereby diverging from the traditional autonomy of the Itamaraty 
in the definition of the foreign policy direction” (Christensen, 2013:273). Furthermore, while 
foreign relations were important, in the public eye they had no traction and offered very little 
opportunity to deliver what was regarded the bread and butter of Brazilian politics; thus, Lula 
was free to make changes at the helm as he saw fit (Burges, 2009). The changes he made at 
Itamaraty made powerful political statements about foreign policy, such as the appointment of 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes136, as secretary-general (Burges, 2009). This and other such 
                                                          
135 Domestic success in terms of increase in gross national product rates (GDP) and narrowing the gap between 
the rich and the poor (Amorim, 2010b). 
136 He was previously fired by former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Cardoso, Celso Lafer, due to his 
continuous discontent with Cardoso’s main foreign policy driver, namely closer ties with the US (Burges, 2009). 
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appointments did not carve significant thematic shifts in the South American oriented Brazilian 
foreign policy; however, they have opened up for an expansion of a wider South-South 
alignment (Burges, 2009) i.e. autonomy through diversification.  
 
This shift resulted in the intensification of South-South integration efforts137 that ranged from 
establishing the G-20 group of developing nations, to the issue-specific IBSA, and to the 
politically idealistic transformation of the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) into the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR138) (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Soares de Lima, 2005; Alden and Vieira, 
2005). Villa and Viana (2010) argue that UNASUR is a novelty within South American 
integration, as it does not focus on trade issues, instead it focuses on multilateralism at the 
regional level, with security and infrastructural cooperation as key components.  
 
In terms of its leadership role outside of South America, Brazil has been active in the security 
dimension on the global scale. Brazil has been particularly critical of military interventions by 
the US and its partners. Brazil maintains its stance of multilateralism in terms of security issues, 
and vociferously opposes interventions by one country in the sovereign territory of another 
(Christensen, 2013; Spektor, 2012). However, in 2003 under Lula’s directive the country 
accepted the command of UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti by sending 1200 soldiers (Rohter, 
2004); a move that some claim to be in contrast with Brazil’s long-standing non-intervention 
principle (Spektor, 2012; Seitenfus, 2007). The presence in Haiti, is linked to the tradition of 
Brazilian diplomacy to cooperate in policies that promote international and national peace 
initiatives (Christensen, 2013). However, Villa and Viana (2010) see the policy as a paradox, 
as Brazil was seeking to gain autonomy from and neutralise, or even displace, the US’s 
traditional central role in South American security.  Brazil’s contribution to the peace mission 
in Haiti, demonstrated not only that Brazil was willing, but fully capable of taking on a 
leadership role that demands the ability to mobilise resources (Christensen, 2013; Rohter, 
2004). Through this mission and its objectives, Brazil’s international status was strengthened, 
                                                          
137 The importance of South-South Cooperation will be further discussed in section 4.3 in terms of Brazil’s 
relations with Africa, as well as in section 4.6. 
138 “UNASUR is a broad project of regional integration and cooperation. It includes political, economic, social, 
environmental, cultural and infrastructural elements” (Christensen, 2013:275). 
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which was necessary for Brazil in its more general international strategy, namely the alleged139 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Christensen, 2013; Bernal-Meza, 2010).  
 
In the defence of national sovereignty and national development interests (both political and 
economic), Lula’s administration assumed a more assertive role and sought privileged alliances 
in the South, not least so in Africa. In addition to this, Lula did not shy away from taking on 
and vociferously speaking about Brazil’s role as leader, both in South America but also in the 
South (Garcia, 2011). President Lula and foreign minister Celso Amorim (2003-2010) placed 
importance on the expansion of the country’s diplomatic presence, trade engagements and 
development cooperation; thus, expanding Brazil’s global role and offering a new voice to 
international discussions. This is particularly seen in Brazil’s actions prior and during the WTO 
Doha round, where new coalitions were built to represent the interest of emerging and 
developing countries, and to reverse agricultural trade protectionism (Conceição - Heldt, 2013). 
These new coalitions posed a challenge for the US and EU, as they indicated that emerging 
powers are not willing to open their markets for industrial products form the developed 
countries, without having considerable concessions in traditionally protectionist sectors, such 
as agriculture, textiles, footwear, iron and steel, and consumer electronics (Conceição - Heldt, 
2013). In addition, they used distributive bargaining strategies by refusing to accept further 
tariff rate reductions for industrial products, until the US and EU made reciprocal concessions 
in agriculture (Vickers, 2012). Conceição - Heldt (2013) and Mahrenbach (2013) claim that 
this change in Brazil’s (and India) stance on trade negotiations and the general global system 
can be studied through Putnam’s (1988) two-level games approach140. In short, national 
preferences are determined by sub-national interests141, i.e. domestic factors influence 
international outcomes and the interaction between states on a global scale. This can further be 
divided into two categories: the state centric approach that focuses on domestic institutions 
(Ehrlich, 2007; Goméz-Mera, 2009) and the society- centric approach that looks at how interest 
                                                          
139 This is a disputed topic, some authors (Christensen, 2013; Bernal-Meza, 2010; Burges, 2009; Vigevani and 
Cepaluni, 2009) claim this to be the main aim of Brazilian foreign policy, while others (Amorim, 2010b) claim it 
to be of little significance.  
140 “Putnam’s two-level games approach suggests that, during international negotiations, government 
representatives have to take into account the interest of their constituents at the domestic level (bureaucracies, 
interest groups, and the media) as they do those of those of their counterparts at the international level” (Conceição 
- Heldt 2013:433).  
141 For instance, in 1999, in order to integrate the demands of interest groups into the Brazilian negotiating 
position, the Cardoso administration institutionalised the access of interest groups to the government through two 
inter-ministerial working groups: the Thematic Groups and the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on International 
Trade of Goods and Services (Motta Veiga, 2013). 
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groups shape trade policy (De Biѐvre and Eckhardt, 2011; Dür, 2010). However, Mahrenbach 
(2013), Conceição - Heldt (2013) and Lilja (2012), combine these two approaches and link 
domestic political institutions to the role played by powerful interest groups. This is of 
particular relevance to this study, as it focuses on the interaction and relations between MNCs 
and their home-state in foreign policy, which can also include foreign trade policy.  According 
to Muggah (2015), under Lula, Brazil’s foreign policy went through a Golden Age, compared 
to later President Rousseff’s foreign policy that could only be described as the Stone Age142. 
The following few paragraphs will give a brief overview of Rousseff’s (lack) of foreign policy 
to contrast this with the Lula era.  
 
It was mentioned previously that foreign policy issues; and thus, Itamaraty, are not of primary 
importance to the Brazilian citizens. Therefore, the erosion of Itamaraty, once regarded as Latin 
America’s most esteemed, during President Rousseff’s administration, is no surprise as it was 
plagued by severe budget cuts (from US$ 3.3billion in 2010 to US$ 1.1 billion in 2015), 
amounting to 0.2% of its national budget spent on foreign policy (Galves Derolle, 2015; 
Muggah, 2015; Zanini, 2014). Shortly after president Rousseff was elected for another term in 
office in 2014, the Brazilian government announced that Brazil’s foreign policy is active and 
prominent (Suyama and Berron, 2014), which was not reflected in reality. However, Muggah 
(2015), Galves Derolle (2015) and Zanini (2014) claim that Brazilian foreign policy under 
president Rousseff was in the dark, due to its leaders being distracted by a slow economy; thus, 
being more preoccupied by making critical reforms at home in order to increase productivity 
and competitiveness rather than promoting Brazilian interests abroad.  
 
In addition, presidential visits by President Rousseff were only a handful during her first term 
and diplomatic ventures to promote Brazil internationally decreased from 180 visits in 2013 to 
just 40 in 2014 (Muggah, 2015). According to Vieira de Jesus (2014) and Zanini (2014), this 
is due to lack of personal interest and charisma of former President Rousseff but also the lack 
of Brazil’s engagement in global debates, which ultimately dismantled the Lula legacy 
(Muggah, 2015). This lack of engagement in global debates is visible in Brazil stepping back 
from engagement in the Middle East, exercising silence on Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and 
also decreasing the budget for cooperation initiatives within the SSDC realm (Suyama and 
                                                          
142 By refereeing to President Rousseff’s foreign policy as the Stone Age, Muggah (2015) refers to the president’s 
lack of patience for international affairs, and prioritising domestic poverty reduction and infrastructure expansion 
instead. 
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Berron, 2014). According to Muggah (2015) the negligence of foreign policy was increasingly 
visible when Brazilian embassies and consulates in Canada, Guinea, Japan, Paraguay, Portugal 
and US were not able to pay their electricity and water bills, thereby cutting their spending in 
half in early 2015 including on internet, security and local staff. However, domestic reform 
should not come at the expense of foreign policy, because they are ultimately deeply 
intertwined (Galves Derolle, 2015; Muggah, 2015). Galves Derolle (2015) says that despite 
President Rousseff being from the same party as her predecessor, Brazil’s foreign policy during 
her time could only be described as autonomy through indifference.  
 
Reasons for this alleged indifference to foreign policy stem from two sources, one stemming 
from the often-cited trait of Brazilian citizens as being inward-looking and with little 
knowledge of how foreign policy affects their lives (Muggah, 2015; Zanini, 2014). The other 
being the economic situation in the country, further exacerbated by the vast corruption scheme, 
discovered in a 2014 federal investigation dubbed Operação Lava Jato or Operation Car Wash, 
involving Brazilian state-owned oil giant Petrobras and several government branches (Valor 
Economico, 2015), resulting in President Rousseff’s impeachment in February 2016.  
 
Despite the fact that under President Rousseff foreign policy enjoyed less of a priority due to a 
national economic crisis, the pattern of pluralisation of actors within foreign policy commenced 
under Lula, continued. The Finance Ministry, the Environment Ministry in the Executive 
branch and businessmen in the industrial sector have intensified their cooperation with 
Itamaraty in order to implement strategies for Brazil’s international insertion (Vieira de Jesus, 
2014). Furthermore, the main guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy, benign multipolarity143 or 
inclusive multipolarity were adhered to by Rousseff’s administration, particularly by defending 
the greater participation of emerging states in the economic restructuring, such as institutional 
reforms at the IMF and the WB. In addition, in March 2011, Brazil together with India 
reaffirmed its commitment to the UN reform, especially the Security Council through the 
expansion of permanent and non-permanent members to include representation of developing 
states in both (Vierira de Jesus, 2014:32). This stance was further showcased at the third BRICS 
summit in Sanya, China in April 2011, when President Rousseff and the other four leaders 
                                                          
143 Multipolarity can be understood as the distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly 
equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. For instance, the Cold War era can be regarded as 
one of bipolarity (US vs. USSR). What Brazil and other South states advocate for is multipolarity where there are 
not just one or two centres of power, but several. Thus, the alignment of developing states from the South can be 
seen as an attempt at achieving a more balanced world order.  
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(Presidents: Putin of Russia, Zuma of South Africa, Hu of China and Patil of India) defended 
that global economic governance should be strengthened and the voices of emerging and 
developing states in international affairs enhanced (Vieira de Jesus, 2014). What can be taken 
from this is a clear case of advocacy for a more important role of governments from the South, 
with the possibility of the inclusion of economic actors (MNCs) from emerging and developing 
states in the existing economic structures in IPE144.  
 
Lastly, while President Rousseff’s foreign policy was more focused on Brazil’s neighbours, 
such as Argentina (Vieira de Jesus, 2014) and regional integration, during her time Brazil 
attempted rapprochement with the US145 and displayed a more explicit stance on the defence 
of human rights. In relation to countries of the South, although many of Rousseff’s critics 
contended that she neglected Africa, this was actually not the case, as will be shown in the 
following section.  
 
4.3 Brazil’s Relations with Africa  
Considering that this study looks at the role of MNCs in Brazil’s (and China’s) foreign policy 
towards African states, it is essential to look at the historical connections and political and 
economic motivations for Brazil’s relations with Africa. In the 1970s under the military 
regime, the Brazilian government drew upon historical ties, predominantly the transatlantic 
slave trade, to deepen ties with African partner states (Davila, 2010). In 1972, after visiting 
11 African states, Brazil’s foreign minister Mario Gibson Barboza stated: “Africa is an 
abstraction” (Gibson Barboza interview with Davila in 2006, in Davila, 2010). Similarly, in 
1975, just as Ovidio de Melo endured the worst combat in Luanda, Brazilian foreign minister 
Azeredo da Silveira explained that Latin America is the essential environment for Brazil’s 
foreign policy, but Africa is the screen upon which it is projected; indicating that what Brazil 
does in Africa in the 1970s is a model for the relations to come in the 2000s (Da Silveira, 
1975). Historically, Brazilian diplomats and intellectuals regarded Africa as an abstraction, an 
                                                          
144 A more recent case of lobbying for MNCs and free trade can be seen at the World Economic Forum in Dalian 
China, being held in June 2017, where Premier Li Keqiang heralded globalisation and addressed the issue of 
protectionism, by saying that “free trade is the foundation of economic globalisation” (Yan, 2017).  
145 This was however short-lived due to the surveillance scandal that erupted in early 2013 and continued until 
2015, sparking president Rousseff to cancel a state visit to Washington D.C. causing embarrassment for former 
President Obama (Aljazeera, 2015). In addition, while the relations between the US and Brazil were already on 
shaky ground due to the surveillance scandal, business confidence was also jeopardised given the fact that US 
MNCs would have an upper hand in business deals and investments in Brazil until the spying was brought to a 
complete stop (Aljazeera, 2015). 
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imaginary place that mirrored Brazilian culture, its past, its future and its relations with the 
world (Davila, 2010). Thus, when Brazil pursued new (after 2000) relations with African 
countries, diplomats looked back at five centuries of contact across the South Atlantic, and 
the connections that began with Portuguese trading posts and slave trade from West Africa in 
the late 15th century (Davila, 2010); or with what Gilberto Freyre termed luso-tropicality146 
(Freyre, 1958; 1961). This stems from Brazil’s aspirations of being the leader of the tropical 
world, because under the Quadros-Goulart admirations (1961-1964), nationalist demands for 
a more active and independent147 foreign policy brought a change to Brazil’s Africa policy148. 
In 1970 Brazil’s Africa policy shifted again albeit gradually, when slacking ties with Portugal 
and South Africa resulted in the aim of securing political and economic presence in all parts 
of Africa not just the Luso-Brazilian Community. This in turn resulted in Brazil’s disproval 
of Portugal’s colonialist past and Brazil’s improvement in attitudes towards former 
Portuguese colonies, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau.  
 
Furthermore, Brazil’s recognition of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) regime in Angola in 1975 opened up the door for a new diplomatic drive toward other 
front-line states. This can be connected to Brazil’s vision of the South Atlantic connection, not 
only in trade and diplomatic support but also military. This changing tune regarding African 
states and the extension of support to some but not all, reflects personal interest rather than 
solidarity and can be explained by neo-liberal or realist school of thought given Brazil’s need 
(at the time) to secure markets for manufactured goods in other regions than the protectionist 
North American and European. The export of manufactured goods (clothes and industrial 
machinery) had become a major source of demand growth for the Brazilian industry, with 
Brazilian exports increasing from US$16 million in the 1960s to US$640 million in the late 
1970s, with Brazilian products penetrating virtually every African market (exports to Nigeria 
went from US$3 million in 1973 to US$115 million in 1977) (de Freitas, 2016).  
 
                                                          
146 A term which reflects the creation of a multicultural community in the tropics fostering a common identity, 
which could ultimately provide the basis for a political community. 
147 The Quadros-Goulart period was left wing and similar to Lula was in support of more connections with the 
South and was more careful in links with the West and US.  
148 It was originally based on subservience to Portuguese colonial interests supported through the 1953 Luso-
Brazilian Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, but then took a turn of deference to Portuguese policy between 
1961 and 1964. However, when Brazilian domestic politics shifted to a military regime in 1964, Brazilian foreign 
policy towards Africa shifted again in support of Portugal’s position in Africa and by extension South Africa, with 
sanctions against Apartheid-South Africa being opposed by the Brazilian government (ANC, 2000). 
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Access to minerals and oil came only as a secondary consideration; however, imports of raw 
materials were on the increase over the course of the 1970s. South Africa was the most 
important Brazilian raw material supplier with exports of phosphoric acid, copper, iron and 
steel, paper, polyesters, and nickel amounting to US$170 million in 1979. The oil exporting 
countries such as Algeria, Congo, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria followed suit, with oil accounting 
for roughly 70 per cent of Brazil’s imports from Africa between 1975 and 1978. Other countries 
were also singled out as potential suppliers of raw materials to Brazil, with Zambia supplying 
copper, Senegal phosphate, and Guinea aluminium (de Freitas, 2016).  
 
While trade with different African states has been on the increase since the 1970s, deep-rooted 
ties between Brazil and Africa are nowhere more noticeable than in the case of Angola. Today 
(2017), Brazil features among the three most important investors in Angola, with Odebrecht 
contributing to the reconstruction of war-torn infrastructure, including dams and hospitals. In 
addition to large Brazilian MNCs, a number of medium-sized businesses have come to Angola 
over the past decade (2000-2015). This is due to several reasons, firstly, Brazil was the first 
country that officially recognised Angola’s independence in 1975 (Stolte, 2012). This 
provided Brazil the opportunity to establish ties with Angola’s communist MPLA movement, 
which consequently granted Brazilian Petrobras (largest Brazilian state-owned oil firm) rights 
to invest in the newly independent state. In addition to Petrobras, construction firm Odebrecht 
shortly after entered the Angolan market and stayed in the country for almost 30 years, despite 
the civil war (1975-2002). This is a clear indication of the connection between the Brazilian 
state and MNC in foreign policy, as diplomatic tactics were used to secure business deals 
(Burges, 2017).  
 
Secondly, Angola is a Lusophone country, and due to historical and language ties Lusophone 
countries (Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and 
Equatorial Guinea) are first-tier in a pyramidal scheme of foreign policy priorities, followed 
by regional powers (South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya), and all others (Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Ghana, etc.) as outlined in figure eight below.  
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This hierarchy is predominantly due to historical, as well as language ties that have over the 
years helped facilitate trade and investment by Brazilian MNCs in Portuguese speaking 
countries. However, after the realisation of importance of expanding its political and economic 
ties with other African states, the hierarchy has moved on to include regional powers as 
important partners, but also other African states. Increasing presence of Brazilian MNCs in 
African states can be seen in table four below. 
 
 
The increased presence of Brazilian businesses in Africa over the last ten years is a direct 
result of competition with its BRICS partners China and India (Abdenur, 2015). Furthermore, 
between 2002 and 2012, Brazil has increased its diplomatic presence in Africa, from 17 to 38 
embassies, making it now one of the countries with most diplomatic representations on the 
continent (Stolte, 2012). However, the embassies are faced with difficulties and question is 
whether they will maintain their presence in Africa in the long run. In addition, trade between 
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Brazil and Africa has in the same period increased six-fold, partly due to the linking of 
MERCOSUR with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) (Stolte, 2012; Abdenur, 2015).  
 
In addition to numerous presidential visits, foreign and economic ministers and business 
delegations have contributed to the development of the growing Brazil-Africa relationship 
(Stolte, 2012, Abdenur, 2015). During most Key Informant and Elite Interviews (July 2015) 
it was echoed that President Lula was almost always accompanied by MNC representatives 
on his visits to Africa, thereby indicating the importance of MNCs for Brazil’s Africa 
engagement, as well as the interconnectedness between national interests and business (MNC) 
interests. This stems from the previously mentioned connection between national 
development, particularly economic development and the role of business in achieving that 
goal both domestically and by expansion into other markets; thus, reflecting foreign policy as 
economic foreign policy/diplomacy.  
 
Moreover, Brazil has initiated many political and cultural forums to deepen ties with Africa, 
including Hunger and Rural Development and the Africa-South America Summit of heads of 
state. Brazil has also made continuous efforts to contribute to Africa’s development, with more 
than half of Brazil’s technical cooperation resources being directed towards Africa (Stolte, 
2012; Alves, 2013a). In 2016 Brazilian SSDC stood at 39, 5 per cent of the total government 
budget for technical cooperation (Milani et al., 2016). As mentioned before, although Brazil 
is still a recipient of development assistance (Alves, 2013b), it has emerged as a new donor in 
Africa, similar to China. Also, similar to China it does not refer to assistance as aid but rather 
as development cooperation, in accordance to its South-South identity. Brazil has also decided 
to relieve African countries debts of more than US$ 1 billion (Rizzi et al., 2011; Schläger, 
2007). 
 
During President Lula’s era, the Africa strategy included an SSC strategy that positioned Brazil 
simultaneously as a development and business partner, despite Brazil not being allowed to 
bundle its ‘aid’ initiatives with investments and trade (Abdenur, 2015). Brazilian officials 
maintain that Brazil’s cooperation with Africa is based on a feeling of solidarity (in line with 
Nel and Taylor, 2013), shared problems, and development challenges. Brazilian MNCs, like 
Odebrecht, “frame their negotiations with governments by differentiating their approach from 
Northern MNCs, emphasising that the company also delivers something close to development 
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assistance by training a domestic workforce targeted at a long-term presence, not short-term 
importing of labour” (Burges, 2017:123). This was also reiterated by President Lula in 2009 at 
the Opening Ceremony of the 13th African Union Summit, when saying that Brazil does not 
see Africa as an extensive reserve of natural resources, but rather as a partner with shared 
experiences and unified capacities.  
 
This type of rhetoric has been uttered by President Lula and President Rousseff on numerous 
occasions, with promises of cooperation and development being the main driving factors 
behind Brazilian engagement in Africa. In addition, Brazilian officials often use the 
opportunity to stress the shared colonial past as well as geological and cultural similarities to 
enhance relations with African counterparts (Key Informant D, July 2015). One cannot help 
but notice the wording used, namely geological similarities (that would only need to be 
considered in large-scale mining and agricultural investment), paired with historical ties, that 
could serve the purpose of provoking sentimental inclinations amongst the African partner 
countries and their peoples. This could thus serve as a way for the home state (Brazil) to open 
avenues for further investments by its MNCs, especially in those sectors for which geological 
similarities have a role to play (mining).  
 
According to Dauvergne and Farias (2012), Brazil’s foreign policy differs from other 
developing powers such as China and India because the focus is on the pursuit of ‘development 
for Brazil and the global South’, which is also the reason for Brazil’s inclusion in forums such 
as IBSA and BRICS. Brazil’s credentials as a cooperation partner are rooted in its domestic 
success story as a country that has achieved democracy and economic development, while at 
the same time narrowing its crippling inequality gap and lifting millions out of poverty149 
(Alves, 2013b). These experiences aimed at effectively combatting poverty and hunger at 
home, have since become reference points for Brazilian SSDC, defined as an exchange of 
practices and transfer of public policies (Milani et al., 2016).  
 
While some scholars, such as Alves (2013a), Stolte (2012), and Schläger (2007) argue that 
Brazil’s approach to development cooperation differs from other donors/partners in not simply 
providing ‘aid’ but developing a partnership of mutual benefit; others, such as Hirst (2011) are 
                                                          
149 Between 1990 and 2008, Brazil cut malnutrition down from 11 per cent to 6 per cent, thereby improving the 
situation of approximately five million people. 
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more critical. Hirst (2011:34) argues that it is at times difficult to dissociate Brazil’s 
cooperation activities from its economic and political interest, a notion that would echo the 
interconnectedness between national development plans that include economic aspects and 
actors. In an interview with Key Informant D (July 2015) it was mentioned that there has been 
a marriage between diplomacy or rather foreign policy discourse, that is frequently 
accompanied by SSDC rhetoric, presidentialisation (particularly under Lula), and business 
interests (MNCs). This could indicate a form of interdependence between the different actors 
involved in Brazil’s foreign policy, particularly towards Africa, as will be further discussed in 
sections 4.5 and 4.6.  
 
As with other BRICS countries, Brazilian investments in Africa have been increasing 
predominantly in the resource and construction sectors (Stolte, 2012; Alves, 2013b; Abdenur, 
2015). Brazilian MNCs activities are not new but date back to the 1970s when Brazil 
encouraged internationalisation of domestic companies in order to secure resources and thereby 
foster Brazil’s development. Unlike its BRICS partners, Brazilian companies’ presence in 
Africa is explained by their specialisation in areas of civil construction and resources (Stolte, 
2012), such as Vale and Odebrecht. Furthermore, they claim to have a natural/geological150 
and cultural151 advantage to invest in Africa, as stated by Key Informant D (July 2015). 
Additionally, Brazilian MNCs are also seeking new markets abroad; thus, their involvement in 
Africa is not a strategy of securing resources but rather an attempt to internationalize and 
diversify away from the Brazilian market (Stolte, 2012). Combined with trade and investments, 
Brazilian economic engagement in Africa involves the export of Brazilian technology in the 
form of turnkey projects, direct investment, licensing, management and consultancy (Forrest, 
1982). It needs to be said however, that the African markets were far less important before the 
Lula era, as well as after (Key Informant A and Elite Interview B, July 2015). With regards to 
technology transfer, Brazilian construction firms have secured contracts for railways, housing 
and hydroelectric dams in Algeria, roads in Tanzania and Mauritania (Patriota and Pierri, 
2014). In Egypt, Brazilian mining giant Vale has set up a steel plant and in Mozambique, 
Brazilian companies have won contracts to provide technical assistance through the 
                                                          
150 The continent was joined with the South American continent in what is known as Gondwana some 200 million 
years ago; hence, the geological similarities make Brazilian companies better equipped to deal with geographical 
challenges than for instance Chinese. 
151 The cultural affinities and similarities, particularly with Lusophone countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea 
Bissau and Mozambique) stem from an Afro-Brazilian identity. 
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ProSavana152 program using technologies developed in the Cerrado to open up Guinea 
woodland areas in Mozambique to commercial agriculture (Patriota and Pierri, 2014). 
 
Technical cooperation (TC) is one of the main ways in which Brazil has pursued closer ties 
with Portuguese speaking countries in Africa, by being the leading exponent of South-South 
relations through advertising tropical technology. The Brazilian government has always been 
a staunch supporter of technical cooperation between developing countries (TCDC), which 
emerged in the 1960s, culminating in the setup of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) 
in 1987. While firstly focused on Latin America, TCDC has since the 1980s also expanded to 
include African countries (Vaz and Inoue, 2007). 
 
Vaz and Inoue (2007) say that Brazilian TCDC programs mostly focus on agriculture, health, 
water and sanitation, energy, environment, sports cooperation and development of biofuels. In 
addition to these traditional areas, African projects also target education, enterprise 
development and telecommunications. Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOPs) 
receive most projects in education, health and agriculture, including training programs for 
Africans in Brazil, which follows the same pattern as that of other late industrialisers in terms 
of sharing of skills (as seen in the case of China as well). Furthermore, in terms of international 
cooperation for development (ICD), in 2010 approximately 68 per cent of all Brazilian ICD 
went to Latin America and 23 per cent to Africa. Furthermore, of the 23 per cent, 76, 5 per cent 
of all cooperation within Africa is with PALOPs (Cape Verde 24, Guinea-Bissau 21, 
Mozambique 13, Sao Tome et Principe 10, and Angola seven per cent) (Milani et al., 
2016:112). This indicates that Lusophone countries are the most important in terms of Brazil’s 
foreign policy, given that they receive the largest amount of technical cooperation projects, as 
well as investments by Brazilian MNCs, thus, confirming the classification in figure six.  
 
While Brazilian SSDC has been increasing over the last two decades, it is considerably smaller 
in comparison to OECD/DAC states and China. However, Brazil’s SSDC does not involve 
direct financial transfers to partner countries, due to it being statistically and by law set up as 
public expenditure in the annual budget’s expenses. Therefore, it does not include investment 
loans granted by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), activities funded and 
implemented by subnational entities, or the remission of debt of other developing countries 
                                                          
152 See Appendix nine 
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(Milani et al., 2016). This is in direct contrast to the arguments presented by Rizzi et al. (2011) 
and Schläger (2007), who claim that Brazil has relieved African countries debt of more than 
US$ 1 billion; thus, raising questions of transparency.  
 
In comparison to China for instance, Brazil does not bundle investments and trade as part of 
development cooperation. Despite the fact that by law Brazil is only allowed to provide 
technical assistance under the banner of SSDC, Brazilian MNCs also play an indirect role in 
development cooperation, such as in the case of the construction of an antiretroviral factory in 
Mozambique, which involved Vale153.  
 
Considering that technical assistance is mainly provided through ABC, which is not an 
autonomous organisation but an agency created within Itamaraty, its main goal of fostering 
technical cooperation is closely linked to foreign policy priorities and internal development 
needs (Vaz and Inoue, 2007). However, while ABC is located within Itamaraty, and is tied with 
the main executor of foreign policy; to say that development cooperation (provided through 
ABC) is the main tool of foreign policy, is too strong a statement (Key Informant A, July 2015). 
Development cooperation is delivered by many agencies: Coordination for the Development 
of Graduate Human Resources, Funding Authority for Studies and Projects/Brazilian 
Innovation Agency (FINEP), National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, 
Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), and the National Health Research 
Institute/Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ)154 (Vaz and Inoue, 2007), all of which have 
loose ties with Itamaraty, whose purpose is to promote Brazilian technology and consultancy 
services. While all of these are closely interlinked with Itamaraty, their expansion abroad and 
the increasing role of BNDES represent an issue for Itamaraty on how to deal with all actors 
abroad i.e. negotiating and making new contacts (Key Informant C, July 2015). 
 
According to Key Informants A and D (July 2015), there is no consensus among elites in Brazil 
on what SSDC should entail, who should be involved, and lastly there is no official definition 
of development cooperation; however, technical assistance is often mentioned as an integral 
part. Technical assistance is strongly rooted in the SSS (Nel and Taylor, 2013) principles as 
well as Brazil’s own development experience. However, in terms of solidarity, Key Informants 
                                                          
153 See section 4.6.1 for more detail. 
154 For a detailed depiction of the connection between the agencies and different ministries, see Appendix ten.  
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A and D (July 2015) say that when one looks at the different agencies and the sectors in which 
they perform SSDC in Africa, not all of them believe in solidarity. “Only in the health sector, 
the people doing cooperation believe that it is for fundamentally altruistic reasons” (Key 
Informant D, July 2017). This indicates that Brazilian technical cooperation and general SSDC 
appears to be driven by self-interested motives despite subscribing to the following set of 
principles: demand driven cooperation, knowledge transfer, capacity building, use of local 
labour, project design based on local specificities, no conditionality, and respect for national 
sovereignty (Abdenur, 2015; Alves, 2013a; Schläger, 2007). These principles are very similar 
to those used by China when justifying its cooperation efforts in Africa; however, Abdenur 
(2015) claims that Brazil’s ties with Africa are also conducted with an element of Brazilian 
exceptionalism that draws again on historical links and similarities in terms of structural 
conditions and challenges. In short, this interconnectivity echoes that: “for each African 
problem, there is a Brazilian solution” (Alves, 2013b:2), also similar to China’s notion of 
exceptionalism.  
 
According to Garcia and Kato (2015) this quote reflects what they claim to be one of two 
approaches aimed at rebuilding and valuing Brazil’s presence in Africa: the hegemonic vision 
– Brazil being a horizontal partner with African states, including equality and partnership; the 
critical approach - viewing emerging powers (mainly China and Brazil) as neo-colonialists 
within the African continent; thus, creating a field of dispute between the new and traditional 
powers over African resources (Amisi et al., 2015). However, Garcia and Kato (2015:118) 
claim that both of those approaches “tend to victimise African countries and their governments 
and underestimate their capacity for action”. In other terms, the concept of ‘African agency’155 
is in the above-mentioned context rendered obsolete.  
 
Brazil, like China, claims that “development cooperation initiatives are more horizontal, 
demand-driven, and respectful of national sovereignty than Northern aid” (Abdenur, 
2015:265). Because of this shared stance, both governments have long withstood efforts from 
the OECD/DAC to harmonise the norms of international development to reflect the principles 
                                                          
155 African agency is a term that refers to the concepts of Afrocentrism in which it is envisaged that Africans are 
the masters of their own fate and that through asserting their views, cultural traits and historical experiences they 
shape their own realities without the meddling of others, mainly Europeans and Americans. “Healthy groups of 
people are able to impose their reality on the world. They control their image and create stories about themselves, 
to place the things they cherish at the forefront of their expression. It is through agency that people practice self-
determination, and are free to culturally contribution to humanity” (Shahadah, 2012).  
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promoted by Northern donors. Brazil and China’s converging stances on this debate as well as 
their close interaction within multilateral forums, like the UN and BRICS, and the 
establishment of the New Development Bank BRICS on 21 July 2015 (NDB BRICS, 2015); 
serve as a reminder that despite their differences, the two countries have similar approaches to 
DC.  
 
However, Brazil’s DC contains specific deficits, in comparison to development policy of 
OECD countries. Schläger (2007) claims that Brazil’s DC lacks transparency concerning 
funding volumes as well as award criteria due to a general lack of mechanisms that would 
require the government to report on how DC funds are administered (Schläger, 2007), similar 
to China. However, in the aftermath of the Lava Jato scandal, these projects are increasingly 
being made more transparent. Furthermore, due to the proliferation of actors and agencies such 
as FINEP, EMBRAPA, and CAPE, the central position of Itamaraty in DC and in broader 
foreign policy decision making has subsequently been weakened. Thus, to a certain extent, this 
decentralisation explains the fragmentation and low coordination in terms of both vision and 
procedures for DC, which in turn makes it difficult to account for Brazilian DC as a whole 
(Cabral and Weinstock, 2010:2).  
 
Therefore, Western development experts claim that the DC activities of emerging donors in 
countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and Angola, disregard human rights and have as their 
primary purpose securing of national energy requirements (Goldstein, 2013). However, as 
claimed by Jeffery Sachs (in Schläger, 2007): “It is a caricature to say that new donor countries 
are only in it for their own self-interest – and the traditional donor countries are there out of the 
goodness of their hearts”. This indicates the hypocrisy on behalf of the West, while at the same 
time saying that there is no big difference between the North and South in relation to SSDC. 
There are, however, big differences between North and South approaches to DC as stated in 
chapters one and two156. 
 
Lastly, while Brazilian SSDC only takes into account ABC funded activities, excluding 
BNDES financed projects; in 2013 at the 50th Anniversary of the AU celebration in Addis 
Ababa, former President Rousseff stated that she was looking forward to extending technical 
and economic cooperation between Africa and Latin America. This opened the way for ABC 
                                                          
156 For more information, Appendix one can be consulted.  
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to become both an investment and cooperation agency. What this in turn could mean, is that 
actors along the economic spectrum (BNDES and MNCs) could play a larger role in Brazil’s 
SSDC activities in Africa; thus, furthering Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. However, as argued 
previously when it comes to Africa, different countries carry different importance in Brazil’s 
foreign policy. Consequently, depending on either the political and/or economic importance of 
an African country, I argue that this will warrant varying importance and thus different roles 
attached to Brazilian actors (embassies, MNCs, diplomats) in relation to the host state in 
question, as outlined in the process of home state-MNC relations in foreign policy framework. 
However, in order to understand that process, the evolution of home state-MNC relations needs 
to be outlined in the following section, looking particularly at the internationalisation efforts 
of Brazilian MNCs and the connection to the home state.  
 
4.4 Internationalisation of Brazil and the Increasing Role for MNCs 
Brazil has undergone several structural reforms, one of which was a government initiated large-
scale National Privatisation Program in March 1990 under the Collor de Mello administration. 
Afterwards, the Franco administration continued along the same path, despite the relatively 
high resistance to these reforms on behalf of the general public and the companies themselves. 
Each company that was put up for privatisation aroused opposition from unions, consumers, 
and activists and organised protests. In addition, congress opposed both the ensuing elimination 
of jobs and the reduction of opportunities to exercise political patronage (Roett, 2010:92).  
 
However, with the success of each privatisation, the process gained more support and 
momentum, resulting in further privatisation efforts under Cardoso and expanding beyond the 
manufacturing sector to: the mining sector (including one of the world’s largest mining firms, 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (referred to as Vale)), public utilities such as telecom and 
electricity companies, as well as firms owned by individual states and municipalities (Roett, 
2010; Vale, 2016).  
 
Between October 1991 and December 2005, more than 120 state enterprises were sold, 
resulting in US$ 87 billion of generated proceeds and US$ 18 billion in debt transferred to the 
private sector (Roett, 2010; Burges, 2017). In addition to this reform, the Cardoso 
administration represented a sharp break with the past, in the sense that the measures taken 
were aimed at weakening state-held monopolies in critical sectors in order to introduce and 
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encourage private and foreign competition. This is similar to the case of China, where the 
loosening of state control on company holdings resulted in shares being traded on the stock 
market. In the energy sector for instance, the government sought to allow foreign-owned 
companies to invest in oil extraction, an activity previously reserved only for domestic 
companies. When stepping into power, the Cardoso administration had to deal with a closed 
off protectionist economy; at its exit, Brazil was more open, more competitive and there was 
more investment and transparency in the delivery of vital services. Therefore, Cardoso’s 
reforms were and still are regarded as revolutionary (Roett, 2010).  
 
A significant amount of Latin America’s, and Brazil’s, economic growth has been a direct 
result of the high demand (predominantly driven by China) for local commodities (Schwab and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2013). While Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, which 
greatly contribute to the region’s competitiveness, Brazil (due to its sheer size) is by far the 
most natural resource rich country in Latin America. The region’s top commodities include oil 
and gas, minerals (copper, iron ore, silver and gold), and agricultural products (soy, sugar, 
coffee, meat and lumber) (Robles et al., 2015). Over the past decade, despite the 2008 global 
financial crisis, Latin America enjoyed the benefits of a commodity boom as demand for the 
above-mentioned commodities did not vane and prices recovered quickly, especially for 
hydrocarbons and minerals (Robles et al., 2015). In addition to high demand and the subsequent 
price increase of these commodities, the region’s shift from highly protectionist market 
regulations to a gradual liberalisation of the economy has seen MNCs from Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile and Mexico increase their competitiveness, also assisted by their incursion in 
MERCOSUR (Robles et al., 2015). This could be regarded as a shift from a developmental 
state to a more neo-liberal state apparatus, yet with high levels of state involvement, otherwise 
described as state capitalism 3.0 (Nölke, 2014a). Although a gradual abandonment of 
developmental state policies has opened up for a more open market economy, particularly 
during the Cardoso era, the interconnectedness between the home state apparatus and MNCs 
has at the same time, never been more prominent, particularly during the Lula era. One avenue 
that proved remarkably effective, was the tying of Lula’s presidential visits to trade missions, 
with his popularity being used as a mechanism to open doors and smooth regulatory barriers 
for Brazilian FDI (Burges, 2017).  
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“The value of Lula as interlocutor in market opening and FDI facilitation became 
clear in 2013 when the newspaper Folha de São Paulo broke the story that about 
half of the former president’s international trips since leaving office had been 
funded by the empreiteiras, with an emphasis on travels to Latin American and 
African with substantial infrastructure needs” (Burges, 2017:129).  
 
The structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, created the perfect backdrop for the creation 
and further development of the already existing Latin American MNCs that sought to expand 
their reach from national to regional, and ultimately global frontiers. Brazil has some of the 
world’s largest and most advanced mining and oil and gas companies: oil and gas giant 
Petrobras, petro-chemical and construction giant Odebrecht, mining giant Vale, and more.  
 
Vale has operations in 30 countries, including projects in Africa: Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia (Vale, 2016). According to the 2013 Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest 
companies, Brazilian Petrobras, Itau Unibanco Holding, Bradesco, Banco do Brasil and Vale 
held 20th, 42nd, 45th, 67th, and 87th place respectively. Vale’s sales amounted to US$ 45.7 billion 
with profits listed at US$ 4.5 billion and a market value of US$ 92.7 billion (Economy Watch, 
2013). Brazilian MNCs also have a more global reach than those in Chile or Argentina (in 
mining, construction, agriculture and consumer packaged goods), (Robles et al., 2015).  
 
Furthermore, trade and liberalisation policies led to an increase in inward foreign investments 
by foreign MNCs in Brazil, primarily achieved through mergers and acquisition (M&A) deals 
that were directed at privatised utilities, such as Vale and Odebrecht (Cyrino and Barcesllos, 
2013). The presence of these new international players contributed to the increase in 
competition among Brazilian firms in their domestic market; thus, forcing many companies to 
upgrade product, process and management capabilities in order to remain competitive. The new 
atmosphere that was created was one of high competitiveness which induced many Brazilian 
firms to seek new sources of growth; thus, cross-border M&A became one of the preferred 
modes of engagement (Cyrino and Barcellos, 2013). This has also been seen in chapter three 
with regards to China, where overcapacity in the domestic market (particularly construction), 
sparked the need for MNCs to internationalise. 
 
For example, Brazilian MNCs have specific characteristics to their internationalisation that 
somewhat follow Fleury et al. (2013) dimensions of third wave internationalisation as 
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presented in chapter two. It took Brazilian MNCs a long time to internationalise, some even 
took decades after their creation, a feature common of Latin American MNCs (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006). Their initial strategies focused on Latin America, mainly due to reasons of 
geographical closeness and similar institutional settings, cultural traits, and language. 
However, their spatial dispersion changed over time to include new frontiers, created through 
the patterns of globalisation, such as Asia, Africa and Oceania (Fleury et al., 2013). Moreover, 
a crucial trait characterising the success of Brazilian MNCs lies in their relations to their home 
state. Key Informants C and D (2015) argue that the process of internationalisation of MNCs 
specific to Brazil needs to be divided into three timeframes, which are not the same as Fleury 
et al. (2013) timeframes of internationalisation of firms.  
 
The first wave of Brazilian MNC internationalisation started in the 1960s and lasted over the 
course of the 1970s as a result of direct state policy. Additionally, according to Key Informant 
D (July 2015) the 1970s were the real beginning of Brazil’s Africa foreign policy. The first 
companies that went abroad were construction and oil companies, such as Odebrecht that 
entered the Angolan market shortly after independence with the aim of financing a large 
hydropower project, but then got a foot in the Angolan market and stayed (Key Informants C 
and D, July 2015). Similarly, Petrobras was used by the Brazilian military regime to look for 
oil abroad as it had direct access to government and thus received numerous construction 
projects in the domestic market (Key Informant C, July 2015). Due to the big share or rather 
monopoly on market share and connection to the home state apparatus and government itself, 
it was easier for these MNCs to internationalise and work as a tool of Brazilian foreign policy.  
 
The second phase of Brazilian MNC internationalisation started in the 1980s shortly after the 
initial privatisation reforms. In this wave, companies like Vale were privatised and expanded 
to Latin America, which continued during the 1990s in part due to the emergence of 
MERCOSUR and the realisation of increased opportunities for acquisition of market share.  
 
The third and current phase of Brazilian MNCs internationalisation started in the 2000s under 
the Cardoso administration and was further intensified during the Lula administration, where 
public policies (credit/finance) were the main incentives for MNCs to go abroad (Key 
Informant C, July 2015). As previously mentioned, Brazilian MNCs internationalisation firstly 
focused on regional integration, thereafter followed by expansion into developed markets and 
then Africa. Key Informant D (July 2015) states: “Investments predominantly focused on US 
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and EU, a little on Japan, as there was a lack of knowledge about Africa. Market opportunities 
in Africa are not very well known in Brazil”. Under Lula’s first term in office, Africa was not 
high on the agenda for internationalisation of MNCs, as Lula’s foreign policy concentrated on 
South America and regional integration (mostly through the integration of Brazilian meat 
companies). Therefore, efforts were directed at strengthening Brazilian MNCs in the region at 
the biddings of MNCs themselves (Key Informant C, July 2015).  
 
However, with the realisation of potential benefits of Africa’s unexplored markets for Brazil 
and MNCs (Key Informant A, July 2015), expansion started between 2006 and 2010. During 
this period, the agro-industry MNCs were also encouraged to look into investing in African 
agriculture as “national governments raised the prospect of heavily curtailing food imports in 
a bid to restart stagnant rural economies” (Burges, 2017:124). Although the outcomes were 
uncertain, projects such as Odebrecht’s Biocom biofuel initiative in Angola, the ProSavana 
research project in Mozambique and the EMBRAPA experimental farm in Ghana all pointed 
to possible future expansion of investment and activities in the agro-sector (Burges, 2017). This 
expansion was accompanied by the Brazilian government’s assistance in establishing 
diplomatic ties, through presidential diplomacy. While Brazilian executives insist that Brazil 
does not dictate the activities of their national companies, it is common knowledge that during 
Lula’s second term when visiting African states, MNC representatives accompanied him (most 
Elite Interviews and Key Informants, July 2015). This can for instance be seen in the case of 
Lula’s first presidential visit to Mozambique in 2003, where he was accompanied by Roger 
Agnelli, a banker who played a crucial role in assessing the value of Brazil’s premier SOE Vale 
(prior to its privatisation in 1997); and who subsequently became Vale’s first president and 
CEO (Marshall, 2015). This was not the only such visit; in 2006 Vale for instance acquired the 
biggest nickel mining operation in Canada with the help of the Brazilian state apparatus, where 
MNCs profit was equated to represent Brazilian state interests not least due to the state holding 
a seat on the administration council of Vale (Key Informant C, July 2015; Marshall, 2015). 
Lula’s intensified interest in private companies resulted in MNCs expressing big sympathies 
when talking about him in public forums (Key Informants C and D, July 2015).  
 
Since political and economic reasons (inclusion of Brazilian companies in global value chains 
and markets) converged as part of a broader aim of national development and foreign policy 
(Burges, 2017), ministries such as the Ministry of Finance established an international section 
to facilitate closer cooperation with business (Elite Interview A and Key Informant A, July 
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2015). This was also the era of the re-emergence of BNDES as an important actor alongside 
Itamaraty in Brazil’s foreign policy. Foreign trade policy has historically been under the control 
of Itamaraty; thus, to change it, other ministries had to lobby (Key Informant D, July 2015). 
However, as internationalisation was not only dependent on Itamaraty; the inclusion of other 
ministries and institutions therefore slowly became a reality (Key Informant C July 2015). 
Itamaraty became more willing to discuss with civil society, holding consultations and broader 
debates, thereby resulting in a pluralisation of actors in Brazil’s foreign policy (Vigevani and 
Oliveira, 2007). However, the process is best described as the multiplication of spaces for 
communication (Key Informant A (July 2015). While Itamaraty was and still is the main actor 
in formulating foreign policy, a vast array of actors gained multiple avenues to voice their 
opinions and ideas, whose implementation was seemingly left at Itamaraty’s discretion. 
 
However, the connection between Itamaraty and business during Lula deepened and for the 
first time in history Itamaraty had attaches for agriculture (agribusiness) in embassies abroad 
(Key Informant D, July 2015). Given that during Lula’s era, MNC interests were expressed as 
national development interests supported by the increasing number of Brazilian embassies in 
Africa (from 17 to 38 (Stolte, 2012; Key Informant C, July 2015)); one could conclude that 
there is a significant convergence or even symbiosis between the home state and its MNCs in 
foreign policy. However, another aspect aiding in the government nudging companies in 
directions consonant with national development interests, are the state equity holdings and 
financing. Bruges (2017) claims that even though it appears that this wide range of actors had 
disparate interests, they were and are linked in a pyramidal ownership structure which gives 
government significant input into corporate strategy, labelling it capitalism of linkages157 This 
convergence; however, does not mean that MNCs across all sectors and time have to follow 
directives from the Brazilian government.  
 
In contrast, according to Key Informants B, C and D (July 2015), the impact of business on 
Brazil’s foreign policy is significant. This can for instance be seen in the case of private 
companies funding political campaigns. However, there is an attempted political reform which 
                                                          
157 “Illustrative of the interconnectedness of the capitalism of linkages is Lazzarini’s (2011:21) mapping of the 
majority ownership of one of Brazil’s most internationalised companies, the mining giant Vale. At the top level 
two key ‘owners’ of Vale are identified. One is BNDESPAR, the equity-holding arm of the wholly government-
controlled BNDES. The other is a holding company called Valepar, which exists to aggregate together various 
other holders of Vale stock. The government is able to exert some influence over Valepar through its investments 
via BNDESPAR” (Burges, 2017:114).  
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would not allow this anymore, thereby resulting in MNCs negotiating power severely 
diminishing158 (Key Informant B, July 2015). This is partially influenced by the massive 
corruption scandal Operação Lava Jato, which involves Brazilian oil giant Petrobras and 
government branches, which also sparked the inquiry into the idea of government influence 
over business decisions to advance national development goals (Burges, 2017). However, 
while private companies financing of political campaigns may yield significant results in terms 
of financial benefits for them domestically, it is not to say that it would yield such benefits in 
terms of foreign policy, especially since there is no monolithic foreign policy that applies to all 
states in all regions, at all times. However, Key Informant S (September 2017) said that 
Operação Lava Jato is beginning to reveal that corruption with companies also extended to 
development assistance projects. Consequently, as SSDC is part of foreign policy, it indicates 
that the interconnectedness between the home state and MNCs stretches far beyond national 
borders. This will be further analysed in the following section by applying the four pillars of 
structural power and governed interdependence framework. 
 
4.5 Four Pillars of Structural Power and Governed Interdependence Framework 
In the following sections, the role of the home state in providing credit/finance and security 
(diplomatic and legal security) to its MNCs in their international operations will be analysed, 
followed by the role of MNCs in providing the two other pillars of structural power in return, 
knowledge and production. However, before doing so I briefly recap the essence of the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter two. As seen in figure three in chapter two, it is 
argued that home states and MNCs operate in a governed interdependence within a framework 
of structural power, as each actor provides the other with two types of incentives, labelled 
pillars of structural power: credit and security provided by the home state to MNCs, and 
production and knowledge provided by the MNCs to their home state. This contributes to both 
the MNCs and the home state’s competitiveness in IPE, and in turn makes them highly 
dependent on each other.  
 
4.5.1 Financing and the Role of BNDES 
One of the ways in which the Brazilian state supports Brazilian MNCs both domestically and 
internationally, is through the provision of credit/finance. Financing is predominantly done 
                                                          
158 In September 2015, the Supreme Court of Brazil voted 8 to 3 to allow election donations from individuals 
but not from companies, which renders unconstitutional a bill passed in early September 2015 by the country’s 
Congress allowing corporate funding for political parties (Boadle, 2015; Tavener, 2015).  
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through BNDES, whose fundamental role lies in stimulating the expansion of industry and 
large-scale infrastructure within Brazil. Prior to 2002 the Brazilian government and its agencies 
did not have specific policies in place for supporting the internationalisation of Brazilian firms 
beyond the financing of regular trade (Masiero et al., 2014:136). The first change happened in 
2002 when BNDES modified its statute to allow domestic companies to request credit for the 
acquisition of productive assets abroad (Law No.4.418), conditioned by export requirements. 
The second change in 2007 (Law No.6l322) relaxed the referred conditions, by removing 
export requirements (Masiero et al., 2014). This happened simultaneously as China’s accession 
to WTO, and could thus be regarded as Brazil’s attempt at catching up with China’s 
international economic expansion. BNDES was a key instrument for the expanded 
internationalisation of Brazilian MNCs and the achievement of Lula’s domestic and 
international ambitions (Hochstetler, 2014).  
 
While the West was under significant pressure to absorb the shocks of the 2007 global 
financial crisis, the repercussions of that were not felt in Brazil until later in 2010, thereby 
allowing BNDES room for the provisions of funding support to Brazilian MNCs from 2008-
2010. During Lula’s years in ofﬁce, BNDES’s annual disbursements quadrupled and were 
three times bigger than the World Bank’s annual lending in 2010 (Hochstetler, 2014). BNDES 
played an instrumental role in the expansion of Brazilian companies in targeted economies 
and sectors (mining, oil and gas, construction), similar to China from 1999 onward. Moreover, 
even though Brazilian MNCs (both state and private owned) have access to funding through 
BNDES, the construction and resource sectors are privileged above any other and receive the 
largest amount of financing (Stolte, 2012), as was also seen in the case of China. However, 
according to Adriana de Queiroz from the Brazilian Centre for International Relations, Brazil 
cannot compete with China: “Brazil isn’t in a position to compete with the (Chinese) model 
because we can’t even get close to the volume of financing”, adding: “We don’t have the 
resources for that” (Lewis, 2011).  
 
The importance of BNDES for these companies is striking, as BNDES provides support to the 
majority of MNCs in form of either loans, becoming a shareholder, or both. In the case of Vale 
for instance, BNDES did not provide Vale with loans to invest in foreign markets, but did have 
ownership shares (6.7% in 2010), compared to no ownership in 2008 (Masiero et al., 2014:139-
140). This indicates that during Lula’s time in office, the importance of MNCs for Brazil’s 
development internally as much as externally, increased significantly.  
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BNDES is under direct control of the federal Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade; thus, the involvement of the Brazilian state apparatus is present. This increased 
participation of the Brazilian state and government in supporting the internationalisation 
process of Brazilian MNCs is representative of a larger trend of many rising emerging 
economies whose states want to strengthen their strategic role in driving economic 
transformations; thereby reflecting the very nature of state-led economic development or state 
capitalism (Masiero et al., 2014; Nölke, 2014a). However, this does not correspond with 
attempts at increased economic liberalisation as it indicates significant state involvement.  
 
According to Key Informant A (July 2015), BNDES provides financial support to all foreign 
operations of Brazilian MNCs, particularly in infrastructure (Elite Interview B, July 2015) as 
it has the aim of strengthening the Brazilian economy. However, in order to do so, BNDES 
had to change its internal laws to adjust to international markets. This support is regarded as 
beneficial for Brazil in general, since MNCs operations abroad guarantee inclusion in global 
value chains, technology and resources; thus, further entrenching Brazil in the global economy 
and providing it with the political legitimacy in multilateral institutions and forums (Key 
Informant A, Elite Interview A, Elite Interview B, July 2015).  Without financing, the 
assistance of the Brazilian government would prove meaningless due to the difficulty of 
obtaining venture capital at affordable rates from global, African or even private Brazilian 
sources (Burges, 2017). However, while it may seem that BNDES provides vast sums to other 
developing nations, Bruges (2017) claims that export financing for goods and services to 
South America and Africa measures under one per cent of actual disbursements in a typical 
year.  
 
Brazilian public banks were strengthened over the years as a counter point to financial flow 
and speculation of economic volatility. Furthermore, in terms of South American integration, 
particularly relating to MERCOSUR, public banks played a pivotal role in actively promoting 
Brazilian MNCs global expansion as they supported them through the provision of public 
credit, thereby increasing their capacity to invest. This can for instance be seen in the case of 
Banco do Brasil, which has an operations office in Angola to coordinate its activities in Africa. 
The most important thing to note here is that in the mid-2000s there were agreements on 
binational investment guarantees, first in the form of government-to-government, after which 
came the availability of Brazilian lines for credit for African governments, which then allowed 
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for the arrival of Brazilian MNCs in Africa (Burges, 2017). Where credit guarantees proved 
difficult to implement, the government played the part of facilitator of financial risk 
management. This can be seen in the case of Angola, where the Banco do Brasil passes funding 
directly to the Brazilian firms159, instead of passing through the Angolan government with the 
attendant risks of corruption (Burges, 2017). This further indicates that the home state 
partnership with private sector MNCs broadens the capacity to invest in a new market. In 
addition, Elite Interview A (July 2015) stated: “Private enterprises are incorporated in national 
development strategy and induced to follow national interests”. This goes hand in hand with 
Stopford and Strange’s (1991) notion of unidirectional relations between home state and MNC 
where due to the provision of certain incentives and a psychological sense of belonging160, the 
state can ask for certain favours. However, in the case of Brazil it extends beyond SOEs. In 
addition, these favours include activities that could fall under SSDC. 
 
For instance, Brazilian government activities (aid) and Brazilian MNC activities (particularly 
CSR) in countries like Mozambique often converge on ground, as local people do not 
differentiate between the two (Key Informant B, July 2015). This is partly due to the fact that 
government activities, such as SSDC projects often in an indirect way include private Brazilian 
MNCs, as in the case of the antiretroviral factory that included Vale. Therefore, differentiating 
between what are Brazilian government and what are Brazilian MNCs activities, contributes to 
the assumption that they are all interconnected, especially when one also includes BNDES in 
the equation. In relation to the role of BNDES, it can be said that capital and state interests are 
the same (profit), but for the state it is a means to another end (Key Informant C, July 2015). 
The assumption is that increased international economic footprint of Brazilian MNCs will 
ultimately spill over into Brazil’s increased influence in the WTO and IMF; and thus, 
international political influence, so as to warrant a permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
(Christensen, 2013). However, in order to do that, the Brazilian state depends to a certain extent 
on its MNCs to expand to new frontiers, while they (MNCs) at the same time depend on 
favourable financing conditions to make that leap. Thus, the precondition is the state’s 
provision of credit (through BNDES) as one of the four pillars of structural power in the 
governed interdependence framework. However, this also means that when the home state no 
                                                          
159 The Banco do Brasil was running its sixth line of credit tranche for Angola in 2017, valued at roughly $5 
billion, with most of it directed towards infrastructure projects implemented by the Brazilian empreiteiras.  
160 This can for instance be seen in the case of Petrobras and Vale, who both carry the national colors (blue, 
green, and yellow), in their company logos (Key Informant C, July 2015).  
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longer provides those incentives, MNCs are less likely to stay in a given environment. This is 
evident in the instance where after President Rousseff came to power in 2011, and Brazil’s 
foreign policy shifted towards the Latin American region again, embassies in Africa started 
running out of funds and Itamaraty was significantly weakened (Key Informant D and Elite 
Interview B, July 2015); which is said to be one of the reasons why Vale left Zambia in 2014 
(Elite Interview K, May 2016) as will be discussed in section 4.6.2. 
 
4.5.2 Diplomatic and Legal Security 
Another aspect of home state-MNC relations as outlined in the four pillars of structural power 
and governed interdependence framework is the provision of security from the home state to 
MNCs. Security has been defined as diplomatic security in cases of civilian casualties in the 
event of conflict; but also, diplomatic support for companies on ground (establishing bilateral 
ties and avenues for investment). In addition, security refers to legal security, particularly 
investment treaties. As discussed in chapter three, the current global investment regime faces 
structural challenges, due to increasing discomfort about the effects of security measures 
(BITs) Morosini and Sanchez Badin (2015:2).  
 
Countries around the world have reacted differently to these challenges and Brazil is no 
exception. In the 1990s, Brazil was one of the few top economies without BITs or an investment 
agreement model, partially due to the fact that Brazil had only properly started with 
privatisation and the subsequent internationalisation during the same time. Although since then 
Brazil signed BITs with 14 countries, strong political opposition by Congress and the Judiciary, 
combined with an unresolved Executive, prevented it from ratifying the agreements or any 
proposed amendments (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015; Brauch, 2015). Based on 
Congress’s refusal to ratify the BITs, in 2015 Brazil decided to only negotiate investment 
agreements expressly safeguarding the right to regulate (excluding coverage of portfolio 
investments and direct expropriation) and provide for state-state dispute settlement (SSDS) 
(Brauch, 2015). This resulted in the signing of four Agreements on Investment Cooperation 
and Facilitation (ACFIs) with Mozambique, Angola, Mexico, and Malawi from March to June 
2015161 (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015).  
 
                                                          
161 Another two ACFIs with Colombia and Chile were signed later in 2015. 
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Each ACFI creates two types of institutions to govern the agreement: a Joint Committee and 
ombudsmen (Focal Points) (Brauch, 2015). The Joint Committee operates at a state to state 
level, while the Focal Points provide home government assistance to investors through dialogue 
with authorities to address suggestions and complaints from other party’s government and 
investors (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015). In comparison to BITs, where legal disputes 
between foreign company and host state in which its operations are located, are handled as an 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS); the recent (2015) ACFIs signed between Brazil and 
the above-mentioned countries stipulate that all disputes between investor and host state will 
be handled as SSDS162. What these technical terms essentially mean is that if there is a dispute 
between the investor and the host state, negotiations and consultation between these two sides 
will be attempted first and facilitated through the Joint Committee. The home state of the 
investor is granted permission to submit a claim on behalf of the investor, after which the Joint 
Committee will elaborate and the representatives of the investor (government entities, NGOs, 
or other) can be present during the meetings. The Joint Committee will afterwards provide a 
recommendation as to how to resolve the dispute. However, if the dispute is not settled by 
recommendation, the two parties can resort to SSDS.  
 
According to Morosini and Sanchez Badin (2015) and Brauch (2015), unlike traditional BITs, 
the ACFIs do not allow investors to initiate arbitration against the host state. Brazilian public 
officials claim that despite the ACFIs mentioning state to state arbitration, it shall not be the 
primary mechanism for settling disputes (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015). However, while 
these ACFIs were allegedly initiated in order to provide host states with larger negotiating and 
                                                          
162 In the ACFIs (referred to as CIFAs by Brauch, 2015) signed between Brazil and Mozambique and Brazil and 
Angola there are several differing points, however, section IV, Article 15 “Dispute Prevention and Resolution” 
stipulates the following: “The CIFAs mandate the Focal Points and the Joint Committee to prevent, manage and 
resolve disputes between the states. In particular, prior to the initiation of an arbitral proceeding, any dispute is 
subject to assessment, by means of consultations and negotiations, and to a preliminary examination by the Joint 
Committee. A proceeding for a state to submit to the Joint Committee a claim on behalf of an investor is also 
established. While the Joint Committees may elaborate on the procedural details, the main lines of the procedure 
are the following: The home state of the investor presents a written request to the Joint Committee, specifying the 
name of the investor and the challenges or difficulties faced. The Joint Committee has 60 days, extendable by 
mutual agreement and upon justification for another 60 days, to present information pertinent to the case. 
Representatives of the investor, government entities and NGOs involved may participate in the meetings. The 
proceeding of bilateral dialogue and consultations is concluded by the initiative of either state with the presentation 
of a summary report in the subsequent meeting of the Joint Committee. The summary report must include the 
identification of the state and of the investors involved, the description of the challenged measure and the position 
of the states regarding the measure. The Joint Committee holds extraordinary meetings to consider the issues 
before it and may issue a recommendation. Only if the dispute is not resolved by the recommendation, the two 
parties may resort to state–state arbitration. Except for the summary report, all documents and meetings of the 
proceedings are confidential” (Brauch, 2015). 
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regulating power (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015), it also indirectly means that MNCs will 
be protected by their home state, which will settle disputes on their behalf in a SSDS.  
 
Although Brazil has been and still is an emerging economy, it has traditionally been one of the 
top destinations for FDI; thus, these ACFIs are unexpected in the current liberal international 
economic system, as they signal the re-emergence of the interventionist state. However, 
Morosini and Sanchez Badin (2015) and Brauch (2015) argue that Brazil has historically played 
a different regulatory card in a world dominated by BITs; and thus, regard the ACFIs as a 
pragmatic response to the liberal economic system based on Brazil’s domestic needs and geo-
economic position (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015). The ACFI framework was based on 
the revision of previous agreements by Brazilian policy makers and on inputs from the 
Brazilian private sector (Morosini and Sanchez Badin, 2015). The combination of demands 
from private sector investors and government resulted in a model agreement that focuses on 
investment facilitation and risk mitigation, where in effect the home state takes on part of the 
risk of its MNCs, thereby ultimately protecting them. This is in stark contrast to the case of 
China as seen in chapter three. The ACFI agreements opened up space for the integration of 
government and private sector (Key Informant B, July 2015). This becomes clear when looking 
at which areas of investment are covered by these ACFIs (mining, energy and civil 
construction) and thus, which MNCs would be protected by them (Vale, Odebrecht, Petrobras, 
Andrade Guiterrez, etc.), as they are also the ones with the largest presence in overseas markets. 
 
While ACFIs were so far signed with only six countries163, Key Informant B (July 2015) said 
that negotiations were underway with several other countries. According to Morosini and 
Sanchez Badin (2015), these include Algeria, Tunisia, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, and 
Peru.  
 
The core of the ACFIs and what makes them different from the traditional BITs, is the legal 
security aspect. For instance, the ACFI signed with Mozambique provides that if a Brazilian 
mining firm that has a large presence in the Mozambican mining environment (Vale), should 
get into a conflict (about labour laws, royalties, environment, or similar) with the Mozambican 
state; the dispute (if at court level) would turn into a dispute between the Brazilian and the 
Mozambican state. What this implies is that the home state will not only protect its SOEs but 
                                                          
163 Angola, Chile, Colombia, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique. 
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also private companies. These ACFIs serve not only to protect Brazilian MNCs but also the 
Brazilian state, as they are representative of a new phase of Brazilian foreign policy, where the 
negotiating power is given back to the state, reflecting the re-emergence of the interventionist 
state (Key Informant C, July 2015). This relates directly back to the four pillars of structural 
power and governed interdependence framework, as it signals a convergence between the 
interests of the home state and its MNCs. However, it also indicates that by accepting high 
risks on behalf of its MNCs, the home state is in an advantageous position in relation to those 
MNCs. Therefore, it can ask for certain favours and impose certain roles onto MNCs. Elite 
Interviews A and B (July 2015) concur by saying that the interventionist state in Brazil is alive 
and well, as can be seen from several examples, such as the issue with Petrobras in Bolivia and 
Vale’s nickel mine in Canada. While this study focuses on Brazil’s (and China’s) relations with 
Africa, and the examples below are not situated in Africa; they are of relevance as they point 
to the importance of a specific country and assets for Brazil; and thus, to the interaction between 
the home state and MNCs in foreign policy.   
 
Bolivia has grappled with public grievances over their government’s economic policies 
concerning natural gas reserves (foreign company interest being placed above Bolivia’s 
economic priorities), which culminated in what is now known as the Bolivian gas war in 2003, 
where protesting workers (including labour unions and indigenous peoples) clashed with the 
Bolivian army164 (Dangl, 2003; Hauser, 2006). Protesters, including Evo Morales (later in 2005 
President of Bolivia) advocated and pressured the government to nationalise all hydrocarbon 
resources and insisted on indigenous people’s participation in Bolivia’s political sphere. Late 
in 2005, after being elected president, Morales declared that the state was recovering 
ownership, possession, and control165 of all hydrocarbons (Hauser, 2006).  
 
The repercussions of this decision were deemed grave for Petrobras, as their operations would 
be controlled by the Bolivian state, and the royalties they had to pay would increase from 50 
to 82 percent (Christensen, 2013; Luhnow, 2006). In addition, the repercussions would affect 
                                                          
164 The conflict ultimately resulted in a referendum in 2004 where the gas issue was supposed to be resolved, but 
in 2005 under pressure from the protesters the Bolivian congress enacted a new hydrocarbon law requiring higher 
royalties from foreign companies exploiting the gas reserves. 
165 The nationalisation of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons negatively affected the three largest private MNCs operating 
in the field, namely Spain’s Repsol, France’s Total, and Brazil’s Petrobras. What ensued afterwards were negative 
reactions by Petrobras at the nationalisation, because effectively all gas projects that were until that moment under 
Petrobras’ domain became effective immediately controlled by the Bolivian state oil company Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) (Luhnow, 2006). 
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Brazil in general, not least due to the fact that three quarters of gas consumed in Brazil’s 
manufacturing centre, Sao Paulo, and half of the country’s overall supply comes from Bolivia 
(Vogler, 2006; Wheatley and Weitzman, 2007). Therefore, all reasons taken into consideration, 
in order to avoid a foreign policy calamity, the Brazilian government put in place measures to 
ensure that Petrobras does not react (threats of leaving and freezing investments (Vogler, 
2006)) in a damaging way for Brazil’s relations with Bolivia (Elite Interviews A and B, Key 
Informants C and D, July 2015). After allegations came out by President Morales that Petrobras 
did in fact threaten to freeze all investments, President Lula proclaimed, “Petrobras is an 
independent company that invests where it can and where it deems it convenient to do so” 
(Vogler, 2006); thus, implying that Petrobras is free to make its own decisions without the 
involvement of Brazil. However, on 10 May 2006, Brazil started negotiations with Bolivia in 
order to protect its own interests (gas needed for its own economic stability), and promised that 
Petrobras will stay on (Burges, 2017; Luhnow, 2006). This in turn could be regarded as an 
indirect benefit for Petrobras, that the home state had its back in these negotiations; but what 
is more likely is that Brazil was using Petrobras as a pawn to safeguard its own interests.  
 
While the dispute was not a legal one requiring ACFIs to be put in place, it does indicate the 
level of interconnectedness in foreign dispute settlements on behalf of the home state (Brazil) 
and its MNCs (Petrobras), due to overlapping interests between the two. President Lula’s 
proclamation of Petrobras being an independent company in charge of its own investment aims 
appears shaky at best, considering that the Brazilian government holds a 64 per cent ownership 
share in the company; thus, making Petrobras an SOE under direct control of the state 
(Petrobras, 2015). In addition, as Key Informant C (July 2015) claims, government’s strategic 
aims and MNCs aims are deeply intertwined and it would be foolish not to believe that.  
  
All things taken into account, one could say that the provision of security and credit from home 
state to MNCs, as well as the diplomatic support (such as opening of embassies and establishing 
bilateral ties), play a crucial role in the facilitation of MNCs’ operations, making it easier for 
them to enter new markets (Elite Interviews C and D, July 2015). Elite Interview C (July 2015) 
echoes this: “Government does not serve as a form of intermediary, rather fosters companies’ 
operations and makes it easier for them when abroad”. Elite Interview D (July 2015) concurs 
by saying that through this facilitation of MNCs’ operations abroad and assistance given to 
them in forms of credit/finance (BNDES) and security (ACFIs), the government in fact helps 
itself, given that: “Government and company interests are aligned”. These conditions clearly 
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indicate the complexity of relationships between the state and MNCs in Brazil. This goes hand 
in hand with the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework as 
outlined in chapter two, where relations between home state and MNC are interconnected and 
interdependent, but where the home state still maintains the upper hand implied in the word 
governed. The question remains as to how this relates to the role attached to MNCs by the 
home state in its foreign policy, which will be further discussed in section 4.6. The next section 
examines the two other pillars of structural power by looking at production and knowledge as 
part of MNCs domain in the governed interdependence structure.  
 
4.5.3 MNCs Production Responsibility 
One of the core responsibilities of any MNC, whether SOE or private; is cost effective 
production. Given that MNCs are owned by shareholders to whom they are accountable to and 
who expect annual returns in compensation for the funds they make available for the MNC’s 
production and sales activities; it is the MNC’s responsibility to uphold a steady level of 
production (Ahiakpor, 2010). Second to that, in order to be able to provide such returns, MNC 
managers seek out the most efficient workers (the cheaper the cost of labour the better for the 
company), cheapest material, they produce in countries levying the lowest profit taxes, and sell 
their products in markets where they can earn the highest proportion of revenues in relation to 
the input costs (Ahiakpor, 2010). In addition to that, due to wanting to increase their 
competitive advantage above other MNCs in the same sector, MNCs are constantly in need of 
innovation and the acquisition of knowledge (technology and skills).  
 
In order for Brazil to establish itself as an important global player, it needs to expand its 
economic relations with other countries and take part in free trade and global value chains (Elite 
Interviews A and B, July 2015). To gain access to more operations and markets, MNCs do not 
only have to produce to a level satisfactory to both them and their shareholders, but have to 
uphold certain production standards, and adhere to labour laws and environmental protection 
regulations166 of host states.  
 
In terms of production of MNCs operating in the mining sector, Sertã Mansur and Strautman 
(2015) claim that it is pivotal to maintain high levels of production. The mining sector is one 
                                                          
166 To what extent MNCs actually adhere to labour and environmental laws is not the main focus of this study, 
but will be shortly touched upon in the case of Vales operations in Mozambique and Canada. 
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of the main engines of the world economy, as anything from consumer products to 
transportation, infrastructure to energy depends on products such as copper, cobalt, manganese, 
iron, and coal. Mining is a capital and labour-intensive industry in which production levels can 
be negatively affected by numerous factors, not least of which labour and environmental 
concerns, as well as volatility of commodity prices on the global market. 
 
While production levels may be the most important short-term gain for MNCs, access to 
markets, competitive advantage and image have long-term benefits. These aspects may not 
only be important for companies, but also to their home state for two reasons. First, the initial 
access to markets has been enabled by the home state through the provision of financing and 
diplomatic support in terms of opening of embassies. Second, the government (federal 
government through BNDES and National Treasury holding Gold shares) is a major 
shareholder in both state owned and private companies (Vale, 2017a; Carpenter, 2016); thus, 
the companies are accountable to it. In addition, due to Brazil’s aim of increasing influence in 
the WTO and IMF “the government puts pressure on companies to guarantee local gains [high 
production levels and contribution to local job creation] to strengthen Brazilian influence” 
(Elite Interview A, July 2015). In essence, this signals the significant power that the home state 
yields over its MNCs in the case of Brazil.  
 
However, production by Brazilian MNCs has been deemed poor overall, with certain 
exceptions in the mining sector (Elite Interview B, July 2015). Nevertheless, MNCs have not 
ceased operations as a result of other local gains, for example: cooperation activities, local job 
creation, corporate social responsibility, and environmental protection. If a company does well 
in relation to these gains, it will likely foster a positive picture of Brazilian MNCs in the host 
state and potentially extend this to the home state, Brazil. However, if the MNC performs badly, 
it will not only have negative repercussions for the MNC, but in extent for the state from which 
it originates as well, as for instance in the case of Vale’s nickel mine in Canada and its coal 
mine in Moatize, Mozambique. This reflects the broken red arrow in figure four: the effect of 
MNC operations in a host state on host state-home state relations.  
 
Vale purchased Inco, Canada’s largest mining company in 2006 (Marshall, 2015), driven by 
its own motives of profit plus interests of the Brazilian state that got a seat on Vale’s 
administration council (Key Informant C, July 2015). In Canada, Vale found itself in a dispute 
with Canadian workers over wages and working hours, as well as safety issues (Marshall, 2015) 
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resulting in the longest strike in 40 years (eleven and eighteen-month strikes by the union of 
mineworkers) (Marshall, 2015; Key Informant C, July 2015).  
 
Given the institutional backing and strength of labour unions in Canada, Vale couldn’t just lay 
off striking miners; instead it tried establishing the same kind of relationship with its Canadian 
workers as it has with workers in its other global operations. This relationship involved three 
crucial components: “pension plan, bonus, and chain of command between employer and 
employee without direct intervention of the union” (Marshall, 2015). In the end, the 
unacceptable terms and conditions suggested by Vale resulted in the creation of a solidarity-
based civil movement ‘International Articulation of those Affected by Vale’ in support of the 
Canadian miners. What is striking about this case is the fact that President Lula (a former 
metalworker, trade union leader, and founding member of the Workers Party), whom one 
would expect to show solidarity with the Canadian workers, did not make any statements in 
reprimand of Vale nor did he explicitly intervene in Vale’s affairs compared to his direct 
involvement with Petrobras in Bolivia (Key Informants C and D, July 2015). What this could 
potentially indicate is the absence of home state protection in relation to private MNCs as 
opposed to SOEs. However, there are numerous nuances to this.  
 
Firstly, Vale’s wrong-doings in terms of labour issues ultimately caused long-term strikes that 
halted production, which is a crucial component of MNCs operations and one of the four pillars 
of structural power in the governed interdependence framework. Thus, by not providing 
production outputs as expected it would be the home state’s prerogative as a major shareholder 
in Vale to intervene and insist on production resuming regardless of Vale’s disputes or rather 
in spite of them. Secondly, due to not adhering to labour laws, and at the same time being a 
representative of Brazil (by carrying national colours in its logo) Vale not only created a bad 
image for itself but for Brazil in general. These reasons would under any other circumstance 
be enough to warrant some form of home state scolding due to the interdependence of home 
state and MNCs as provided in the governed interdependence framework. However, given the 
nature of the investment agreement between Brazil and Canada (not being an ACFI but a 
BIT167), which as mentioned earlier served to protect investors more than host countries; 
President Lula’s non-intervention in fact protected Vale by letting them sort it out alone and 
                                                          
167 Provided through the “Canada-MERCOSUR Cooperation Agreement” that is a Treaty with Investment 
Provision, which stipulates that negotiation of Foreign Investment Protection Agreements must be done between 
Canada and individual MERCOSUR countries (Investment Policy Hub, 2013). 
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through this indicating that Vale’s aims were more important than worker’s rights. In addition, 
by not intervening publicly, in an environment that already tarnished the image of Vale, Brazil 
managed to not add to the international publicity.  
 
What can be discerned from this example is that MNCs provision of production as part of their 
responsibility towards shareholders (including government) in the governed interdependence 
structure is of varying importance. This warrants varying levels of home state intervention, 
depending on one main factor, namely political and economic importance of the host state in 
which the MNCs operates, for Brazil’s foreign policy. For example: in the case of Bolivia, 
where hydrocarbon production by Petrobras and supply thereof to Brazil keeps the 
manufacturing hub in Sao Paolo running; the home state, Brazil had a direct interest and thus 
intervened in Petrobras’s operations. In the case of Canada, the nickel mine168 in Canada is not 
of immediate economic importance to Brazil’s domestic situation, and therefore, the home state 
did not intervene in Vale’s operations. However, this does not mean that it did not indirectly 
protect the company, by not adding to an already volatile and very public situation.  
 
4.5.4 MNCs Knowledge Generation 
In the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework, it is stated 
that MNCs responsibility is to provide production and knowledge. It was also claimed by 
Stopford and Strange (1991) that whoever controls knowledge ultimately controls power, albeit 
in the context of host state-MNC relations. The home state-MNC relation is unidirectional in 
that the state maintains all the power, despite it being dependent on certain provisions by its 
MNCs such as inclusion in value chains and the creation of knowledge through innovation and 
R&D activities as part of their responsibility in the four pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence structure.  
 
In the case of Brazil, Oliveira (et al., 2013) claim: “Brazil is not considered a good performer 
when it comes to innovation”. However, despite Brazil’s low rate of investment in R&D 
activities, Brazilian firms are internationalising successfully and innovations play crucial roles 
in their strategies. Oliveira et al. (2013) claim that the main difference between Brazilian firms 
and other MNCs lies in the fact that Brazilian MNCs prioritise process innovation over product 
                                                          
168 Brazil does not depend on nickel imports as much as on hydrocarbon imports nor is Canada as regionally 
important for Brazil as is Bolivia.  
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innovation169. Their repertoire includes specific sets of innovation that Oliveira et al. (2013) 
classify as: commodity innovations, sustainable innovations, business model innovations, 
bottom-of-the-pyramid innovations and reverse innovations in order to build their 
competitiveness.  
 
Brazilian MNCs (particularly those in resource industries) often explore the potential to 
develop sustainable innovations and reverse innovations (developed by subsidiaries of 
Brazilian MNCs in foreign countries); and can set up their own R&D centres abroad, which is 
beneficial for them as it facilitates access to local markets in host states, while at the same time 
benefiting Brazil through the creation of global value chains (Elite Interview A, July 2015; 
Salim, 2007). For instance, Petrobras and Vale invest heavily in R&D activities on ground in 
host states; they keep strong ties with local and foreign universities and research centres and 
own a significant number of patents (Oliveira et al., 2013). Regarding bottom-of-the-pyramid 
innovations (brining capabilities from home country to meet the base of the pyramid needs in 
foreign countries), Odebrecht’s operations in Angola170 prioritise this type of innovation.  
 
However, regarding the previously mentioned question of who drives innovation and to what 
end, in the case of Brazil Dr Luiz Mello, Executive Director of Technology and Innovation at 
Vale, says that Brazil is similar to the US in the mid-20th century. He refers hereby to the fact 
that government is still assembling a regulatory infrastructure and looking to the private sector 
to drive innovations and economic growth. However, private Brazilian companies are now, in 
the 21st century doing what Bell Labs, Xerox’s PARC and GE Research Lab did in the 20th 
century, signalling that they are somewhat lacking behind (Salem Baskin, 2015:1). This 20st 
century approach in the case of Vale is best illustrated by its Institute of Technology (ITV) 
where a 100-person team researches cutting edge mining technology as well as biodiversity, 
sociology, weather, and a variety of other seemingly unrelated fields through which 
opportunities and requirements for sustainable growth are explored. This is done with the 
thought in mind that the next phase of mining development needs to be compatible not only 
                                                          
169 “Product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or has significantly improved 
characteristics or intended uses; a process innovation refers to the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved production or delivery method [emphasis added]” (The Innovation Policy Platform, 2013).  
170 In Angola, Odebrecht works in infrastructure, real estate, bioenergy, mining, agribusiness, and special 
projects. Odebrecht has since 2007 been responsible for a revitalisation project covering maintenance work, urban 
sanitation and traffic support on the main roads (Oliveira et al., 2013). In addition, it is responsible for the 
distribution of food by organising the logistics of 29 stores and two distribution centres in 18 provinces (Oliveira 
et al., 2013). 
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with environmental but also socio-economic needs of the people in the areas affected by mines, 
something already taken into consideration by Western mining companies (Salem Baskin, 
2015). ITVs progress can be seen in environmental risk mitigation through R&D and 
innovation, while at the same time offering professional development certification programs 
and connecting Vale with Brazil’s tech start-up community (Salem Baskin, 2015). What can 
be deducted from this follows suit with the aforementioned notion that latecomer countries in 
the innovation process follow a path of process innovation rather than product innovation.  
 
In relation to the question of who drives innovation, Elite Interview A (July 2015) argues that 
1.2 per cent of Brazil’s GDP is spent on R&D, of which government contributes 0.7 per cent; 
thereby indicating that the Brazilian government’s role in driving innovation through the 
provisions of resources is significant. However, the aim is to step up MNC spending and 
encourage and strengthen public-private cooperation.  
 
Elite Interview A (July 2015) says that of the 0.7 per cent government contribution, it is not 
BNDES that is interested so much in innovation (rather infrastructure and installation). It is the 
Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (FINEP) that promotes Brazil’s economic and 
social development through the procurement of public funding for science and technology 
innovation at companies, universities, technological institutes and other public or private 
institutions (FINEP, 2017). Nevertheless, while FINEP funds research and innovation, the 
assistance of BNDES in providing credit for Brazilian MNCs increases the capacity to invest 
and facilitates technology and innovation (Elite Interview A, July 2015); thus, through the 
involvement of two state entities, the home state’s role is again deemed pivotal. When asked 
which sectors receive the most amount of financing for innovation and R&D, especially 
considering Brazilian MNCs expertise in resource sectors and agriculture; Elite Interview A 
(July 2015) said:  
“…given that Brazil wants to move away from overdependence on commodities, 
innovation policy is not directed at mining to a large extent, although there are 
projects in that sector as well. Mining is not a central figure of innovation policy; 
instead areas such as energy, bio-tech and agriculture are the main recipients”.  
 
In addition, domestically Brazil requires all foreign MNCs to establish R&D centres in Brazil 
instead of just implementing technology from abroad. Interestingly, Brazilian MNCs are not 
under home state directives obligated to do the same in their foreign operations, although it is 
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encouraged as it will facilitate access to more local and regional markets for the MNC (Elite 
Interviews A and B, Key Informant A, July 2015). In addition, R&D activities in their 
operations abroad and consequently access to more markets will be beneficial for not only the 
MNCs but also Brazil as it is claimed that it has the potential to facilitate higher influence in 
international economic organisations. What this indicates is that despite Brazil trying to foster 
a picture of SSS (Nel and Taylor, 2013) and SSC cooperation of which one of the main 
components is skills and technology transfer (through establishing R&D centres in foreign 
countries), MNCs knowledge and innovation efforts are not about the benefit of other countries. 
It is ultimately about the benefit of Brazilian MNCs specifically, and in extent Brazil in general.  
 
This section served to illustrate how the two pillars of structural power (production and 
knowledge) provided by MNCs and the two pillars (security and credit) provided by the state, 
contribute to the governed interdependence of the home state and MNC. The governed aspect 
of this interdependence reflects the fact that the home state maintains the upper hand in the 
relationship, as MNCs depend on the state’s incentives (credit and security) to access new 
markets. In addition, in aspects that are supposed to be MNCs responsibility, (production and 
knowledge) they still depend on the home state to facilitate knowledge acquisition and 
innovation through state institutions (like FINEP) and state funds.  
 
This has been further intensified by the fact that even MNCs lobbying power in terms of 
funding of political campaigns has been significantly diminished due to the ban on private 
funding for political campaigns (Boadle, 2015; Tavener, 2015). Therefore, due to MNCs 
dependence on the provision of security and credit from the home state, as well as the home 
state driving and facilitating knowledge creation; the relationship is rather one of dependence 
of MNCs on the home state. This dependence also gives the home state leverage to demand 
certain favours or to impose a certain role (access to new markets, resource acquisition, and 
image creation) onto its MNCs, both domestically but also in its foreign policy. However, I 
argue that this role will greatly differ depending on the host state’s importance for Brazil’s 
foreign policy. This will be further explored in the following section in relation to the main 
research question: What role do Chinese and Brazilian MNCs play in the foreign policy 
objectives of their home states towards Africa? 
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4.6 MNCs Role in Brazil’s Foreign Policy towards Africa 
In chapter two it was argued that through the provision of certain incentives (credit and 
security) as part of the home states two pillars of structural power, the home state has leverage 
to request certain favours/tasks (SSDC activities, profit, positive image) from MNCs. In 
addition, depending on the task or favour at hand, the MNC will play a specific role in the 
home state’s foreign policy towards a host state. Furthermore, it was argued that not all host 
states carry equal foreign policy priority for the home state as that depends on political and 
economic factors. In section 4.3 of this chapter it was argued that in terms of Brazil’s relations 
with Africa, some states are more important politically and historically (Lusophone states) and 
others are more important economically (regional powers: South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt). 
I argued that the main targets in terms of Brazilian investments in Africa as well as SSDC 
activities are Lusophone countries, of which Mozambique stands out as a large recipient of 
mining investments and SSDC projects in health and agriculture171 (ABC, 2017). According to 
ABC, Mozambique has seen over 100 cooperation projects over the 30 years of ABCs 
existence, Angola has also had more than 60 projects, predominantly in the health and 
agricultural sectors. However, there are also some development cooperation projects in mining 
and energy, as well as technical cooperation projects in defence. In terms of other countries, it 
was argued in section 4.3 that African countries that are neither Lusophone nor regional leaders 
(South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt) are not as important to Brazil’s foreign policy aims; thus, 
Brazilian MNCs’ role in Brazil’s foreign policy towards those states will also vary in type and 
importance. This section will however only focus on the role of mining MNCs, such as Vale 
in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Zambia and Mozambique.  
 
As previously mentioned, Brazilian engagement in African resource extraction sectors is not 
based on Brazil’s dependency on natural resources, given the abundance of the same in the 
domestic realm; rather, Brazilian companies specialising in resource extraction venture abroad 
in order to secure new markets (Stolte, 2012). In addition, as claimed by Elite Interviews and 
Key Informants (July 2015) Brazilian companies have increasingly been venturing abroad 
driven by a profit rationale. However, especially in relation to Africa, Brazilian MNCs often 
use time-and-place appropriate terminology when explaining their motives for engagement in 
                                                          
171 The most well-known Brazilian development cooperation project in Africa is the trilateral partnership with 
Japan and Mozambique, which aims at transplanting Brazilian technology and expertise (through EMBRAPA and 
the FGV) to foster agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor in Northern Mozambique; called the Program 
of Triangular Co-operation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannahs of Mozambique, known as 
the ProSavana Project (Alves, 2013a).   
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resource sectors, such as development cooperation, mutual benefit and win-win. Indeed, one 
of Brazil’s biggest metal and mining companies, Vale claims that its performance is ruled by 
transparency in management, respect to shareholders rights, development of its employees, and 
the promotion of life quality improvement of the communities in which it operates (Vale, 
2006). Furthermore, through the Vale do Rio Doce Foundation, Vale carries out sustainable 
social programs in its regions of operation, always guided by the utmost respect for local values 
and customs (Vale, 2006). This would imply that Vale is somehow different from developed 
market MNCs in the sense that it puts profit making as secondary to shareholders right and the 
respect of local people’s rights and customs, which does not coincide with Vale’s above-
mentioned activities and behaviour in Canada. According to Amisi et al. (2015:97), large MNC 
from emerging markets are no different to developed market MNCs in the sense that they are 
not committed to the development of ordinary people, neither at home nor abroad. Whether 
this is correct or not will be seen below with the use of Vale as an example.  
 
Vale is one of the world’s largest mining companies, and the largest in Brazil. It is the world 
leader in iron ore production and the second largest producer of nickel, as well as a major player 
in the production of manganese, copper, coal, iron “pellets”, ferroalloys and fertilizers (Sertã 
Mansur and Strautman, 2015). Vale’s operations do not only include mining operations but 
also logistics (transportation of mined ore via railways to ports), energy (production to meet its 
own needs), and steel production (transformation of iron ore to steel) (Vale, 2017). Considering 
this vast array of operations in addition to them stretching across more than 25 countries on 
five continents, Vale’s importance in the mining world cannot be denied. In addition, due to its 
historical importance for Brazil and the connection with its home state, it is argued in 
accordance with figure four (process of home state MNC relations in foreign policy) that Vale 
plays a specific role in Brazil’s foreign policy, one imposed on it by its home state.  
 
4.6.1 MNCs role in Brazil’s relations to Mozambique 
Mozambique is one of the Lusophone countries that has seen most of Brazil’s SSDC projects 
in Africa, and is of high importance for Brazil’s Africa foreign policy. There is a large presence 
of Brazilian MNCs operating in all sectors in Mozambique, including in mining where Vale is 
the dominant MNC and was awarded the Moatize172 coal mining concession in 2004. 
                                                          
172 The coal project in the Zambezi river basin holds one of the world’s largest coal reserves; however, the main 
consumers of the coal are Brazil, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East where the coal is used for steel production 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 203 
 
Furthermore, Vale is also involved in the construction of railroads173 that would allow for the 
mine products to be transported to and exported through the Nacala port in Nampula.  
 
According to Elite Interviews C and D (July 2015), Vale’s presence in Mozambique as a mining 
company has yielded significant positive results for the local population, claiming that “mining 
has the potential to change local realities” (Elite Interview C, July 2015). This was backed by 
saying that Vale employees on average 80 per cent of local people in its overseas operations, 
but in Mozambique it employs 90 per cent, thereby contributing to job creation and GDP (Elite 
Interviews C and D, July 2015). In addition, it was mentioned that Vale provides two types of 
training programs: for employees, technical training (off-road truck drivers, crane operators, 
and the like); for suppliers, they foster the local economy by hiring contractors (5 trucks from 
the local community) and they train them to understand practices that are necessary for them 
to improve competitiveness. However, while this is of value for the local population it is also 
for the benefit of Vale; given that through training and value-added production they can 
minimise their own expenses, minimise reputational risks and created avenues to enter new 
opportunities. This was also echoed by Elite Interviews C and D (July 2015): “Vale will not 
pay in excess of 200 per cent for a product, so training is a vital component”.  
 
According to Elite Interview D (July 2015), Vale’s presence in Mozambique as a logistical 
operator makes a difference in the local economy, especially since the establishment of the 
Nacala corridor railway, but also in the regional174 economy that also benefits Malawi175 as it 
crosses the country’s southern part. These particular investments by Vale, as well as 
agriculturally based SSDC projects (such as ProSavana176) are backed by EMBRAPA and other 
Brazilian state institutions (BNDES, FINEP). The Nacala corridor is regarded by many local 
people in Mozambique to be a booster of Brazilian agribusiness’s internationalisation (Garcia 
and Kato, 2015), thereby implying the interconnectedness between Brazilian state and 
Brazilian MNCs.   
 
                                                          
and electricity generation.  The project is a joint venture, of which 85 per cent is controlled by Vale (15 per cent 
by Mitsui Co. & Ltd from Japan). 
173 Vale has control of Mozambique’s biggest railways owned by the Nacala Integrated Logistics Corridor, a 
partnership between Vale (80%) and Railroads of Mozambique (20%). 
174 There is also the potential to connect the Nacala corridor to Zambia in the future (Elite Interview D, July 
2015). 
175 Import by Malawi is much cheaper now that they are using the railway built by Vale, and Mozambique 
benefits now that it is exporting its agriculture (Elite Interview C, July 2015) 
176 See Appendix nine.  
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While the economic benefits of the Nacala corridor may be important (although disputed in the 
section below) for both Mozambique and Malawi, local people perceive the benefits to be more 
beneficial for Brazil. Key Informant C (July 2015) however, says that cooperation projects help 
legitimise companies’ investments and that in Mozambique the local people do not differentiate 
(blurred differentiation) between horizontal activities (SSDC, knowledge share) and vertical 
(profit driven investments) as they converge on ground. While horizontal activities are often 
perceived to be for mutual benefit as claimed by the Brazilian government and vertical are 
often MNC driven; due to the blurred lines between what is government and what is MNC 
initiated, the perception/image of Brazil converges with the image that Brazilian MNCs exude 
on ground (Key Informant C, July 2015). To relate this back to the process of home state-MNC 
relations in foreign policy (see figure four); due to the overlapping of government initiated 
projects that often include MNCs, it is difficult to differentiate between the principal actors. As 
indicated by causality arrow two, MNC activities in the host state can be either vertical or 
horizontal and trigger different perceptions of the MNC, which as indicated by the broken red 
arrow, can either cause a positive or negative relation between home and host state. In the 
illustration of Vale’s Moatize project, this image is not often positive, as will be explained 
below. Thus, it is assumed that the negative image of an MNC can cause a negative image of 
the MNCs state of origin, and thus negative relations between the host and home state. 
 
The project has been attracting both national and international criticism, one of which relates 
to the ill-treatment of 1300 local families that were forced to relocate to make way for the mine 
(Downey, Bonds and Clark, 2011; Friends of the Earth International, 2013). The Mozambique 
Centre for Public Integrity found that Vale used a divide and rule strategy to resettle displaced 
families in rural and semi-urban areas 45 km from their home community and 75 km from the 
city of Tete. In addition to being resettled far away from their home communities, the displaced 
families were compensated with housing that was below acceptable standards, due to leaking 
roofs and lack of proper foundation (Friends of the Earth International, 2013). Also, despite 
promises by Vale that each affected family would be provided land for agriculture and access 
to clean tapped water, the families have never received it (Amisi et al., 2015). Moreover, local 
people told Friends of the Earth (FoE) that the company had created a little Brazil, thereby 
implying that the employment opportunities for local people were limited, and that only short-
term contracts were available for local workers, with fewer rights being bestowed upon them 
than workers from neighbouring countries and Brazil. This in turn created resentment among 
the unemployed local people (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Friends of the Earth International, 2013). 
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Recruitment of foreign (Brazilian) workers as opposed to locals was also raised as a point of 
critique in relation to China (brining Chinese workers to African operations) in chapter three, 
indicating a similarity in operational practices.  
 
In addition to all of the above, by being displaced far from their communities, they also lost 
access to their local markets at which they sold their produce (firewood, charcoal, food). A 
displaced resident claimed that Vale has exacerbated their poverty, since they have become 
unemployed, poor and without access to the market or any other sources of income in the new 
settlements (Amazon Watch, 2012).  
 
In response to the above, in late 2011 FoE Mozambique invited members of the community 
that have been affected by the project to raise awareness of the problems caused by Vale, after 
which the issues were taken to Parliament, where it was agreed that a parliamentary working 
group would monitor the affected area. However, in January 2012 after several attempts to 
resolve the issues with Vale, the local communities turned to peaceful protests. Vale suffered 
major public relations failures over its poor handling of resettlements in Tete, Lula warned 
Brazilian companies not to make mega errors and thus harm the image of Brazil (Burges, 
2017). While Brazilian companies were aware that support from Itamaraty would only be 
provided in extreme circumstances and that Itamaraty would not go against the Mozambican 
government to aid Vale (Burges, 2017); the protests mentioned above were however met with 
aggression from the Mozambican state police in an attempt to intimidate and suppress the 
communities’ call for justice (FoE International, 2013). What this indicates is Mozambique’s 
dependence on foreign MNCs investments; thus, any possibility of losing FDI and in turn 
revenue (due to the MNC leaving based on local people’s complaints), is motivation enough to 
intimidate and supress the locals and in turn protect foreign MNCs interests. This was also 
mentioned in relation to Chinese activities in Zambia in chapter three. Consequently, what this 
could mean is when the host state is highly dependent on FDI, even in cases of MNCs obvious 
wrongdoing, the MNCs will not suffer major consequences (neither from the host nor home 
state) and the host state’s relation to the MNCs home state will be left unaffected.  
 
Moreover, Vale is claimed to not have fostered social and entrepreneurial accountability, it did 
little advertising and did not assess the qualifications of local workers for its projects. Only 
after a great deal of negotiations with the Mozambican government, the company contributed 
to the establishment of a Tete training centre in partnership with Odebrecht and Keltz (Garcia 
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and Kato, 2015), which differs from the above-mentioned importance that Vale allegedly 
ascribes to training activities as a way to minimise its long-term expenses. According to Garcia 
and Kato (2015) and Elite Interviews C and D (July 2015) aid-financed cooperation initiatives 
such as training of the African workforce (teachers, students and technical staff) are considered 
a remarkable effort on behalf of the Brazilian government and private actors involved. The 
most impressive effort is considered to be in the construction industry through the 
establishment of the Industrial Training Service (SENAI), a workforce-training centre. 
However, concerns have been raised about the potential control of Mozambique’s intellectual 
property by Brazil (Garcia and Kato, 2015). In addition, these type of training centres close to 
foreign customers, have significant benefits for MNCs as they gain knowledge about market 
preference and market dynamics which they can use to their advantage in further operations 
(Salim, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, it was mentioned that Brazil has been an active SSDC player in recent times 
(2000s onwards), especially in Lusophone countries of Africa, with projects ranging from 
agriculture assistance to health sector technical assistance and skills transfer. Brazil’s highest 
profile SSDC project to date in the health sector is the construction of an antiretroviral factory 
in Mozambique. This project was promised by President Lula in 2003, but was only completed 
in 2012 due to certification problems with the World Health Organisation. The project was 
developed by FIOCRUZ, a leading scientific institution for research and development in 
biomedical sciences and the Vale Foundation covering 80% of the factory rehabilitation cost 
(US$ 4.5 million) (Russo et al., 2014). The project is valued at a total of US$ 23 million and 
involves the provision of equipment, technology transfer, capacity building and certification 
(Alves, 2013b). The main aim is the production of antiretroviral drugs for the supply of the 
Mozambican as well as neighbouring markets, and although fully functional, the factory has 
since its handover to Mozambican authorities in august 2012 been plagued by operational 
problems177 (Russo et al., 2014; Alves, 2013b).  
 
Nevertheless, this project is often hailed as a positive example of Brazilian SSDC in Africa, 
but it also signals that there remain issues with the way projects are handled from the onset and 
                                                          
177 Russo et al. (2014:5) highlight the following issues: local skills shortages were overcome through training of 
Mozambican staff in Brazil; however, the handover of management positions was a major issue. In addition, due 
to Mozambique’s poor industrial environment, the raw materials and maintenance services for pharmaceutical 
transformation had to be procured from South Africa, China, India and Brazil (Russo et al., 2014). 
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that transparency is a crucial aspect that needs to be improved. In addition, while Brazilian 
SSDC projects are predominantly done under the pillars of the ABC, the antiretroviral factory 
project involved a non-state actor (Vale). This raises questions as to what role MNCs178 like 
Vale play in the facilitation of home-host state relations, if any, and how is this manifested on 
ground.  
 
According to Elite Interview B and Key Informants C and D (July 2015), this particular project 
was originally planned as a SSDC project between Brazil and Mozambique, with Brazil 
carrying the majority of the costs. However, when the Mozambican government could not find 
sufficient funding to pay off its part, upon approaching the Brazilian government for assistance, 
they were directed towards Vale to ask for help. This signals a departure from the argument 
that Brazil does not mix investments and trade with aid and SSDC activities. Furthermore, this 
indicates that the home state has leverage to ask MNCs for favours, based on the MNCs 
dependence on the home state, even when they are not state-owned. It could be said that this 
manoeuvre served two purposes; one, through its benevolence in providing financial assistance, 
Vale’s image as a good doer can assist the MNC in accessing new projects within Mozambique; 
second, it is a political benefit for Brazil since this SSDC project (combined with economic 
benefits) raised its image and legitimacy as an important global player. Due to the home state 
being a shareholder in Vale, despite it being a private MNCs, the home state had advantage to 
exercise power over the MNC and indirectly impose a specific role onto the MNC - positive 
image creator. Although, in June 2017, shareholders of Vale agreed on a share conversion plan 
that would boost transparency, give equal votes to all shareholders and limit government 
meddling; the Brazilian “government will keep a golden share, allowing it to fend off hostile 
takeover attempts and shape strategic decisions” (Nogueira and Parra-Bernal, 2017). This 
indicates that the home state still has the upper hand, even in relation to private MNCs.  
 
The construction of the antiretroviral factor played out in a Lusophone country and as 
mentioned, Lusophone countries are the most important in a pyramidal scheme of Brazilian 
foreign policy priorities towards Africa. Consequently, such operations will accordingly have 
higher impact on Brazil’s foreign relations. The question is if so, what role (image creator, 
SSDC provider, national champion, or other) Brazilian MNCs play in Brazil’s foreign policy 
                                                          
178 The biofuel development projects in Angola and Mozambique led by Odebrecht and Petrobras fall under this 
category as well. 
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objectives towards African countries that are neither priority nor second tier, but third tier 
countries such as Zambia; and how the exercise of that role affects host-home state relations.  
 
4.6.2 MNCs role in Brazil’s relations to Zambia 
Brazil’s economic relations with Zambia have already started in the 1960s; however, it was not 
until 1970 that official diplomatic ties were established, when the Embassy of Brazil in Nairobi 
(Kenya), began to cumulatively represent Brazil in Zambia. In the years up to 2007 there have 
been significant changes in terms of Brazilian embassies in Zambia and vice versa179. In 2007, 
the Brazilian embassy in Zambia was reopened. In 2008, Zambia was hit by overwhelming 
floods and loyal to its portrayal as being a SSS country (Nel and Taylor, 2013), Brazil donated 
3.5 tons of beans and 3 tons of corn as humanitarian aid to the victims. Question is, whether it 
was purely out of solidarity or if there was another motivation guiding this assistance, as shortly 
after, the Brazil-Zambia Joint Committee was established and an official visit by President Lula 
to Zambia followed in 2010.  
 
It was mentioned that President Lula was often accompanied by representatives of large MNCs 
when visiting African states (stated by several Elite Interviews and Key Informants, July 2015 
and August 2016), thereby showcasing the importance that Brazil attaches to its MNCs. 
However, in a quest to establish closer ties with SSDC partners, President Lula also placed 
high importance on establishing diplomatic ties that in many ways preceded Brazil’s aims of 
deeper economic engagement in and with Africa in terms of both trade and investment. This 
goes hand in hand with the diplomatic aspect of the provision of security as part of the four 
pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework, as the opening of 
embassies/diplomatic support is regarded as part of the home state’s role in fostering better 
conditions for its MNCs to enter new markets. This in turn helps the home state in increasing 
its influence in global financial institutions such as the WTO and IMF; thus, it is a two-sided 
benefit. This also includes the already mentioned De Azevedo Brito heading the World Food 
Programme much due to support from African states.  
 
                                                          
179 In 1982 upon President Kenneth Kaunda return from Brazil the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Trade 
was signed and Brazil established its first embassy in Lusaka, which was operational until 1996 (Itamaraty, 2016). 
From 1996 onward, the Brazilian Embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe took over representation of Brazil in Zambia, 
until 2007 when the Brazilian embassy in Lusaka was reopened (Itamaraty, 2016). 
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It could therefore be argued that the establishment of the Brazilian embassy in Lusaka in 2007 
and President Lula’s 2010 visit to Zambia, catered for business interests (Key Informant C, 
July 2015) and opened the way for Vale to enter the Zambian copper market in 2010 and open 
its first Zambian joint venture (JV) operation, the Lubambe copper mine180 in the Copperbelt 
province (Vale, 2016).  
 
As seen in the previous section on Mozambique, whenever there are large-scale mining 
operations at play, local people are often negatively affected by resettlement, as they are not 
adequately compensated and resettlement is often provided sub-standard. However, in Zambia, 
the mine’s CSR program includes resettlement under which the company has undertaken to 
resettle 205 households from the affected area to a new area within the existing Konkola 
Village plus establishing of a new Millennium Village Project181 (ZCCM, 2016; Vale, 2016). 
Lubambe has also initiated programs for safety, environmental responsibility182 and 
community interaction from the outset (ZCCM, 2016).  
 
According to Elite Interviews C and D (July 2015), the Lubambe mine is a good investment, 
but a very small operation, and copper is a very new commodity for Vale, only having started 
producing it in 2005. Vale first established copper operations in Chile, Brazil, DRC and then 
Zambia. According to Elite Interviews C and D (July 2015), explorations in Chile are still on-
going, but the deposits are geologically unattainable, therefore forcing Vale to focus on Africa. 
In October 2010, former Vale CEO Roger Agnelli said that the days of easy discoveries were 
over and that the discovery of new world-class copper deposits is increasingly dependent on 
                                                          
180 The greater Lubambe mining licence area includes extensions of the copper mineralisation from the south 
and east Limb of the current mine to the Konkola basin in the south and the Kawiri and Kawiri North basins. The 
project includes the expansion of operations into an area six kilometres south of the current mine, along the 
Konkola basin. The mine is an 80 per cent Joint venture between Vale (40 per cent) and African Rainbow Minerals 
(40 per cent), with Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines holding the remaining 20 per cent stake (Vale, 2016). The 
JV has previously completed a pre-feasibility study on a resource of 80 million tonnes, which would boost total 
production output to 100 000 tonnes of copper in concentrate per annum (ZCCM, 2016; Vale, 2016). Construction 
of the concentrator plant was completed two months ahead of schedule, in September 2012, and concentrate 
production started in October 2012. The full cost of the project is roughly US$ 456 million and is estimated to 
employ roughly 1500 full-time employees at full production. Furthermore, according to ZCCM (2016), the mines 
lifespan is estimated to be 28 years and the copper produced by Lubambe will be sold for smelting and refining 
within Zambia. 
181 MVP is or was (status unclear) a project initiated by the Earth Institute at Columbia University, UN 
Development, and Millennium Promise in an attempt to prove that the integrated approach at rural development 
can be used to achieve Millennium Development Goals. However, the status of the MVPs is not clear and from 
the MVP website there is no mention of an MVP existing in Zambia (only a map saying that the Konkola MVP 
targets 5000 people) and all the information is older than 2015 (MVP, N/A).  
182 The environmental management program includes the monitoring of dust, noise, diesel emissions, water 
quality, vibration and illumination. 
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Africa; thus, Vale was taking steps to build a large African asset base (Campbell, 2011). This 
came at the same time when Vale opened the JV in Lubambe in 2010. However, while copper 
is now a strategic commodity for Vale, fluctuating copper prices have caused the company to 
suffer profit losses like many other copper mining MNCs (Elite Interviews C and D, July 2015). 
Furthermore, Vale suffered uncertainty in terms of organisational leadership and the direction 
of investments (including African operations) following the replacement of Agnelli with 
Murilo Ferreira in May 2011. However, Ferreira said that the company had a lot of interest in 
Mozambique, Zambia, Guinea, Malawi and Liberia and would continue with expansion plans 
(Campbell, 2011).  
 
What is most interesting with regards to Vale and the change in leadership is also the 
connection to the Brazilian government. Upon being asked about Vale’s connection to the 
government, Ferreira said that while the Brazilian government may not interfere in Vale’s 
operational decisions, it does not harm that official Brasília supports the company’s operations 
and activities in Africa, and noted that Brazilian President Rousseff “viewed very positively 
our involvement in iron-ore in Brazil and in Africa” (Campbell, 2011). This can be explained 
by applying figure four, where increased MNC international operations contribute to the home 
state’s power in international relations.  
 
Elite Interview R (June 2016) concurs with this by saying: “Vale has the final say in all 
decisions relating to their business activities”, thereby indicating that the company has 
operational flexibility, as was also claimed in relation to Chinese MNCs in chapter three. 
However, when asked about Vale’s cooperation activities (SSDC activities, such as skills and 
technology transfer) in Zambia and whether Vale does this on their own initiative or directives 
from the home state; Elite Interview R (June 2016) said: “There is some coordination with the 
Brazilian government concerning social programmes but the social investments programmes 
concerned with the Lubambe Mine are managed and controlled by Lubambe with support from 
the JV partners”. Social investment programmes connected directly to the mine’s operations 
are done in cooperation with African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) as part of the companies CSR 
practices, which ultimately bring a competitive advantage for both ARM and Vale. Both model 
good corporate behaviour and can thus get more investment opportunities (as opposed to MNCs 
that do not adhere to CSR practices).  
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However, when looking at Vale’s behaviour in other countries, such as Mozambique and 
Canada for instance, the question arises whether the good practices are a result of the JV nature 
of the cooperation with ARM and ZCCM, instead of just Vale’s own initiatives. This is, 
however, beyond the scope of this study. The social programmes that Vale coordinates with 
the assistance of the Brazilian government however are the ones that are of more interest to 
this study. This coordination of social programmes between a home state institution and a 
private MNCs indicate a level of interdependence, as directives from the home state to MNCs 
performing social programs in a host state could increase the benevolence of that same host 
state to grant further market opportunities to the MNC. At the same time, it may generate a 
good image of Brazil due to converging views of on ground of Brazilian SSDC actors and 
MNCs (Key Informant C, July 2015). This good-doer image, could in turn increase Brazil’s 
influence in global forums due to the support of the African partner state. 
 
Furthermore, when asked about Vale’s connection to the Brazilian government in terms of legal 
protection in Zambia in particular, Elite Interview R (June 2016) stated: “Vale would only 
receive some unofficial counsel from the Brazilian Government if there were any legal 
troubles”. This is thus quite different than in the case of Vale in Mozambique or Angola for 
instance, where the 2015 ACFI stipulates that Brazilian MNCs (regardless of ownership 
structure) in terms of legal disputes with the host state would have the dispute settled on a state 
to state level, rather than company to state. While Brazil and Zambia have not signed such an 
ACFI, Key Informant B (July 2015) said that the possibility of it happening in the future should 
not be excluded, as Brazil is increasingly moving in the direction of an interventionist state. In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, this implies that in host states that are of less 
importance to Brazil’s foreign policy aims, the provisions of incentives to Brazilian MNCs 
(including security and finance) will be on a lower scale, especially also in cases where the 
MNCs do not operate on their own but are engaged in JVs. Therefore, it could be argued that 
given Zambia’s low importance for Brazil’s foreign policy aims, it is less likely that MNCs 
will have a specific role imposed on them by the home state. This confirms the argument that 
different Brazilian actors, particularly MNCs will play varying roles in Brazil’s foreign policy 
towards African states depending on the political or economic importance of a specific host 
state for Brazil’s foreign policy aims.  
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In terms of the above-mentioned issues with exploration activities as highlighted by former 
Vale CEO Ferreira in 2011, Elite Interview I (June 2016) related this to Vale’s operations in 
Zambia:  
“Vale had two divisions operating in Zambia, exploration and mining. Exploration 
has closed. And their JV in the Lubambe Mine which is on-going. They closed 
exploration for a number of reasons, some of which resulted from the lack of 
suitable discoveries and the change in strategy in focussing on particular areas 
only”. 
 
Furthermore, Elite Interview I (June 2016) pointed out: “They are looking at divesting their 
interest in the Lubambe Mine”. This is possibly a result of the mine’s low production capacity 
in comparison to other mines, and the fact that Vale is changing its focus to other locations.  
In an interview with Key Informant N (May 2016), it was, however, mentioned that Vale had 
already left Zambia in 2014. The respondent did not specify which parts of Vale’s operations 
are still on-going, but from observation it appeared as if the respondent was under the 
impression that Vale had left Zambia altogether. This does not concur with the information on 
Vale’s webpage183, as it is clear that they are still operating in Zambia. This creates the 
impression that even high-ranking government officials in Zambia have limited knowledge as 
to the actors involved in their mining sector.  
 
Lastly, during an interview at the Brazilian embassy in Lusaka in May 2016, a high-ranking 
Brazilian government official mentioned:  
“Nobody told me about Vale’s decision to leave Zambia, I found out only later after 
they had already left. Nobody from the embassy had anything to do with Vale, as 
they were independent; however, I found out after their departure that there were 
problems with the Brazilian government, so they left Zambia” (Elite Interview K, 
May 2016).  
 
On the other hand, Elite Interview I (June 2016) had no knowledge of issues with the Brazilian 
government.  
 
                                                          
183 For more information on the Zambian mine, please refer to: http://www.vale.com/en/aboutvale/across-
world/pages/default.aspx  
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Considering that both of these respondents are high ranking Brazilian personnel in their 
respective organisations, their responses indicate several things. Firstly, the speculation about 
whether Vale left explorations in Zambia due to issues with the Brazilian government raises 
questions of what type of issues, given that operational decisions are usually company 
prerogative and not government. Secondly, the fact that there is speculation about the strained 
relations between Vale and the Brazilian government could indicate that while some 
information was leaked to personnel, the majority of it remains a secret between the highest 
levels of Vale’s leadership and the home state.  
 
Furthermore, from observation and speaking to Key Informants and Elite Interviews in Brazil 
and Zambia, it appears that Brazilian companies, whether in mining or another sector are not 
very prominent in Zambia. According to Key Informant P (May 2016) it seems to be a pattern 
of South American companies to establish JVs with other companies instead of having their 
own subsidiaries. Furthermore, the Zambian government tried to establish partnerships with 
Brazil; however, according to Key Informant P (May 2016) nobody knows how successful this 
has been, thereby again indicating the limited knowledge of Zambia-Brazil relations in general. 
Even Brazilian SSDC cooperation efforts with Zambia have been limited, with only 13 projects 
being initiated of which 12 have been finalised by 2015 (Key Informant A, July 2015).  
 
What can be discerned from this is that Brazilian presence in Zambia is not nearly as prominent 
as Chinese presence as seen in chapter three, nor is it as prominent as Brazil’s presence in other 
African countries, like the Lusophone ones. When visiting the Brazilian embassy in Lusaka, it 
was quite obvious to see that even among Brazilian diplomats there is very little knowledge of 
Brazilian MNCs presence in Zambia. Elite Interview K (May 2016) echoed this and said that 
even when Brazilian companies come to Zambia, the embassy is not informed about this by 
the companies, but rather third-party sources. This indicates two things: firstly, the previously 
mentioned diminishing role of Itamaraty’s embassies in relation to controlling different 
Brazilian actors (MNCs) in foreign countries; and second, the above-mentioned division of 
African states according to importance for Brazil’s foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, this 
indicates that in cases of an African country’s high foreign policy importance it is highly 
unlikely that the Brazilian embassy on the ground would have such limited knowledge of 
Brazilian MNCs presence and their activities, as in the case of Vale in Zambia. While this does 
not indicate that the dependence of MNCs on the home state is limited, it does indicate that due 
to limited interaction and limited importance of that host state, MNCs have operational 
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flexibility and the home state does not have to procure favours from them. It indicates that in 
host countries of lesser foreign policy importance for Brazil, the home state will not impose a 
specific role onto Brazilian MNCs.  
 
4.6.3 Effect of MNC activities on host state - home state relations  
In terms of the feedback loop of MNCs activities’ impact on host state-home state relations (as 
presented in figure four), most Key Informants and Elite Interviews (July 2015) claimed that 
in cases of MNCs limited production, limited local benefits, no adherence to CSR practices, 
environmental damage, and more; the home state (Brazil) would not close them down or 
deregister them. This would not only cause a bureaucratic nightmare, similar to the Chinese 
case as discussed in chapter three; but the home state would lose out on potential benefits 
(production, positive image creation) that the same MNC can provide if operating in another 
country, which is of higher political or economic importance for Brazil. It could be argued that 
this is similar to the case of China in chapter three, as MNCs role in China’s foreign policy 
depends on five indicators (sector, time, ownership structure, event, and region of operation) 
of MNC importance.  
 
Considering this chapter focused on Brazil’s relations with African states, it could be argued 
that the presidential change that occurred over the last two decades changed the importance of 
Africa for Brazil’s foreign policy. With the end of the Lula era, the quest for Africa’s resources 
and the decreasing money flow to Brazilian embassies has also changed the role played by 
Brazilian MNCs. While in the early 2000s MNCs role was that of a national champion in terms 
of access to resources and expansion to other markets, their international reach and expertise 
in particular sectors (mining and agriculture for instance) increased over time and thus, their 
role was no longer that of national champion as they became highly specialised in their 
respective fields (Stolte, 2012). However, later on, especially in the second Lula term, with 
Brazil’s increasing turn to Africa and the proclamations of SSS and SSDC, accompanied by 
the involvement of MNCs in SSDC activities (see case of Vale in Mozambique) it could be 
argued that their role shifted to increasingly focus on positive image creation, coupled with 
profit generation184. However, what seems to be the deciding indicator as to the type of roles 
(national champion, image representative, or no role) played by MNCs, is the region/country 
                                                          
184 This could however also be part of the MNCs own reasoning, as their survival, especially after 2013 and the 
eruption of the Petrobras Lava Jato scandal indicated that MNCs would increasingly have to depend on themselves 
for survival. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 215 
 
of operation, with Lusophone countries being the most significant. Therefore, in terms of 
Mozambique for instance it could be said that Brazilian MNCs play several roles: national 
champion, and positive image creator for Brazil through SSDC projects (antiretroviral factory); 
in terms of Zambia (an African country representative of the least important countries in terms 
of Brazil’s foreign policy), MNCs play no role in Brazil’s foreign policy. In other words, if the 
host state is not of high priority to Brazil’s foreign policy aims, Brazilian MNCs will have no 
role imposed onto them and thus more (albeit limited, as seen from the example of Vale in 
Zambia and the issues with the home state) operational flexibility.  
 
In addition, relating to the feedback loop of MNCs activities in the host state and how they 
impact the relation between the host and home state, it is difficult to discern that regarding 
Brazil-Zambia relations, as knowledge about Brazilian operations even among people directly 
involved with facilitating MNCs entrance into Zambia (such as ZDA, Brazilian embassy in 
Lusaka, MNCs) is limited. However, in other countries, such as Mozambique, the activities of 
Brazilian MNCs have the capacity to negatively but also positively affect the image that Brazil 
wants to project. Thus, it could be said that Brazil’s foreign relations with Mozambique depend 
to a certain extent on Brazilian MNCs as good-doers and therefore, the MNCs role in Brazil’s 
foreign policy towards Mozambique could be described as image representative/creator. 
However, as illustrated above, despite the wrong-doings of Vale in its Moatize operation, due 
to the dependence of Mozambique on investments and revenue provided by Brazilian MNCs, 
the MNC in question will be left unaffected and the relations between the home and host state 
unshaken. In comparison, due to the low importance of Zambia (or other third-tier foreign 
policy priority countries as depicted in figure eight), for Brazil’s foreign policy, the relations 
between the two states will also depend less on the behaviour of Brazilian MNCs in the field. 
Therefore, and as seen from the example of Vale, Brazil does not impose a specific role onto 
MNCs operating in countries of little foreign policy priority.  
 
It has been argued that the provision of incentives (credit and security) from the home state to 
MNCs representing two of the four pillars of structural power gives the state leverage to attach 
a specific role to MNCs in its foreign policy. Furthermore, it was argued that the imposition of 
role depends on the political and/or economic importance of the host state for Brazil’s foreign 
policy aims. In addition, despite MNCs on certain occasions providing one of the two pillars 
of structural power (production); given that the home state funds and drives the generation of 
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knowledge (the second pillar under MNCs domain), the MNCs are highly dependent on the 
state, and thus, more likely to adhere to a specific role imposed onto them by the home state.   
 
Ultimately, instead of the four pillars of structural power being divided half/half between the 
home state and MNCs as outlined in figure three in chapter two, in the case of Brazil, the home 
state has power over three of those pillars; and thus, has the upper hand, as seen in table five. 
 
 
In addition, Brazil’s historical and political background of state-led development and state 
intervention in economic affairs has not changed over time, making the MNCs highly 
dependent on the home state for support and guidance. Moreover, due to the home state 
controlling three of the four pillars of structural power, the home state has the upper hand over 
its MNCs and thus also leverage to impose a specific role onto them in its foreign policy. 
Therefore, the home state-MNC relationship in the case of Brazil is not one of governed 
interdependence, but rather dependence as the MNCs depend on the home state to provide 
credit and security, as well as drive knowledge generation. However, in terms of MNCs role in 
Brazil’s foreign policy, the enforcement thereof by the home state depends on one indicator, 
namely the political (UN Security Council vote backing) or economic (higher investments in 
areas that will increase Brazil’s credibility in front of the WB and IMF) importance of the host 
state in which the MNCs operate for Brazil’s foreign policy aims. Host states that are of lesser 
importance in terms of Brazil’s foreign policy, warrant that even if attached a specific role; 
MNCs will have more operational flexibility than if operating in a host state of high 
importance, such as Mozambique.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter contextualised the Brazilian case study and placed it within the broader debate on 
emerging powers of the South. In the first section an outline of Brazil’s foreign policy, its 
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history, the actors involved, and the changes that occurred over the past two decades was 
provided. In tandem with Brazil’s growing diplomatic activism, liberalization of its economy 
in the 1990s, set the scene for the emergence of much more internationalized MNC’s. The 
second part of the chapter contextualised Brazilian MNCs, both state-owned and private as 
important actors in Brazil’s foreign policy, specifically towards Africa. I applied the four pillars 
of structural power and governed interdependence framework on Brazil-MNCs relations and 
found that the provision of incentives gives Brazil leverage to impose a specific role onto 
MNCs in its foreign policy. In comparison to the Chinese case study in chapter three, where 
the imposition of role onto MNCs by their home state is guided not only by the four pillars but 
also the five indicators of MNCs importance (time, sector, region, current events and ownership 
structure); in Brazil, the role of MNCs in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa is mostly 
guided by one thing, namely the importance (political or economic) of the African country in 
question. However, the types of role in the case of China and Brazil are the same ranging from 
national champion, to positive image creator through performing of SSDC activities (in 
Lusophone countries), to market access pioneer (in Lusophone countries and regional 
hegemons), to no role being attached to MNCs at all (in third tier countries, such as Zambia).  
 
Furthermore, while it was stated by some Elite Interviews and Key Informants that Brazilian 
MNCs often act motivated by profit maximisation and new market access (such as Vale in 
Zambia’s copper sector), when issues arise either in terms of limited production; and thus, 
limited wealth generation, the home state can intervene in their operations (recall them or 
restructure) due to its role as major shareholder and the leverage bestowed upon it through the 
two pillars of structural power (security and credit) that it provides to MNCs, as well as the 
state’s role in facilitating knowledge creation (through funding), something that is supposed to 
be the MNCs responsibility (one of its two pillars of power). This indicates that the four pillars 
of structural power and governed interdependence framework is skewed more towards the 
home state than MNCs, thereby echoing the argument of the re-emergence of the 
interventionist state and a relationship of dependence of MNCs on the home state. Moreover, 
despite the claim of SSS and mutual benefit SSDC, which may be iterated in order to get 
lucrative projects, but then may not be executed (Mozambique’s Moatize project), Brazilian 
MNCs are in that sense no different from Western MNCs. However, some SSDC projects 
involving Brazilian MNCs (antiretroviral factory in Mozambique), especially since they 
involved both the Brazilian MNC and government institutions, can have a positive impact on 
the image of both; thus, the role of MNCs is regarded as that of positive image creator.  
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To summarize: role of MNCs in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa differs based 
predominantly on the importance of the African country in question. I confirmed that different 
countries in Africa carry different levels of importance based on Brazil’s diplomatic or 
economic motives and that based on that country’s importance for Brazil, Brazilian actor’s 
roles in Brazil’s foreign policy towards the country in question will differ.  
 
Historically, Brazilian MNCs operating in the natural resource sectors (mining and oil and gas) 
had the role of national champion in relation to Brazil’s foreign policy objectives. Due to their 
inexperience and limited knowledge of overseas markets, Brazilian mining MNCs had the 
underhand in their relations with their home state, given that the home state provided credit 
and security. As time progressed and MNCs got a better footing in international markets, one 
would assume that they would also have more leverage in their relations to their home state. 
However, from the above-mentioned it is clear that the MNCs are still highly dependent on the 
home state (Brazil) as it maintains the upper hand through the control of three out of four pillars 
of structural power, making the relationship one of MNC dependence rather than governed 
interdependence.  
 
Lastly, in spite of Brazil’s attempted shift towards an open market economy, the deeply 
embedded roots of developmental state and its interventionist and protectionist role (ACFIs) in 
relation to MNCs; indicates that even well-performing (private or state-owned) MNCs that are 
arguably autonomous, are more likely to adhere to a specific role imposed on them by their 
home state, than their Chinese counterparts. The following chapter will provide a detailed 
comparative analysis of Brazil and China’s relations with their MNCs in their foreign policy 
towards developing states from Africa.   
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION  
5.1 Introduction  
Since the turn of the century, Political Science and IR have increasingly focussed on studying 
the rise of new actors in IPE. In the majority of studies, these new actors refer to the BRICS 
states and actors associated with those states, MNCs, NGOs, aid workers, military personnel, 
and more. The research focus followed the development of trade and investment patterns that 
increasingly started to look at relationships between developing countries. As both China and 
Brazil cemented a trade and investment portfolio in Africa, interactions between these two 
countries and the continent became a popular research theme. The Chinese and Brazilian 
economic presence in Africa brought with it an array of actors, most importantly MNCs. China 
and Brazil’s political background and institutional setting have contributed to the blanket 
hypothesis that behind every strong MNC there is a strong state and vice versa. Therefore, this 
study set out to investigate the state-MNC relationship in foreign policy. As I have noted in the 
preceding chapters, research on state-MNCs predominantly covers MNCs from developed 
states operating in either other developed states or in developing states of the South. There has 
been a growing number of literature on MNCs from developing states operating globally; 
however, this literature deals almost exclusively with economic aspects within IPE. State-MNC 
relations literature also mostly deals with the relations between MNCs and the host states in 
which they operate, with discussions of host state-MNC relations mostly being devoted to the 
LDCs, while the home state-MNC analysis mostly focuses on the advanced industrialised 
states. Consequently, this study sought to investigate the relations between home states and 
MNCs in foreign policy towards developing states in the South, with all three actors originating 
from the developing world. The main research question guiding this study was: What role do 
Chinese and Brazilian MNCs play in the foreign policy objectives of their home states towards 
Africa? This chapter aims to compare and contrast the cases of China and Brazil discussed 
earlier. To do so, this chapter is divided into three main sections.  
 
In the first section I reflect on theories and research design used in this study. Following that, 
I outline the main findings for each of the case studies, China and Brazil. Thereafter, I engage 
in the comparison of the findings for both countries, draw conclusions, and answer the main 
research question. The study concludes with suggestions for future research on state MNC 
relations in IPE.  
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5.2 Reflection on theories and research design used 
While attempts have been made (Boddewyn, 1988) to include aspects of political behaviour of 
MNCs by looking at a combination of international economic, political economy, political 
science, sociology and organisation theory “…vastness of these underlying disciplines 
precludes the consideration and integration of all relevant factors, interactions and 
implications…” (Boddewyn, 1988:342). In an attempt to account for factors that dominant 
economic models of MNCs behaviour treat as marginal, such as the role of the state, Strange 
(1988, 1996) developed a theory of structural power stretching the entire duration of her 
academic career. Strange’s structural power theory (1996) offers an approach that not only 
integrates international business and political science, but also allows for changes in the 
relations between the two units of analysis (state and MNC), stretching time, space and region.  
 
In the triads of relationships, (Stopford and Strange, 1991) where three relationships are 
provided: state-state, firm-firm and state-firm; the last mentioned only refers to host state-firm 
relations. This is a limitation to Stopford and Strange’s (1991) theory, which this study 
attempted to expand on and contribute to, by asking the question of how home state-MNC 
relations can play an equally important role in IPE. Therefore, this study adapted this approach 
and incorporated Strange (1996) with Weiss’s (1998) theories into a theoretical framework that 
was applied to an in-depth analysis of home-state firm relations, something that has been dealt 
with marginally in the above-mentioned works. Coupled with the findings, this is the main 
contribution of this study to the topic of state-MNC relations in IPE.  
 
The study of home state-MNC relations was done through the application of Strange’s four 
pillars of structural power (1996) and Weiss’s (1998) governed interdependence in order to 
assess how the home state-MNC relationship affects the host-state MNC relations and 
consequently home state-host state relations, as reflected in the triads of relationships. The four 
pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework provide that the home 
state MNC relations are interdependent, but can be skewed to one or the other, depending on a 
variety of factors. This analytical framework allows for changes in relationship dependency as 
context varies. Depending on the changes of context, the roles imposed onto MNCs by their 
home state in its FP will differ, and their adherence to that role will be optional. In addition, 
the four pillars of structural power are a precondition for the imposition of a specific role onto 
MNCs by their home state. 
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Considering the research design and methodology, the selected research design was a 
comparative case study. Brazil and China were selected based on their perceived applicability 
to the selected theoretical framework. The framework deals with relations between home-states 
and MNCs in FP. Cases had to be selected based on the following attributes: historical strength 
of the state, history of state-MNC relations in which the state had the upper hand and dirigisme 
tradition. Hence, China and Brazil were deemed appropriate. The theoretical framework is 
based on the assumption that the home state maintains the upper hand in relation to its MNC 
both in the domestic and foreign realm and that MNCs’ foreign activities will be aligned with 
the home states FP objectives. This was predominantly expected in the case of China, but as 
will be explained below, the findings of this study reflect a counterintuitive reality. Both 
countries are also active participants in the global political economy, they are regarded as 
leaders of the South, both have had significant economic growth over the past two decades 
(1990-2015) and they have a significant presence on the African continent. Given the footprint 
in economic affairs in Africa and Africa’s sheer size, this study had to be limited to the 
exploration of China and Brazil’s presence in one specific country (Zambia)185, as a 
representative of third tier countries in the pyramidal scheme of country importance and only 
one sector in which Chinese and Brazilian MNCs engage in, namely mining.  
 
5.3 Summary of the main findings  
The following sections will present the main findings for each of the cases, China and Brazil. 
A comparative analysis of cases will conclude this section.  
 
5.3.1 China  
In chapter three, China was contextualised in order to pave the way for the application of the 
theoretical framework. China’s history has over the years been plagued by numerous invasions 
by foreign powers, making it suspicious of foreigners, something that was reflected in its 
foreign policy for years prior to the 1980s. Furthermore, China’s political structure 
characterised by Marxist ideological underpinnings has also trickled down to its foreign policy 
and the ways in which China dealt with foreign states. However, over the course of the 1980s 
and the realisation by Deng that economic development and cooperation with the international 
                                                          
185 However, in the case of Brazil, Mozambique was used as another example, but more as a comparison with 
Zambia, illustrating the very indicator of host state importance for Brazil’s economic or political foreign policy 
aims.  
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community was needed not only for the benefit of the Chinese people, but for the benefit of the 
CCP itself (as its legitimacy depended on the provision of economic stability); China 
increasingly started adopting open market/capitalist principles and expanded to new frontiers 
in search of economic opportunities.  
 
This sparked an increasing interest in economic ties with the countries of the South, particularly 
in Africa, whom China had in the years prior to 1980 supported in revolution movements, based 
on solidarity. Increasing economic motives in China’s foreign policy towards Africa, 
particularly in the years after 1999 and the launch of the “Go Out Strategy”, contributed to the 
rise of Chinese non-state actors, specifically MNCs. Given China’s institutional and political 
background, being a nominally communist state, combined with its economic proliferation 
gave impetus for the study of home state (China)-MNC (Chinese) relations in foreign policy 
towards developing states from the South. 
 
This study applied the four pillars of structural power and governed interdependence 
framework to uncover the nature of the interaction between the home state and MNCs based 
on the provision of certain incentives: credit, security (diplomatic and legal), production, and 
knowledge. The theoretical framework implies that the home state and MNCs function in a 
structure of interdependence given that each depends on the provision of incentives from the 
other; however, with the home state maintaining the advantage. Most literature on China and 
Chinese MNCs concurs with this by arguing that the MNCs are subordinate to their home state, 
based precisely on the political and institutional background, i.e. communism. However, the 
changes in China’s political economy have been neglected to a certain extent, as the focus has 
been on the state’s overpowering role over all aspects of political and economic life. Thus, the 
possibility for MNCs to at least be on par with their home state in terms of power in IPE, if not 
in a more powerful position, have not been considered to a large extent. By applying the four 
pillars of structural power and governed interdependence framework on home state-MNC 
relations in the case of China, I argue that the home state-MNC relation is one of conditioned 
governed interdependence. I found that the provision of the credit incentive gives China 
leverage to request certain favours from MNCs and request that they play a certain role in its 
foreign policy; however, this role changes depending on five indicators of MNC importance 
(time, sector, region, event, ownership status) and can range from: national champion (mostly 
applicable to mining MNCs in the 1990s); image representative/creator (applicable to any 
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MNC that is handpicked to do SSDC projects). However, in cases where none of the indicators 
of MNC importance are present, the MNCs will not have a role imposed onto them.  
 
In addition, changes in China’s economy and the expansion of MNCs to new frontiers have 
over the years (1990-2015) given more leverage to MNCs based on their increasing 
performance and generation of new knowledge (through both acquisition and sharing), which 
contributes to both their, and the home states competitiveness in the global economy. Thus, 
despite the assumption that the state has the ultimate power over its MNCs, based on the 
interdependent nature of their relationship, the MNCs can choose if they want to play a specific 
role and if so, in which ways they will operationalize it, as seen in section 3.5. Furthermore, 
given that the home state’s provision of the security incentive to MNCs is not visible in the 
case of China, like in Brazil and thereby leaving the MNCs to deal with their own risks; 
provides the MNCs with operational flexibility, and in so doing, echoing the very aspects of 
the capitalist global economy and the role of the state therein.  
 
Lastly, even though the imposition of a specific role onto MNCs by their home state depends 
on the division of control of the four pillars of structural power, in the case of China186 it is also 
dependent on five external factors: time in history; sector of MNC operation; ownership 
structure of the MNC; region of operation; and events in and around the region of operation. 
Thus, I argue that depending on the political and/or economic importance of a certain country 
(Zambia vs. South Africa) or region (Africa vs. Latin America) for China’s foreign policy aims, 
MNCs will play different roles.  
 
On a theoretical level, the pillars of structural power precede the imposition of role onto MNCs 
by home states in FP. This chapter expanded on Stopford and Strange’s (1991) argument that 
MNCs will follow home state directives, by applying the pillars of structural power (Strange 
1996) onto home state-MNC relations and finding that depending on who controls which pillar, 
the relationship can be skewed to one or the other actor. While the home state-MNC relations 
in foreign policy in the case of China have been characterised by conditioned governed 
interdependence, at least in the timeframe that this study was concerned with (1990-2015); the 
theory applied, allows for changes in the locus of control of power, swinging from home state 
                                                          
186 In the case of Brazil, there is only one indicator, namely the importance of the region of MNCs operations as 
outlined in chapter four.  
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to MNCs and vice versa, or including both equally. This is dependent on the control of the 
pillars combined with the five external indicators of MNC importance.  
 
5.3.2 Brazil  
In chapter four, Brazil was contextualised in order to pave the way for the application of the 
theoretical framework. Through providing some background Brazil’s history and political 
dynamics, the relations between the state and MNCs were contextualised. Brazil has 
historically emphasised multilateralism and peaceful negotiations in its foreign policy. Due to 
the historical connection with Africa based on the Atlantic slave trade, and similar colonial 
background, Brazil has been a supporter of African liberation movements during the 1950s and 
onward. Furthermore, Brazil’s political underpinnings of dictatorships and military regimes, 
that have left the country poor and underdeveloped, have in the years after the 1980s, sparked 
the need for economic modernisation and development. Reforms initiated in the early 1990s 
during President Cardoso’s two terms tried to absorb and consolidate changes caused by 
globalisation, particularly those of market liberalism and thereby replace the dominant 
economic development model based on import substitution industrialisation. 
 
These shifts in domestic priorities also trickled down to Brazil’s foreign policy where in search 
of economic opportunities for domestic development, Brazil attempted integration in 
international markets. With this, an increasing interest in economic ties with the countries of 
the South erupted, particularly in Africa, whom Brazil had in the years prior supported in 
revolution movements, based on solidarity. Increasing economic motives in Brazil’s foreign 
policy towards Africa, particularly in the years during President Lula, contributed to the 
intensified internationalisation of Brazilian MNCs.  
 
Despite trying to absorb and consolidate open market/liberalist principles domestically, 
Brazil’s history of authoritarian regimes and the historical role of the state as the main 
development driver, sparked the need to study the ways in which the home state (Brazil) 
interacts with MNCs (Brazilian) in foreign policy towards developing states from the South. 
This was done through the application of the four pillars of structural power and governed 
interdependence framework. The theoretical framework stipulated that the home state and 
MNCs function in a structure of governed interdependence given that each depends on the 
provision of incentives by the other. By applying the four pillars of structural power and 
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governed interdependence framework on home state-MNC relations in the case of Brazil, I 
argue that the home state-MNCs relation is one of dependence of MNCs on the home state 
rather than governed interdependence. I found that the provision of credit and security 
incentives gives Brazil leverage to request certain favours from and allows it to impose a 
specific role onto MNCs in its foreign policy; however, this role changes depending on one 
factor, namely the political or economic importance of the host state for Brazil’s foreign policy. 
Therefore, role differs from national champion to positive image creator through performing 
of SSDC activities (in Lusophone countries), to market access pioneer (in Lusophone countries 
and regional hegemons), to no role being imposed at all (in third tier countries, such as Zambia). 
 
While Brazilian MNCs profit motivation is important in their quest for new markets, when 
issues arise either in terms of limited production and consequently limited wealth generation, 
the home state can intervene in their operations (recall them or restructure), due to the state’s 
role as major shareholder in MNCs (even private ones187). Furthermore, the provision of 
security to MNCs through the recently initiated ACFIs, where disputes between the MNC and 
the host state in which it operates will be settled between the host state and the home state 
(Brazil), indicate the re-emergence of the interventionist state; and therefore, the home state’s 
power over MNCs. Lastly, due to the home state’s significant role in facilitating knowledge 
through funding provision, something that is supposed to be the MNCs domain (as part of its 
two pillars of structural power), the structural power framework is skewed more towards the 
home state; thus, giving it leverage to impose a role onto MNCs in its foreign policy. 
 
In addition, despite the economic benefits that MNCs international operations bring to Brazil 
(due to the home state’s control of three of the four pillars of structural power) the MNCs do 
not have as much flexibility in choosing to adhere to a specific role imposed onto them. 
However, these roles are not necessarily very obstructive to the MNCs very own raison d’être. 
 
On a theoretical level, the pillars of structural power precede the imposition of role onto MNCs 
by home states in FP. This study expanded on Stopford and Strange’s (1991) argument that 
MNCs will follow home state directives, by applying the four pillars of structural power 
(Strange 1996) onto home state-MNC relations and finding that depending on who controls 
                                                          
187 While recalling might be more difficult in the context of private MNCs, restructuring is possible due to the 
state’s shareholder role in the company, as in the example of Vale.  
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which pillar, the relationship can be skewed to one or the other actor. However, while the theory 
applied allows for changes in the locus of control swinging from home state to MNCs and vice 
versa, in the case of Brazil, for now the state maintains the upper hand188. This is based on its 
control of three pillars of structural power and the historically conditioned institutional and 
political background; thus, leaving MNCs in a position of dependence.   
 
5.3.3 Comparison between China and Brazil  
This study was a comparative enquiry of home state-MNC relations in the cases of China and 
Brazil. As mentioned in chapter one, these two countries have similarities in the historical 
strength of the state, the way they approach relations with states from the South, and the 
increasing presence of economic motives and actors (MNCs) in facilitating those relations. It 
was anticipated at the beginning of this study that these similarities will cause a similar result 
in relation to the main research question, namely the role of MNCs in China and Brazil’s 
foreign policy towards Africa. After the research was conducted, several similarities were 
confirmed, but some significant and counterintuitive differences were found.  
 
In reflection on the site of the research, the harsh reality is that despite the Western research 
hype, China-Zambia relations is not on the domestic (Zambia) research agenda. Although it is 
talked about in the streets of Lusaka, the bus station, the local pub and the taxi stand, it is not 
part of the mainstream dialogue in academic circles. In trying to find reasons for this, the 
simplest answer was lack of resources, but also just a lack of interest. My field trip to Zambia 
coincided with the African Development Bank Annual Meeting in Lusaka, attended by 
delegations of, amongst other, Chinese businessmen and government officials. Respondents 
interviewed during that week did not express much interest in the event. In the case of Brazil, 
interest in and knowledge of involvement in Zambia was even less than in the case of China.  
 
In relation to the theoretical framework, the four pillars of structural power were present in 
both cases (China and Brazil). However, their allocation differed. Where the theoretical 
framework stipulates that two pillars are controlled by the home state (credit and security) and 
two by MNCs (production and knowledge); thus, contributing to a governed interdependence 
structure, in the case of China this was partially confirmed, as the state controls one of the two 
                                                          
188 In the case of China, the relationship between the home state and MNCs is more balanced.  
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(credit). However, the state does not provide security189, especially not legal security190 to its 
MNCs in their foreign operations, partially because it sees business and politics as separate and 
also because it does not interfere in host state issues. The MNCs on the other hand, provide 
relatively stable production levels and acquire and contribute to the sharing of knowledge, 
which in turn makes both them and their home state more competitive. Therefore, due to the 
provision of certain incentives, the home state and MNCs operate in an interdependent 
relationship, albeit conditioned governed interdependence, as the pivotal role of the state 
implied in the word governed is somewhat diminished and is conditioned by the five indicators 
of MNC importance in foreign policy.  
 
In the case of Brazil, the home state and MNCs function in a relation of dependence of MNCs 
on the home state, as the home state controls three of the four pillars of structural power (credit, 
security, and drives knowledge through the funding of innovation). Thus, the MNCs are 
subordinate to the home state. The security pillar is the one that mostly contributes to the 
counter intuitiveness of the findings, as Brazil (being a democracy that over the years has had 
significant economic growth and absorbed open market/capitalist economic principles) has 
become the poster child of the re-emergence of the interventionist state. This is done by 
providing legal security (through ACFIs) to its MNCs (SOE and private) operating in various 
international markets. This would have been expected of the Chinese state in relation to its 
MNCs, as the role of the state in China has been portrayed as both controlling and 
overpowering in relation to other non-state actors. However, China provides limited security 
to MNCs in their operations in a host state; thus, leaving them to deal with risks on their own 
as it does not want to meddle with issues on host state territory, given that it would be a breach 
of the non-interference principle.  
 
This has significant repercussions for the imposition of role onto MNCs in each state’s foreign 
policy. In the case of Brazil, I found that MNCs will be more likely to follow foreign policy 
directives and specific roles imposed onto them by the home state, as their operations and 
survival largely depends on the benevolence of their home state to continue providing credit, 
security and funding for knowledge acquisition. In the case of China, MNCs have more 
                                                          
189 It provides some form of diplomatic support by establishing ties with the local government, but ultimately if 
the MNCs do not register with the Chinese embassy on ground in the host state, even this diplomatic security may 
be limited.  
190 Please refer to section 3.4.2 for more detail.  
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operational flexibility as a result of the home state’s dependence on their production and 
knowledge generation, albeit through knowledge transfer that opens further (economic) 
opportunities for the MNCs, and in extent (political) opportunities for the home state. This in 
turn makes both China and its MNCs more competitive in the international economic 
community. In short, the nature of the relationship between the home state and MNCs in the 
case of China is one of conditioned governed interdependence indicating that the pivotal role 
of the home state implied in the word governed does not hold ground under all circumstances, 
as it is conditioned based on the MNCs importance and structural power leverage at a specific 
time and in a specific setting. In the case of Brazil, it is a relationship of dependence, by MNCs 
on the home state, due to the home state’s control of three of the four pillars of structural power. 
  
Role, attached to MNCs by their home states, as argued in chapter one can take on several 
forms, which are applicable to both Chinese and Brazilian MNCs, and range from:  
national champions – mostly relating to MNCs operating in capital intensive sectors (oil and 
gas, and mining) that internationalised early in the 1990s; market access pioneers – through 
knowledge sharing and thus opening of new pathways; and positive image creators – relating 
to MNCs that perform significant SSDC projects in their operations and thereby contribute to 
the positive image for themselves and the home state.  
 
However, a major difference between China and Brazil lies in both in the pillars of structural 
power and the locus of control between the home state and MNCs, as well as the indicators that 
inform the type of role the home state can impose onto MNCs. In the case of China, the role of 
MNCs in foreign policy depends on five indicators of MNC importance (time of operation, 
sector of operation, ownership structure of MNCs, region of operation, and evens in and around 
region of operation). In the case of Brazil on the other hand, the only indicator that makes a 
difference in the type of role that MNCs play in foreign policy, is the political or economic 
importance of the host state (in which the MNCs operate) for Brazil’s foreign policy objectives.  
 
Lastly, the correlation between the role imposed onto MNCs by their home state and their 
execution of that role, and its effects on the relation between the host state and the home state 
(see figure four), is similar in both cases. As found in this study, even if an MNCs performs 
activities that are in violations of host state law, if that host state is highly dependent on MNCs 
investments and the provision of other benefits that come with FDI (job creation, skill and 
technology transfer); MNCs negative behaviour will not have a permanent negative effect on 
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that host state’s relations with the MNCs’ home state. However, if the MNC performs well and 
contributes to local development (through job creation and skills and technology transfer as 
part of SSDC), thereby creating a positive image of itself, it will render positive effects for the 
MNC (access to more investments and markets) but also arguably for the home state (through 
host state support in international forums). This can be seen in both the case of China and 
Brazil.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
In the context of the delimitations of this study as set out in the first chapter, the following 
proposals for future research are made. The recommendations fall within three key areas: home 
state, sector, region, and focus.  
 
This study focused on two members of the BRICS grouping: China and Brazil. It provides for 
an interesting and valid comparison, but also warrants the necessity to either compare two other 
BRICS members or other developing countries, as representatives of the home state unit of 
analysis. On the first mentioned, as Russia is not a developing country from the South, a valid 
comparison would not be possible. That leaves two other member states, India and South 
Africa. In the case of India, the country’s investment in Africa is also focused on capital-
intensive sectors such as oil and gas and mining; however, increasingly Indian MNCs have 
been investing in Africa’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In addition, similar to China, 
India is also a large development cooperation partner. As the only African member whose 
MNCs are also dominant across the continent, South Africa acts as both a home state and a 
host state for investments of developing countries of the South. This makes for an interesting 
comparative study on state-MNC relations in the developing world. However, as mentioned, 
other developing states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico; with differing political and 
institutional backgrounds and significant MNCs present in the countries of the South can be 
used in future research. Turkey already has extensive operations in East Africa (particularly 
Tanzania) and compared with Indonesia or South Africa, whose MNCs operate across the 
continent in various sectors, would prove an interesting comparison.   
 
Recommendations for future research on particular sectors is based on changes in the 
investment climate. For example, China’s initial investment interest in Africa was driven by 
the need for resources to facilitate its domestic growth. It changed to include other sectors of 
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importance such as agriculture, telecommunications, manufacturing and most importantly 
infrastructure development. I anticipate that research findings will be different across sectors 
as the motivations for MNCs investment will differ based on either MNCs intrinsic needs or 
home state needs.  
 
Another key area of recommendation is the region of operations. While this study focused on 
China and Brazil’s relations to MNCs and their foreign policy towards African states, it only 
looked at host states representative of the third-tier category of importance of foreign policy. It 
is anticipated that by looking at the second (for example Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and first tier (regional hegemons such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana) that 
the home state-MNC relations towards those category host states will differ. Lastly, while this 
study only focussed on China and Brazil in Africa, other developing countries of the South can 
provide valuable contributions to home state-MNC relations in FP, such as Argentina and 
Bolivia. It is apparent here how important context is when analysing state-MNC relations.  
 
The final key area of recommendation is the focus of the study. While this study looked at the 
behaviour of Chinese and Brazilian MNCs in the site of research, Zambia; it did not go into 
detail about all operational features of these MNCs. Since this was not an ethnographic study, 
in which social and environmental impacts of the MNCs operations were the focus, they were 
not covered in depth. These topics are however not discarded as important for future research. 
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5. Key Informant E, Head of Policy and Partnerships (DCD level), UNDP China, Beijing, 
China, 08 March 2016 
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University, Beijing, China, 11 March 2016 
7. Key Informant G, Associate Professor at the College of Humanities and Development 
Studies (COHD)/Research Centre for International Development (RCID) at China 
Agricultural University, Beijing, China, 14 March 2016 
8. Key Informant H, Research Assistant at the Centre for Chinese Studies (2013), 
Stellenbosch University, South Africa, 15 March 2016 
9. Key Informant I, Secretary-general of Charhar Institute (Non-governmental think tank 
on diplomacy and international relations)/Deputy editorial director of Public 
Diplomacy Quarterly of the CPPCC Foreign Affairs Committee, Beijing, China, 16 
March 2016 
10. Key Informant J, Post-doctor Researcher, Department of History at Peking University 
(did his PhD on Zambia), Beijing, China, 16 March 2016 
11. Key Informant K, Executive Director: International business at Brand South Africa 
Beijing Office (China World Tower), Beijing, China, 17 March 2016 
12. Key Informant L, Business Advisor at Africa at Work and Brand SA, Beijing Office 
(China World Tower), Beijing, China 17 March 2016 
13. Key Informant M, Associate Professor Centre for China's Overseas Interests Studies, 
School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies 
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University/Guest Professor Department of Chinese Studies, Azhar University, Cairo, 
Egypt (email interview), 02 April 2016 
14. Key Informant N, Business Development Specialist, Zambia Development Agency, 
Lusaka, Zambia, 24 May 2016 
15. Key Informant O, Head of Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, 
University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia, 24 May 2016 
16. Key Informant P, Research Fellow/Lecturer at Economic and Business Research 
Programme, Institute of Economic and Social Research, University of Zambia, Lusaka, 
Zambia, 24 May 2016 
17. Key Informant Q, President of Association for Asian Studies in Africa/Professor of 
History, School of Education, University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2016 
18. Key Informant R, Professor at Political Science Department, St Andrews University 
(Scotland), Stellenbosch, South Africa, August 2016  
19. Key Informant S, Professor at Political Science Department, Stellenbosch University, 
South Africa, September 2017.  
 
Elite Interviews 
1. Elite Interview A, Chairman of the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects 
(FINEP) under the Ministry of Science and Technology/Professor of Political 
Science at PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 08 July 2015 
2. Elite Interview B, Coordinator of Studies in International Governance and 
Institutions, Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Strategic Affairs 
Secretariat of the Presidency, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 13 July 2015 
3. Elite Interview C, External Affairs, Vale Headquarters, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 25 
July 2015 (skype interview) 
4. Elite Interview D, External Affairs General Manager, Vale Headquarters, 25 July 
2015 (skype interview) 
5. Elite Interview E, Africa Scholar at China Institute of International Studies/Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, China, 09 March 2016 
6. Elite Interview F, Africa Scholar from the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations/ Ministry of State Security, Beijing, China, 10 March 2016 
7. Elite Interview G, Professor of International Relations/Chairman of Academic 
Committee of the School of International Studies/Director of the Centre on 
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American Studies at Renmin University/Counsellor of the State Council of China, 
Beijing, China, 14 March 2016 
8. Elite Interview H, Professor and Director of African Studies at Institute of West-
Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Think 
tank of the PRC State Council, Beijing, China, 15 March 2016 
9. Elite Interview I, former Vale Country Manager Base Metals in Zambia, LinkedIn 
correspondence, 1 and 3 June 2016 
10. Elite Interview J, METOREX Public Affairs Manager, (Email interview – 
questionnaire), May 2016 
11. Elite Interview K, Brazilian Ambassador to Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia, 26 May 
2016 
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Appendix one: Differences and similarities between NSC and SSC 
 NSC SSC 
Nature and purpose of 
support 
 
Philosophical perspective 
 
Participants 
 
 
Level of development 
 
 
Role of participants 
 
 
Conditionality 
 
 
 
Flexibility 
 
 
 
Priority sectors 
 
 
 
Adherence to global 
governance frameworks 
like Paris Declaration 
 
 
 
Data, monitoring and 
evaluation 
• ODA. Stated to be altruistic 
in nature  
 
• Framework approach 
 
• At least one participant has 
very high per capita income 
 
• Large difference in stages of 
economic development between 
donor and recipient 
• Donor and recipient of ODA 
 
 
• ‘Top-down’ with policy 
conditionality and no predictability 
 
 
• Multi-layered time-
consuming bureaucratic structures, 
hence added transaction costs 
 
• Grant assistance and budget 
support for social sectors 
 
 
• Donors use guidelines of 
Paris Declaration, which they evolved 
as an instrument for effectiveness 
 
 
 
• Peer-reviewed by DAC-
OECD. Data compiled and 
periodically released by the national 
governments and DAC-OECD. 
• Mutual benefit and growth 
 
 
• Ingredients approach 
 
• Both partners may have very 
low per capita income 
 
• Both partners almost at same 
stage of economic development 
 
• Relationship of equality: 
both may contribute to the process  
 
• Request-driven and 
generally free from conditionality of 
any kind, so largely within timelines 
 
• Highly decentralised and 
relatively fast with few implications 
for transaction costs 
 
• Economic and technical 
cooperation largely confined to 
project in infrastructure and 
productive sector investment 
• Providers are out of the 
purview of any global arrangement 
such as Paris Declaration, in which 
they were not involved. Hinges on 
Mutual trust of partner countries 
 
• No monitoring mechanisms 
beyond occasional reports of data and 
anecdotal detail 
Source: Chaturvedi, 2012:24 
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Shorter version 
Western donors Southern development cooperation partners 
 Charity191 
 Moral obligation to the unfortunate 
 Expertise based on superior knowledge, 
institutions, science and technology 
 Sympathy for different and distant 
others 
 The virtue of suspended obligation, a 
lack of reciprocation 
 Opportunity 
 Solidarity with other Third World countries 
 Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing 
development in poor-country circumstances 
 Empathy based on a shared identity and 
experience 
 The virtue of mutual benefit and recognition of 
reciprocity  
 Source: direct quote from Mawdsley, 2012: 153 
  
                                                          
191 This can include poverty reduction programs (UK uses this principle), as well as fighting hunger (Germany’s 
approach), depending on which government one asks.  
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Appendix two: List of Respondents and Organisations  
Primary Data 
Brazil 
Key informants BRICS Policy Centre; 
Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI-PUC);  
Institute for Social and Political Studies (IESP-UERJ) at the State 
University of Rio de Janeiro; 
Gestão de Interesse Público (GIP) (Institute for Public Interest 
Management); 
Development Initiatives (DI) 
Scholar of international relations (not Chinese and Brazilian): St 
Andrews University 
 
Elite Interviews  Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos/Funding Authority for Studies 
and Projects (FINEP), an organization of the Brazilian federal 
government under the Ministry of Science of Technology; 
Professor of Political Science at PUC Rio; 
Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a government 
think-tank for technical support with regard to public policies 
(fiscal, social, economic); 
Two Vale HQ Representatives;  
China 
Key Informants Former Colleague from Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) 
(Stellenbosch University), also representative of China Non-
ferrous Metal Mining Corporation (CNMC) 
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA); 
The Charhar Institute, a non-governmental think tank on China’s 
foreign policy and international relations 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) China; 
Centre for African Studies of Peking University; 
College of Humanities and Development Studies 
(COHD)/Research Centre for International Development (RCID) 
at China Agricultural University; 
Centre for China's Overseas Interests Studies, School of 
International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International 
Studies University; 
Chinese scholars that used to live and work in Africa (Zambia 
predominantly):  
Businessmen and analysts from Africa at Work and Brand SA 
Beijing; 
Scholar of international relations (not Chinese and Brazilian): St 
Andrews University 
Elite Interviews Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), affiliated to the 
PRC’s State Council; 
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a think tank of 
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs;  
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
affiliated to the Ministry of State Security; 
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Counsellor of the State Council; 
Zambia  
Key Informants Zambia Development Agency (ZDA); 
University of Zambia, Department of Geography and 
Environment Studies; 
University of Zambia, Department of History; 
University of Zambia, Economic and Business Research 
Programme, Institute of Economic and Social Research 
Elite Interviews  Metorex Representative; 
Vale; 
High – ranking Brazilian Embassy Official 
Secondary Data (published works) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP); World Bank; The South Centre; South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA); Africa Institute of South Africa; MOFCOM; Busan 
Proceedings;  
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Appendix three: Ethical Clearance from Research Ethics Committee (Humanoria) 
Stellenbosch University  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 289 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 290 
 
Appendix four: Stages of industrialisation, state involvement, and home-grown MNCs in 
emerging economies: Generalised patterns and characteristics  
  C)State involvement  
A) Growth stages B) Internal forces 
for outward push 
i) Growth  ii) Overseas 
business  
D) Types of home 
MNEs’ activity 
by motive 
 Tier I: Labour-
driven (textiles, 
sundries, & 
assembling)  
Labour shortages 
& rising wages 
(towards the end of 
tier-I-stage) 
High, direct Low, indirect Labour-seeking 
Export-
substituting 
 Tier II: Scale-
driven, 
capital/resources-
intensive (metals, 
chemicals) 
Needs for 
resources Space & 
environmental 
constraints 
 
 
High, direct 
Resources-
seeking Space-
seeking 
 Tier III: 
Assembly-
driven, parts-
intensive 
(automobiles) 
Needs for 
technology, 
brands, & export 
markets 
 
 
Medium, indirect 
Market-seeking 
Brands-seeking 
Protection-
seeking 
 Tier IV: R&D-
driven, high-tech 
(computers and 
pharmaceuticals)  
Needs for 
technology & 
brands 
High, indirect Low, indirect Knowledge-
seeking Brands-
seeking 
 Tier V: IT-
enabled, 
telecom/Internet-
driven 
Needs for latest 
technology 
High, direct Low, indirect Alliance-seeking 
Source: Ozawa, 2014.  
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Appendix five: Organisational structure of CNMC 
 
Source: CNMC, 2011 
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Appendix six: Ownership structure of Metorex  
 
 
 
Source: Jinchuan, 2016 
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Appendix seven: Questionnaire sent out to Metorex  
 
Do Chinese mining multinational corporations (MNCs) engage in development 
cooperation (skills and technology transfer, and innovation) activities on ground? 
No     Yes (If yes, what type of activities)  
 
Are Chinese mining companies mandated to do this by their home state?  
No     Yes (if yes, in what way)  
 
Do Chinese mining companies have influence on China’s foreign policy towards Zambia? 
No     Yes (if yes, in which way) 
 
If a Chinese mining company should get into legal trouble with the Zambian state, will the 
Chinese state protect it? 
No   Yes (if yes, to what extent and what are the repercussions) 
 
Does China’s international image depend on Chinese MNC behaviour in a host state 
(Zambia)?  
No     Yes (if yes, in what way)  
 
Why do Chinese mining companies decide to invest in the Copperbelt? 
Profit    Government decision (if this, why)   Other 
 
Open-ended Question: Can you tell me what specific development cooperation 
programmes Metorex does on ground in Zambia? Do you provide scholarships to students 
to go to China for further education for instance? 
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Appendix eight: Collum Coal Mine timeline  
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Appendix nine: Brazil -  Africa South-South Development Cooperation projects  
ProSavana – Mozambique 
Although in its early stages, the Program of Triangular Co-operation for Agricultural 
Development of the Tropical Savannahs of Mozambique, known as the ProSavana Project is 
probably the most well-known Brazilian development cooperation project in Africa. It is a 
trilateral partnership with Japan and Mozambique, which aims at transplanting Brazilian 
technology and expertise (EMBRAPA and the FGV) to foster agricultural development in the 
Nacala Corridor in Northern Mozambique. The idea for this project stems from the 1970s 
cooperation venture with Japan that sought to transform the unproductive tropical savannah 
eco-region of central Brazil, Cerrado, into the country’s grain basket (Alves, 2013b). 
Accounting for a full 21% of Brazil’s landmass, the Cerrado, is after the Amazonian rainforest 
the second largest habitat area in Brazil, stretching even into neighbouring Bolivia and 
Paraguay (Conservation International, 2011).  
 
Similar to Cerrado, the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, covering a land mass of roughly 10 
million hectares stretching over 3 provinces (Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia), the Nacala 
Corridor is home to over 4 million people, most of which are farmers. The project is based on 
three pillars: “strengthening Mozambican agricultural scientific research; formulating an 
integrated master plan for agriculture development; and consolidating technology transfer and 
rural extension based on the concept of family farming” (Alves, 2013a:3).  
 
The ProSavana project, with a timeline of 10-20 years aims to improve food security in the 
region and foster competitiveness of the rural sector by increasing productivity and generating 
surpluses for export (Alves, 2013a). The project was agreed upon in 2010, and is currently 
undergoing the final stages of negotiation, with approval pending until end of 2015 (Sanchez, 
2015). While the abovementioned aims of the project are seemingly good, the project has so 
far only been met with criticism, ranging from allegations of land-grabbing to lack of 
transparency, public consultation and public participation in establishing the terms of the 
project (GRAIN, 2015; Sanchez, 2015). Despite the negative attention it has been getting, the 
project still serves as a constant reminder of Brazilian efforts to assist African partner countries 
with their development.  
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Cotton 4 – Western Africa 
Based on Brazil’s cotton sector revolution of the 1990s, the Cotton 4 project aims to replicate 
and develop the productivity and quality of cotton production in Mali, Benin, Chad and Burkina 
Faso. The project is executed by the Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) 
and has involved the establishment of an agriculture research centre and a demonstration centre 
based in Mali, where a number of seeds are tested and adapted to suit local conditions. The 
project is now in its second phase that started in 2014, and now includes Togo. The first phase 
included the above-mentioned establishment of a research and demonstration centre in Mali 
and the establishment of  
“an office complex; an entomology lab to raise natural enemies of major cotton 
plant pests in the area; a cold chamber to store genetic resources; a shed to process 
samples, and space for a power generator. Furthermore, soil and biotechnology 
laboratories were revitalized. The project has also enabled the training of human 
resources and adaptation of several Brazilian technologies ranging from seeds to 
techniques to improve production systems such as no-till farming and integrated 
pest management” (EMBRAPA, 2015). 
 
In addition to this project, EMBRAPA has been involved in smaller agriculture projects, such 
as cocoa cultivation in Cameroon and the Republic of Congo, rice in Senegal, and biofuels in 
Ghana, Sudan, Senegal and Nigeria, as well as in Angola and Mozambique with the assistance 
on Odebrecht and Petrobras (Alves, 2013a).  
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Appendix ten: Key players, financial and administrative flows of scientific and technical 
cooperation 
 
Source: Vaz and Inoue, 2007:8 
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